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ABSTRACT 
Our ways of thinking modernism and its legacy are imprinted with the pattern of an 
opposition, a struggle between two sets of extremes: objective and subjective; form 
and feeling; mechanistic and organic; mind and body; knowing and being; self and 
world; aesthetic and historical. The three writers whose work I explore in this thesis 
challenge prevailing notions of this oppositional discourse. Entering the scene of 
modernism late in its history, Elizabeth Bowen, Eudora Welty and Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty develop a new kind of vision that makes us rethink the relationships between 
perceiver and perceived, between mind, body and world. All three writers undertake a 
fundamental reorganisation of the relationships between internal consciousness and 
external things through the narration of a perception that is outside the limits of 
discrete sensations or causal relationships. Physical things are neither pure objecthood 
nor merely external triggers for the ramblings of a solipsistic consciousness, rather 
they infringe on a consciousness whose own edges are indistinct. This writing 
establishes an interdependent and interlocutory relationship between subject and 
world, which become not opposite ends of a perceptual scale, but aspects of a common 
flesh. The intimate connection to the world is both comforting and threatening, both 
reinforcing subjectivity and de-centring it. 
The re-ordering of the connections between self and world leads to a reassessment of 
collective identity and historical agency, as well as impacting upon approaches to 
modes of representation. In trying to express the pre-linguistic experience of embodied 
consciousness, this writing looks to models of mute expression found in visual images. 
Exploring how the invisible aspects of experience emerge within the visible realm, the 
writing takes on an often hallucinatory or uncanny character. Charting the passage 
from being to doing, from perception to creation, from the style of the flesh to the style 
of fiction, Merleau-Ponty, Welty and Bowen dissolve received boundaries and 
distinctions at every level. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I am starting with something strange, something that emerges in the writing of the 
three authors in this study: Elizabeth Bowen, Eudora Welty and Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty. All three, within various forms, seek to articulate the ways we install ourselves 
in the world, undertake a passage from experience to expression. Bowen and Welty are 
fiction writers who look to the domestic sphere, to the scale of everyday lives, to the 
things that go on inside houses. One might say, however, that these houses are always 
haunted. In the midst of the writing there is something kicking to get out, some 
presence that refuses to lie quietly within the limits of genteel domestic fiction. But if 
we might think of this presence as a ghost, it must be a ghost with a body; the strange 
something in the writing is an enigmatic combination of the psychological and the 
corporeal. This bodily element makes the strange presence known to us; known but not 
necessarily understood; known somatically, through a sympathetic contraction of 
sinews, a responsive tingling of nerves. 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is directed towards an explication of precisely this strange 
something, this interaction of the visible and the invisible. Edward Said suggests that 
Merleau-Ponty's thought is best understood not as a way of uncovering 
new truths about man but as a way of intensifying participation in 
human experience. One does not read his work to discover what one 
had not known before. Instead, one is readmitted from distraction to 
one's own experience, as is the case when one reads Proust. ' 
This "readmittance to one's own experience", the sense of an "intensified participation 
in human experience" infuses that experience with a sense of the uncanny; through 
Bowen and Welty's fiction and Merleau-Ponty's notion of the "flesh", experience is 
both made strange and made more familiar. The term "flesh" describes an experience 
that we feel we recognize and yet, as a description, tests the limits of our compliance. 
The flesh is "a general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the 
1 Edward Said, `Labyrinth of Incarnations: The Essays of Maurice Merleau-Ponty', Reflections on Exile 
(London: Granta, 2001), pp. 1-14 (pp. 5-6). 
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idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a 
fragment of being" (VI, 139). It is the meeting point between the manifest and the 
latent, between object and subject, between the visible and the invisible. It provides a 
means for talking about a space that all three of these writers attempt to occupy and to 
interrogate: a middle space between the poles of the material and the intangible, 
between objectivism and subjectivism. At the centre of this interrogation is the 
question of what this space might do to or for representation. 
This strange space has a critical genealogy in discussions about modernism, more 
often than not as the missing centre of a pervasively polarized way of thinking. In his 
account of modernism, T. J. Clark describes the movement as "a desperate, marvellous 
shuttling between a fantasy of cold artifice and an answering one of immediacy and 
being-in-the-world". 2 Modernism, for Clark, is characterized precisely by its failure to 
reconcile these twin terms of the inanimate and the human. The necessity of this 
failure is directly questioned by Bowen, who seeks to unite an aesthetics of form and 
of feeling: "On the one hand, a greater romantic irregularity, more carelessness; on the 
other, a greater impersonality - are these impossible to combine? " 
3 
In addition to straddling these aesthetic concerns, this writing takes place at a strange 
cultural moment. Stretching from the twenties to the seventies, it comes late to 
modernism proper. Faced not only with that legacy but also that bestowed by having 
survived two world wars, this is a writing that has retrospection written into it 
ontologically, aesthetically and historically. That is not to say that it is purely 
backwards-looking; rather, this work approaches the idea of inheritance not only as a 
memorializing responsibility to the past, but as an ongoing creative task directed 
towards an open-ended future; "outliving is something we do" (OD, 162). 4 
This future was beginning to construct its own successor to its modernist ancestors in 
the decades through which Merleau-Ponty, Bowen and Welty developed their 
2 T. J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodes frone a History of Modernism (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1999), p. 10. 
3 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living' (n. d. [1948]) [published as `The Forgotten Art of Living' in Contact: 
Good Living 13 (December 1948), pp. xxvi-I], HRHRC, [p. 7]. 
4 My emphasis. 
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reputations. In his study of the arts in the inter-war years, Tyrus Miller evokes a sense 
of what it was to have inherited modernism's future, a future which had failed to live 
up to its revolutionary promise; "the much bleaker future that had come to pass despite 
all avant-garde `renewals'. "5 This notion of bleakness emerges again and again 
through descriptions of these years as well as those following the Second World War. 
Bowen, as we will see later, describes the years following both wars as "an empty 
landscape", a "vacuum", 6 a world threatened by "mechanical uniformity". ' T. J. Clark 
echoes these sentiments, describing "the `modernity' which modernism prophesied"8 
as a "blankness", which is characterized by a "great emptying and sanitizing of the 
imagination", and the sense that "meaning is in short supply". 9 Considering the 
intellectual moment in which Merleau-Ponty's work appeared, M. C. Dillon evokes a 
similar sense of creative and ethical paralysis. 
Lacking the absolute ground of divine revelation, finite minds could not 
be bound to consensus. Heidegger left us with a lonely poet listening at 
the brink of madness to a silence not yet broken by the directing word 
of gods to come. And his politically oriented followers groped in the 
sacristy of humanism for values to guide us through times when the 
superabundance of human bodies threatens the welfare of each one of 
them. 10 
In the face of this emptiness, all three of my writers look towards precisely that 
"suberabundance of human bodies" both as a creative source and as the site for a 
potential solution to the threatened loss of meaning and imagination that troubled their 
5 Tyrus Miller, Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction and the Arts between the World Wars (Berkley & 
London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 3. 
6 Bowen, `A Year I Remember - 1918' (1949), [Transcript for a radio play, broadcast 10 March 1949. 
Unpublished], HRHRC, p. 18. 
7 Bowen, `Subject and the Time' (1953) [published in Proceedings, Second Series, Number 4: American 
Academy of Arts and Letters (New York: National Institute of Arts and Letters with the Evangeline 
Wiblour Blashfield Foundation, 1954), pp. 22-28], HRHRC, p. 4. 
Clark, p. 2. 
Clark, p. 7. 
lo M. C. Dillon, `Preface: Merleau-Ponty and Postmodernity' in Merleau-Ponty Vivant, ed. M. C. Dillon 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. ix-xxxv (p. x). 
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historical moment. Narrating both the intensity of perceptual experience and the power 
of intersubjective relationships, Merleau-Ponty, Welty and Bowen turn to the 
contingency of the body and its material world in order to explore less tangible ideas. 
Using creative and imaginative means, they use a return to things themselves, an 
examination of what is given within experience, of what is personal and particular as a 
means of approaching questions of meaning. 
Making reality real is art's responsibility. It is a practical assignment, 
then, a self-assignment: to achieve, by a cultivated sensitivity for 
observing life, a capacity for receiving its impressions, a lonely, 
unremitting, unaided, unaidable vision, and transferring this vision 
without distortion to it onto the pages of a novel, where, if the reader is 
so persuaded, it will turn into the reader's illusion-" 
This intertwining of the notions that reality is both there to be observed, explained and 
also "made real" through "illusion", reflects a wider discussion about the roles of the 
interpretative and the inventive impulses in relation to modernism and postmodernism. 
Jean-Francois Lyotard distinguishes the modern from the postmodern through a focus 
on how each approaches what he calls the "unpresentable"; a notion that might be 
compared to the "something strange" that I have already identified. The modem, he 
claims, is that which presents "the fact that the unpresentable exists. To make visible 
that there is something that can be conceived and which can neither be seen nor made 
visible. " 12 By contrast, the postmodern is "that which, in the modern, puts forward the 
unpresentable in presentation itself; [... ] that which searches for new presentations, not 
in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable. The 
postmodern artist or writer is in the position of the philosopher. "13 The modern takes a 
pleasure in the sublime limitations of the representation of human knowledge, 
retaining its form through a representation of the unpresentable as a missing element. 
The postmodern "denies itself the solace of good forms, " developing its own formal 
" Welty, `Place in Fiction' (1956), EYE, pp. 116-133 (p. 128). 
12 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979) (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 78. 
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rules in the process of creation, creating rather than commenting upon the nature of 
reality. 14 
Echoing Lyotard's distinction, Brian McHale identifies differing dominant foci in the 
two phases. Modernism, he claims, is concerned with the epistemological and 
postmodernism with the ontological; there is a development "from problems of 
knowing to problems of modes of being". 15 Miller summarizes the distinction thus: 
Modernist fiction [... ] seeks, despite the confusing webs of psychic, 
perceptual, and social facts, to disclose a coherent, knowable world. 
Postmodernist fiction, in contrast, functions differently. Relinquishing 
the modernist quest to know `the' world, it invents possible worlds. 16 
Although McHale acknowledges the "bidirectional and reversible" intertwining of 
these two tendencies, it is always the case, he suggests, that one takes precedence over 
the other; even as they co-exist, they remain distinctly separate. '? 
Part of what I am suggesting about the work of Merleau-Ponty, Bowen and Welty is 
that it works to dissolve the distinctions, deployed throughout critical discourse about 
modernism and its successors, between disclosure and invention, reality and 
imagination, knowing and being. Alan Wilde, who acknowledges the influence of 
Merleau-Ponty on his explorations of modernist and postmodernist aesthetics, 
identifies just such a dissolution. "Merleau-Ponty's effort to restore or recover the 
being of the world suggests the attempt, ambiguously foreshadowed in late 
modernism, of some postmodernists at least to exchange for the role of the modernist 
spectator, that of the more active participant. " 8 But more than simply exchanging 
13 Lyotard, p. 81. 
14 Lyotard, p. 81. 
15 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 10. 
16 Miller, p. 12. 
'7 McHale, p. 11. 
" Alan Wilde, Horizons of Assent: Modernism, Postmodernism and the Ironic Imagination (Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981), p. 15. 
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disclosure for invention, Merleau-Ponty merges the two through his approach to 
Being: "the world both determines and is determined by consciousness. "19 
Whilst such discussions form an important contextual backdrop for the current study, 
my interests here do not lie with the accommodation of my chosen writers within or 
against the terms of a critical tradition. Rather, I am interested in the ways that the 
work of each illuminates the others; how in setting up a conversation between these 
works, written out of different social, political and geographical contexts at a shared 
historical moment, I may shed light not only on each individual author but also upon 
the cultural landscape across which they are scattered. Welty notes that "reality is no 
single, pure ray, no beacon against the dark. It might be thought of as a cluster of 
lesser lights, visible here on earth like the windows of a village at night, close together 
but not one. 1!, 20 It is just this sense of a loose-knit community, of being "close together 
but not one" that I hope to capture here, investigating not only the in-between spaces 
within the works studied, but the spaces in-between those works; spaces in which there 
can be seen a world emerging. 
ýýý 
For all three of my writers, but most explicitly for Merleau-Ponty, vision is the site at 
which received intellectual polarizations are broken down. Merleau-Ponty develops a 
phenomenological philosophy that is based on perceptual experience. At the centre of 
this is the notion of the embodied subject and of that subject's relation to the world. 
Through the examination of lived experience, he discovers that perceptions are 
inseparable from the things that are perceived and that thoughts, rather than forming 
the basis of our experience, emerge instead from a layer of primordial being. This 
primordial layer is characterized by connectedness; between mind and 
body and 
between self and world - which also, crucially, includes other selves. 
An important 
aspect of this connection emerges in the notion of reversibility, the idea that 
I not only 
touch, but am touched, not only see but am seen; "vision [is] doubled with a 
complementary vision or with another vision: myself seen 
from without, such as 
19 Wilde, p. 29. 
20 Welty, `Reality in Chekhov's Stories' (1977), EYE, pp. 61-81 (p. 63). 
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another would see me, installed in the midst of the visible" (VI, 134). Merleau-Ponty 
describes the acceptance of this integrated, pre-cognitive realm for the ground of 
conceptual life as "the perceptual faith" (VI, 3). This is, however, strictly a faith of 
blood and muscle, of earth and stone, a faith that requires no leap of the imagination or 
suspension of disbelief, but that is self-evident: "We see the things themselves, the 
world is what we see" (VI, 3). 
Merleau-Ponty's focus on the notion of visibility is reflected by Bowen and Welty in 
their own preoccupation with matters of vision. Both describe how they learned their 
first lessons about representation through a visual medium: Welty through her 
photographs of the Great Depression and Bowen through her early training as a 
painter. Their fiction explores how the mute meanings of the perceived world might be 
expressed within language through an indirect mode of representation. Consequently, 
their prose touches the borders of poetry and of pictures. It is contorted into broken 
rhythms - "I'd rather keep the jars, `jingles' and awkwardnesses" claimed Bowen of 
The Heat of the Day21- and allowed to thicken into textured images, like paint; "In my 
sensory education I include my physical awareness of the word" insists Welty (OWB, 
10). In this study, I will trace these crossings between perception and writing through a 
discussion of Welty's photographs and her reasons for abandoning them, and an 
examination of the perceptual intensity of Bowen's writing, and her interest in painting 
as a site for exploring representational issues. 
Coming late to the context of literary modernism, the work of these three writers 
nonetheless coincides with an ascendency in the history of modernist visual aesthetics. 
Spanning the mid-twentieth century from the twenties to the seventies, Merleau-Ponty, 
Welty and Bowen reach the denouement of their own careers at the same moment that 
visual modernism is both definitively formulated and begins to decline. The 1960s saw 
the publication of Clement Greenberg's seminal essay `Modernist Painting', setting a 
standard from which modernist art theory has taken its lead ever since. The same 
decade saw a flurry of opposing responses to Greenberg and his fellow critics' 
pronouncements and the erosion of painting's very foundations with the inception of 
minimalist and conceptualist practices. This crisis point provides an illuminating 
21 Bowen, letter to Daniel George (2 June 1948) [unpublished], HRHRC. 
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perspective from which to look back over modernism's central tensions and is also, I 
will argue, the point at which Welty, Bowen and Merleau-Ponty all achieve their most 
successful negotiations of the space between the visible and the invisible. 
Each of my three writers emerges from a moment infused with conflict and material 
destruction. Written into the ardent attachment to the world of things and to the world 
as seen that is central to this writing is the very real sense, garnered from historical 
experience, that even what is most solid remains terrifyingly contingent. Merleau- 
Ponty recognizes a paradox inherent in the moment of destruction, claiming that we 
see "[exposed], at the moment that life is threatened, the underlying movement 
through which we have installed ourselves in the world" (VI, 104). In this writing, the 
revelatory is always tinged with the threat of terror or dissolution. The understanding 
of presence, of identity takes place through the imagining of their destruction, through 
absence. Thus, Welty's essay on the centrality of `Place in Fiction' cannot resist 
voicing the idea that "[i]t is only too easy to conceive that a bomb that could destroy 
all trace of places as we know them [... ] could also destroy all feelings as we know 
them". 22 Similarly, as Bowen emphasizes the steadying effect of material things, she 
includes the idea of the loss of those things. 
After inside upheavals, it is important to fix on imperturbable things. 
Their imperturbableness, their air that nothing has happened renews our 
guarantee. Pictures would not be hung plumb over the centres of 
fireplaces or wallpapers pasted on with such precision that their seams 
make no break in the pattern if life were really not possible to 
adjudicate for. These things are what we mean when we speak of 
civilization [... ] In this sense, the destruction of buildings and furniture 
is more palpably dreadful to the spirit than the destruction of human life 
(DH, 287-288). 
These interweavings of presence and absence, solidity and contingency install a sense 
of the uncanny at the heart of experience. The question of how one might inhabit such 
22 Welty, `Place in Fiction', pp. 116-133 (pp. 122-123). 
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a historical moment is entwined with the question of how to represent it. In a review of 
Henry Green's 1946 novel, Back, Philip Toynbee identifies a mode of perception 
employed by Green that he finds difficult to define, describing it as "a strange 
hallucinatory angle". Despite this, Toynbee observes, the novel does not depart from a 
representation of reality: "there is nothing fantastic about the book. People talk 
precisely as their prototypes talk in the world we know. " He continues: "the unique 
quality of the writer's vision is beyond all power of description in any terms but his 
own. I can only write that the world looks altogether new through the eyes of this book 
and that this novelty of vision seems to me to be the most important as well as the 
most difficult achievement for the modern novelist. " 23 It is interesting to note 
Toynbee's eagerness to stress the adherence to some kind of realism in the writing. 
This extraordinary vision, it seems, is still a vision of the ordinary world, in which we 
can recognize our own experience. "Hallucination, " Toynbee suggests, may not be a 
departure from reality, but in fact "a new revelation of the real world. "24 This elision of 
the hallucinatory and the real is another example of the occupation of the in-between 
space of modernism. It also emerges in Bowen and Welty's fiction in the form of a 
sense of the more than real, of what Jacqueline Rose describes as being "too 
present. , 25 There is in the writing an exaggeration of the impact of the meeting of 
bodies and things, bodies and bodies. 
In her study of Proust, Julia Kristeva writes, "however much a literary work 
corresponds to the theories or bodies of knowledge that illuminate it, it always goes 
much further in revealing their truths and seducing us with its secret and elusive 
complexity. , 26 I want to state from the start that I certainly don't intend this to be a 
study of how Bowen and Welty rewrite Merleau-Ponty's philosophy in literary form; 
if these writers teach us anything it is that things are never that easy. In yet another 
dissolution of polarities, the creative and the interpretative acts merge; the philosophy 
in question here is just as seductive and elusive and secretive as the fiction. Merleau- 
23 Philip Toynbee, review of Back by Henry Green, in Horizon, 15 (85) (January 1947), 74-75 (p. 75). 
24 Toynbee, 74-75 (p. 75). 
25 Jacqueline Rose, `Bizarre Objects: Mary Butts and Elizabeth Bowen', Critical Quarterly, 42 (1) 
(Spring 2000), 77-85 (p. 79). 
26 Julia Kristeva, Time and Sense: Proust and the Experience of Literature (1994) (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 269. 
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Ponty is a conscious literary stylist, writing at length about artistic idiom and turning to 
Proust in attempting to define the most complicated aspect of his ontology. In fact, he 
explicitly describes philosophy and literature as engaged upon the same project. 
From now on the tasks of literature and philosophy can no longer be 
separated. When one is concerned with giving voice to the experience 
of the world and showing how consciousness escapes into the world, 
one can no longer credit oneself with attaining a perfect transparence of 
expression. Philosophical expression assumes the same ambiguities as 
literary expression. 27 
This ambiguity of expression leaves Merleau-Ponty's writing littered with images and 
metaphors. It seems as though he is trying to mould, to shape the words as if working 
in a plastic, rather than a written medium, as if he feels the need to create his own 
unique means of communication, the one given to him having proved insufficient for 
his needs. "The writer's thought does not control his language from without, " he 
writes, "the writer is himself a new kind of idiom, constructing itself, inventing ways 
of expression, and diversifying itself according to its own meaning" (PRO, 9). 
ýýý 
Bowen and Welty knew each other personally and admired each other as writers. In a 
letter following their first meeting in 1949, Bowen wrote to Charles Ritchie: 
You know my passion for her works. She had apparently drifted over to 
Dublin on her own. She sent me a telegraph from there and I asked her 
to come down and stay .... 
I take to her most immensely and I think you 
would. She's very un-writerish and bien elevee.... I think she's like me 
in preferring places to people; and any unexpected sight or view while 
we are driving about the country makes her start up in the car with a 
smothered cry as though she had been stung by a wasp.... No one would 
pick her out on sight as `an interesting woman'. Actually I think she's a 
27 Merleau-Ponty, `Metaphysics and the Novel', SNS, pp. 26-40 (p. 28). 
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genius rather than an interesting woman, which I am glad of, as I prefer 
the former. 28 
Welty expresses a similar approval of Bowen throughout her writings and interviews, 
confiding, "I learned from her.... She had a marvellous mind, you know"29 and 
claiming her to be "more robust, human and rounded"30 than Virginia Woolf. Her 
letters to Bowen express an almost ardent attachment: "I wish I could hear your 
voice"31; "I wish we had been born related"; 
I miss and will miss and have missed you, but knowing that doesn't 
take away, it adds to. But it's so strange, isn't it, the crisscross of where 
& when we are with all we love & must love - The deepest thing in the 
world I think -I feel it in what you write so. 
All this despite the fact that, as she notes, their relationship was "so countable, 3 times, 
4 times, maybe 5 to meet in our lives. " 32 Given the evident strength of their 
attachment to one another, particularly on the basis of so little time together, and their 
active interest in each other's work, it is surprising that no critic has focussed on the 
relation between the two. The relationship is usually granted only a passing mention in 
any study of either writer, with no in-depth treatment either biographically or through 
a comparison of their writing. 
Welty, the daughter of an insurance company clerk and a schoolteacher, grew up in a 
modest house in Jackson, Mississippi, taking regular trips to her grandparents' 
respective homes on a mountaintop in West Virginia and a farm in southern Ohio. A 
far cry it would seem from Bowen's own childhood spent in a grand ancestral home in 
28 Bowen cited in Victoria Glendinning, Elizabeth Bowen: Portrait of a Writer (London: Phoenix, 
1993), pp. 209-210. 
29 Albert J. Devlin and Peggy Whitman Prenshaw, `A Conversation with Eudora Welty, Jackson 1986', 
Mississippi Quarterly 39 (4), 431-454 (p. 435). 
30 Welty in `An Interview with Eudora Welty' (29 July 1977), Jean Todd Freeman, in CON, pp. 191-221 
(p. 218). 
31 Welty, letter to Bowen (n. d. ) [Addressed from `Ile de France'. Unpublished], HRHRC. 
32 Welty, letter to Bowen (n. d. ) [Addressed from `21 Wellington Square'. Unpublished], HRHRC. 
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County Cork, a smart town house in Dublin and school in England. Despite these 
differences, the two women were both Southerners and Welty claims that Bowen "said 
that wherever she went, in the whole world almost, the Southerners were always 
different from the Northerners. She always felt the congeniality. "33 Welty also draws 
more direct links between the experience of living in Ireland and in her own Southern 
states. She describes the way that the Irish Troubles and the American Civil War 
scarred their respective landscapes. "You still have the physical memories of things 
that happened on your property, in your homeplace. That's one reason why it's so hard 
to forget. , 34 
As the focus on physical environment as a keystone of identity suggests, the turn to the 
phenomenal in Bowen and Welty's writing does not work to dehumanize their 
narratives; it is not simply a case of writing that pays more attention to objects than to 
people. On the contrary, at the centre of their fiction is a fundamental belief in the 
importance of human relationships. Maud Eilmann identifies an ethical 
"[r]esponsibility for the other" in Bowen's work, and claims that if Bowen's characters 
"discover anything, it is that they cannot live without company". 35 Eudora Welty 
describes her own "continuing passion" as a writer "to part a curtain, that invisible 
shadow that falls between people, the veil of indifference to each other's presence, 
each other's wonder, each other's human plight" (OTOP, 8). The focus on 
"imperturbable things" is not opposed to their concern for human drama, but an 
important part of it; it is by looking at these things in a particular way that the inhuman 
and the human, the object and the subject of perception, overlap. 
It is this simultaneous belonging to the realm of subject and object that provides an 
access to the world as something shared. The presence of bodies in this writing brings 
us back to a history on which modernism sometimes seems in danger of losing its grip. 
We get the sense that this history, fraught with conflict, anxiety and destruction as it 
was for both Bowen and Welty, can only be accessed obliquely, through the body. 
33 Devlin and Prenshaw, 431-454 (p. 433). 
34 Devlin and Prenshaw, 431-454 (p. 448). 
35 Maud Ellmann, Elizabeth Bowen: The Shadow Across the Page (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2003), p. 20. 
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Both women explore the constellations, of people and of things, in which we place 
ourselves in order to understand the nature of our present being. 
Paradoxically though, this understanding of presence contains an absence at its heart. 
The strange relation between the being there and the not being there, the visible and 
the invisible is captured by Bowen in a passage from her wartime novel, The Heat of 
the Day. She writes, 
the dead, from mortuaries, from under cataracts of rubble, made their 
anonymous presence - not as today's dead but as yesterday's living - felt 
through London. Uncounted, they continued to move in shoals through the city 
day, pervading everything to be seen or heard or felt with their tom-off senses, 
drawing on this tomorrow they had expected - for death cannot be so sudden as 
all that. Absent from the routine which had been life, they stamped upon that 
routine their absence (HD, 86). 
The realities of war are not reached through direct articulation, but through the 
inarticulate experience of the body; the dead make their presence felt through things 
perceived. This articulate experience of the body is often countered by a failure of 
other types of communication. Characters are at once alienated from each other, 
misunderstood by each other and tightly connected, bound up by the bonds of a silent 
and sensuous commonality. Through a mute experience of the other we are brought 
back to our own experience of ourselves; there is a realization of the shared nature of 
what we perceive, of our existence in the world, of our `routine', even if it is a routine 
that is constantly threatened. It is this connection between the thought and the sensed, 
between ideas and things that Merleau-Ponty describes as the "most difficult aspect" 
of his ontology and that provides the main point of contact between his philosophy and 
Bowen and Welty's fiction. 
For Merleau-Ponty, while we may be certain that we perceive the world, that what is 
given to us as surface within perception is there before us, there is also a mysterious 
depth to the world; "For us the essential is to know precisely what the being of the 
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world means" (VI, 6). 36 Through its explorations of the connection between the 
manifest existence of the world and its latent meaning, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy 
undertakes an engagement with aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis. While it is clear 
that he reconfigures some of the central structures of these theories, he remains 
sympathetic to Freud's ideas and makes use of key psychoanalytic terms. In the 
preface to Phenomenology of Perception, Freud is named as an adherent to the 
"manner or style of thinking" that phenomenology describes (POP, viii). In a later 
work, Merleau-Ponty goes further, claiming: 
Freudian thought [... ] confirms phenomenology in its description of a 
consciousness that is not so much knowledge or representation as 
investment; it brings to phenomenology a wealth of concrete examples 
that add weight to what it has been able to say in general of the relations 
of man with the world and of the interhuman bond (PSY, 67). 
I am interested here in what Merleau-Ponty's reading of psychoanalysis tells us about 
his theories of consciousness or unconsciousness, rather than in what it might or might 
not reveal about Freud. He takes Freudian ideas and places them in the context of his 
own embodied model of subjectivity, interpreting the psychologized and symptomatic 
body in terms of his own notion of flesh that encompasses the realm beyond that body. 
He is particularly interested in Freud's development of a means of reading in the 
material sign an invisible and shifting essence, that recognizes the subtlety and 
complexity of symbolic relations. It is this "aiming toward the same latency, " 
Merleau-Ponty tells us, that is the key connection between Freud's project and his own 
(PSY, 71). Merleau-Ponty, however, transplants this latency from the depths of the 
mind to the quivering surface of things, to the visibility of the world; "perception is 
unconsciousness" he proclaims (VI, 189). Through this bringing into the light that 
which was once hidden, Merleau-Ponty gives flesh to the uncanny. He takes the 
experiences that Freud designates as uncanny - telepathy, narcissism, doubleness, 
revelation - and installs them in the perceptual world. He places them not 
just in the 
realm of the imagined or the literary but in the realm of the real, the material, the flesh. 
36 My emphasis. 
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Maud Elfmann comments: "In a paranoid exaggeration of Merleau-Ponty's theory that 
the world reciprocates the gaze of the spectator, Bowen's objects scrutinize their own 
beholders, usually with an evil eye. , 37 The meeting of the realms of object and 
consciousness is characteristic of this work. The mute, material world becomes the site 
for the expression of the most hidden parts of experience, for its unconscious. Bowen, 
Welty and Merleau-Ponty reunite the antagonism, seen in so many accounts of 
modernism, between things seen and solipsistic consciousness, between the 
impersonality of form and the spirit of human subjectivity. These writers push 
representation to its limits, testing for ways to express latency whilst still preserving 
the latent-ness of it. Merleau-Ponty, in his final work, moves towards an expression of 
this relation, "the bond between the flesh and the idea, between the visible and the 
interior armature which it manifests and which it conceals" (VI, 149). It is the question 
of this bond that forms "the most difficult point" of his ontology; it is also, I will 
argue, what animates the strangeness at the heart of Bowen and Welty's fiction. 
37 Eilmann, p. 6 
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CHAPTER ONE 
"The paradox of expression": Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy 
We touch here the most difficult point, that is, the bond between the flesh and 
the idea, between the visible and the interior armature which it manifests and 
which it conceals. 
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 
24 
In a lecture delivered in 1951, Merleau-Ponty reflects on the developments in 
philosophical notions of subjectivity seen by the twentieth century thus far. 
Acknowledging the impossibility of any kind of comprehensive approach to the task, 
he nonetheless identifies a recognizable "transformation in our understanding of man" 
which is not available through a systematized survey but obliquely perceived in the 
cultural products of the period. It is felt in the texture of that historical experience, 
"sedimented in us. It is our substance; we have a lively total feeling for it when we 
look back to the writings or the facts of the beginning of the century" (MA, 92). This 
transformed conception connects even the most disparate of practitioners; the texture 
of modernity is engrained in their productions. "We men who have lived as our 
problem the development of communism and the War, and who have read Gide and 
Valery and Proust and Husserl and Heidegger and Freud are the same" (MA, 92). 
What these men have conspired to produce in common, Merleau-Ponty ventures to 
suggest, is a dissolution of the absolute, dichotomized notions of the preceding era. 
T. J. Clark's polarization, discussed in my introduction, of modernism's fantasies "of 
cold artifice" and "being-in-the-world" emerges here as an opposition between the 
antithetical doctrines of idealism and materialism. What Merleau-Ponty identifies as 
emerging in the space between these dissolving dichotomies is the recognition of 
contingency. From the no-man's land revealed by the dismantling of cosmically-scaled 
opposites comes a philosophy that is characterized by ambiguity and chance; 
contingency takes the place of certainty as an ethics of understanding. The totalitarian 
extremes of Fascism, Merleau-Ponty claims, can be read as a direct reaction against 
precisely this contingency. The fear of it is also evident "even in the doctrines which 
helped reveal it"(MA, 110); namely in a Marxism that has forgotten how to fully 
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believe in the potential of its own transformative foundations. "The discussions of our 
time are so convulsive only because it is resisting a truth which is at hand, and because 
in recognizing - without any intervening veil - the menace of adversity, it is closer 
perhaps than any other to recognizing the metamorphoses of Fortune" (MA, 111). 
Merleau-Ponty, like others on the intellectual French Left in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, felt dissatisfied with the abstractions of the philosophical tradition 
in which he had been educated himself, feeling a need for a reflective method that 
could effectively approach historical reality. Within the pervasive Western philosophy 
of instrumental reason Merleau-Ponty saw a dangerous and increasing disparity 
between philosophical thought and lived experience. From the position of a post- 
World War Two Europe, already dismembered by conflict, perched between the twin 
enemies of Soviet Russia and Capitalist America, the need to find an effective 
philosophical discourse gained startling immediacy. The phenomenological method, 
with its rallying cry for a return to `things themselves' inherited from Husserl, 
provided a way to regain contact with an experience outside the distortions of concepts 
or ideologies. Surveying the political landscape of 1947 in Humanism and Terror, 
Merleau-Ponty warns against the dangers of an unchecked faith in the principles a 
society claims for itself: "The purity of principles not only tolerates but even requires 
violence", he claims (HT, xiii). And further: "To understand and judge a society, one 
has to penetrate its basic structure to the human bond upon which it is built; this 
undoubtedly depends upon legal relations, but also upon forms of [labour], ways of 
loving, living and dying [... ] [A] regime which is nominally liberal can be oppressive 
in reality" (HT, xiv-xv). 
These words, written just after the Second World War, bring to mind Freud's fear, 
expressed in the aftermath of the First, that "the common bonds" of community had 
been cut, not to be repaired for many years to come. 
' To return to a paradox that I 
noted in my introduction, revelation occurs at the moment of threat. This is true not 
only of these wounded human bonds, but also their physical context; amidst the ruins 
Sigmund Freud, `Thoughts for the Times on War and Death' (1915), On the History of the Psycho- 
Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works, SE XIV (1914-1916), trans. and ed. 
James Strachey, (London: Hogarth Press, 1995), pp. 273-300 (p. 279). 
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of post-war Europe, the abundance of dead and damaged bodies, Merleau-Ponty turns 
to material things and the body as a source of knowledge. Equally, at a moment when 
faith in transcendence and trust in absolute forms of knowledge were being eroded on 
all sides, he makes recourse to a different kind of faith altogether. Before anything 
else, he reminds us, we know our own bodies; we are sure of the body's existence and 
of its relation to the world. This "facticity" takes the place of any supernatural or 
idealist transcendence, working to reorganize the Cartesian cogito (POP, vii). 
Merleau-Ponty explains, "it is not the `I am' which is pre-eminently contained in the `I 
think, ' not my existence which is brought down to the consciousness which I have of 
it, but conversely the `I think, ' which is re-integrated into the transcending process of 
the `I am', and consciousness into existence" (POP, 446). This primacy of the 
existential over the intellectual is expressed in the "perceptual faith": "We see the 
things themselves, the world is what we see" (VI, 3). It is not thought or its 
corresponding doubt, but physical being, that "unjustifiable certitude" which Merleau- 
Ponty identifies as "the seat of truth within us" (VI, 11). 
Here still, however, the problem of some disparity, of thought's unavoidable escape 
from experience, rears its head. Despite the carnal certitude that Merleau-Ponty 
describes, difficulties occur when one begins to ask how or why that certitude exists, 
when one tries to express this fundamental, primary knowledge, to transform pre- 
linguistic faith into rational words. "[W]hat is strange about this faith is that if we seek 
to articulate it into theses or statements, if we ask ourselves what is this we, what 
seeing is, and what thing or world is, we enter into a labyrinth of difficulties and 
contradictions" (VI, 3). From Merleau-Ponty's early work on perception in which he 
rejects causal theories of sensation, to his later development of an ontology of "flesh" 
which envisions a chiasmic meeting of thought and thing, his philosophy is in search 
of a coincidence of being and knowing. Presence here is both retrospective, predicated 
on an always/already existent foundation, and constantly deferred, leaving subjectivity 
Tantalus-like in front of its ever-retreating shadow. His work explores the possibility 
of a reflective embodied subjectivity that is able simultaneously to think and be fully, 
physically present in the world, to be both flesh and idea. 
As this suggests, language - what can be expressed in it and what remains always 
outside it - plays a central role in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. His solution to the 
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potential blind alley it posits is to go beyond the crude positivism of direct "theses or 
statements" and to look to more creative and oblique forms of expression. Thus he 
turns to novelists and, centrally, painters as paradigms of his philosophical ideas, as 
the most effective communicators of mute perceptual experience. His own writing also 
takes on an increasingly dense and ambiguous style. In his Preface to the Themes 
, 
from 
the Lectures, John O'Neill describes Merleau-Ponty's approach to writing. He claims, 
whether in lecturing or in writing, Merleau-Ponty never used language 
as a mere tool or index of his thought. He rejected the logical stripping 
of language, not because he was heedless of clarity, but because logic 
leads to the construction of a world from which man is absent and, with 
him, the consequences of time, that is, of magic, myth and poetry. 2 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological impulse, his desire for a philosophy that can 
describe the realities of historical being, does not result in an instrumentalized, 
dissecting writing. Rather, he produces a prose that is filled with ambiguities, 
reflecting both the content of his ontology and his attitude to philosophical 
interrogation. For his phenomenology, Being is not pure surface, but is infused with 
depth, shadow, invisibility. Correspondingly, Merleau-Ponty's prose, whilst it may 
invite the presence of man, myth and poetry, is also littered with absences. 
Whilst at one level, then, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy emerges as one of immanence, 
facticity and one that avoids scepticism, it is also true that it is marked by non- 
coincidence, absence, deferral. This structure of de-centring or difference does not 
work in the same way as in the theories of deconstruction or psychoanalysis. There is a 
consolation in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy that is not there in those other systems of 
thought; here, even as something is missing or deferred, something is given back. The 
absence emerges within our very existence which, rather than being something 
contained within the limits of a Cartesian consciousness, is defined as a folding over of 
visibility upon itself; it is, as I will elucidate, this perceptual reversibility that makes us 
human. A body incapable of self-reflection - of turning its powers of perception back 
on itself - "would be an almost adamantine body, not really 
flesh, not really the body 
z John O'Neill, `Translator's Preface' to TL, pp. xi-xvii (pp. xiii-xiv). 
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of a human being. There would be no humanity" (EM, 163). The human only emerges 
"when the spark is lit between sensing and sensible, lighting the fire that will not stop 
burning until some accident of the body will undo what no accident would have 
sufficed to do .... " (EM, 163-164). However, the reversibility relation is always, at 
some level, incomplete; it is impossible for me to be simultaneously touched and 
touching. My style of being, encapsulated in the flesh, has a gap at its centre; the very 
thing that defines my humanity is the thing that is impossible for me to experience. 
This description of a missed aspect of my own being echoes, of course, the 
psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious. Throughout his writings, Merleau-Ponty 
demonstrates a keen interest in the ideas of psychoanalysis and the ways in which they 
might interact with his own phenomenological investigations. The relationship 
between philosophy and psychoanalysis has often been a turbulent one and both 
Husserl (whom Merleau-Ponty takes as his predecessor) and Sartre (who worked with 
Merleau-Ponty editing Les Temps Modernes) rejected its teachings. Sartre, in 
particular, famously criticized the notion of the unconscious, on the basis that it simply 
represented the `bad faith' of the analysand. On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty's interest 
in psychoanalysis seems predicated to a large extent precisely on the extent to which 
the unconscious provides links to phenomenology. I want to suggest that the way that 
Merleau-Ponty re-imagines the unconscious as an element of perceptual experience 
prompts the emergence of the flesh as something inherently uncanny. This 
uncanniness is connected to the gap at the centre of experience that I have already 
identified, specifically to the effort to express or represent it; the process, in a sense, of 
giving it flesh. This instalment of the uncanny at the heart of experience and 
representation also reverberates through the atmosphere of Bowen and Welty's fiction, 
creating a bridge between their fictionalized accounts of perceptual experience and 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophical investigations. I will return to the notion of the 
uncanny in more detail at the conclusion of this chapter, but first I will undertake a 
discussion of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, in particular tracing the persistence of the 
notion of a `missed' space through the development of his ontology. 
ýýý 
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Merleau-Ponty's most famous work, Phenomenology of Perception was published in 
1945, the same year that Merleau-Ponty and Sartre founded Les Temps Modernes. The 
pair had met at the Ecole Normale Superieure, which Merleau-Ponty entered in 1926 
to study philosophy. Merleau-Ponty had returned to the Ecole Normale in 1935 as a 
tutor and it was here that he completed his doctoral thesis in 1938, published in 1942 
as The Structure of Behaviour. This early work explores the relationship between 
consciousness and nature. In it, Merleau-Ponty undertakes a critique of the dualistic 
philosophy of psychology that opposes the mental and the physiological as objects 
operating on each other within a set of causal relations. In the years that followed this 
work Merleau-Ponty's interest in Husserlian phenomenology grew, something he 
shared with his friend, Sartre. 3 This interest, both combined with his earlier critique of 
dualistic psychology and applied to ideas about perception, reaches its culmination in 
the Phenomenology. 
In the post-war period, Merleau-Ponty's work reflects his growing unease with his 
previous Communist sympathies. Between the 1947 publication of Humanism and 
Terror and that of Adventures of the Dialectic in 1955 there is a perceptible shift away 
from Marxist ideals. This was partly influenced by the Korean War, which caused the 
Soviet Union to become, in Merleau-Ponty' s eyes, an imperialist aggressor, which in 
turn called into question for him the possibility of socialism. His growing rejection of 
Marxism caused problems in Merleau-Ponty's relationship with Sartre and with others 
on the intellectual Left, and he resigned as the political editor of Les Temps Modernes 
in 1950. 
Merleau-Ponty's academic career had flourished following the publication of the 
Phenomenology, and he held increasingly prestigious posts, including, from 1949, the 
Chair of Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne followed by a chair at the College 
de France from 1952. At the time of this appointment to the College de France (when 
he was the youngest member ever to be elected), he wrote a proposal outlining his 
intended work for the future. He expresses his wish to take the discoveries made in the 
3 Although, as Margaret Whitford argues at length, the use the two made of the notion of `a return to 
things themselves' differs significantly. Margaret Whitford, Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Sartre's 
Philosophy (Lexington KY: French Forum, 1982). 
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Phenomenology about the nature of perception and use them to explore how 
"communication with others, and thought, take up and go beyond the realm of 
perception which initiated us to the truth" (PRO, 3). This going beyond is begun in the 
later work, culminating, as I will discuss later, in The Visible and the Invisible, 
published in an unfinished state after Merleau-Ponty's untimely death in 1961. 
Merleau-Ponty's approach to philosophy is derived from that of Husserl, whom he 
acknowledges frequently throughout the Phenomenology. However, the direction in 
which Merleau-Ponty proceeds diverges from his predecessor's significantly, often to 
a much greater degree than his own reading of Husserl suggests. 4 In the preface to the 
Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty explicitly draws out the terms of his philosophical 
project. It aims, as we have seen, to bring to expression pre-linguistic experience: "that 
world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks" (POP, x). 
Merleau-Ponty's description of actual perceptual experience rather than any thought 
about it produces a theory of perception that is not predicated on a causal, detached 
relationship between mind, body and world but on an integration between the three 
terms. The perceiving subject is an embodied subject who is, in a phrase borrowed 
from Heidegger, `in-the-world'; "[t]he perceiving mind is an incarnated mind. I have 
tried, first of all, to re-establish the roots of the mind in its body and in its world" 
(PRO, 3). Perception can no longer be understood, therefore, as a mediation between 
the world, my body and my understanding, because the three are inextricably 
entwined. "Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate 
4 This reading is highly contentious, with Merleau-Ponty attributing to Husserl's work a bigger shift 
towards an existential philosophy than that work actually reveals. Hubert L. Dreyfus explains that the 
work upon which these claims are based was unpublished in 1945 when the Phenomenology appeared. 
Subsequent publications of it have revealed that in fact Husserl remained stubbornly devoted to a 
position that Merleau-Ponty claims he had given up for a stance that reflected, indeed he suggests 
influenced, that of his pupil, Heidegger. Hubert L. Dreyfus, `Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Husserl's 
(and Searle's) Concept of Intentionality' in Lawrence Hass & Dorothea Olkowski (eds. ), Rereading 
Merleau-Ponty: Essays beyond the Continental-Analytic Divide (New York: Humanity Books, 2000), 
pp. 33-52. However, I am not concerned here with the accuracy or otherwise of Merleau-Ponty's 
reading of Husserl. In the explication of the Phenomenology that follows, I will make reference to the 
earlier thought of Husserl in order to demonstrate how the thought that Merleau-Ponty pursues differs. 
In doing so I will leave Merleau-Ponty's appraisal of Husserl's later thought largely unchallenged. 
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taking up of a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is 
presupposed by them" (POP, xi). 
In the light of this formulation of perception, Merleau-Ponty undertakes a 
reassessment of existing theories of perception largely on the basis that they ignore the 
primordial experience, attempting to understand perception as a communication 
between a separate object and (fundamentally split) subject. The large part of the 
Phenomenology is taken up by this extended critique whose two main targets are 
empiricism and intellectualism. Despite their differences, both strands of thought 
approach perceptual experience from a scientifically objective viewpoint; they try to 
explain the process by which we perceive from a position outside the experience, 
explaining it as the result of causal relationships between the subject's body and the 
perceivable world. Within this framework, perception consists of a simple passage 
from an external stimulus to the body to consciousness. 
This causal approach to perception, Merleau-Ponty claims, bypasses the evidence of 
our own experience; it is imposed upon that experience by thought. "Pure sensation, " 
he writes, "defined as the action of stimuli on our body, is the `last effect' of 
knowledge, particularly of scientific knowledge, and it is an illusion [... ] that causes us 
to put it at the beginning and to believe that it precedes knowledge. It is the necessary, 
and necessarily misleading way in which a mind sees its own history" (POP, 42-43). 
Thought about the world (such as that of science or theories of perception) is always a 
secondary application, something that tries to order the original perceptual experience, 
that "forces the phenomenal universe into categories which make sense only in the 
universe of science" (POP, 12). So what we usually consider as enlightenment, as 
coming to knowledge, actually constitutes a step away from the truth that 
is manifest 
in the evidence of our experience. Accepted notions of understanding are thus 
reversed, requiring that "the well known instruments of physico-mathematical 
analysis" be abandoned in favour of "another type of intelligibility" 
(POP, 12). 
This intelligibility is not that, then, of a cut-off mind contemplating an objective world, 
but rather of a body engaged in a circular relationship with the world that 
it perceives. 
The world that I am in is also " `in me' as the permanent horizon of all my 
cogitationes and as a dimension in relation to which 
I am constantly situating myself' 
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(POP, xiv). The subject is not simply placed in the world as an object acted on by 
other objects as in the theories of empiricism, but neither is the subject a constituting 
consciousness that thinks a world into being as it is for intellectualism It is also not the 
case that the apprehended world exists in-itself prior to or outside of perception: the 
world only becomes meaningful in relation to the perceiving subject. In other words, 
there can be no distinction between the notions of an external, objective realm and the 
representations of that realm within the individual consciousness. The world is its 
appearance, its representation for us; the world we experience is not a mere internal 
copy of some objective world `out-there'. "The thing, " writes Merleau-Ponty, "is 
inseparable from a person perceiving it, and can never be actually in itself because its 
articulations are those of our very existence, and because it stands at the other end of 
our gaze or at the terminus of a sensory exploration which invests it with humanity" 
(POP, 373). The subject's relation to the world then, in a sense, constitutes a 
humanizing of the inhuman; the things of the world are not only `in me', but I become 
implicated in them, in a way that extends beyond my physical position `in-the-world'. 
The idea that there is a tangible, affecting dimension to the act of looking (which, it 
should be noted, works both ways) is taken up and developed by Merleau-Ponty in The 
Visible and the Invisible through the notion of reversibility, which I will discuss later. 
The world and the perceiving subject exist in relation to each other in a way that means 
I cannot understand myself separately from the perceived world or the perceived world 
separately from myself. In fact, we are so "through and through compounded of 
relationships with the world" (POP, xiv), that we cannot see those relationships 
clearly. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the way we exist in and with the 
world, we must try to suspend our habits of thought, our `natural attitude' and re-learn 
to look at the world as strange and paradoxical. Phenomenological reflection, as 
described by Merleau-Ponty, is not a retreat into transcendent thought, but a re- 
looking, an achievement of "wonder in the face of the world" (POP, xv). This recalls 
modernism's efforts to see the world afresh, to recognize the extraordinary in the 
everyday. 5 For Merleau-Ponty, this is to be sought through the reduction, which is a 
5 For example, Surrealism's aestheticization of the found, worthless object or documentary 
photography's fascination with the banal Siegfried Kracauer writes in his essay `The Mass Ornament' 
of "[t]he surface level expressions" of a culture which "provide unmediated access to the fundamental 
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concept borrowed from Husserl, although the way in which Merleau-Ponty uses it 
differs fundamentally. 
In Husserl's earlier transcendental phenomenology, the reduction involves a setting 
aside, or placing into brackets of our direct experience of the world, in order to gain 
access to a deeper level of reality, to the essences of things. These essences are 
discovered in the intentional content of consciousness, which consists of one's mental 
representations of the world to oneself. It is through this intentional content that, 
according to Husserl, our contact with the world is directed in the process of 
intentionality. It is the directedness itself rather than the aimed-at object that forms the 
subject of Husserl's study in the reduction. In fact, the object need not even be real in a 
material sense, but may belong to an ideal realm; it is not necessary in this case to 
establish the existence or otherwise of an objective reality. This means that reflection 
can then be undertaken in a sort of sealed-off state, achieved through the 
transcendental reduction that suspends one's being in the world in order to study the 
nature of that being, the manner of the relation of subject to world, from a detached 
viewpoint. Through studying the relation of the one to the other, a notion of the 
`subject' and of `objective world' can be reached. 
Unsurprisingly, the way in which Merleau-Ponty uses the reduction takes a more 
existential turn. He uses it to place not experience in brackets, but the subsequent 
explanations of it, the very notion of `meanings' or `essences' that knowledge uses to 
order the primordial experience for our understanding. In this way, what is hoped for is 
a pre-scientific description of the lived world, one that attempts to access a realm 
behind the intellectualized, idealist constructions of it that have been set aside. The aim 
substance of the state of things. " Siegfried Kracauer, `The Mass Ornament' (1927), The Mass 
Ornament: Weinar Essays, trans. and ed. Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge MA & London: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), pp. 75-88 (p. 75). Walter Benjamin also focuses on the importance of the 
everyday, talking of the "revolutionary energies that appear in the `outmoded' and how "the poverty of 
interiors, enslaved and enslaving objects - can suddenly be transformed into revolutionary nihilism. " 
Walter Benjamin, `Surrealism' (1929) in One Way Street and Other Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
and Kingsley Shorter (London: NLB, 1979), pp. 225-239 (p. 229). This idea of the potentiality of 
`architectonic destitution', of the debris of outmoded culture is also reflected in what Theodor Adorno 
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of this philosophical enquiry, unlike that of Husserl, is not a pure meaning or essence. 
The realm of `ideas' is rather encountered en route to the original experience. In 
Merleau-Ponty's archaeological project to discover "the structure of the perceived 
world [that] is buried under the sedimentations of later knowledge" the reified notion 
of the essence is one of the accreted layers to be dug through (PRO, 5). In this way, 
even though such an essence is not the aim of reflection, it also can't be ignored as it is 
a part of our `natural attitude', our relationship to the thing that we must become aware 
of in order to move beyond. 
The need to proceed by way of essences does not mean that philosophy 
takes them as its object, but, on the contrary, that our existence is too 
tightly held in the world to be able to know itself as such at the moment 
of its involvement, and that it requires the field of ideality in order to 
become acquainted with and to prevail over its facticity (POP, xvi). 
It is in this `facticity' of the thing that its true meaning emerges. There is not a separate 
realm of true essences, but rather the meaning of a thing is tied to, comes out of, our 
experience of the thing: essence cannot be separated from existence. A thing cannot be 
separated into parts, some of which are meaningful; there is not some separate idea 
that acts as an organizing principle to which the aspects of thing conform Rather, 
"[t]he significance of a thing inhabits that thing as the soul inhabits the body: it is not 
behind appearances"(POP, 372), but emerges within them. The meaning of something 
is contained in its totality, in what Merleau-Ponty calls its `style' of being; it is built up 
of every infinitesimal part of its manner of existing in the world, not sealed off in some 
inner essence. "Truth does not `inhabit' only the `inner man', or more accurately, there 
is no inner man" (POP, xii). It is through perception, through our pre-linguistic, pre- 
intellectual experience of an embodied existence in the world, that we come into 
meaning, and it is upon this intuitive, primal experience of meaningfulness that 
knowledge and its accompanying systems are built. This experience is what Merleau- 
Ponty describes as "the silence of primary consciousness" in which "can be seen 
appearing not only what words mean, but also what things mean: the core of primary 
calls "the history congealed in things. " Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (1966), (London: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 53. 
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meaning around which the acts of naming and expression take shape" (POP, xvii). For 
Merleau-Ponty then, the phenomenological reduction aims to gain access to the space 
of this appearance of meaning, it is "the ambition to make reflection emulate the 
unreflective life of consciousness" (POP, xvii) because perception, not thought, "is 
defined as access to truth' '(POP, xviii). 
However, this is an ambition that can ultimately never be fulfilled: it is not possible to 
suspend our being in order to study its nature. There is no "pure, knowing subject" 
(PRO, 5), "there is no thought which embraces all our thought" (POP, xv). We cannot 
transcend our bodily being or escape that being's position in the world and so "[t]he 
most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete 
reduction" (POP, xv). Despite the effort to reach primordial experience, the nature of 
our being-in-the-world constitutes a sort of permanent blind spot, occupying precisely 
that gap which I described above. Even though perception is defined as `access to 
truth', this access will always be limited and this truth is always going to be partial, 
shifting and oblique. What the phenomenological investigation is destined to reveal, it 
seems, is "the ambiguous relation which we entertain with our body and, correlatively, 
with perceived things" (PRO, 4). It is not I, nor the world, nor any other single entity 
that forms the source of meaning or truth. Rather, this meaning emerges through an 
infinite series of relations between self, others and things and it is not posited from 
above by my knowledge or inherent as transcendental essence within a world of things 
that is separate from me. "The phenomenological world is [... ] the sense which is 
revealed where the paths of my various experiences intersect, and also where my own 
and other people's intersect and engage each other like gears" (POP, xxii). The 
meaning to which these interrelations lead is, we are told, `emergent' rather than fixed, 
whole or total. Indeed, there is no absolute meaning, no `pure being'. "Finally, " writes 
Merleau-Ponty, "we find that the perceived world [... ] is not a pure object of thought 
without fissures and lacunae; it is, rather, like a universal style shared by all perceptual 
beings. While the world no-doubt co-ordinates these perceptual beings, we can never 
presume that its work is finished. Our world, as Malebranche said, is an `unfinished 
task"' (PRO, 6). 6 
6 My emphasis. 
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This notion of "style", which simultaneously suggests some kind of order or structure 
and hints at some kind of absence or sense of a lack of substance, is one that re- 
emerges throughout Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. In Phenomenology of Perception, he 
discusses the notion of the phenomenological method that he has inherited from 
Husserl not in terms of a generalized theory or system of knowledge, but something 
"which can be practised as a manner or style of thinking" (POP, viii). Likewise the 
flesh, which is introduced in Merleau-Ponty's later ontological writings, is described 
as "a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a 
fragment of being" (VI, 139). The use of the term clearly works towards finding a way 
of discussing ontological categories beyond fixed Idealistic notions or essences. 
Instead, Being is imagined in terms of a process or creative engagement. Through the 
notion of style, I want to suggest, Being is connected at a fundamental level to the 
realms of idiom and representation. 
The linking of ontological and stylistic questions in this way suggests the possibility 
for some kind of authentic expression, one that can traverse the gap between 
perceptual experience and language. "The writer's thought does not control his 
language from without, " Merleau-Ponty writes, "the writer is himself a new kind of 
idiom, constructing itself, inventing ways of expression, and diversifying itself 
according to its own meaning" (PRO, 9). Similarly, the painter's style must be seen 
"emerging at the point of contact between the painter and the world, in the hollow of 
the painter's perception, and as an exigency which arises from that perception" (PW, 
59). The line between the writer's being and his ways of expression merge; he is his 
writing in the same way that he is his thought or, indeed, himself. The basis for 
subjectivity proliferates beyond the limits of the self, "constructing itself' in the world. 
The private thoughts of an individual are not merely represented in words or painting, 
but, somehow, capable of being present in them; "what the viewer sees on the canvas 
is not merely the evocation of a woman, of a trade, or of a pose, or even a `concept of 
life' (that of the model or the painter), but another typical way of inhabiting the world, 
of handling it, and of interpreting it" (PW, 60). However, as I explained above, despite 
this description of an elision of being, thought and writing, Merleau-Ponty continues to 
be frustrated by the failure of philosophical thought and expression to adequately 
convey experience. It is precisely this question of the possibilities of expression that 
is 
developed in his later work. As we will see in his growing interest in literature and 
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painting as somehow paradigmatic of his philosophy, he sees the most accurate 
descriptions of experience as occurring not in clear, scientific or language, but in what 
is most oblique, ambiguous and creative. In The Prose of the World, he outlines this 
difference between functional and creative language. 
We may say that there are two languages. First, there is the language 
after the fact, or language as an institution, which effaces itself in order 
to yield the meaning which it conveys. Second, there is the language 
which creates itself in its expressive acts, which sweeps one on from the 
signs towards meaning - sedimented language and speech (PW, 10). 
Merleau-Ponty's own writing works towards just such a creative idiom; in tandem 
with the difficulties and ambiguities of his philosophy, there is an obliqueness in his 
words. "The perceived, by its nature, admits of the ambiguous, the shifting" Merleau- 
Ponty writes, but in fact, his descriptions often seem to arise not out of perception at 
all but out of hallucination (POP, 13). Even in the Phenomenology which, like much 
of his early work, makes extensive reference to biological and psycho-visual research, 
there are also moments, just as one is becoming mired in the ever-thickening 
technicality of the language, when he produces metaphorical, fictional examples of the 
perceptual phenomenon he is discussing. These moments appear like a coin conjured 
out from behind one's ear, enabling one to see what one was struggling to understand, 
to be almost dazzled by its simplicity. But there is more going on here than simple 
analogy. At such points there is a meeting of the matter-of-fact and the extraordinary 
which somehow translates the shifting and nebulous impression through an ironclad, 
almost clinical description. Supernatural transformations are brought onto the plane of 
reality through rational descriptions of what reason tells us is impossible, creating a 
vertiginous or uncanny sense. This is what happens, it seems, once you stop thinking 
of perception as an abstract concept and put it back into the body; or at least it is what 
happens to it in words. "Suppose that I throw a stone. It hurtles across the garden. For 
a moment it becomes an indistinct meteor-like object, and then a stone again when it 
falls to the ground some distance away" (POP, 312). Whilst in his analysis of this 
movement, Merleau-Ponty points out that "the stone itself [... ] is not modified", the 
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strangeness of the description remains. Similarly, in The Visible and the Invisible, 
when exploring the effect that the movements of the body have upon vision, he writes: 
"[M]y movements and the movements of my eyes make the world 
vibrate - as one rocks a dolmen with one's forger without disturbing its 
fundamental solidity. With each flutter of my eyelashes a curtain lowers 
and rises, though I do not think for an instant of imputing this eclipse to 
the things themselves; with each movement of my eyes the things suffer 
a brief torsion, which I also ascribe to myself; and when I walk in the 
street with eyes fixed on the horizon of the houses, the whole of the 
setting near at hand quivers with each footfall down on the asphalt, then 
settles down in its place (VI, 7). 
Although Merleau-Ponty is trying to demonstrate the transcendent facticity of the 
perceptual world, what is striking in this passage is its vertiginous strangeness. Even as 
he emphasizes that the hallucinatory transformation is not occurring at the level of 
material reality - "I do not think for an instant of imputing this eclipse to the things 
themselves" - he simultaneously undermines that claim through his unqualified 
assertions: "the things suffer", "the world [quivers]. " It is not merely as though the 
movements of my body send shivers through the world, his description suggests, but it 
is something that actually happens. The uncanniness created by this textual ambiguity 
extends beyond the prose to the experience that it describes; being becomes a strange 
inhabiting of the space between the perceptual subject, prey to illusion, and the 
perceptual object which asserts its sovereignty. It is in this space that we see 
expression at work, the figure of the philosopher or writer or artist in the act of 
becoming that "new kind of idiom, constructing itself, inventing ways of expression, 
and diversifying itself' (PRO, 9). 
What we are left with in the Phenomenology of Perception is a philosophy of 
ambiguity. "The experience of our own body [... ] reveals to us an ambiguous mode of 
existing" (POP, 230), Merleau-Ponty tells us. The certainties of Cartesian dualism, 
which accustomed us "to disengage from the object" are dissolved through the return 
to perceptual experience. "[E]xperience of one's own body runs counter to the 
reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each other, and which 
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gives us only thought about the body, or the body as an idea and not the experience of 
the body or the body in reality" (POP, 231). But whilst the Phenomenology establishes 
this ambiguity as the ground from which philosophy must launch itself, as the style by 
which it must be infected, its achievements remain unsatisfactory for Merleau-Ponty. 
This is expressed in a text written on the occasion of his candidacy to the College de 
France, which summarizes his past work and sets out a prospective plan for the future. 
"The study of perception could only teach us a `bad ambiguity, ' a mixture of finitude 
and universality, of interiority and exteriority. But there is a `good ambiguity' in the 
phenomenon of expression" (PRO, 11). Expression and its role in the clarification of 
an ambiguity that is more than a simple `mixture' of opposing elements comes to 
dominate Merleau-Ponty's later writings, work which culminates in The Visible and 
the Invisible. 
*ýý 
Just as Phenomenology of Perception positioned itself in opposition to existing 
theories of perception, Merleau-Ponty' s The Visible and the Invisible takes the form of 
a critique of prevailing methods of philosophical investigation, including the realm of 
science and moving through Kantian, Husserlian, Bergsonian and Sartrean philosophy. 
The work culminates in a chapter entitled `The Intertwining - The Chiasm' in which 
Merleau-Ponty introduces new concepts, developing his ontology of the flesh. It is 
here that we catch a glimpse of the direction in which this work would have gone, had 
its completion not been interrupted by Merleau-Ponty's death. The version of the text 
that is available today is in fact the introduction to what would have been a much 
larger work. The manuscript that Merleau-Ponty left behind was clearly only in its 
early draught stages, with ongoing corrections, erasures and working notes. This 
foreshortening of the text introduces an inherent sense of confusion, of void or absence 
to the work; as Claude Lefort notes in his foreword to The Visible and the Invisible, "it 
brutally confronts us with an essential ambiguity from which more often than not we 
prefer to turn away. "7 This brutal confrontation with a void of one kind is echoed by 
Merleau-Ponty's negative approach to the definition of his philosophy throughout the 
first three chapters; as in the Phenomenology, he spends a lot of time telling us what is 
Claude Lefort, `Editor's Foreword' to VI, pp. xi-xxxiii (p. xvii). 
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not the case rather than what is. Rather than simply opposing the elements of the 
philosophies that are being argued against, he first dons the cloak of their exponent. 
The text tricks us, beguiles us with an argument, only to reveal that we have been 
fooled before demonstrating how. These blind-alley moments produce a strange 
experience of reading, compounded by the other aspects of Merleau-Ponty's particular 
style. 
The ambiguity inherent in the descriptive attempt is a problem of which Merleau- 
Ponty is, of course, all too aware. Throughout The Visible and the Invisible he comes 
up against the dilemma that in trying to get closer to the thing through explanation or 
theorization, we are in fact alienated from an experience that we in fact `know' a 
priori. "The world is what I perceive, but as soon as we examine and express its 
absolute proximity, it also becomes, inexplicably, irremediable distance" (VI, 8). He 
once again expresses the frustration in the inability of language to convey the 
subtleties of embodied experience, the difficulty that accompanies the attempt to 
convey impressions outside of binary oppositions and fixed categories. "Where two 
convictions may coexist without difficulty in the exercise of life, " he writes, "once 
reduced to theses and to propositions they destroy one another and leave us in 
confusion" (VI, 8). Philosophy may be engaged in trying to bring our experience of the 
world to expression, but at the same time, it "is not a lexicon, it is not concerned with 
`word-meanings, ' it does not seek a verbal substitute for the world we see, it does not 
transform it into something said" (VI, 4). Here once again, the space is opened up for a 
more oblique, literary style of writing to take on philosophical expression. Likewise, 
the non-verbal realm of painting, linked by a "common bond" of creative expression to 
literary language, is capable of communicating what theory misses. Despite Merleau- 
Ponty's skill as a writer, one retains the feeling that he is not comfortable in his chosen 
element, that he would much rather pick up a brush and paint for us what he is trying 
to say. For as he writes elsewhere, "[t]he painter, whatever he is, while he is painting 
practises a magical theory of vision" (EM, 166). 
The writing that results from the recognition of this conundrum has at times a cryptic, 
shadowy quality, a tempo of approach and retreat as if it is afraid of frightening away 
the very thing it is trying to capture. Lefort also notes this stylistic reticence, the text's 
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"[c]onstant reservations, allusions to what will be said later, the conditional form"8 In 
the key chapter, `The Intertwining - The Chiasm', the writing reaches an almost poetic 
pitch as Merleau-Ponty tiptoes the closest to the motivating heart of his philosophy: 
precisely that "most difficult" point at which ideas and their fleshly incarnation in 
words coincide. The gaps, ambiguities and problems of expression at the formal level 
of the text continue to be reflected within the philosophy itself. Paradoxically perhaps, 
what emerges seems to be a philosophy of fullness. Through perception we experience 
a miraculous "totality" (VI, 8) that forces us to reject scepticism and accept, however 
enigmatic the relationship between consciousness and world may be, that "[w]e see the 
things themselves, the world is what we see" (VI, 3). The text is characterized at every 
level by the complicated interactions between absence and presence - the visible and 
the invisible. This sense of paradox is encapsulated in the notion of flesh, which 
Merleau-Ponty uses as a sort of "prototype of Being" (VI, 136). 
The very word `flesh' evokes powerful and contradictory responses. It is at once erotic 
and brutal, conjuring up simultaneous ideas of desire and dead meat. It contains ideas 
both of solidity and shiftingness. Flesh is undeniably real, physical; to be incarnated, 
`made flesh', is to be brought into being, made unavoidably `here'. At the same time 
though, flesh is susceptible to change; it grows, it can be wounded, it dies. The flesh of 
my body is what encloses me, forms my boundary, whilst also being the most obvious 
point of commonality between myself and my fellow human beings. Despite Merleau- 
Ponty's protestations that what his use of the word denotes "is not matter, is not mind, 
is not substance" (VI, 139), it cannot be accidental that the name he chooses to give to 
this most central aspect of his ontology is so physically evocative. Indeed his denial of 
flesh's fleshiness, his insistence that we not look at those things that the word so 
strongly draws us to, creates a strange kind of doubleness that must be intended to be 
included as part of our understanding of it. 
This understanding takes shape in `The Intertwining - The Chiasm' chapter which, as I 
have suggested, introduces the new terms of Merleau-Ponty's developing ontology. 
We get a tantalizing glimpse of what he was on the verge of unveiling, which is added 
to by the fragmentary `Working Notes' included in the published version of the text. 
Lefort, pp. xi-xxxiii (p. xxiii). 
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Here, the connections between a theory of perception and ontology become more 
clearly drawn through an exploration of the relation between the embodied subject and 
the world. The chapter sees the introduction not only of the notion of flesh, but also of 
concepts such as perceptual reversibility, the chiasmic relation between body and 
world and the interaction of the visible and the invisible aspects of experience. The 
aesthetic experience is invoked as a site for a concentrated emergence of Being, 
developing Merleau-Ponty's arguments with regards to painting in `Eye and Mind' in 
relation to music and literature. What, then, I find particularly useful here for my own 
trajectory of thought, is the suggestion of some kind of ontological creativity. There is 
a theory of Being here that looks to art objects as well as to the experience of the world 
for ontological importance and that recognizes in each the same active process of 
construction, of becoming. In looking at this chapter, I want to trace the emergence of 
these ideas to discover how Merleau-Ponty comes to a Being which is, in various 
ways, structured around creative and communicative expression. 
The chapter begins with an examination of the way that the perceiving body relates to 
the perceived world, which both echoes and extends what was begun in 
Phenomenology of Perception. Between my vision and the visible world, Merleau- 
Ponty tells us in typically metaphorical style, there is "an intimacy as close as between 
the sea and the strand" (VI, 130-131). This intimacy, however, does not tip into 
absorption or confusion; if either the seer or the seen were to disappear into the other, 
the vision would cease. Merleau-Ponty describes what takes place as a sort of 
caressing, or "palpating", of the things by my gaze, which both "clothes them with its 
own flesh" and leaves their "own sovereign existence" (VI, 131) intact. This apparently 
paradoxical process is possible only if we cease to think of the visible thing as "a 
chunk of absolutely hard indivisible being" that is fully present and coincident with 
itself, and see it rather as an opening or "straits", a point of communication. The 
visible is less "a thing, therefore, than a difference between things", its "precise form" 
(VI, 132) is caught up in a web of interrelations with other visible things, both 
immediately present and temporally and spatially distant. 
Merleau-Ponty demonstrates this notion through using the example of the colour red, 
through a description whose emotive tone has the quality of Proustian remembrance (a 
literary connection that is utilized more explicitly later in the chapter). 
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The red dress a fortiori holds with all its [fibres] onto the fabric of the 
visible, and thereby onto a fabric of invisible being. A punctuation in 
the field of red things, which includes the tiles of roof tops, the flags of 
gatekeepers and of the Revolution, certain terrains near Aix or 
Madagascar, it is also a punctuation in the field of red garments, which 
includes, along with the dresses of women, robes of professors, bishops, 
and advocate generals, and also in the field of adornments and that of 
uniforms. And its red literally is not the same as it appears in one 
constellation or in the other, as the pure essence of the Revolution of 
1917 precipitates in it, or that of the eternal feminine, or that of the 
public prosecutor, or that of the gypsies dressed like hussars who 
reigned twenty-five years ago over an inn on the Champs-Elysees. A 
certain red is also a fossil drawn up from the depths of imaginary 
worlds (VI, 132). 
In the renowned episode of the madeleine in Remembrance of Things Past, Proust 
shows us the machinations of memory that emerge not only "out of the very depths of 
my being"9 but also "from my cup of tea. "10 Similarly here, the connectivity of 
"invisible being" that Merleau-Ponty describes is imagined not merely as the internal 
stirrings of a private consciousness, but as somehow infused in material things, 
occurring in the outside world. While the particular resonances evoked in the passage 
can clearly be seen to emerge from mind of a Frenchman of a certain historical 
moment, they are attributed as much to the thing itself - the red dress with which the 
excursus begins - as to the observer. This apportioning out of perceptual experience 
between oneself and the things themselves, this confluence of self and world is, as I 
will discuss later, one of the key sources of the uncanniness that inhabits Merleau- 
Ponty's ontology. As Nicholas Royle writes, the uncanny may "happen to oneself, 
9 Marcel Proust, Swann's Way (1913), in Remembrance of Things Past, Vol. 1: Swann's Way; Within a 
Budding Grove, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), p. 
50. 
'0 Proust, p. 51. 
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within oneself, but it is never one's `own': its meaning or significance may have to do, 
most of all, with what is not oneself, with others, with the world itself. "" 
Through thinking of perception in this way Merleau-Ponty hopes to rediscover not the 
hidden contents of a self-contained consciousness, but the connecting "tissue that lines 
[visible phenomena], sustains them, nourishes them, and which for its part is not a 
thing, but a possibility, a latency, and a flesh of things" (VI, 132-133). Whilst not 
intended as any kind of substance in the Cartesian sense, the term "flesh", Merleau- 
Ponty admits, is no coincidence, "no analogy or vague comparison. " It denotes the 
intimate "relation of pre-established harmony" that the bodily seer has with the visible 
things; it is why I do not simply see things at a distance, but that my look "envelops, 
palpates, espouses the visible things" (VI, 133). Thus, the evocative journey through 
the essence of redness can perhaps be thought of as a narration of the flesh itself, its 
movement reflecting the sensuous work of perception. 
The idea that perception involves an active engagement with the perceived things is 
elaborated by Merleau-Ponty through the notion of perceptual reversibility. This 
reversibility is first introduced, as the tactile descriptions above suggest, not through 
the notion of vision, but through touch. In order to be able to experience the things 
outside my body through touching, Merleau-Ponty reasons, there must be some 
fundamental relationship between my body and the things. In other words, at the same 
time as I experience my hand touching something from within, my hand must also be 
accessible from the outside, must also be tangible in the same way as the things that I 
touch. Subsequently, in theory, I can touch myself touching, "when my right hand 
touches my left hand while it is palpating the things"(VI, 133-134). As with tactile 
experience, so too for other areas of perception; as well as the overlapping of the roles 
of subject and object, there is an overlapping (without coincidence) of the realms of 
the tangible and the visible. "We must, " Merleau-Ponty claims, "habituate ourselves to 
think that every visible is cut out in the tangible, every tactile being in some manner 
promised to visibility" (VI, 134). "This extraordinary overlapping, " he writes 
elsewhere, "which we never think about sufficiently, forbids us to conceive of vision 
as an operation of thought that would set up before the mind a picture or representation 
11 Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) p. 2. 
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of the world, a world of immanence and of ideality" (EM, 162). Instead, looking 
becomes a sensuous operation. My look isn't something which remains within my 
body as an exercise of my mind, but rather it makes contact with the things that it sees. 
Just as I reach out my hand towards that which I touch, creating a communication 
between the outside of my body and the surface of the thing, so too does my vision 
extend outwards, creating a path of interaction between the horizons of my body and 
those of the visible thing. What emerges here is a reversal of the notion that blind 
people `see' things through the use of their hands. This is instead a form of touching 
through the eyes, "a palpation with the look" (VI, 134). If we consider this within the 
structure of reversibility, it follows that the things that I look at also `palpate', touch, 
me; to look at the world is also to feel it, to be seen is also to be touched. 
This sensuous reversibility of perception, by which looking involves a sending out and 
a receiving of a tangible impact, is an aspect of Merleau-Ponty's ontology that is of 
central interest to the present study. It is this notion, magnified, extended, and made a 
part of everyday human interaction, that I see echoed by Bowen and Welty. The 
connection to the philosophy here is all the more compelling given Merleau-Ponty's 
ambiguous mode of expression. Just as the boundary between the consciousness I have 
of the things that I see and the things themselves is collapsed, so too is the line 
between metaphor and fact. The possibility is introduced that my looking may have an 
effect on the outside world that it looks at as well as on me. My experience of the 
world becomes a 
blending with the world that recommences for me each morning as soon 
as I open my eyes, [... ] that flux of perceptual life between it and 
myself which beats unceasingly from morning to night, and which 
makes my own secret thoughts change the aspect of faces and 
landscapes for me, as, conversely, the faces and landscapes bring me 
the help sometimes and the menace sometimes of a manner of being a 
man which they infuse into my life (VI, 35). 
Just as we saw in the Phenomenology, the writing leaves it unclear at some level 
whether the transformation of material phenomena actually occurs or is only apparent, 
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only here the effect is redoubled, the external things wreaking their own 
transformation upon the observer. 
In the autobiographical One Writer's Beginnings, Welty describes her own realization 
of the connection between herself and the things she looked at. As she grew up and 
began to write, she claims: 
I found the world out there revealing because [... ] memory had become 
attached to seeing, love had added itself to discovery, and because I 
recognized in my own continuing longing to keep going, the need I 
carried inside myself to know - the apprehension, first, and then the 
passion, to connect myself to it. Through travel I first became aware of 
the outside world; it was through travel that I found my own 
introspective way of becoming a part of it. 
This is, of course, simply saying that the outside world is the 
vital component of my inner life (OWB, 76). 
This certainly seems to reflect the blending or fusion with the world through 
perception that Merleau-Ponty describes. Welty's description here pulls the fabric of 
the perceived inside-out so that it becomes confused, tangled: an awareness of the 
outside world leads to a looking inside, an `introspection', which in turn results in a 
connection to or placing in the outside. The impact that occurs between the outside 
world and inner life is here one of emotion - the love associated with things long 
remembered - rather than physical. It is, as Merleau-Ponty describes, "secret thoughts" 
that merge with things seen. 
In Bowen's writing, however, we see the notion of vision's tangible impact developed 
furhter. In her account of her family home, Bowen's Court, she describes the relation 
between the generations in terms of precisely such a perceptual intensity. 
The dead do not need to visit Bowen's Court rooms - as I said, we had 
no ghosts in that house - because they already permeated them. Their 
extinct senses were present in lights and forms. The land outside 
Bowen's Court windows left prints on my ancestors' eyes that looked 
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out: perhaps their eyes, also, left prints on the scene? If so, those prints 
were part of the scene to me (BC, 451). 
This directly echoes Merleau-Ponty's notion that "my own secret thoughts change the 
aspect of faces and landscapes" and also develops it; my perception, it seems, 
somehow infuses the very being of what it perceives, my look becoming a part of the 
thing not only "for me", but for others. This notion that one's very presence can stain 
an environment runs throughout Bowen's work, as does the opposite notion of the 
impact of the outside upon a perceiving individual. In a letter to Virginia Woolf, 
written in 1935, Bowen describes the feeling of having people in to look around her 
house, which is up for sale. 
It does feel odd -I suppose because no one who isn't a friend comes 
into one's house, normally, and these strange mutters, from upstairs and 
everywhere, of people who have come to look for cracks in the walls is 
something really not like life at all. It makes the rooms feel unfamiliar 
afterwards; they begin to look, even, a different shape. 12 
In The House in Paris (whose publication, incidentally, Bowen discusses in the same 
letter), we are warned: 
It is a wary business walking about a strange house that you are to 
know well [... ] The you inside you gathers up defensively; something is 
stealing upon you every moment; you will never be quite the same 
again. These new unsmiling lights, reflections and objects are to 
become your memories, riveted to you closer than friends or lovers, 
going with you, even into the grave: worse, they may become dear and 
fasten to you like so many leeches on your heart (HP, 95). 
Bowen here transforms the notion of reversibility into something much more explicitly 
physically threatening than Merleau-Ponty (and perhaps even Welty). At times she 
goes further still, straying into the realm of the hallucinatory. Recounting 
Henrietta's 
12 Bowen, letter to Virginia Woolf (July 31 1935), in MT, pp. 210-212 (p. 211). 
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encounter with the intimidating Mme Fisher in The House in Paris, Bowen describes 
the old woman's gaze as "a battery". Under this physical assault, "[Henrietta] felt 
every hair she had, and every freckle, every red bone button down her stomach stand 
out with frightening meaning: if pictures suffer, she did" (HP, 51). Whilst Bowen's 
work may be seen as extending or expanding Merleau-Ponty's ideas, the darker, 
stranger sides of the phenomena that she brings out so artfully already exist in what he 
is saying albeit in a more implicit manner. Bowen seems to take all the seeds of 
terrible possibility sown by the philosophy and allow them to germinate into 
something much larger and more monstrous. 
For Merleau-Ponty, it follows from the overlapping of the tangible with the visible that 
the relation of reversibility must also extend to the realm of the visible: if in order to 
touch we must also be touched, then in order to see, we must also be seen. My looking, 
my vision is reciprocated by another vision that observes me from the outside, sees me 
in my position in the visible world. "[H]e who sees, " Merleau-Ponty tells us, "[... ] is 
one of the visibles, capable, by a singular reversal, of seeing them" (VI, 135). Rather 
than vision emanating from either the subject or the world, vision occurs when there is 
interaction, "commerce", when one bit of the visible (i. e. me) turns back on the rest of 
the visible (i. e. the world). So vision is formed as a "a Visibility [... ] in itself, which 
belongs neither to the body qua fact nor to the world qua fact - as upon two mirrors 
facing one another" (VI, 139). The reflected images don't belong to either of the 
surfaces in particular, but rather "form a couple, a couple more real than either of 
them"(VI, 139). So the seer, as one half of this couple, is "caught up" with the other 
part, what is seen; I am myself visible within the visible at which I direct my vision. 
Hence, "there is a fundamental narcissism to all vision"(VI, 139). But this comes not 
only from the fact that I see myself in the visible, it is also as if the visible things direct 
their own gaze at me, as if I experience myself not only as seen from the outside, but 
am actually "seen by the outside". In this sense, "the seer and the visible reciprocate 
one another and we no longer know which sees and which is seen" (VI, 139); there is 
an anonymous and general `Visibility'. This generality that lies "midway between the 
spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style 
of being wherever there is a fragment of being" (VI, 139) is given the name of flesh. Its 
sinews connect the human and the inhuman, objects, `the outside, ' become animated, 
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acting as constant voyeurs of our being. This being henceforth becomes tainted with a 
faint sense of paranoia, it becomes, in Bowen's words, "a risky business. " 
This notion of being-in-the-world naturally has implications at the level of selfhood. 
Being fluctuates between a doubling of oneself and a loss of oneself. The notion of a 
solipsistic consciousness is destroyed in favour of a subject that is reliant on the 
outside, collapsing the rigid Cartesian distinctions between subjectivity and the 
material world. The kind of humanity that the reversibility relation ultimately brings us 
to, it seems, is one in which `I' am diminished in the face of something that transcends 
me, in the face of an all enveloping flesh. The material, perceivable world with which I 
engage in such an intimate relation becomes both a "help" and a "menace". It brings 
me an unrivalled fullness, facticity and meaning, reinforcing my selfhood twice over, 
but this necessarily brings with it an increased anxiety. The potential for personal harm 
has been extended beyond the limits of the self to its physical surroundings. `I' am 
both reinforced and reduced, doubled and split. In this context Bowen's hyperbolic 
claim, discussed in my introduction, that "the destruction of buildings and furniture is 
more palpably dreadful to the spirit than the destruction of human life, " might not 
seem so extraordinary after all (DH, 288). 
However, the moment of the reverse exchange, the precise point of transformation 
between perceiver and perceived "is always immanent and never realized in fact" (VI, 
147). The point at which my status as perceiving subject and that as perceived object 
intersect is never made available to me: I cannot touch myself touching. I can never 
fully coincide with myself. Even though there is a reversibility of subject and object, 
the perceiving subject must remain separate, differentiated from the perceived object in 
order to perceive it. 
My left hand is always on the verge of touching my right had touching 
the things, but I never reach coincidence; the coincidence eclipses at the 
moment of realization [... ] I experience - and as often as I wish - the 
transition and the metamorphosis of the one experience into the other, 
and it is only as though the hinge between them, solid, unshakeable, 
remained irremediably hidden from me (VI, 148). 
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There is, then, a hiatus, a gap, an absence at the very heart of my experience, of my 
existence; my presence to myself is in fact constantly deferred. However, this constant 
deferral of presence is different from the kind of deferral described by Derrida. For 
him, the play between signifiers never reaches any final term, the notion of presence 
dissolves. For Merleau-Ponty though, the perceptual faith has revealed to us that the 
world is really there, that we do really perceive it. 13 There is something beyond 
perception (and beyond language) that it refers to, an experience that is pre-reflective, 
primordial. So the gap at the heart of experience is not really nothing, it is "not an 
ontological void, a non-being: it is spanned by the total being of my body and by that 
of the world; it is the zero of pressure between two solids that makes them adhere to 
one another" (VI, 148). 
The gap or difference between two terms does not therefore work in the same way as 
Derridean differance, which breaks apart or deconstructs, which takes us forever 
beyond the realm of fullness or presence. The gap or difference for Merleau-Ponty is, 
paradoxically, a kind of unifying force. The spaces between are not outside spaces of 
annihilation, but part of the fabric of the flesh. Presence is not deconstructed but 
becomes predicated on non-coincidence, on difference: "self-presence is presence to a 
differentiated world" (VI, 191). I and the things are different aspects of one flesh. The 
fabric of the visible is continuous and any one thing that appears within it is woven 
inextricably onto the things around it, as well as other visible things that are not there, 
the things that, for me, the thing is connected to. I am part of the fabric of this thing's 
visibility too and therefore am one of the things to which it is tied. The space between 
things, like the gap at my own centre, is filled by the expanse of my body and of the 
world, by the thickness of the flesh. 
Like the missed experience in one psychoanalytic theory of trauma, although as we 
will see more carnal or embodied, the hiatus in my being isn't exactly an absence. 
14 It 
13 For a number of discussions on different aspects of the relationship between the philosophies of 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, see M. C. Dillon (ed. ), 
Ecart and Differance: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on 
Seeing and Writing (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997). 
14 For a detailed account of the differences between the mimetic and antimimetic theories of trauma, see 
Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
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isn't irrevocably lost, but it is available through its approximations, its representations 
of itself. The very `missingness' of the missing element structures our experience of it 
even while it does not diminish its sovereignty or my faith in the reality of its 
existence. My body may well be the only means I have of coming to the world, but the 
fluctuating and limiting influence of its mediation does not mean that the thing itself 
fluctuates or is limited: "The stirring of the appearance does not disrupt the evidence of 
the thing" (VI, 7). Just as we can't touch something without covering it over with a 
part of our body - our hand for example - so too is it impossible to see something 
without encasing it in the grip of our gaze. This `covering over' or blind-spot does not 
prevent me from experiencing the things themselves, "it is not a matter of another 
layer or veil that would have come to interpose itself between them and me" (VI, 7). It 
is in fact this blind spot that provides my only means of approach. 
There is a complicated relationship here between notions of presence and of absence 
which points to a central concern of Merleau-Ponty's ontology, what he refers to as 
"the most difficult point, that is, the bond between the flesh and the idea, between the 
visible and the interior armature which it manifests and which it conceals" (VI, 149). 
The "carnal texture" of the sensible (whether that be music, words, lights) "presents to 
us what is absent from all flesh; it is a furrow that traces itself out magically under our 
eyes without a tracer, a certain hollow, a certain interior, a certain absence, a negativity 
that is not nothing" (VI, 150-151). This is reminiscent of that gap at the centre of the 
human being between the body as subject and as object, which is also "not an 
ontological void" but filled by the flesh's thickness. In the same way, the absence at 
the heart of the sensible is characterized by a sense of fullness. The experience of the 
idea that sits at the centre of the carnal experience is one of substantiality; "At the 
moment one says `light, ' at the moment [in Proust's Remembrance of Things Past] that 
the musicians reach the `little phrase, ' there is no lacuna in me" (VI, 151). The sensible 
ideas `possess' us through the experience, rather than the other way round, "precisely 
because they are negativity or absence circumscribed" (VI, 151), because they are the 
space of an active becoming, of potentiality. 
*** 
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This central question of the relationship between the visible and the invisible can be 
better understood through a consideration of Merleau-Ponty's discussion of creative 
expression and representation, the acts that emerge from his discussion of 
intersubjectivity. For it is not only, of course, through material things that we interact 
with the world. The power of perception to extend beyond the limits of the body, and 
the susceptibility of the self to the force of the outside also play a part in Merleau- 
Ponty's conception of the relations between self and others. The way in which I see the 
world may, we are told, have an impact on the vision of the other. It is possible that by 
my engaging in communication with an other, "through the concordant operation of 
his body and my own, what I see passes into him, this individual green of the meadow 
under my eyes invades his vision without quitting my own, I recognize in my green his 
green" (VI, 142). This idea of an invasion of one person's vision by another's is 
extraordinary, almost like a demonic possession. This sense is reflected in `Eye and 
Mind' where Merleau-Ponty describes intersubjectivity in terms of haunting. He talks 
of "the `others, ' not merely as my congeners, as the zoologist says, but the others who 
haunt me and whom I haunt; the `others' along with whom I haunt a single, present, 
and actual Being as no animal ever haunted those beings of his own species, locale, or 
habitat" (EM, 160-161). 
However, it is vital to remember that, coexistent with this ghostly presence of people 
to one another, there is a bodily, material interaction. In fact, it is the presence of other 
bodies that bring me back to my own existence as a body that is in the world. In my 
relation of reversibility with the non-human world, my vision is reflected back to me 
as in a mirror. As soon as my gaze is returned by another person however, this 
"phantom" image is dispelled, replaced by a sense of depth that echoes that which I 
experience in myself. The presence of the other "[betrays] the solipsist illusion that 
consists in thinking that every going beyond is a surpassing accomplished by oneself" 
(VI, 143). Through this fuller reversibility, this intercorporeity, the notion of 
generality, or of Being, fully emerges. 
[T]he body is lost outside of the world and its goals, fascinated by the 
unique occupation of floating in Being with another life [... ] And 
henceforth movement, touch, vision, applying themselves to the other 
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and to themselves, return toward their source and, in the patient and 
silent labour of desire, begin the paradox of expression. " (VI, 144). 
The relation between self and other is, then, a sensuous one between bodies, in which 
the perceptual functions are exchanged and redoubled. "[T]he body [... ] clasps another 
body, applying itself to it carefully with its whole extension" (VI, 144). Even while the 
subject has a haunting presence which extends beyond the limits of the body in the 
activities of perception, it is bound by the thickness of the flesh. The body is not only a 
"massive corporeity" (VI, 144); the flesh also operates on a level beyond that of 
simply seeing and touching. Bowen and Welty repeatedly express a similar awareness 
of this inherence of the incorporeal within the corporeal. "The human face and the 
human body are eloquent in themselves" (OTOP, 8), Welty declares. Bowen imagines 
a form of understanding (in this instance of a place rather than another person) that 
takes place through the non-cognitive experience of the body: "Knowledge of Rome 
must be physical, sweated into the system, worked up into the brain through the 
thinning shoe-leather. Substantiality comes through touch and smell and taste, the 
tastes of different dusts. When it comes to knowing, the senses are more honest than 
the intelligence" (TR, 4). 
The merger between the flesh's physical and more haunting, its visible and invisible 
aspects is seen most clearly in the gestural and vocal communication between bodies, 
"the emergence of flesh as expression" (VI, 145) which reaches its apex in the activity 
of artistic creation. Thus, the aesthetic experience is capable of revealing something 
special about the relationship between flesh and ideas. In `Eye and Mind', Merleau- 
Ponty draws a direct link between artistic style and philosophy: "any theory of painting 
is a metaphysics" (EM, 171). He sets up an opposition between Cartesian ontology and 
what he calls `modern' philosophy, linking the former to the classical style of painting 
predicated on geometrical perspective and the latter to modem painting which breaks 
with those linear rules in favour of an emphasis on colour. Style or form and ideas or 
thought are, it seems, inseparable. Paradoxically then, we are closest to meaning, truth, 
to something authentic, when we are in the realm of the created, the artistically 
constructed. "[A]rt and philosophy together, " he writes, "are precisely not arbitrary 
fabrications in the universe of the `spiritual' (of `culture'), but contact with Being 
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precisely as creations. Being is what requires creation of us for us to experience it" 
(VI, 197). Being is, it seems, coterminous with a creative imagining. 
This applies not only to visual art, but also to other realms of creative expression, 
including literature. It is Proust, Merleau-Ponty claims, who has gone furthest "in 
describing an idea that is not the contrary of the sensible, that is its lining and its 
depth" (VI, 149). Through the experience of literature, of music, of the visual, he 
claims, we engage in "an exploration of an invisible and the disclosure of a universe of 
ideas" as much as we do through the theories of science. In contrast to scientific ideas, 
however, these other ideas are inseparable from their sensible manifestations and 
cannot "be erected into a second positivity"; their content is synonymous with their 
form These sensible ideas cannot be described or circumscribed, but only experienced. 
There is thus a certain mystery attached to the coherence of the idea; it appears to us as 
something that is held together, but if we try to understand how, to "lay hands on it 
[ 
... 
] we do in fact feel that the attempt is misconceived, that it retreats in the measure 
that we approach" (VI, 150). It is futile to try to move beyond the artistic 
representation to the motivating idea, indeed, to think in terms of such a `beyond'. The 
idea is not something waiting to be seen, "provided that the screen that masks it is 
lifted. Here, on the contrary, there is no vision without the screen" (VI, 150). These 
ideas are, then, both unrepresentable and yet only accessible through a form of 
representation. 
This discussion of the relation between the visible and the invisible in expression 
brings us back to Lyotard's exploration of the "unpresentable" in relation to 
modernism and postmodernism, discussed in my introduction. "I shall call modern, " 
he declares, "the art which devotes its `little technical expertise' [... ] to present the fact 
that the unpresentable exists. "15 The postmodern, by contrast, is 
that which, in the modem puts forward the unpresentable in 
presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the 
consensus of a taste which would make it possible to share collectively 
the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for new 
15 Lyotard> p. 78. 
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presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a 
stronger sense of the unpresentable. 16 
Merleau-Ponty may be read, in this schema, as postmodern, but it is important to note 
elements of what Lyotard designates as "modern" that remain. Lyotard's description of 
the postmodern act of creation in which "[t]he artist and the writer [... ] are working 
without rules in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done" 17 certainly 
reflects Merleau-Ponty's description, discussed above, of the artist as idiom 
"constructing itself, inventing ways of expression, and diversifying itself according to 
its own meaning" (PRO, 9). However, for Merleau-Ponty the "unity of consciousness" 
is not "seriously damaged" by this reformulation in the way that Lyotard envisions. 18 
Rather, it is precisely through a process of creative reinvention that consciousness 
displays some inherent organizational logic; it "[diversifies] itself according to its own 
meaning, " even if the final attainment of that meaning is, as in Lyotard's description of 
Proust, "constantly deferred. "19 Merleau-Ponty thus retains some sense of the "solace 
or pleasure" of comprehensible form as well as striving towards the imparting of "a 
stronger sense of the unpresentable. , 20 The rapprochement between unpresentable 
ideas and representation is enabled by the nature of embodied consciousness, whose 
physical perceptions occur in tandem with thought. Thus, in expression, the 
unpresentable is communicated through the creative reconstruction of material form: 
The meaning of a book is given, in the first instance, not so much by its 
ideas as by a systematic and unexpected variation of the modes of 
language, of narrative, or of existing literary forms (PRO, 8). 
An idea is not something existing in itself, separately from the realm of the 
presentable, but it is something that is constructed within perception, that emerges 
from the association of sensible, perceivable elements. What is unpresentable inhabits 
a schema of representation, both present to us and unobtainable, becoming known to 
16 Lyotard, p. 81. 
17 Lyotard, p. 81. 
18 Lyotard, p. 80. 
19 Lyotard, p. 80. 
20 Lyotard, p. 81. 
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us indirectly in a fashion that echoes Bowen's recognition that "[w]hen it comes to 
knowing, the senses are more honest than the intelligence" (TR, 4). 
The painter, Merleau-Ponty suggests, is particularly sensitive to this mode of sensual 
understanding. He recognizes connections, meanings in the visible world and 
emancipates them from being "smothered in the stupor of objects", creating "a more 
agile body" for them through his manipulation of paint on canvas. The artist's creation 
consists, then, of presenting "the minimum of matter that is needed for meaning to 
manifest itself' (PW, 47). In a similar process, the poet "melts ordinary language" into 
a new form (PW, 63). In the great work of art, visual or verbal, this rearrangement of 
the world gives new or added meaning, "the disorder is always another order. It is a 
new system of equivalences which demands this upheaval and not just any one, and it 
is in the name of a truer relation among things that their ordinary ties are broken" (PW, 
63-4). 
The artistic, creative vision presents us not with a poor copy of an objective reality, but 
with a fuller reality, one to which the human body has been added. "The eye is an 
instrument that moves itself, a means which invents its own ends; it is that which has 
been moved by some impact of the world, which it then restores to the visible through 
the offices of an agile hand" (EM, 166). The eye and the hand in question here, as 
components of an embodied consciousness, are more than a receptor of light rays or a 
manipulator of a brush; the process of the artist's translation of the world into painting 
involves a psychological aspect also. The painting "offers to our sight, so that it might 
join with them, the inner traces of vision [... ], it offers to vision its inward tapestries, 
the imaginary texture of the real" (EM, 166). The perception of visible things is 
mediated not only through the biological body, but through the psychic body. It is not 
only connected to consciousness but unconsciousness: indeed, at one point Merleau- 
Ponty goes so far as to consider that "perception is unconsciousness" (VI, 189). Just as 
the sensible idea is not to be found outside or behind the sensible experience, so too 
the `unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind the back of our 
`consciousness', but in front of us, as articulations in our field [... ] [I]t is that through 
which objects are possible" (VI, 180). 
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This notion of a connection between unconsciousness and perception is reflected in a 
passage from Bowen's The House in Paris, in which Karen Michaelis considers ideas 
about perception and ambiguity through the metaphor of photography. Bowen makes a 
complicated series of moves in the passage and I will quote at length in order to follow 
these through. 
[Mrs Michaelis'] well-lit explanations of people were like photographs 
taken when the camera could not lie; they stunned your imagination by 
being exact. Would those unmysterious views in a railway carriage 
make you visit a place, even in dreams? You could not fall in love with 
an Edwardian camera-portrait, with polished shoulders, coiffure and 
curved throat. The lake showing every ripple, the wood showing every 
leaf, or the stately neck with pearls are too deadeningly clear. It is more 
than colour they lack. Without their indistinctness things do not exist; 
you cannot desire them 
Blurs and important wrong shapes, ridgy lights, crater darkness 
making a face as inhuman as a map of the moon, Mrs Michaelis, like 
the camera of her day, denied. She saw what she knew was there. Like 
the classic camera, she was blind to those accidents that make a face a 
face, a scene that scene, and float the object, alive, in your desire and 
ignorance. Nowadays, a photograph is no more than an effort to 
apprehend. So Mrs Michaelis did not like modern photography, which 
she found exaggerated and woolly. Some recent studies of Karen by 
one of her friends had been regretfully put away in a drawer. She, not 
unfairly, found that an over-great sense of mystery too often leads to 
artiness [... ] It is inexcusable not to be clear, she said (HP, 152-153). 
Bowen uses the comparison between "Edwardian" portrait photography and "modern" 
photography (which, I would suggest, comes closer to an idea of painting21) to 
distinguish between two types of vision. The former is "well-lit", "exact", stunning the 
2 Bowen's notion of "modern photography" certainly, as I discuss, echoes Merleau-Ponty's description 
of what painting does with regard to vision. It might perhaps be interesting to consider the intertwined 
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imagination into a kind of paralysis; it is, in a sense, the scientific vision or functional 
language that Merleau-Ponty sees as missing the heart of experience. The "modem" 
photography that Bowen describes sees more than its predecessor, captures those 
elements of vision that it had "denied"; like the painting that Merleau-Ponty describes, 
it presents us with "the inner traces of vision. " Yet, despite this fuller vision, "modem 
photography" is also more indistinct; it floats in desire and ignorance. This is because 
the extra things it sees are "blurs", "wrong shapes", "accidents. " Thus, the modern 
camera's more precise vision is more mysterious; it is both "exaggerated" and 
"woolly. " It is this kind of vision that we see in Merleau-Ponty's notion of creative 
expression that is capable of communicating the invisible, pre-linguistic realm of 
experience. 
In his famous essay `The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' 
(published in 1936, the year after The House in Paris), Walter Benjamin describes 
what he calls "the optical unconscious" in a way that echoes both Bowen and Merleau- 
Ponty's sense of the hidden aspects of perception. He relates how "photographic 
reproduction [... ] can capture images which escape natural vision. , 22 This occurs 
through obvious manipulations such as enlargement or simply by virtue of the fact that 
the camera is capable of extracting and freezing one moment from the flow of many. 
The effect in both cases is a kind of magnification of experience that reaches aspects of 
it that usually pass us by. But the effect also goes beyond a mere magnification; it is, 
again, "a metamorphosis" (VI, 8). "The enlargement of a snapshot, " claims Benjamin, 
does not simply render more precise what in any case was visible, 
though unclear: it reveals entirely new structural formations of the 
subject [... ] Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than 
opens to the naked eye - if only because an unconsciously penetrated 
space is substituted for a space consciously explored by man. Even if 
one has a general knowledge of the way people walk, one knows 
nothing of a person's posture during the fractional second of a stride 
histories of photography and painting, throughout which each medium has tried successively to either 
imitate or escape the other's mode of representing. 
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[ 
... ] The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does 
psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses. 23 
Merleau-Ponty is involved in the same kind of revelation of the hidden, or 
`unconscious' aspects of our perceptual experience. He is fascinated by the way in 
which painting "gives visible existence to what profane vision believes to be invisible" 
(EM, 166). To the realism of Mrs Michaelis' Edwardian camera portraits, this type of 
vision provides a sort of hyper-realism, or perhaps, seeing as it is the underside of 
perception that is captured, a `hypo-realism'. Whatever we decide to call it, it is kind 
of vision that, as Benjamin suggests, witnesses the meeting of a conscious and an 
unconscious optics, a revelation of the hidden, something which, as I will suggest later, 
brings it close to the Freudian uncanny. 
This uncanniness also emerges in the double nature of my being-in-the-world, which 
is at once solid, contained by horizon structures and mutable, transcending those 
notions of containment. 
For after all, sure as it is that I see my table, that my vision terminates 
in it, that it holds my gaze with its insurmountable density, as sure even 
as it is that when, seated before my table, I think of the Pont de la 
Concorde, I am not then in my thoughts but at the Pont de la Concorde 
(VI, 4-5). 
This imagining is not a realm separate from the perceived world but occurs within it, 
does not challenge its veracity but is a part of it. The real and the imaginary, like the 
visible and the invisible, the conscious and unconscious of perception, are not two 
objects to be compared or opposed rather, Merleau-Ponty tells us, "[t]he imaginary is 
lodged in the world" (PW, 47n). In this sense, the situating of the imaginary in the 
world doesn't lead to scepticism, such as that which claims we can never know the 
difference between the perception and the dream Waking perception may be 
22 Walter Benjamin, `The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' (1936), Illuminations, 
trans. Harry Zorn, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Pimlico, 1999), pp. 211-244 (p. 214). 
23 Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', pp. 211-244 (pp. 229-230). 
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`paradoxical' and difficult, but it is still discernible from our sleeping dreams: "there is 
a difference of structure and, as it were, of grain between the perception or true vision, 
which gives rise to an open series of concordant explorations, and the dream, which is 
not observable and, upon examination, is almost nothing but blanks" (VI, 5). So, 
within perception, strange things may happen: appearances may quiver, my 
imagination may intertwine with my sight. But the experience is distinguishable as 
`real' by virtue of something that Merleau-Ponty describes as `grain' and what I think 
is another example of that notion of style. This is perhaps, as I will discuss below, what 
gives Merleau-Ponty's odd descriptions of perception their particular sense of the 
uncanny. They are both foreign to us, hallucinatory sometimes, and yet there is 
something about them that is so familiar and commonsensical. The dream, by contrast, 
may be surreal but it is not uncanny in the same way because it is so far removed from 
what we know to be real. We know that the dream is not reality precisely because we 
can compare it to perception, which, even though it may contain uncertainties or 
ambiguities, still possesses the texture, the style of the flesh. 
The distinction between perception and dream may be evident when the two 
experiences are placed in relation but until the false perception is revealed as such in a 
confrontation with the world, it succeeds in defeating the perceiving subject: "the rags 
of the dream can, before the dreamer, be worth the close-woven fabric of the true 
world" (VI, 5-6). The perceptions through which we experience the world are shifting, 
unstable and may be revealed as false at any moment. A perception is only discounted 
as false once one that I accept as true replaces it. This experience of disillusionment 
reveals to us the "fragility of the `real"'. However, even within this knowledge of 
reality's fragility, the notion of the real itself is not dissipated; at the moment that I 
experience a perception, "it incontestably gives itself as `real' and not as `very 
possible' or probable", even if it eventually gives way to "a new `reality"'. 
What I can conclude from these disillusions or deceptions, therefore, is 
that perhaps `reality' does not belong definitively to any particular 
perception, that in this sense it lies always further on; [ ... ] 
Each 
perception is mutable and only probable - it is, if one likes, only an 
opinion; but what is not opinion, what each perception, even if false, 
verifies, is the belongingness of each experience to the same world, 
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their equal power to manifest it, as possibilities of the same world (VI, 
40-41). 
Once again, Merleau-Ponty invokes a relation of incessant deferral, of never-fulfilled 
desire; reality is "always further on" just out of reach, like that chiasm at the centre of 
my being which defines my humanity and which I can never experience. But although 
reality is never finally here, never reached by my perception, as I have said, Merleau- 
Ponty nevertheless avoids falling into the doubt of scepticism. 
This is possible because what is true, what is transcendent is the world, not any notion 
of `the real', which is not here a measure of authenticity in the ordinary sense; that is 
why an artistic interpretation of what I see may be "truer" than the original vision. This 
pulling out of the perceptual rug from under our feet is balanced by Merleau-Ponty's 
retention of the notion of a familiar and consistent `world' which unlike `reality' is not 
measured in the binary terms of true or false. The world (I think we may also say here 
`the flesh' or `Being') is pluralistic, characterized not by totality, but by dehiscence; by 
the universal style of the flesh, which is not an object or ideal, but is revealed within 
active and interactive experience. When Merleau-Ponty describes reality as `fragile' it 
does not mean that the world, the ground of all our experiences, threatens to break up 
or vanish, but that our hold on it is shakeable. 
Paradoxically, this recognition of the fragility of our hold on the world, the uncertainty 
that must always haunt our knowledge of it, succeeds in bringing the world and the 
perceiver closer. This is perhaps because the reason for the constant disillusionment is 
the subject's possession of some kind of prior knowledge or standard of what the false 
perception fails to be. In this sense, there is a difference between scepticism's constant 
doubting that what I see is in fact what I see and the `fragile reality' that Merleau- 
Ponty introduces. He insists: 
the very fragility of a perception, [... ] far from authorizing us to efface 
the index of `reality' from them all, obliges us to concede it to all of 
them, to recognize all of them to be variants of the same world, and 
finally to consider them not as all false but as `all true, ' not as repeated 
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failures in the determination of the world but as progressive 
approximations (VI, 41). 
The `true' or `real' perception is not one variant of all the possible perceptions, rather, 
all perceptions are variants of the real. Our determination of the world is an 
approximation; our notion of it is built up, created within our own activity of 
perception. But this is an organized creativity that adheres to some inexplicable 
standard. We have "prepossession of a totality which is there before one knows how 
and why, whose realizations are never what we would expect them to be, and which 
nonetheless fulfils a secret expectation within us, since we believe in it tirelessly" (VI, 
42). It is this mysterious `prepossession' (which, strangely, is also simultaneously a 
failure to possess) of the world that remains a constant, not some abstract notion of the 
`real' or the `true'. It is what keeps all of my progressive `illusions' attached to my 
present perception. It seems that it is this, rather than some pure thought, which is the 
proper meaning of `truth' for Merleau-Ponty. As he writes elsewhere, "Truth is another 
name for sedimentation, which is itself the presence of all presents in our own" (S, 96). 
He continues: "There is finality only in the sense in which Heidegger defined it when 
he said approximately that finality is the trembling of a unity exposed to contingency 
and tirelessly recreating itself' (S, 97). It is this notion of a tireless (re)creation that is 
the central point. The true, the real, is not something I could get at if I could only get a 
bit closer, lift a veil, get a better view. It is not something to be uncovered or laid hold 
of, but that can only emerge within our ever-renewed efforts at creating it: Once again, 
"Being is what requires creation of us in order to experience it" (VI, 197). 
This organization of the sensible world brings us back, I think, to `the most difficult 
point' approached at the end of The Visible and the Invisible, namely the connection 
between the flesh and the idea. This creative imagining of reality is, crucially, an 
activity of the body, the flesh. Ideality is not a separate or fixed realm, but it "streams 
forth along the articulations of the aesthesiological [or perceptual] body, along the 
contours of the sensible things" (VI, 152). Ideas are things that "lead their shadowy life 
in the night of the mind only because they have been divined at the junctures of the 
visible world. [They involve] a type of surpassing that does not leave its field of 
origin" (VI, 152-153). This movement of a simultaneous going beyond and remaining 
within the material helps to explain the fact that even perceptions that we may count as 
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`false' provide access to the world, are always in a sense `true'. Representation can be 
meaningful in and of itself, without having to have recourse to some ideal realm 
behind it. 
In this process, language is key. "Why not admit, " Merleau-Ponty asks, "[ ... 
] that 
language as well as music can sustain a sense by virtue of its own arrangement, catch a 
meaning in its own mesh, that it does so without exception each time it is conquering, 
active, creative language, each time something is, in the strong sense, said? " (VI, 153). 
This `creative' language is not a simple process of signification that can be de-coded if 
only we could get a better run at it. Rather, the ideas of language are a "never-finished 
differentiation" (VI, 153). The meaning of the linguistic expression exists in-between 
all the differentiations, is held in suspension at the moment of our experiencing a 
phrase. The idea of a sentence comes to us as in a musical chord, or the `little phrase' 
that Merleau-Ponty borrows from Proust. Similarly, our sense of the real comes from 
the simultaneity of our perceived impressions. All of these experiences are more than 
the sum of their parts. It is the process of their construction, the movement of their 
creation that is meaningful. It is in their very obliqueness, in their failure to look head- 
on at the core of meaning around which they hang, that they capture its essence. This 
is perhaps why Merleau-Ponty's head-on descriptions of the experience of perception 
sound so strange; they are in danger of missing the very thing they are trying to 
convey. In contrast, those parts where he uses the aesthetic experience to explain what 
he intends, where he reflects his ontology onto the screen of art and of literature, 
capture, albeit in misty form, the very heart of his philosophy. 
Although the philosophical enquiry is aimed at a primordial, pre-reflective experience, 
the means through which it best reaches it is a creative one. This brings art and 
philosophy decisively together. In one of the `Working Notes' to the Visible and the 
Invisible entitled `Philosophy and Literature', Merleau-Ponty describes philosophy 
itself as a creative task. 'Philosophy, " he notes, "precisely as `Being speaking within 
us, ' expression of the mute experience by itself, is creation"(VI, 197). Merleau-Ponty's 
ontology can only be fully comprehended through the idea of artistic expression; one 
can't just look at it on its own, or if one does, something is lost. It is in art that we see 
the central relationship of Merleau-Ponty's ontology emerge - that between the subject 
and the world, or as he expresses the "classical definition of art" in his essay on 
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Cezanne, "man added to nature". 24 The notion of creation or creativity certainly has a 
value attached to it, which goes beyond an appreciation of the artistic endeavour. The 
activity of creation seems to occupy a place at the heart of Merleau-Ponty's 
explorations of Being, to have some fundamental ontological function. It is from this 
intimate relationship with notions of creativity that, I want to suggest finally in this 
chapter, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy gains its sense of the uncanny, a sense that 
emerges from and moves beyond the Freudian definition of the term. 
** 
In 1960, the year before his death and a time at which he was working on The Visible 
and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty wrote a preface to Angelo Hesnard's L'Oeuvre de 
Freud, at Hesnard's request. This preface, entitled `Phenomenology and 
Psychoanalysis', reveals the parallels identified by Merleau-Ponty between his own 
work and that of Freud. He rejects the causal aspects of Freudian theory, but identifies 
a fundamental similarity in the orientation towards human action and experience as 
meaningful. The criticism of psychoanalysis focuses on Freud's means of expression. 
Antipathy towards Freud's theories result largely, he suggests, from misunderstandings 
of the work due to these failures in articulation. He claims to have been "persuaded 
[... ] that psychoanalysis is informed with a thought which nevertheless is expressed 
only very indirectly in certain Freudian concepts" (PSY, 68). He relates this use of 
"rudimentary imagery" to the discipline's origins in medical science. Its growing 
status as " an ideology [... ] an element of our culture" requires of it a more 
sophisticated language. 
"Freud's genius, " claims Merleau-Ponty, "is obviously not that of philosophical or 
exhaustive expression; it resides, rather, in his contact with things, his polymorphous 
perception of work, of acts, of dreams, of their flux and reflux, of counter-coups, of 
echoes, of substitutions, of metamorphoses. Freud is sovereign in this 
listening to the 
confused noises of a life. " However, the language that couches this 
"prodigious 
intuition of exchanges - exchange of roles, exchange of the soul and the 
body, of the 
24 Merleau-Ponty, `Cezanne's Doubt', SNS, pp. 9-25 (p. 16). 
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imaginary and the real - this universal promiscuity [... ] leads to misunderstandings 
between Freud and the hurried reader (perhaps between Freud and himself)" (PSY, 68). 
Merleau-Ponty reads a subtlety of perception in Freud, a power of `intuition', an 
openness, it seems, to the very shiftingness or `universal promiscuity' that forms the 
heart of his own `philosophy of ambiguity'. It is possible and even necessary, Merleau- 
Ponty suggests, to read Freud outside a scientific or an objectivist approach, as well as 
being equally important to rescue psychoanalysis from the clutches of idealism The 
latter threat grows in prominence, he claims, as the doctrine becomes more and more 
institutionalized. "[W]e must ask ourselves, " he claims, "whether it is not essential to 
psychoanalysis -I mean for its existence as therapy and as verifiable knowledge - to 
remain, not exactly a disreputable enterprise or secret science, but at least a paradox 
and an interrogation [... ] It is psychoanalysis that has returned our myths to us. What 
will become of all this if the tamed sphinx soberly takes its place in a new philosophy 
of enlightenment? " (PSY, 70-71). Again, what Merleau-Ponty seems to extract from 
Freud is something approaching the `paradoxical' or `mythical', something that even 
while it might be a `verifiable knowledge' is nevertheless interested in something more 
shadowy, or oblique, than `enlightenment'. 
What Merleau-Ponty identifies, finally, as the alliance between his own work and 
psychoanalysis is a joint attempt to approach a meaning that is not ideal but 
experiential, not posited or reified but emergent, shifting and elusively symbolic. They 
are both methods that read the body and bodily experience - not "the useful, 
functional, prosaic body" but rather "the human body which rediscovers its symbolic 
or poetic weight" (PSY, 69). In other words, it is not so much the `body' as the `flesh' 
that is read, the site at which the materially visible meets the invisible `weight' of 
meaning. For as we have seen, the flesh in Merleau-Ponty signifies more than the 
material weight of the body, it is a certain style of Being, the form and structure of not 
only visible but also invisible reality. What Merleau-Ponty seems to propose is a kind 
of phenomenological symptomology; a reading of the surfaces of this world that leads 
to an elucidation of "a world on the margin of, and counter to, the true world, a lived 
history beneath the effective history -a world called illness" (PSY, 67). It is this 
appeal to a world `at the margins' that Merleau-Ponty identifies as the connecting 
ground between his own thought and that of Freud: "it is by what phenomenology 
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implies or unveils as its limits - by its latent content or its unconscious - that is in 
consonance with psychoanalysis [ ... ] Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not 
parallel; much better, they are both aiming toward the same latency" (PSY, 71). 
I want to suggest, however, that Merleau-Ponty's notion of what or where this 
`latency' or unconscious might be reconfigures Freud's conception of it. As we have 
seen, for Merleau-Ponty, "perception is unconsciousness" (VI, 189). 
[The] unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind 
the back of our `consciousness, ' but in front of us, as articulations in 
our field. It is `unconscious' by the fact that it is not an object, but it is 
that through which objects are possible, it is the constellation wherein 
our future is read - It is between them as the interval of the trees is 
between the trees or as their common level. It is the Urgemeinshaftung 
of our intentional life, the Ineinander of the others in us and of us in 
them (VI, 180). 
For Merleau-Ponty, there is slippage between vision, the world and the 
unconsciousness; they all combine in the flesh, in which the, as he terms it 
"aesthesiological" (VI, 152), or perceptual, body meets the libidinal, the psychologized 
body of Freud. 
The body which possesses senses is also a body which has desires and 
thus aesthesiology expands into a theory of the libidinal body. The 
theoretical concepts of Freudianism are corrected and affirmed once 
they are understood, as suggested in the work of Melanie Klein, in 
terms of corporeality taken as itself the search of the external in the 
internal and of the internal in the external, that is, as a global and 
universal power of incorporation (TL, 129-130). 
It is, I think, precisely this universal incorporation (to be understood both in terms of 
inclusion and of a making it of the body) that produces the sense of the uncanny that 
emerges in Merleau-Ponty, as well as in Bowen and Welty. Thus, when Bowen writes 
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of the atmosphere of London in the Blitz, we see a similar `incorporation' taking place. 
"It seems to me, " she writes, 
that during the war the overcharged subconsciousnesses of everybody 
overflowed and merged [... ] Sometimes I hardly knew where I stopped 
and somebody else began [... ]Walls went down; and we felt, if not 
knew, each other. We all lived in state of lucid abnormality (DL, 95). 
As we will see, Welty's notion of `confluence' ("I'm crazy about that word 725) also 
has the same sense, and the idea she suggests of "a form of human vision" is akin to 
Merleau-Ponty's vision that is robed in flesh, in all its connotations, from the 
perceptual to the desirous (OTOP, 8). To look is also to feel, to be `touched', not only 
physically, but psychically. 
These connections between Merleau-Ponty, Bowen and Welty are, perhaps, to be 
drawn most suggestively through the notion of the uncanny, which, I suggest, 
Merleau-Ponty allows us to re-read beyond Freud's famous conceptualization. 
Merleau-Ponty takes all the elements of Freud's uncanny and gives them carnal 
texture. This again is part of the "most difficult aspect" of his ontology that involves 
the relation of the idea and the flesh. 
But however we finally have to understand it, the `pure' ideality already 
streams forth along the contours of the aesthesiological body, along the 
contours of the sensible things, and, however new it is, it slips through 
ways it has not traced, transfigures horizons it did not open, it derives 
from the fundamental mystery of those notions `without equivalent, ' as 
Proust calls them, that lead their shadowy life in the night of the mind 
only because they have been divined at the junctures of the visible 
world (VI, 152). 
25 Welty in `A Conversation with Eudora Welty' (9 August 1978), Martha van Noppen, in CON, pp. 
263-280 (p. 270). 
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This drawing together of `the night of the mind' and the `visible world' through the 
flesh replays the reconciliation of twin conceptual poles, the habitation of a conceptual 
gap, that we have seen recurring throughout this chapter. In now approaching it 
through the form of unconsciousness and perception, it reveals more readily the ways 
in which it might induce a sense of the uncanny. 
Freud describes the uncanny as "that class of the frightening which leads back to what 
is known of old and long familiar. "26 In coming to understand the uncanny or 
unheimlich further, Freud also employs Schelling's description of the term as denoting 
"everything that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light. , 27 
The re-emergence of the hidden in Freud's uncanny is the re-emergence of what has 
become unconscious, either in terms of the psyche or of cultural beliefs. The uncanny 
takes one back, he claims, 
to the old, animistic conception of the universe. This was characterized 
by the idea that the world was peopled with the spirits of human beings; 
by the subject's narcissistic overvaluation of his own mental processes; 
by the belief in the omnipotence of thoughts and the technique of magic 
based on that belief [ ... 
]; as well as by all the other creations with the 
help of which man, in the unrestricted narcissism of that stage of 
development strove to fend off the manifest prohibitions of reality. 28 
The uncanny is for Freud then, in one of its key manifestations, the essentially 
narcissistic idea that thoughts, consciousness, the power of the mind might have any 
effect beyond or outside the mind of the individual subject, an idea that has been 
succeeded in both culture and the developed psyche. Interestingly, it is precisely these 
notions, dismissed by Freud as outdated, that are taken up by Merleau-Ponty, but for 
him, they describe the nature of pre-cognitive perceptual experience. 
26 Sigmund Freud, `The Uncanny' (1919), An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, SE XVII (1917- 
1919), trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1995) pp. 217-252 (p. 220). 
27 Freud, `The Uncanny', pp. 217-252 (p. 225). 
28 Freud, The Uncanny', pp. 2 17-252 (p. 240). 
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Thus, even in his most materialist moments, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy espouses 
aspects of the uncanny. In a lecture on `The Concept of Nature', he attempts to prove 
that even disciplines such as biology reveal a world that must be understood outside 
fixed categories. He suggests that in the process of the scientific study of a particular 
species, an interpenetration or slippage occurs between the observing human being and 
the animal species. He writes, "all zoology assumes from our side a methodical 
Einfuhlung into animal behaviour, with the participation of the animal in our 
perceptive life and the participation of our perceptive life in animality" (TL, 97). It is 
easy to see how eco-criticism has made good use of Merleau-Ponty's theories, but 
what I find interesting here is the way in which our notion of subjectivity and 
consciousness are transformed in what he is suggesting. Echoing Freud's notion of the 
primitive or delusional notion that one's thoughts are omnipotent, consciousness here 
is a force that has an effect outside the limits of the body. It is not just that I can 
imagine being in the place of another, but that there is an actual interchanging of 
perceptual experience; it is, perhaps, less empathy than telepathy. 
In the `Working Notes' to The Visible and The Invisible Merleau-Ponty relates the 
telepathic to what he calls "the occult in psychoanalysis (the unconscious)". Crucially, 
he then once again goes on to connect it to visibility. The notion of telepathy comes 
from the fact that the "corporeal schema [... ] is the hinge of the for itself and the for 
the other - To have a body is to be looked at (it is not only that), it is to 
be visible". In 
a later note, he elaborates: "to perceive part of my body is also to perceive it as visible, 
i. e. for the other. " The "halo of visibility" that surrounds the body and each of its parts 
precedes the actual appearance of a perceiving other: "it is a presence of the imminent, 
the latent, or the hidden" (VI, 245). 29 This latent presence, this visibility in principle, is 
what gives rise to what we call telepathic experiences. 
One feels oneself looked at (burning neck) not because something 
passes from the look to our body to burn it at the point seen, but 
because to feel one's body is also to feel its aspect for the other. One 
29 Merleau-Ponty is careful to point out that "this visible not actually seen" is different to the Sartrean 
imaginary, in that it is not a presence to or of the absent (VI, 245). 
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would here have to study in what sense the other's sensoriality is 
implicated in my own (VI, 245). 
For Freud, the sensation of telepathy comes from the imagining of an other whose gaze 
is directed at the subject, the impact of which is felt stirring in the depths of the 
unconscious. Where he discusses telepathy in relation to the uncanny, it is described as 
a trace remaining in the unconscious of an earlier mental state rather than an external 
aspect of perception. By contrast, for Merleau-Ponty it emerges from the fact of an a 
priori visibility that animates the existence of the subject, the other and the world; it is 
a consequence of the fact that being is defined by a folding over of that visibility upon 
itself. 
Once again, we see Merleau-Ponty transporting what we understand as the 
unconscious into the realm of perceptual consciousness. As we have seen, it is this 
bringing together of these disparate notions within the ontology of flesh which 
produces a new conception of consciousness. The experience of reading Merleau- 
Ponty not only induces a sense of the Freudian uncanny, but that uncanniness becomes 
central to his ontology; "everything that ought to have remained secret and hidden" 
becomes externalized, imbued in the visible. The primal or animistic traits that for 
Freud have been relegated to the unconscious, are for Merleau-Ponty more of a living 
phenomenon, not in the first place `hidden' but already in the world. The invisible, the 
unconscious, the space that is beyond representation irrupts onto the plane of the 
perceived, splintering not only the surface of Merleau-Ponty's prose, but also the fixed 
notions through which we approach perceptual experience. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological method is, in a way, a philosophy that comes late 
to a tradition; it "existed as a movement before arriving at complete awareness of itself 
as a philosophy" (POP, vii). It also has at its heart the very structure of coming late, of 
having to re-connect with an experience that has been forgotten. It is "a philosophy for 
which the world is `already there' before reflection begins" (POP, vii). But this work 
of recovery, far from constituting a regression or repetition, is paradoxically enacted 
through the act of creative expression. It is, finally, this sense of unpresentable 
experience, which pre-exists comprehension and that nevertheless fights to emerge in 
an effective form of expression, which induces the sense of the uncanny. The uncanny 
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here is understood not simply as a strange phenomenon of the unconscious but a vital 
aspect of our interaction with the world as perceiving subjects. The uncanny is 
coterminous with the flesh, that style we see emerging "as an exigency which arises 
from [... ] perception" (PW, 59). Thus Merleau-Ponty breathes life into the Freudian 
uncanny, making it real, giving it flesh. 
It is this uncanny quality, emerging from the pressure of an invisible, submerged force 
upon the surface of representation that I will be tracing through the work of Welty and 
of Bowen. In their fictional worlds, the force of the flesh infects not only their own 
aesthetic practices but also the realm of human relationships that is their literary 
landscape. Through their explorations of perceptual experience within lived situations, 
within social, historical and personal contexts, their writing plays out the human 
consequences of what Merleau-Ponty describes in philosophical terms, not just 
reflecting his ideas, but extending the limits of their possibilities. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
"A form of human vision": Welty's Pictures 
72 
The sharpest recognition is surely that which is charged with sympathy as well 
as with shock - it is a form of human vision. And that is of course a gift. We 
struggle through any pain or darkness in nothing but the hope that we may 
receive it, and through any term of work in the prayer to keep it. 
- Eudora Welty, One Time, One Place 
During the Great Depression, Eudora Welty travelled around Mississippi writing news 
stories and taking photographs as a junior publicity agent for the Works Progress 
Association. She later claimed: "most of what I learned for myself came right at the 
time and directly out of the taking of the pictures. The camera was a hand-held 
auxiliary of wanting-to-know" (OWB, 84). The knowledge to which the camera 
provides access is not that of "information" or reflection, but simply of what is there to 
be seen. For Welty, the camera represents a pure mode of vision that allows the world 
to appear for itself, but it is also a vision that is incomplete. "It was an eye, though - 
not quite mine, but a quicker and unblinking one - and it couldn't see pain where it 
looked or give any" (OTOP, 7). It was, Welty claims, only after returning home, after 
developing her prints and looking at them "by myself, that I had the chance to see [... ] 
what I had there, " the chance to respond to "the story of [the subject's] life in her face" 
(OTOP, 7). For Welty then, narrative springs from observation, from a recognition that 
"[t]he human face and the human body are eloquent in themselves" (OTOP, 8). This 
idea of bodies as expressive communicators echoes, of course, what Merleau-Ponty 
recognized in Freud: "the symbolic or poetic weight" of the human body, the inherence 
of the invisible in the visible. This human eloquence, Welty stresses, reveals itself only 
when returned by a vision that is itself `human'. For her to `see what she had there' in 
her photographs, it was necessary to step out from behind the camera, whose own 
`unblinking', inhuman eye lets nothing pass through it but light, recording the visible 
scene precisely whilst remaining coldly unresponsive to its meaning, its `story'. It 
takes an eye encumbered, slowed down by the weight of a fleshly body to respond to 
the image of a human face rather than simply registering its physical contours; it takes 
an eye itself sensitive to pain to see it. 
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In one sense then, the camera works for Welty as a phenomenological tool, aiming 
towards the things themselves, to a visual realm outside or prior to the transformative 
effects of cognition. However, as we have seen in Merleau-Ponty's discussion of 
perception, human vision has access to the world because it is of the same flesh, 
because there exists between vision and the world a structure of reversibility. The 
camera cannot partake in this reversibility and thus, through its mode of seeing, 
something is lost. Merleau-Ponty suggests that where painting produces a 
representation "according to a logic of the body and the world I know well, " the 
photograph presents a vision that is alien to my experience of the world. For example, 
while painting can effectively portray a sense of movement or duration within a single 
image, the photograph fails to do so because of its inhuman ability to be outside time, 
outside contingency. 
Rodin said very wisely, `It is the artist who is truthful, while the 
photograph is mendacious; for, in reality, time never stops cold. ' The 
photograph keeps open the instants which the onrush of time closes up 
forthwith; it destroys the overtaking, the overlapping, the 
`metamorphosis' (Rodin) of time. But this is what painting, in contrast, 
makes visible, because the horses have in them that `leaving here, going 
there, ' because they have a foot in each instant. Painting searches not 
for the outside of movement but for its secret ciphers, of which there are 
some still more subtle than those of which Rodin spoke [... ] [T]he all 
of painting is never altogether outside time, because it is always within 
the carnal (EM, 185-186). 
Welty's sensitivity precisely to the latent symbolism or poetry of the "carnal", to the 
"secret ciphers", the embedded stories of her photographic scenes, eventually led 
her 
to abandon this art form for another. Photography provided an education 
in the 
importance of attention to appearances, in the observational skills that allow one to 
recognize "the moment in which people reveal themselves" (OTOP, 
7-8). But Welty 
claims that for her, "a fuller awareness of what [she] needed to 
find out about people 
and their lives had to be sought for in another way, through writing stories" 
(OTOP, 8). 
This chapter is in part concerned with the images produced before that move and 
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Welty's subsequent commentary upon them. I want to suggest that this retrospective 
commentary attempts to conceal a discomfort about the kind of vision that 
photography might represent, about what it might be doing; a discomfort manifested in 
Welty's abandoning of the medium in favour of literature. I will also suggest, however, 
that this attempt to rescue her photographs from a particular kind of "inhuman" vision 
is not only retrospective but visible within the images themselves; in the subjects 
Welty chooses to portray and the ways in which she approaches them One of the 
central ways in which this takes place is through the portrayal of interactions that are 
grounded on notions of speech; even before she explicitly changed medium, Welty's 
images were inscribed with words. 
The desire to develop a discursive model of representation is a reflection of that 
sensibility of the in-between space discussed in my introduction. The artwork, for 
Welty, represents the result of a communication between the subjective and objective 
realms. She presents through her art the story of an ongoing encounter with the world, 
showing how it is through this encounter that it emerges. This emergent world is not 
fixed or object-like, but shifting and unpredictable: 
`real, ' as in `the real world, ' does not, as we know, mean invariable or 
static, or ironclad, or consistent, or even trustworthy. What is real in life 
[ 
... 
] may be at the same time what is transient, ephemeral, 
contradictory, even on the point of vanishing before our eyes. So it isn't 
just there. 1 
This sense of the inchoate is, in one way, embraced by Welty. Referring to the 
snatches of adult conversation she was exposed to as a child, she remembers "it was 
tantalizing never to be exposed long enough to hear the end" (OWB, 14). 
This embracing of an uncertain, open-ended reality is however, twinned with a belief 
in the essential resilience of the self. The notion of the unique and dignified individual 
human spirit is one that Welty vigorously defends, eschewing any thinking in terms of 
divisive groupings or "generalizations". Barbara Ladd notes that Welty's sense of the 
I Welty, `Reality in Chekhov's Stories', pp. 61-81 (p. 63). 
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individual was developed in the context of World War Two. She reflects on the fact 
that "individualism" at that historical moment stood largely in contrast to the notion of 
"totalitarianism". For Welty, she suggests, a focus on the individual, far from being an 
opposition to notions of community or relationality, represents a means of preserving 
smaller-scale interactions against the encroachment of State power. 2 It is precisely the 
spaces between people, as connective tissue rather than separating line, that Welty's 
photographs and her fiction interrogate. Welty looks to ways in which fundamentally 
stable identities might be traversed, consciously working "to part a curtain, that 
invisible shadow that falls between people" (OTOP, 8). 
However, despite her emphasis on unique individuality and the relationships that 
connect each to each, the kind of individuals and relations that emerge in Welty's work 
are, in some ways, peculiarly ungrounded. Describing her own reaction to one of her 
Depression photographs, Welty claims: "What I respond to now, just as I did the first 
time, is not the Depression, not the Black, not the South, not even the perennially sorry 
state of the whole world, but the story of her life in her face" (OTOP, 7). One wonders 
what precisely that story might consist of once expunged of its historical, social, 
political and geographic contexts; how might one begin to tell it outside "the 
Depression, the Black, the South"? Indeed, what remains most striking in the 
photographs today is precisely their overwhelming focus on - in contrast to Welty 
herself - poor, black southerners. Welty's resistance to these categories, I would 
suggest, is reflective of an attempt to resist the objectifying tendencies of the camera, 
something seen in her incorporation of the verbal within the visual. 
In this chapter I will explore how, in both her photography and her writing, Welty 
develops models of individual and social identity that are centred on this notion of the 
voice. Conversation, the fundamentally reversible activity of speaking, emerges as a 
site for the development of empathy on a personal scale in opposition to the distancing, 
dehumanizing effects of more public discourse. In this context, an exploration of 
Welty's approach to photography not only illuminates the visual quality of her written 
2 Barbara Ladd, ` "Writing against Death": Totalitarianism and the Nonfiction of Eudora Welty at 
Midcentury', Eudora Welty & Politics: Did the Writer Crusade? ed. Harriet Pollack and Suzanne Marrs 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001) pp. 155-177 (p. 171). 
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work, but also the way in which she conceives the interaction between human relations 
and representation. The "human vision" described in my epigraph is as applicable to 
her fiction as her photographs, in that it describes an intertwining of these ethical and 
aesthetic realms. Whilst this intertwining leads Welty towards a poetics of empathy, 
there is a threat that private interaction occurs at the expense of historical contingency. 
I will address this possibility here, investigating to what extent Welty leaves room for 
the emergence of the historical and political within her evocation of more personal 
relations. 
*** 
[Fig. 1] A group of figures squat in the shadow of a tree. Gazes criss-cross the vague 
circle, creating a net of concentration surrounding some distracted movements of the 
hands at its centre. In the foreground, eyes locked, bodies hunched towards each other 
are two men, deep in conversation. As we look at this image, our eye is drawn into the 
space between these two mobile mouths, the space of their exchange. 
[Fig. 2] In another picture, a young man and woman are standing on the street. Their 
bodies betray a nervousness, feet mirroring each other's stance, eyes too shy to meet. 
The man's arm is half-raised, his lips parted as if he is physically trying to pluck the 
right words out of the air. The woman, whose body is angled towards her partner's, 
nevertheless shields herself with a protective arm looped across her own waist, her 
other hand raised awkwardly to her face, her eyes directed conspiratorially, as if for 
support in her embarrassment, straight at the camera. 
[Fig. 3] Here again, the photographed eyes meet our own, concealed though they are 
by the shadow of the brim of this woman's hat. Seated on a porch chair, her dwelling's 
interior receding into darkness away from bright sun outside, she wields an ice pick, 
apparently waving it at the photographer. Her expression belies this menacing gesture 
however, a broad smile spread across her face. Recalling taking this photograph, Welty 
remembers the woman saying " `I'm gone kill you, ' which was her joke [... ] She had 
an ice pick. She didn't mean it. She was teasing, like 'I'm gonna get you' " (PHO, 
xxv). 
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Fig. 1 Eudora Welty, `Political Rally on the Courthouse Grounds', Pontotoc, 1930s 
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Fig. 2 Welty, `Making a Date', Grenada, 1935 
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Fig. 3 Welty, `Woman with Ice Pick', Hinds County, 1930s 
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The world revealed in these images is one drenched in talk. From the depths of their 
own silence the photographs convey the chatter of raised voices at a political rally, the 
hushed, shy tones of a courting couple, the chuckle of an old woman teasing her young 
visitor. These voices are caught for us, solidified like a glaze over their scenes, 
colouring them with that particular shade that Welty might call "human vision" 
(OTOP, 8). This human element emerges from an overlapping of vision and voice, as 
if the verbal provided the depth to counter the photographs' dwelling at the surface. 
This verbal element extends to the relationship between the photographic subjects and 
the viewer. There is a sense of an exchange in which it is not only the camera that 
shoots; those people fixed by its gaze shoot back, with the sharpness of that brandished 
ice pick. Welty's photographs might themselves be considered as a series of 
conversations, an ongoing discursive engagement. Welty herself describes both her 
photography and her writing as motivated by "a wish to respond to what I saw" (PHO, 
xv). 
In the autobiographical One Writer's Beginnings, Welty starts the story of her artistic 
development with the description of sounds. This first chapter entitled `Listening' is 
followed by `Learning to see' and `Finding a voice', emphasizing the fundamental role 
not only of voices to the development of self, but also of a more general attentiveness 
to the world. Through this narrative, we encounter the incessant titter and chime of 
clocks in the Welty family home, the "elegant rush and click" of a toy train set 
accompanied by the "cries of excited children", the music of Welty's mother's singing 
and the records played on the Victrola. But what is central is the sound of voices 
engaged in the telling of stories, of Welty's mother reading to her, of the gossip of her 
mother's friends: "as a small child I would ask to sit in the middle, and say as we 
started off, "Now, talk" (OWB, 13). Elsewhere, Welty identifies this propensity for 
chatter as something particularly Southern. 
As it happens, we in the South have grown up being narrators. We have 
lived in a place [... ] where storytelling is a way of life. When we were 
children we listened a lot. We heard stories told by relatives and friends. 
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A great many were family tales. We absorbed not only the fairy tales, 
but the sheer nature of telling them 3 
Welty, despite her supposed shyness, was herself very voluble, granting an 
extraordinary number of interviews and referring to herself as "real accessible" as a 
writer. 4 She admits, in contrast to Bowen's periodic retreat from contact, that she 
always answers a ringing telephone even when trying to work: "I can't not do it. ,5 "I 
listen all the time", she confesses, "I love it. I don't do it because I have to, but because 
I like to. "6 
This listening in life emerges in Welty's art. She directly links the spoken word to her 
experience as a reader and a writer. "There has never been a line read that I didn't 
hear. As my eyes followed the sentence, a voice was saying it silently to me" (OWB, 
11). The voice whilst "human" is not her own or of any other identifiable person, but 
she claims "the voice of the story or the poem itself' (OWB, 11). To read is also to 
listen, but this process is far from passive. Reading takes on the quality of conversing, 
engaging with another entity, another voice; it is a reflexive or, to echo Merleau-Ponty, 
reversible activity. This becomes particularly clear in Welty's discussion of this same 
listening that occurs in the process of her writing. 
My own words, when I am at work on a story, I hear too as they go, in 
the same voice that I hear when I read in books. When I write and the 
sound of it comes back to my ears, then I act to make my changes. I 
have always trusted this voice (OWB, 12). 
The words, the material of her art, act as some kind of sounding board for her 
thoughts, as if the inked lines vibrated like the strings of a piano. It is only through this 
projection into, or mediation through the outside that Welty actually comes to hear 
3 Welty in `Eudora Welty: "I worry over my stories"' (16 September 1973), Don Lee Keith, in CON, pp. 
156-170 (p. 158). 
4 Welty in Todd Freeman, pp. 191-221 (p. 204). 
s Welty in Todd Freeman, pp. 191-221 (p. 205). 
6 Welty in `A Visit with Eudora Welty' (Summer 1975 and 1976), Bill Ferris, in CON, pp. 171-190 (p. 
179). 
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what she has written. She responds to her own growing work as a reader/listener, 
migrating into the position of audience, achieving some level of externality in relation 
to her own work in a kind of literary reality-testing. The space of her writing is thus 
poised between her internal and external landscapes; it is in the space of the 
conversation. This depersonalizing of the voice of her fiction does, however, seem 
strange in the context of a notion of subjectivity characterized by the specificity of the 
voice. Whilst insisting that "every living being has a voice and every voice is 
distinctive, like no other", Welty disowns her own voice, reducing her role in the 
creative process to some sort of mediator or translator. 7 She tries to erase herself from 
the writing process to an extent, or at least to erase the notion of herself as the absolute 
creative source. This move is reflected in her approach to and comments upon 
photography. However, in the context of images which are ostensibly working as 
documentary, this denial of authorial influence is potentially more problematic. 
Welty's interest in photography developed, as discussed above, during the Depression 
when she worked for the Works Progress Administration. She was, in fact, employed 
not as a photographer but as a reporter and interviewer. Welty has frequently 
commented on the impact of this experience on her writing. What exerted influence 
was not so much the particular stories and people that she encountered as a particular 
way of approaching the world, of listening to it. The terms in which she describes this 
experience work to emphasize a pre-cognitive, non-interpretative mode of 
understanding, reinforcing the sense of Welty as intuitive medium between the world 
and the page. She says of her recollections of the period: "mostly I remember things 
visually. I remember how people looked, just people standing against the sky 
sometimes, at the end of a day's work. Something like that is indelible to me. "8 This 
focus on an indirect, visual mode of comprehension suggests some kind of 
photographic process of exposure that is more somatic than intellectual. The 
implication is that this constitutes a purer, more authentic record of experience than the 
formal context of her WPA interviews might offer, a record that somehow taps into the 
7 Welty. `Lecture 3: Finding a Voice', One Writer's Beginnings. 1983. Harvard University Press [audio 
CD from the original tapes of Welty's April 1983 William E. Massey, Sr. Lectures in the History of 
American Civilization, revised versions of which are published in O'WB}. 
8 Welty in Bill Ferris, pp. 171-190 (p. 175). 
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unconscious level of the interaction. Welty claims that knowledge of her interviewees 
reached her "indirectly", around the outside of what was explicitly said. 9 
This construction of a sense of authenticity continues in Welty's discussion of the 
resultant photographs of these encounters which are presented as solidifications of 
those indirect registerings of meaning; they are here made "indelible" not only for 
Welty but for us. In the introduction to One Time, One Place, a collection of these 
photographs, Welty is careful to emphasize the amateur nature of her image making. 
She downplays her own skill as a photographer, adamant about the "unposed" nature 
of the pictures, their status as "snapshots, " their "crudities". Rather than diminish the 
value of the images, however, Welty presents her lack of professionalism in the light 
of a beneficial innocence of vision that allowed reality to emerge untainted. This is 
combined with an emphasis on her absence of motive: "I began with no end in view, I 
just took the pictures because I wanted to. Just impulse [... ] I had no position I was 
trying to justify, nothing I wanted to illustrate. They were pictures because I would see 
something I thought was self-explanatory of the life I saw. "10 Just as she attributes her 
stories to a space outside herself, so too does Welty present her photographs as beyond 
her control: "the photographs speak for themselves" (PHO, xvii). 
In fact, the pictures are presented to us not as made objects, but as autochthonous 
beings, born directly from the world they portray. This reflects Welty's childhood 
notion about the relationship between books and authors: "It had been startling and 
disappointing to me to find out that story books had been written by people, that books 
were not natural wonders, coming of themselves like grass" (OWB, 5). Welty views 
her role as photographer not in terms of creating or authoring, but as merely letting the 
life explain itself, providing an unmediated presentation that constitutes a "record of 
fact" without being a consciously made "social document" (OTOP, 4). For her, any 
reflection or thought about the scene of her photograph or the experience it records 
occurs after its creation; "It was after I got home [... ] that I began to see objectively 
what I had there" (OTOP, 7). This abnegation of any agency in the creation of the 
images works to align Welty with the position of her subjects who are 
just as 
9 Welty in Bill Ferris, pp. 171-190 (p. 175). 
10 Welty in Bill Ferris, pp. 171-190 (p. 173). 
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powerless in the face of some mechanical process of reproduction. It is not only her 
lack of technical skill or motive that Welty sees as producing a frankness of vision, but 
also and perhaps more importantly, her particular relationship to the lives she was 
photographing. 
A better and less ignorant photographer would certainly have come up 
with better pictures, but not these pictures; for he could hardly have 
been as well positioned as I was, moving through the scene openly and 
yet invisibly because I was part of it, born into it, taken for granted 
(OTOP, 4). 
Welty once again dissociates herself from the position of the photographer, installing 
herself instead in the position of photographic subject. She is not merely an outside 
observer but actually "part of' the scene that she observes and records. While Welty 
believes that this connection somehow renders her "invisible", she cannot, in fact, help 
but reveal the sinews of that connection at every stage. 
Indeed, it is precisely the fact that Welty is not absent from the scene of her 
photographs that distinguishes them This presence is symbolized in a photograph 
taken at ruins in Port Gibson [Fig. 4], near her hometown of Jackson. In this image, 
there are no people, only the looming skeletal figure formed by the neo-classical 
pillars, the remaining presence of past lives. But in the foreground, there is a shadow, 
the shape of a figure hunched forward, holding something. It is of course Welty, 
looking down into her box camera, appearing to us as some ghostly entity. The shadow 
is at once delicate, almost birdlike, and yet huge; this shape competes for our attention 
with the enormity of the ruins. As well as affirming the photographer's presence, the 
shadow draws a visible connecting line between the spaces behind and in front of the 
camera. It is a kind of visual dialogue, an exchange between the elements of the scene 
- the sunshine, the dusty trail - and Welty herself. 
Where Welty's presence is not so visible, it emerges in subtler ways. We see in the 
relaxed limbs of photographed bodies the evidence of an expected, or at least an 
unremarkable visitor. Welty's presence, bodily and imaginary, suffuses her images, 
reflected back at us as from the gestures, the gazes of her subjects [Fig. 5]. Here, a 
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young woman remains leaning on the pillar of her porch in an unselfconscious, restful 
pose. There is an air of quiet contentment in the image in which, through the eyes of 
the woman that are directed out of the frame, both Welty and the viewer of the 
photograph are implicated. And here, a boy pauses in his task of, as the title tells us, 
dancing for pennies, to greet Welty and her camera. His smile is both welcoming and 
suggestive of some shared joke [Fig. 6]. 
However, Welty's easy identification with the position of her subjects is potentially 
troubling. Her own white, middle-class, college-educated background contrasted with 
the poor, black lives that her camera was so frequently trained on. This disjunction is 
one that she touches on in her introduction to One Time, One Place. "While I was very 
well positioned for taking these pictures, I was rather oddly equipped for doing it", she 
admits, referring to her "stable, sheltered" upbringing, her education and her state of 
"complete innocence" about the world (OTOP, 7). She does, however, defend her 
pictures against any attack that might be made on the basis of this disparity between 
herself and her subjects. "And had I no shame as a white person for what message 
might lie in my pictures of black persons? No, I was too busy imagining myself into 
their lives to be open to any generalities" (OTOP, 6). Once again, Welty rejects the 
notion of any wider collective or public identity in favour of a focus on the individual. 
She imagines that this side-stepping of divisive groupings allows for the development 
of empathy, a connection to the internal life of an other in which we can recognize 
aspects of our own. The danger is of course, that in so doing, the importance of the 
external factors - the historical, political, social - to the development of those inner 
lives is forgotten. " 
It is important to recognize that the way in which Welty positions and defends her 
photographs is intended to distance them from the much better known oeuvres of 
" Peggy Whitman Prenshaw, among others, sees this turn to the private individual as an explicitly 
political one, or rather, an anti-political one. Prenshaw describes Welty's deep 
distrust of public politics, 
which were "compromised [... ] for her by group conformity and racism". She continues: 
"[Welty] 
makes a case for the superior efficacy of the separate, personal sphere as the venue where understanding 
of the Other takes places, where self-knowledge occurs, and where one's political 
beliefs may therefore 
take humane shape. " Peggy Whitman Prenshaw, 'Welty's Transformations of the 
Public, the Private and 
the Political' in Did the Novelist Crusade?, ed. Pollack & 
Marrs, pp. 19-46 (p. 21). 
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Fig. 4 Welty, `Ruins of Windsor', Port Gibson, 1942 
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Fig. 5 Welty, `Saturday Off, Jackson, 1930s 
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Fig. 6 Welty, `Dancing For Pennies', Jackson, 1930s 
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other Depression-era photographers. These photographers were working under the 
auspices of the Farm Security Administration, a programme implemented by 
Roosevelt's administration in the 1930s to help tackle the effects of the Great 
Depression. Imported from beyond the South, largely from artistic backgrounds, the 
now famous group included Walker Evans, Russell Lee and Dorothea Lange. When 
considered in the context of this group's aims and ideas, Welty's apparently naive 
claims about her photographs' unmediated authenticity take on a greater significance. 
She compares her "factual records" with the "social documents" of the professional 
FSA photographers, in particular Walker Evans; "his are all deliberately composed 
pictures" (PHO, xix). She expresses a distaste for the way in which these 
photographers co-opted individuals in the pursuit of their own particular mission, 
however worthy. Hearing that some of the children photographed by Evans in the 
thirties were now resentful, Welty replies, "I don't blame them. I would be too. I'd find 
that cause for resentment" (PHO, xiii-xxviii). 
Whereas Welty claims: "I learned from my own pictures", she sees Evans as having set 
out with his own project of instruction, a ready-formed idea to which his subject- 
matter would be moulded (OTOP, 7). Evans' own work during the Depression is, 
indeed, later acknowledged by him to have been part of an effort to establish his own 
artistic style. Alan Trachtenberg writes of Evans' sense of himself as, to use Evans' 
own phrase, "a maverick outsider", something which "whet his appetite to make a 
personal mark". 12 Evans' unique visual style can be seen emerging in his Depression 
pictures. Images like `Garage' [Fig. 7] and `Negro barbershop' [Fig. 8] are beautifully 
composed and balanced, encouraging us to respond to them almost as abstract 
paintings, as a series of shapes as much as realist documents; they display a technical 
virtuosity that is simply not there in Welty's images. Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, 
the document of the Depression that Evans collaborated on with the writer James 
Agee, reveals the apparently vast difference in intentions behind such accomplished 
images and Welty's snapshots. Agee's introduction to the book is now famous for its 
remarks on the nature of the documentary approach, on the importance of a method 
12 Alan Trachtenberg, Reading American Photographs: Images as History. Mathew Brady to Walker 
Evans (New York: Hill and Wang, The Noonday Press, 1989), p. 237. 
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freed from illusion, and on photography's potential for unveiling "simply the cruel 
radiance of what is". 13 
Despite sharing with Welty a belief in the bare factual potential of the photographic 
image, the descriptions of the relations between this facticity, artistic method and the 
role of the photographer that appear in this volume mark strong differences of view 
from hers. In contrast with Welty's assertion that "what merit the pictures do have has 
nothing to do with how they are made: their merit lies entirely in their subject matter", 
Agee and Evans reflect at length on "how the pictures were made" and the influence of 
their own characters on that process (OTOP, 4). The emphasis is on these two artists, 
on their project, their aims. We are repeatedly reminded of the fact of their being 
"young men" at the time of the project: "two angry, futile and bottomless, botched and 
overcomplicated youthful intelligences in the service of an anger and of a love and of 
an undiscernible truth, and in the frightening vanity of their would-be purity" 14; "At 
the time, Agee was youthful-looking twenty-seven" 15; "Physically Agee was quite 
powerful, in the deceptive way of uninsistent large men. "16 Alfred Kazin notes that one 
important aspect of Agee's text is its "attack on the facile mechanics and passivity of 
most documentary assignments" . 
17 In attacking the passivity of the photographer, 
Agee's and Evans' approach transfers it to the photographed. Rather than working to 
collapse the boundary between themselves and their subjects as does Welty, Agee's 
and Evans' focus on their physical and intellectual agency draws a distinct line 
between the two realms. Looking at Evans' 1936 photo "Bud Fields and his family" 
[Fig. 9], it is hard to imagine this family outside the context of the picture. It seems 
quite conceivable that they might remain sitting there, inactive, slowly decaying under 
the weight of their poverty for the rest of eternity. 
13 James Agee `Preamble' to Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (1941), by James Agee and Walker Evans 
(London: Peter Owen, 1965), pp. 7-15 (p. 11). 
14 Agee, pp. 7-15 (p. 9). 
Is Walker Evans, `Foreword: James Agee in 1936' (1960), Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, by Agee 
and Evans, pp. ix-xi (p. ix). 
16 Evans, pp. ix-xi (p. X). 
17 Alfred Kazin, On Native Grounds: an interpretation of modern American prose literature (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1943), p. 495. 
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Fig. 7 Walker Evans, `Garage', Atlanta, Georgia, 1936 
Fig. 8 Evans, `Negro Barbershop', Atlanta, Georgia, 1936 
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Fig. 9 Evans, `Bud Fields and his Family', Hale County, Alabama, 1936 
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Reflecting on the "curious" nature of their project, Agee identifies something vaguely 
"obscene" in the effort 
to pry intimately into the lives of an undefended and appallingly 
damaged group of human beings, an ignorant and helpless rural family, 
for the purpose of parading the nakedness, disadvantage and 
humiliation of these lives before another group of human beings. 18 
Agee acknowledges a key difficulty of the documentary approach: the drawing of a 
clear boundary line between those whose fate it is to be looked at and those who are 
permitted to look, a disempowerment that is emphasized through the description of 
those photographed as "ignorant and helpless". Welty, however, denies the presence of 
this conferred passivity in her own photographs by continuing to emphasize her 
connection to her subjects. In a symbolic effacement of the distinction between them 
and her, Welty relates how she tried to give copies of her photos to the people in them, 
claiming that she was often asked to take people's pictures for them precisely because 
they had never owned one before. 
The resistance of the oppressive, defining gaze of the camera emerges not only in 
Welty's comments on her photography, but also within the images themselves. As we 
have seen, Evans' pictures do nothing to disguise their status as objects created in 
pursuit of a particular "purpose", however problematic that purpose might be. By 
contrast, Welty's images consistently work to undermine the notion of authorship. 
They are filled with instances of playful interaction with the camera, of self-exposure 
and performative display [Figs. 10 & 11]. By not making poverty the centre of her 
images, Welty attempts to prevent it from defining them. 
Whatever you might think of those lives as symbols of a bad time, the 
human beings who were living them thought a good deal more of them 
than that. If I took picture after picture out of simple high spirits and the 
joy of being alive, the way I began, I can add that in my subjects I met 
often with the same high spirits, the same joy (OTOP, 6). 
18 Agee, pp. 7-16 (p. 7). 
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Fig. 10 Welty, `Pageant of Birds, Farish St Baptist Church', Jackson, 1930s 
Fig. 11 Welty, `Ida M' Toy, Midwife', Jackson, 1940 
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However, in resisting one kind of story, Welty cannot avoid creating another, enacting 
an authoring of a different kind. Her claims for her connection to the world of her 
photographs and their superior authenticity constitute a challenge to what she saw as 
the disconnected, objectifying approach of professional photographers of the 
Depression such as Evans. It is a challenge related to her opposition to public politics 
in favour of the more private realms of human relations. The photographs themselves 
are deployed as a part of this challenge, created to adhere to its terms as much as 
Evans' pictures adhere to the terms of his own project. In response to an ethical 
question pertaining to the realm of human relationships, Welty deploys an aesthetic 
model, albeit one that is based upon a discourse of de-aestheticization. 
This response is echoed in Welty's approach to fiction writing. In a 1965 essay entitled 
`Must the Novelist Crusade? ', she openly discusses her reservations about entering the 
public, historical world of politics. Welty responds to the criticism that her writing did 
not more overtly address the troubles in her native South: "All right Eudora Welty, 
what are you going to do about it? Sit down there with your mouth shut? "19 She 
identifies fiction's inherent complexity as the reason for its failure as polemic. 
Whereas "the generality" is the key weapon for the crusader, "on fiction's pages, 
generalities clank when wielded [... ] They make too much noise for us to hear what 
people might be trying to say. " 20 
The novel attempts to "disclose" something, making "a private address". 
21 By contrast, 
Welty claims, the crusader, moving in the public world of politics, argues using "the 
voice of the crowd [which] must rise louder all the time, for there is, of course, the 
other side to be drowned out". 22 Whilst for Welty the individual voice forms the basis 
of subjectivity, the publicly constituted or exercised voice threatens to suppress the 
individual subject. The voice of the crowd, with its gathering volume, represents 
19 Welty, `Must the Novelist Crusade? ' (1965), in EYE, pp. 146-158 (p. 147). 
20 Welty, `Must the Novelist Crusade? ', pp. 146-158 (p. 148). 
21 Welty, `Must the Novelist Crusade? ', pp. 146-158 (p. 153). 
22 Welty, `Must the Novelist Crusade? ', pp. 146-158 (p. 153). 
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the simple assertion of the self, the great, mindless, general self [ ... ] 
Nothing was ever learned in a crowd, from a crowd, or by addressing 
and trying to please a crowd. Even to deplore, yelling is out of place. To 
deplore a thing as hideous as the murder of three civil rights workers 
demands the quiet in which to absorb it. 23 
Speaking may well be an expression of one's humanity, conversation a model for 
empathy, but speaking too loudly, too publicly and in a manner that does not invite 
response becomes inhumane, "brutal". 24 Welty's emphasis in writing about her 
photographs on the individual voice, "the story of life in a face" as against more 
politicized categories ("the Depression, the Black, the South"), constitutes a rejection 
of precisely this "brutality". 
Welty sees this focus on the foreground, the smaller scale, as something at which 
literature is particularly successful. In Chekhov she finds a model example of an 
approach that rejects the abstract concept in favour of individual experience. "Reality - 
along with good and evil, justice and love, and other subjects of particular importance 
to him - he dealt with in terms of the particular and personal meaning it took on for 
human beings in the course of their lives. "25 This focus on the "particular and 
personal" crumbles vast reified concepts to which everyday lives are subject and 
instead makes concepts subject to the passage of those lives. The result reveals a 
reality that for Welty, as we have already seen, is not fixed or whole, but that flickers 
like an infinite constellation. 
Great fiction, we very much fear, abounds in what makes for confusion; 
it generates it, being on a scale which copies life, which it confronts. It 
is very seldom neat, it is given to sprawling and escaping from bounds, 
is capable of contradicting itself, and is not impervious to humour. 
There is absolutely everything in great fiction but a clear answer. 
26 
23 Welty, `Must the Novelist Crusade? ', pp. 146-158 (p. 153). 
24 Welty, `Must the Novelist Crusade? ', pp. 146-158 (p. 153). 
25 Welty, `Reality in Chekhov's Stories', pp. 61-81 (p. 63). 
26 Welty, `Must the Novelist Crusade? ', pp. 146-158 (p. 149). 
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This letting go of fixed notions and definite answers in favour of a proliferating, 
chaotic sense of the world is reflected by Bowen, who writes that, for the novelist, 
human values 
are neither abstractions nor standing points; [the novelist] perceives 
them to be in their nature not fixed, but shifting. He cannot but be aware 
of the endlessness of human variation and dissonance, the doublings 
and twistings of mankind under the grip of circumstance and the 
pressure of life. The novelist's subject is not society, not the individual 
as a social unit, but the individual as he himself is, behind the social 
mask. As such, his peculiarities are infinite. 27 
A distrust of abstracted or generalizing narratives seems to be combined for both 
writers with some loss of faith in collective life, "society". While this may appear to 
be, on one level, a politically naive aesthetic, it is something undoubtedly related to the 
anxieties of a historical period shadowed by war and the threat of Fascism. For Bowen, 
as I will show, even the scene of intimacy between two threatens to become a 
battleground, never totally detachable from the effects of the wider world. But Welty 
turns to this intimate scale as a focus of faith; it is only at this level, somehow 
suspended from wider social affiliations that communication, conversation can 
effectively occur. For her, immediate, private experience has some inherent truth 
value, an authenticity for which the public realm cannot be relied upon. This private 
level has the character of the pre-cognitive realm of phenomenology; "that world 
which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks" (POP, ix). It is this 
foundational authenticity that Welty believes her photographs also give her access to, 
the exposure of subject to world echoed and traced by the exposure of the film to light. 
Welty identifies a narration of this exposure to the world in the work of Henry Green, a 
novelist whom she greatly admired. The manner in which she describes this aspect of 
Green bears relation to her own work. Like Toynbee, whose response to Green we saw 
in my introduction, Welty identifies within Green's hallucinatory aesthetic a dogged 
27 Bowen, `Disolyalties' (1950), in MT, pp. 60-62 (p. 60). 
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devotion to some enduring, grounded element. His employment of a "most interesting 
and vital imagination" is tempered by "a knowledge of the wide world"; imagination 
here is not an escape from reality but a means of opening towards it. 28 
You could say that he starts with the visible and present world, the 
variety of its people, and time. Then you could take one theme of his to 
be the extreme, almost triumphant vulnerability of man to this mortal 
world and variety, what with the power of the feelings and the fates and 
the plain nuisances that come in the course and confinement of time to 
assail him. [.... ] A character with defenses up on three sides will be 
found in the end helpless as a baby on the fourth side; and generally - 
here is a mark of this writer - feeling the better for it. Vulnerability is a 
personal and valuable and selfish possession - perhaps more; perhaps in 
effect it is the self. 29 
Welty adds an emotional level to Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the ontological 
flesh as a "visibility in general"; for her it becomes a "vulnerability in general". This 
notion of a self that is constituted by its exposure to the dangers of a potentially hostile 
world coincides, as we will see, with Bowen's notion of a subjectivity always under 
threat. Welty evokes a sense of an ever-imminent impact and the ingenious but futile 
attempts people make to stave off the knowledge of it. 
Signs, omens, charms and works, hopes, confidences, deceptions and 
self-deceptions, truth and lies, loving and harre-doing, everything sweet 
or formidable that we go provided with all in the end tell what we tried 
to provide against. All, down to the most frittering talk and most antic 
behaviour of daily living, are eloquent of the complicated, almost 
oriental threats that are constantly being made against our living at all. 
Death by inches is waiting just beyond the door, and someday the dead 
2 Welty, `Henry Green: Novelist of the Imagination' (1961), in EYE, pp. 14-29 (pp. 14-15). 
29 Welty, `Henry Green', pp. 14-29 (pp. 14-15). 
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pigeon, or the fire bomb, will come tumbling down from the sky 
30 straight for somebody's head. 
However, this vulnerability works in different ways for Bowen and Welty. For 
example, as I will show, in Bowen's The Death of the Heart, exposure to the world 
results in the loss of some inner life. "At the back of the spirit a mysterious landscape, 
whose perspective used to be infinite, suddenly perishes: this is like being cut off from 
the country for ever. Not even meeting its breath down the city street" (DH, 417). For 
Welty, even in the midst of a "triumphant" vulnerability, there remains something 
within the self that is inviolable, some "indelibility in the face of chaos". 31 This 
perceived resilience is what leads Welty to refer to the poverty-ravaged lives that she 
photographed in the Depression as characterized by "dignity", as "heroic"; the 
individual becomes a point of resistance against the outer workings of history. 
"Trouble, even to the point of disaster, has its pale, and these defiant things of the 
spirit repeatedly go beyond it, joy the same as courage" (OTOP, 6). 
In this context, the smalinesses of everyday routine, "the personal and the particular, " 
become the emblems of this heroic survival. By contrast for Bowen, the banalities of 
this routine become "threatening and meaningless" (DH, 417). For her, as we will see 
in my next chapter, far from representing a means of defying an external threat - that 
of a hostile wider history - the patterns of "carrying on" are themselves the evidence of 
the threat, the suppressed lunacy, that they are meant to conceal. Banality - empty 
social mores, perfectly polished furniture, the ordered progression of mealtimes - is 
the symptom of a deeper excess. Where Welty brackets off human lives from the 
brutalities of history, actively working to delimit the private and public realms, Bowen 
cannot stop seeing "how psyches get shaped by history" and vice-versa. 32 For her, the 
spirit can never totally "go beyond" external trouble; vulnerability is total and 
terrifying. Welty's belief in the essential durability of the human spirit is what allows 
her, perhaps naively, to conceive of vulnerability as "triumphant", "valuable". It 
constitutes a sensitivity to the world that is grounded in a fundamental solidity. 
30 Welty, `Henry Green', pp. 14-29 (p. 16). 
31 Welty, `Henry Green', pp. 14-29 (p. 26). 
32 Lyndsey Stonebridge, `Anxiety at a time of Crisis', History Workshop Journal 45 (Spring 1998), 171- 
182 (171). 
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Exposure to the world may leave its scars, imprint its lines on a face, but that heroic, 
surviving element emerges through the physical evidence of suffering unscathed. 
Merleau-Ponty describes how through witnessing another's efforts to protect him or 
herself from suffering, through his exercise of the will to survive, we come to develop 
a sense of empathy. 
The moment the man wakes up in the sun and reaches for his hat, 
between the sun which burns me and makes my eyes squint and the 
gesture which from a distance over there brings relief to my fatigue, 
between this sweating forehead and the protective gesture which it calls 
forth on my part, a bond is tied without my needing to decide anything. 
If I am forever incapable of effectively living the experience of the 
scorching the other suffers, the bite of the world as I feel it upon my 
body is an injury for anyone exposed to it as I am - and especially for 
this body which begins to defend itself against it (PW, 137). 
From my awareness of otherness within myself through the reversibility relation, the 
fact that I am both touched and touching, both the subject and the object of my gesture 
to shade myself from the sun, there emerges an awareness of the other person. The 
other must be understood as a unique individual who through being unique, is like me; 
the facts of their experience are not like anyone else's, but their feeling of those facts, 
their vulnerability to them and the reaction that is provoked, is something that I can 
understand, that I myself experience. 
Whilst the photograph is capable of stating the facts of this exposure to the world, for 
Welty, it is the writer's task not merely to witness this other exposure but to inhabit it 
from within. The writer goes beyond what Merleau-Ponty describes, not merely 
empathizing with the fact that the other experiences the bite of the world, but deducing 
the unique imprint left by the particular bite that person has received; Welty thus 
imagines precisely the possibility of "effectively living" the other's experience that 
Merleau-Ponty denies. Individual suffering is imagined by Welty not as something that 
works to isolate individuals from one another, but as some dehiscence, some 
connection between them; as evidence of a shared vulnerability. From the recognition 
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of a transcendent kernel of sameness, one can undertake an inhabiting of situated 
otherness, of the contingent nature of the other's construction as an other. History is 
thus come upon obliquely, through the story of its effects, through the inverted imprint 
of its pattern. 
The proper exercise of the writer's imaginative capacities is thus, Welty suggests, 
more valuable than the novelist who directly `crusades', who manipulates "stock 
characters" for the sake of moral comment; who puts the history before the individual 
"story of life". In the 1960s, in response to the racist assassination of Medgar Evers, a 
black man from Jackson, Welty was driven to write a short story. `Where is the voice 
coming from? ' is one her very few overtly political works. 
I did write a story the night it happened. I was so upset about this and I 
thought: I live down here where this happened and I believe that I must 
know what a person like that felt like - this murderer. There had been 
so many stories about such a character in the stock manner, written by 
people who didn't know the South, so I wrote about the murderer 
intimately - in the first person, which was a very daring thing for me to 
do. 33 
Through examining her own experience of the world with which this man had 
interacted, imagining the ways that the world might have sunk its teeth into him, Welty 
attempted to produce an intimate portrait of a character insidious to her own moral 
sense. It was, as it happened, a portrait so accurate that the manuscript had to be 
changed at the last minute before publication; the facts of the case, discovered 
subsequently to the story's writing, were so close to Welty's imagined version of 
events that there was concern the trial might be influenced. 
The story constitutes the murderer's description of the events surrounding the murder, 
all told in his chillingly leisured Southern drawl. This discomfort is added to by the 
casual attitude towards the killing, which takes place quickly, quietly and without 
conscience. Indeed, the whole narrative is strangely emotionless. The motivation for 
33 Welty in Todd Freeman, pp. 191-221 (p. 203). 
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the murder is not anger or hate so much as an irritation arising from a sense of political 
impotence, an invisibility in the affairs of the world which is contrasted by the 
appearance of a "black nigger face" on the television (WVC, 603). "Ain't it about time 
us taxpayers starts to calling the moves? [ ... 
] Even the President so far, he can't walk 
in my house without being invited" (WVC, 607). However, the murder is presented not 
as an overtly political act, not in the name of anyone but the murderer himself, "for my 
own pure-D satisfaction" (WVC, 604). Far from being an event of public significance, 
the killing seems a purely private matter. Indeed, the narrator describes a strange and 
unsettling sort of intimacy between himself and his victim. As he approaches the scene 
of the crime, he notes the surroundings with the attentive gaze of a lover who sees 
everything in the context of their beloved: "his street, " "his light on waiting for me, " 
"his garage, " "his driveway" (WVC, 603). The stifling heat which hangs over the 
whole story envelops both bodies, the killer and the killed, together: "But it was so hot 
all I did was hope and pray one or the other of us wouldn't melt before it was over" 
(WVC, 603). As a car pulls up ("a new white car" which causes further affront; the 
killer could never afford it himself) and the awaited figure steps out, this intimacy 
builds to an uncomfortable climax. "That was him. I knowed it [... ] I knowed him then 
like I know me now" (WVC, 604). But this identification is shattered as the bullet 
leaves the gun. To send home the point, the gunman stands over the body saying 
Roland? There was only one way left for me to be ahead of you and 
stay ahead of you, by Dad, and I just taken it. Now I'm alive and you 
ain't. We ain't never now, never going to be equals and you know why? 
One of us is dead. What about that, Roland? (WVC, 604) 
Even this moment of delineation still, however, retains an awkward sense of 
fellowship through the use of the dead man's first name, hedging in the strange eulogy. 
As the narrative progresses through the events following the murder - the arrival of a 
delegation from the NAACP, the police swamping of the town "getting us white folks 
nowheres" (WVC, 607) - the temperature rises, seeming to spread outwards from the 
barrel of the gun, dropped in weeds at the murder scene, too hot to touch. The growing 
heat weighs on the narrator like the guilty conscience he fails to exhibit. 
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But by the time I was moving around uptown, it was hotter still. That 
pavement in the middle of Main Street was so hot to my feet I might've 
been walking the barrel of my gun. If the whole world could've just felt 
Main Street this morning through the soles of my shoes, maybe it 
would've helped some (WVC, 606). 
Quite who or how this imagined walking in his shoes might help is not clear; him in 
his heated affliction or the police in their hunt for him. But it certainly also implies a 
more general sense in which the exercise of empathy might be of help. This man's 
sensitivity to empathy is also suggested elsewhere through a childhood memory that 
surfaces in his narration. 
Once, I run away from home. And there was a ad for me, come to be 
printed in our county weekly. My mother paid for it. It was from her. It 
says: 'SON: You are not being hunted for anything but to find you. ' 
That time, I come on back home (WVC, 607). 
That simple message from mother to son demonstrates an ability to imagine one's way 
inside the feelings of another, to feel the street "through the soles of [his] shoes". The 
exactness of the recollection suggests an implicit acknowledgement of its fittingness at 
the time and its efficacy, confirmed by the prompted return home. But once again, this 
skirting of the edges of revelation by the narrator fails; he fails to make the imaginative 
leap himself that he values being made toward him. As the story ends, he sits with his 
guitar "with nobody home but me, and I start to play, and sing a Down. And sing a- 
down, down, down, down. Sing a-down, down, down, down. Down" (WVC, 607). 
In exercising the empathetic powers of fiction, Welty manages to demonstrate the fatal 
consequences of their failure in others. This is a failure somehow connected to the 
emasculating effects of public power and politics on the individual. These effects, she 
seems to suggest, lead to a sense of universal persecution and the subsequent growth of 
small-scale resentments within that realm. What is most disturbing in the story is the 
way that such resentment binds the opposed parties to each other in a way that negates 
empathy. They are linked through their shared vulnerability to the same heat, the same 
general atmosphere, but rather than taking this common suffering as a point of 
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identification, the murderer chooses to let it isolate them from one another. His final 
song brings to us a lament for this fact and a pessimistic intimation of what the future 
may hold. 
Despite her resistance to the role of the novelist as crusader, Welty is not, in the words 
of her anonymous night time callers, "sitting down there with her mouth shut", 
resigned to the situation in which she finds herself. This story is an attempt to 
understand a potential enemy and to prompt her reader to understand, to make the 
imaginative leap where her narrator fails, to ask with the title: where is the voice 
coming from? This connection between voice (or subjectivity) and situation (the 
`where') is key; "[characters'] meaning must always bear on and be defined by what 
they came out of. " 34 This grounding is not, as already discussed, a publicly 
constructed one, but rather the "where" and "what" of the character's source can only 
be understood through the personal and particular. It is in this context of a potential 
collapse of understanding and empathetic association that Welty employs her 
photographs as symbols of connectivity. Through them, she emphasizes the emotive 
power of the domestic scene, cementing together subjectivity and situation, as I will 
now demonstrate, through the notion of "home". 
*** 
If Welty's fictional voices are ungrounded in a historical sense, they are certainly 
firmly rooted in a non-specific idea of "home". It is true that her writing is tied to its 
region, appearing within a landscape whose customs and contours she knows 
intimately. But "home" for Welty, rather than expressing a specific material 
connection to a place, is important in the sense of a feeling that emerges from the 
development of affective relational ties; it is a form of relatedness, almost, in fact, an 
emotion. "Home" as a general term constitutes precisely that concern for "private life", 
for "human relations", for the "personal and particular" that Barbara Ladd sees Welty 
pitting against larger, more public narratives of identity. 35 "Home" is capable of 
3-4 Welty in `A Conversation with Eudora Welty' (22 June 1980), Joanna Maclay, in CON, pp. 299-319 
(p. 314). 
3s Ladd, pp. 155-177 (p. 156). 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Two 105 
encompassing the sense of a shifting reality in that, for every subject that speaks it, it 
refers to a different location. At its heart, however, in its shared sense, it contains a 
notion of rootedness, an idea of fixed, definite identity. Home, I want to suggest, is the 
term through which Welty's exploration of rootedness and dissolution, presence and 
contiguity can be explored. 
If home might be seen as a site of resistance, it also has the potential to be an inhibiting 
force; the domestic "sheltered" aspects of Welty's life and works were felt not just as a 
creative source by Welty as she claims, but also as a potential limitation. This emerges 
in her desire for newness, for experiences beyond her own, for travel and also in her 
fascination with and use of tropes of transformation. But even as these journeys are 
undertaken and these transformations take place, the fixed grounds from which they 
emanate - home, the real thing - remain fundamentally unchanged, always present 
within the passage away from them. In the same way, the photograph both transforms 
the world before us and leaves it intact; it concretizes the process of transformation, 
preserving it as a reliable, symbolic ambassador of the world in a way that is 
potentially dangerous. It was this danger that Welty saw in the photographs of Walker 
Evans, in his portrayal of one poor family as an eternal allegory of poverty. It is, I 
would suggest, against this danger that she invests her own images with the idea of 
dialogue, in the hope that they might continue to speak back, go on announcing their 
individual "defiant things of the spirit" against a homogenizing historical gaze (OTOP, 
6). 
Home was somewhere that Welty herself literally never got away from, being born and 
dying in the same small town within the space of a few blocks; the house in which she 
was born in fact overlooks the cemetery where she is buried. In her many interviews 
and non-fictional writings, this close relation to home is portrayed by Welty as vital 
and beneficial. In response to being asked what her most significant choice had been, 
Welty replied: "I chose to live at home in a familiar world and have never regretted 
it. "36 This connection to and affection for home is clearly related to Welty's preference 
for the private over the public sphere, something reflected in the domestic settings of 
many of her stories and photographs. It also, in its combination of the universal and the 
36 Welty in `Eudora Welty' (Fall 1970), Barbaralee Diamonstein, in CON, pp. 38-47 (p. 39). 
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particular, expresses something of that sense of the resilient, surviving individual 
spirit. 
The word `home' appears in twelve of the pictures' titles from One Time, One Place, 
applied to widely varying scenes. The rundown shacks of poor black families and the 
half-sunk houseboat of a poor white one, the grandeur of a old colonial mansion, and 
ruins of various kinds. The suggestion is that whatever surface level changes might 
occur, whether the physical dwelling slides into dilapidation or shines under a new 
layer of paint, its meaning, its essential character does not change. The application of 
the term to so many different places works to disconnect it from Welty's authorial 
voice and make it seem as though it is spoken by the inhabitants of the images; `home' 
expresses the specific relation of these people to this place. This sense of the control 
of the term being in the hands of the subjects rather than the viewer or maker of the 
picture is enhanced by the fact that Welty never enters the houses in them. Her 
photographs are always of exteriors, often with the home's occupants interposed 
between the camera and the building [Figs. 12 & 13]. 
While the idea and connection to home may well he at the centre of Welty's work, the 
opposite of home is just as vital. This is reflected in her preoccupation with travel; One 
Writer's Beginnings is full of journeys and reflections on their importance to her 
aesthetic development. She describes her childhood trips to her mother's family in 
Ohio as producing some kind of physical awareness of narrative. "The trips were 
wholes unto themselves. They were stories. Not only in form, but in their taking on 
direction, movement, development, change" (OWB, 68). This love of travel stayed 
with Welty into adulthood, leading her editor to write in 1947: "I can see that you are 
by way of becoming our best travelled author. , 
37 It seems, though, that Welty's thirst 
for travel was thwarted on many occasions, largely due to familial commitments: much 
of Welty's life - until she was in her sixties - was spent 
looking after her increasingly 
frail mother. In One Writer's Beginnings. Welty describes the "the torment and guilt" 
that she has always attached to travel: "they seemed, each journey away from home, 
something that might have been less selfishly undertaken, or something that would test 
37 Lambert Davis at Harcourt, Brace & Co, letter to Welty (June 23 1947) [unpublished], MDAH. 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Two 107 
Fig. 12 Welty, `Home', Claiborne County, 1930s 
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Fig. 13 Welty, `Home', Jackson, 1930s 
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us, or something that had better be momentous, to justify such a leap in the dark" 
(OWB, 94). 
Welty's powerful connection to home certainly seems to balance on the line between 
blessing and burden. This is borne out by her private letters, which detail how her 
responsibility to her mother frequently confined her to Jackson. She was driven to miss 
important cultural events outside Mississippi, to cancel work engagements and even, it 
appears, stopped from being able to write. Her letters to Lehman Engel, a friend from 
childhood, are littered with references to her mother's illness, her own subsequent 
exhaustion and her disappointments at missed opportunities. 38 In one letter, she writes 
excitedly of a Ford Foundation grant she has been offered to help her write a play, 
which would involve spending six months in New York. "Of course it's like a dream 
and maybe always will be, for I'll have to work it out some way to be able to leave 
[ 
... 
]I have to do this. "39 A subsequent letter reveals: "I see no prospect of taking up 
the Ford grant, since I am now more needed than ever. "40 She cancels various trips to 
New York due to her mother's health, on at least one occasion missing the opening of 
Engels' new show: "It kills me to miss it. The family situation. "41 Elsewhere: "Things 
aren't any better at home and I've felt lately both depressed about it and unequal to 
coming. , 42 The letters reveal the effects of this situation on her professional as well as 
her emotional life: "I've got way behind with my work, etc., on account my mother 
had a right wrist out of commission, still has, and I'm so inefficient"43; "I do well but 
can't seem to get back into words. , 44 Receiving a letter from a friend on a trip to 
London during a period of being held in Jackson by the pull of her familial 
commitment, Welty writes: "The thought of travel is nice to get wind of here. , 45 This 
sense of travel as some kind of relief is repeated in another letter, which discusses her 
mother's illness. 
38 Lehman Engel collection, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi. 
39 Welty, letter to Lehman Engel (n. d. ) [unpublished], Lehman Engel Collection. 
ao Welty, letter to Lehman Engel (June 3,1960) [unpublished] Lehman Engel Collection. 
" Welty, letter to Lehman Engel (n. d. ) [unpublished], Lehman Engel Collection. 
42 Welty, letter to Lehman Engel (n. d. ) [unpublished], Lehman Engel Collection. 
43 Welty, letter to Lehman Engel (n. d. ) [unpublished], Lehman Engel Collection. 
'-' Welty, letter to Lehman Engel (n. d. ) [unpublished], Lehman Engel Collection. 
45 Welty, letter to Lehman Engel (n. d. ) [unpublished], Lehman Engel Collection. 
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For some reason I haven't been able to write letters to my old and 
honest friends, even to say thank you and remember pleasures [... ] but 
that's because the prospects have looked dark and I was afraid I'd say 
so [... ] By the same token I haven't written anything, but while I was 
off having such a good time in New York my ideas got gently shifted 
into shape, so I intend to work at first chance. 46 
Here the relief is specifically creative, the distance from home somehow providing the 
space for ideas to shift. 
While there is no doubt that Welty's deep connection to her home place is a 
fundamental aspect of her writing, it is also true that this is accompanied by a need for 
newness, not-home. This ambivalent significance of "home" is frequently overlooked 
in criticism on Welty. For example, in her recent comparative study of the concept of 
"home" in Welty's and Walker Percy's literature, Marion Montgomery suggests that 
Mississippi, their shared homeland, "appears more a problem for Percy than for his 
friend Eudora, for whom Jackson is reassuring and comforting as a writer". 47 This 
application of a happy, "comforting" gloss to Welty's work and life is, as we shall see 
in a subsequent chapter, a recurring feature throughout critical responses. Hermione 
Lee, however, does recognize something less straightforward at work in Welty's 
writing. Her double-edged approach to notions of home and the accompanying ones of 
community and family, Lee claims, is "one of the great energizing paradoxes" of her 
work; "what she most celebrates is also most resisted. " 48 While her writing is tied to a 
particular place - in a way that became a superstition for Welty - she seems to have 
some need to simultaneously transcend that fixedness, to imagine its other in tandem 
with itself. This paradoxical sense is captured in the oft-quoted (they even appear on 
her tombstone) final lines of One Writer's Beginnings. "As you have seen I am a writer 
who came of a sheltered life. A sheltered life can be a daring life as well. For all 
46 Welty, letter to Lehman Engel (n. d. ) [unpublished], Lehman Engel Collection. 
47 Marion Montgomery, Eudora Welty & Walker Percy: The Concept of Home in their Lives and 
Literature (Jefferson NC and London: McFarland & Co. Inc, 2004), 1. 
48 Hermione Lee, Introduction to The Collected Stories of Eudora Welty (London: Virago, 1998), pp. ix- 
xxi (p. xxi). 
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serious daring starts from within" (OWB, 104). "All serious daring", all departures 
from what is known, what is safe, "starts from within", from that very known-ness, 
that safety itself. There is an intimate and chiasmic relation between home and not- 
home. Welty's model of empathetic relationality develops along the same lines. We 
could gloss the enunciation of her photographs, for example: I begin by knowing 
myself, from some fixed and certain centre. From that experience of myself and my 
relation to the world, the location and feeling of my `home', I come to understand the 
other, I can perceive her connection to her 'home'. 
This structure of a fixed ground and a revelatory migration beyond it brings us back to 
that in-between space described in my introduction. The "desperate marvellous 
shuttling" between fixity and shiftingness emerges in Welty's relation of the real and 
the fantastic. "Fantasy itself must touch ground with at least one toe" she tells us, 
perching her stories on the hinge between the most known and the most strange. 49 This 
earthbound approach to fantasy is evident in Welty's writing. Even in its most 
mysterious moments it is reluctant to ever let us leave reality, something that changes, 
even accentuates, the sense of strangeness rather than diminishing it. As Bowen 
suggests: "that magical things should occur in a real-life place makes them, to me, 
more magical. , 50 The Robber Bridegroom, Welty's retelling of a Grimm Brother's 
story in the context of the actual historical and geographical setting of the eighteenth- 
century Natchez Trace, is a book-length example of this. Bowen referred to this text as 
"a fairyless fairy tale, " and it is not only here that Welty de-wings a potentially 
magical figure. 51 In `The Petrified Man', as two women talk about a travelling 
freakshow, they switch between descriptions of the exotic wonders and the prosaic 
details of their own lives. The petrified man himself, Leota informs Mrs Fletcher, is 
gradually 
`turning to stone [... ] All he can do, he can move his head just a quarter 
of an inch. A course he looks just terrible. ' 
49 Welty, `Place in Fiction', pp. 116-133 (p. 126). 
so Bowen, Introduction to The King of the Golden River or The Black Brothers, by John Ruskin 
(London: Macmillan, 1962), pp. iii-v (p. iv). 
51 Bowen, Review of The Golden Apples by Eudora Welty (1950), in MT, pp. 172-174 (p. 173). 
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`I should think he would, ' said Mrs Fletcher frostily. `Mr Fletcher takes 
bending exercises every night of the world. I make him. ' 
Next up for discussion is Lady Evangeline, a mind reader. "Was real good, " Leota 
admits. "She had what Mrs Pike said was the `sixth mind' but she had the worst 
manicure I ever saw on a living person. , 52 
At moments both writing and photography can occupy this liminal aesthetic space, this 
crossing of the space between the mundane and the fantastic, the physical thing and the 
mythical transformation of the thing. It is perfectly captured by one of Welty's 
photographs [Fig. 14], in which we see the mechanical weight of a fairground ride 
against a background of soft white clouds. At the end of a metal pole there is, 
suspended in mid-air, an upside-down boat, small against the vast expanse of the sky. 
Extended from the boat's shadowy pit is a pair of human arms, flailing impossibly into 
the void, their visible movements translating to us the forward lurch of the ride's 
progress. The boat in the picture is flying but, as the heavy mechanism of the ride 
reminds us it is also fixed to the ground, earthbound. We feel the imminent fall in our 
own stomachs, catching our breath at the force of the anticipated freewheel. This 
arrested moment, still as it is, somehow contains the entire revolution of the 
mechanism. 
One Writer's Beginnings traces such transformative moments that are identified by 
Welty with a significant development of her artistic vision. She describes as some of 
her earliest memories a collection of objects, "instruments that would instruct and 
fascinate", belonging to her father. These included "a telescope with brass extensions", 
"a folding Kodak", "a magnifying glass, a kaleidoscope and a gyrosope", and "an 
assortment of puzzles composed of metal rings and intersecting links and keys chained 
together" (OWB, 3). These earliest objects, these remembered instruments of 
perceptual transformation and trickery cast their shadow across the subsequent story of 
Welty's life, both psychic and perceptual. Her process of psychological and artistic 
development - or `transformation' - is achieved through various encounters with 
52 Welty, `Petrified Man', A Curtain of Green: a volume of stories (1941), (London: John Lane, 1943) 
pp. 34-50 (p. 41). 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Two 
K 
113 
Fig. 14 Welty, `Death Defying, State Fair', Jackson, 1939 
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objects or perceptual events which themselves display transformative aspects. The 
story of her life swings acrobatically from moment to moment through this text, 
tracing the changes that occur not only between these islanded instances but also, more 
importantly, within them. Welty discovered through photography how to recognize 
"the moment in which people reveal themselves", and her retrospective account of her 
progression through childhood constitutes a succession of such revelatory instances 
(OTOP, 7-8). "Learning stamps you with its moments", she declares. "Childhood's 
learning is made up of moments. It isn't steady. It's a pulse" (OWB, 9). 
Welty recalls an instance from her childhood when she drew a daffodil with a yellow 
pencil in a children's art class: "my sharpened yellow pencil and the cup of the yellow 
daffodil gave off whiffs just alike. That the pencil doing the drawing should give off 
the same smell as the flower it drew seemed part of the art lesson - as shouldn't it be? " 
(OWB, 9-10). This slippage between senses is also a slippage between what is real and 
what is represented. A similar transformation occurs at another moment, alluded to 
earlier, in which Welty describes as her learning the physicality of language. 
There comes the moment, and I saw it then, when the moon goes from 
flat to round. For the first time it met my eyes as a globe. The word 
`moon' came into my mouth as though fed to me out of a silver spoon. 
Held in my mouth the moon became a word. It had the roundness of a 
Concord grape Grandpa took off his vine and gave me to suck out of its 
skin and swallow whole, in Ohio (OWB, 10). 
First of the transformations in this passage is the moment of Welty's enriched seeing 
of the moon; "the moment in which it revealed itself' perhaps. Then this newly seen 
satellite becomes a word, migrates into language. And finally, it becomes a metaphoric 
grape. The transformation of the actual perception coincides with the transubstantiation 
from object to word and from word to image in a process almost cyclical. This 
linguistic passage echoes the path of that photographed fairground ride, swinging 
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around its axis, the movement confined to a delimited space: the reach of the metal 
arm, the thing itself, the moon as seen in the night sky. 53 
ýýý 
In an essay on `Writing and Analyzing Story', Welty undertakes an analysis of her 
own story, `No Place for You my Love', which follows the meeting and spontaneous 
journey of a man and a woman in the sweltering landscape of the deep South; 
"strangers, they had ridden down in a strange land together. , 54 As they drive through 
this unknown landscape, the frequent hostility of the environment - its extreme heat, 
its hoards of scuttling creatures, its unfamiliar faces - throws the two together inside 
the protective, speeding bubble of the car: "their chariot, among lions. , 55 The 
movement of the narrative is the movement of their relationship, turning between 
them, the only thing they share in common. Their conversation is minimal, but Welty 
displays their relation in other ways. The point of view alternately hovers above them 
both and swoops from one to the other, echoed in the switching between "they" and 
"he" or "she". There are also more physical exchanges that occur between the two, 
taking the place of the absent verbal interaction. On a river ferry, the woman's hat 
blows off to be caught by the man and he returns it to her, bringing also the relief of 
his shadow against the sun. She gives something in turn, through her maintenance of a 
53 In The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known (London: Free Association 
Books, 1987), Christopher Bollas explores "the human subject's recording of his early experiences of 
the object. This is the shadow of the object as it falls on the ego, leaving some trace of its existence in 
the adult" (p. 3). He goes on to describe what he calls "the transformational object", something "known 
less as a discrete object with particular qualities than as a process linked to the infant's being and the 
alteration of his being" (p. 4). While Bollas is clearly referring here to a psychoanalytic rather than a 
phenomenal object, Welty's narration of her own childhood experiences of actual, apparently "discrete", 
objects in the autobiographical One Writer's Beginnings, reflects his discussion. Welty transfers (or 
perhaps links) psychic to perceived transformations, reuniting the object with its shadow. What is most 
significant for my discussion here is the fact that Welty and Bollas express a similar understanding of 
the object "as a process". Transformation is concretised; tied down to a specific object or image. 
54 Welty, `No Place for You My Love', The Bride of the Innisfallen and Other Stories (London: Varnish 
Hamilton, 1955), pp. 9-30 (p. 29). 
55 Welty, `No Place for You My Love', pp. 9-30 (p. 16). 
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calm demeanour in the face of a minor crisis on board the ferry. "Perhaps her 
measuring coolness was to him what his bodily shade was to her. "56 
Welty describes how, in struggling to write the story, she realized that the key was 
where the real point of view belonged. Once I'd escaped those 
characters' minds, I saw it was outside them - suspended, hung in the 
air between two people, fished alive from the surrounding scene. As I 
wrote further into the story, something more real, more essential than 
the characters on their own was revealing itself. In effect, though the 
characters numbered only two, there had come to be a sort of third 
character along on the ride - the presence of a relationship between the 
two. It was what grew up between them meeting as strangers, went on 
the excursion with them, nodded back and forth from one to the other - 
listening, watching, persuading or denying them, enlarging or 
diminishing them, forgetful of what they were or what they were doing 
here - in its domain - and helping or betraying them along. 
57 
This story is one of Welty's most Bowen-esque narratives and indeed appears in a 
collection written in the company of and dedicated to Bowen, The Bride of the 
Innisfallen. Here, Welty echoes one of the other writer's idiomatic elements. In her 
study on Bowen, Ellmann centres around the notion of the mysterious extra presences 
that hover around Bowen's writing: "there is always one too many, an uninvited guest 
at every table. , 58 This third presence, Elfmann explains, intervenes in the relations 
between two people, "as an obstacle yet also as a catalyst to love" and also as the 
shattering of a private intimacy through the intrusion of a multiplicity of others. In a 
passage from The Heat of the Day Bowen explicitly narrates the intervention of this 
shadowy third. 
56 Welty, `No Place for You My Love', pp. 9-30 (p. 16). 
57 Welty, `Writing and Analyzing a Story' (1955), in EYE, pp. 107-115 (pp. 111-112). 
58 Ellmann, p. 24. 
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No, there is no such thing as being alone together. Daylight moves 
around the walls; night rings the changes of its intensity; everything is 
on its way to somewhere else - there is the presence of movement, that 
third presence, however still, however unheeding in their trance two 
may try to stay. Unceasingly something is at its work (HD, 188). 
Despite the apparent similarities between what is being described here, there is I think 
a crucial difference, one that brings us to Welty and Bowen's divergent approaches to 
questions of relationality. 
Where Bowen imagines the third presence as a threatening interloper to whose whims 
the terms of relationality are subject, Welty understands it as the relation itself. For 
Bowen, the coming together of two involves a potential loss of self on both parts; the 
relation remains an unbound force against which individual subjects have no defence. 
For Welty, the process or movement of relating is given physical form, a thing 
conceived from the coming together of two that nonetheless leaves each intact. In 
being solidified in this way, it is not fixed, unchanging, but continues to be informed 
by its dual source. It "nods back and forth between them", like a conversation made 
visible, engaged in process that is by turns passive - "listening, watching" - and active 
- "persuading or denying". 
But also, and crucially, where the third term is for Welty something that emanates 
from the two and marks them off from the outside world, for Bowen this extra 
presence is precisely that world, is history. As two lovers sit down to dinner together, 
we are told: 
Their time sat in the third place at their table. They were the creatures of 
history, whose coming together was of a nature possible in no other day 
- the day was inherent in the nature. Which must 
have been always true 
of lovers, if it had taken till now to be seen. The relation of people to 
one another is subject to the relation of each to time, to what is 
happening (HD, 187). 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Two 118 
Where Welty retains a belief in the possibility of a kind of eidetic reduction, a staving- 
off of history and the public world by recourse to the private realm of human 
relationships, Bowen increasingly realizes that the bleeding of the public into the 
private is unavoidable; there is no sealing off of some part of the self away from the 
effects of historicized experience. History for her is more chaotic and illimitable than 
Welty's vision of a collection of external circumstances or events, traceable through 
the imprints it leaves on individuals. Bowen is resigned to the fact that history gets in 
the way. Our intimate connection to the world drives an irreducible wedge between 
individuals, precluding the possibility of ever absolutely knowing one another, of ever 
"being alone together"; "The relation of people to one another is subject to the relation 
of each to time" (HD, 187). Welty allows us to imagine the possibility that through the 
power of empathy we might escape history and its potential divisiveness; that we 
might discover hibernating beneath the shocks of the outside world some shared, 
enduring human element. The divergence between these views is echoed within 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. Galen A. Johnson writes: "Flesh as prototype of Being is 
the opening to self-other communion and solidarity, just as it is the opening to self- 
other divergence and alterity. "59 Welty and Bowen, whilst both writing fictions of the 
flesh, interpret its possibilities in different ways. These differences account for those at 
a stylistic level. Bowen's writing is characterized by sentences that crack and break, 
riven, as Eilmann points out, by the conflict that fills her narratives. 60 Virginia Woolf 
said of Bowen's style: "I feel like you're trying to throw a lasso with a knotted rope. , 61 
By contrast, Welty's metaphoric style throws a clean circle, pivoted around a fixed 
centre. Like the photograph, it is a transformation that is tied to its source, whilst 
leaving that source intact. 
At the end of this analysis of her own story, Welty concludes that when the writing and 
reading is over, "[t]he world remains just the same as it always was, and luckily 
enough for the story, among other things, for it can test and talk back to the story any 
59 Galen A. Johnson, `Introduction: Alterity as a Reversibility', Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, 
Eds. Galen A_ Johnson & Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), pp. xvii- 
xxxiv (p. xxi). 
60 Ellmann, p. 11. 
61 Glendinning, p. 82. 
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day in the week". 62 Bowen sees the relationship between fiction and reality quite 
differently, claiming: 
any real-life scene that has once been sucked into the ambience of the 
story is affected, or infected, forever. The road, cross-roads, corner of a 
wood, cliff, flight of steps, town square, quayside or door in a wall 
keeps a transmuted existence: it has not only given body to fiction, it 
has partaken of fiction's body. 63 
Where Bowen sees a mutual devouring, Welty imagines a continuing conversation 
between story and world. The story's transformation is temporary, the world remains 
unchanged and fiction respects its boundaries. There is an implicit acceptance in 
Welty's view that there is some verifiable, authentic "real world" that it is possible to 
understand outside the influence of illusory interpretations. It is this belief that allows 
her to ingenuously assign her photographs the status of authentic slices of reality and 
also to imagine a scene of interaction that is untouched by the names applied to it by 
the wider world: "the Depression, the Black, the South. " 
For all Welty's insistence on the transitory, chaotic, messy nature of reality, her 
fictional world is one that is firmly held in its place by some deep-dug foundation. By 
setting its own limits, it shields itself from the world beyond its borders. While her 
resistance to public affairs might at times seem short sighted, Welty reveals through 
the realm of human relationships a meaning that transcends a particular history or 
place whilst always revealing the indentation of its source. She explores structures that 
reach across historical spheres, that magnetize people to each other; the minuscule 
fault-lines and junctions that grow up at the heart of human interactions. Her starting 
point and focus is the meeting of individual voices in conversation and she retains a 
belief in the value of that equal and honest communication at all levels, from the 
private to the public. 
62 Welty, `Writing and Analyzing a Story', pp. 107-115 (p. 115). 
63 Bowen, `Out of a Book' (1946), in MT, pp. 48-53 (p. 52). 
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Despite its reluctance to shout politics from the rooftops, Welty's writing 
unquestionably carried political consequences. While on one level it shuts itself off 
from the historical realm, it also suggests a model for beginning to engage with that 
realm. Her work "speaks to what is more deeply within, that is, the personal, and 
conveys its meaning that way. And then one hopes that a person made alert or aroused 
to be more sensitive to other human beings would go on to look at things on a larger 
scale by himself. "64 Welty makes the importance of the personal realm to an 
understanding of the "larger scale" clear, showing how the development of empathy 
(or the failure of it) at the individual level can and will be applied in the context of 
more public relationships. However, the belief in the possibility of this "by himself' 
carries with it the notion of subjectivity that is disconnected from the larger scale 
which it examines. Hence, while Welty's work develops a democratic vision that is 
sensitive to the value of individual voices, there is a sense in which it will always 
remain separate from the historical realm that it both illuminates and rejects; precisely, 
perhaps, as Welty intended. 
64Devlin and Whitman Prenshaw, 431-454 (p. 453). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
"Fiction with the texture of history": Bowen's Wars 
121 
I am only not afraid of a conflictless Better World because I am absolutely 
convinced there will never be one. 
- Elizabeth Bowen, Why Do I Write? 
In the autobiographical account of her childhood, Seven Winters, Elizabeth Bowen 
recalls being told about the Russo-Japanese war, which at the time was playing itself 
out "at the unsafe other side of the world" (SW, 25). In her child's imagination, this 
war was being fought between fur-clad, sledge-driving Russians and Japanese dolls in 
paper garments, modelled on the prized possession of an aunt. However, Bowen 
describes a moment in which this fantastical foreign conflict suddenly shifted into the 
realm of the real. 
Hearing a clock strike, one morning, with more meaning than usual, I 
stopped half-way up a grandstand to realize that time held war. The 
hour was more than my hour; within it people were fighting; the fur and 
paper people grimaced with hate at each other and let off guns. This 
was happening - happening as surely as I raised my right foot to put it 
on a new tier. This was my first vision -I mean, the first moment in 
which I conceived of reality as being elsewhere than in me.... (SW, 25- 
26). 
As Bowen tells it then, her first realization of the autonomous existence of others and 
of elsewhere coincides with a realization of conflict. This anecdote, dropped into an 
account of a childhood visit to a horse show with no more fanfare than the description 
of her afternoon naps that immediately follows, announces a key feature of all her 
work. As a member of the Anglo-Irish aristocracy, she was born into a position defined 
by conflict, both at the level of individual identity and external history. An adolescence 
spent in the company of the First World War was followed by the manifestation of an 
ever-present threat in the shape of the Irish Troubles and then Civil War, as 
fictionalized in her second novel, The Last September. Then, two decades later, came 
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the outbreak of the Second World War, through whose treacherous, raided years 
Bowen stubbornly occupied London. "I would not have missed being in London 
throughout the war for anything: it was the most interesting period of my life", she 
claims, and it is a period captured in one of her best known novels, The Heat of the 
Day. ' 
The idea that a life under bombardment is more interesting than injurious is reflected 
in Bowen's comments about writing. "I do think conflict essential [to the writer] - 
conflict in the self (a never quite dislodgeable something to push against), and an if 
anything hyper-acute sense of every kind of conflict, in society" (WHY, 56). Conflict 
and creativity go hand in hand for Bowen in a way that both reflects and reverses 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of creativity. Where the latter sees the artwork as the site of a 
happy union between conceptually antithetical aspects of Being, Bowen envisions it as 
entwined with a violent discord. This sense is given concrete truth in Bowen's 
description of her experiences of writing in the midst of the Blitz. In a postscript to her 
collection of World War Two stories, The Demon Lover, Bowen attempts to describe 
her experience of writing in the atmosphere of the Blitz. These stories, she claims, 
acted as releases. Each time I sat down to write a story I opened a door; 
and the pressure against the other side of that door must have been very 
great, for things - ideas, images, emotions - came through with such 
force and rapidity, sometimes violence [... ] [These stories] were flying 
particles of something enormous and inchoate that had been going on 
(DL, 94-95). 
Without the excuse of writing, she admits, "much that had been pressing against the 
door might have remained pressing against it in vain" (DL, 95). Just as making up 
stories provided Bowen with an essential release from the pressures of wartime 
existence, people in general, she claims, fell back on "hallucination", "dreams", 
"fantasies" as "an unconscious, instinctive, saving resort" (DL, 96). 2 What they were 
1 Bowen, `Autobiographical Note' (n. d. [c. 1948]) [unpubished], HRHRC. 
2 As Lyndsey Stonebridge points out, the anxiety dreams of wartime citizens were recorded by Mass 
Observation and used as evidence in a report for the Ministry of Information on the subject of civilian 
morale by the psychoanalyst R. A. Macdonald in 1939. Stonebridge, `Anxiety at a Time of Crisis', 171- 
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saving themselves from was not only the anxiety that accompanied the immediate 
physical threat to bodies, but also a threat to a less tangible sense of self. "Outwardly, 
we accepted that at this time individual destiny had to count for nothing: inwardly, 
individual destiny became an obsession in every heart" (DL, 97). In an atmosphere 
where, Bowen claims, "I hardly knew where I stopped and somebody else began" (DL, 
95), these "resistance-fantasies" provided a means of delimiting the boundaries of the 
self, provided "certainties" to fill "the vacuum for the uncertain `I"' (DL, 98). These 
instances of self-delusion echo Merleau-Ponty's notion of the unavoidable pitfalls 
faced by a consciousness trying to understand its own workings. In rationalized 
theories of perception, he claims, the ambiguous nature of bodily experience is 
bypassed in favour of a more comprehensible story. In such theories, we encounter 
"the necessary, and necessarily misleading way in which a mind sees its own history" 
(POP, 43). In Bowen too, it is such necessary delusions that provide some kind of 
stable ground; fiction, fantasy, hallucination have their own rules, patterns and 
rhythms, drawing supporting threads through a world and through selves on the edge 
of decomposition. 3 
It is not only under the conditions of actual bombing that the self suffers such an 
uncertainty, that such an "enormous and inchoate" force is felt beneath the surface of 
experience. In or out of war, lives in Bowen's writing are always under siege in one 
way or another; actual, historical war is an apotheosis rather than an aberration. In one 
of her most quoted passages from The Death of the Heart, published the year before 
the outbreak of World War Two, Bowen observes: 
182 (p. 171). It is interesting to note that the founder of Mass Observation and the commissioner of the 
report, Tom Harrisson, shares a name with Harrison, the sinister and mysterious spyer-on-spies of 
Bowen's wartime novel The Heat of the Day. 
3 This notion of the hallucinatory or fictional as a stabilizing influence is reflected in Freud's discussion 
of delusional systems. In `Totem and Taboo' he writes: "There is an intellectual function in us which 
demands unity, connection and intelligibility from any material, whether in perception or thought, that 
comes within its grasp; and if, as a result of special circumstances, it is unable to establish a true 
connection, it does not hesitate to fabricate a false one. Systems constructed in this way are known to us 
not only from dreams, but also from phobias, from obsessive thinking, and from delusions. " Freud, 
`Totem and Taboo: Some points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics' 
(1913), Totem and Taboo and Other Works SE XIII (1913-1914), trans. and ed. James Strachey 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1995), pp. ix-161 (p. 95). 
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1 swear that each of us keeps, battened down inside himself, a sort of 
lunatic giant -- impossible socially, but full-scale - and that it's the 
knockings and batterings we sometimes hear in each other that keeps 
our intercourse from utter banality (DH, 434). 
This giant, whose force foreshadows that inchoate force behind the door described 
above is, like that force, the life-spring of creativity. "The novelist's subject, " Bowen 
writes elsewhere, "is not society, not the individual as a social unit, but the individual 
as he himself is, behind the social mask. i4 It is this "mask, " the ways in which people 
choose to interact with each other, that Bowen's writing so incisively explores; but, 
following a pattern that we have seen before, the social mask acquires most interest for 
Bowen at the points when it is most threatened. In a recorded conversation with the 
author Jocelyn Brooke, Bowen admits her preoccupation with what she calls 
the horror beneath the surface - it sounds alarming - yes I suppose I 
have always been aware of that, or I've been aware of it, that 
something, something that emerged in my writing. For that reason, that 
very reason, the maintenance of the surface as a subject fascinates me. 
In fact, the more the surface seems to heave or threaten to crack the 
more its actual pattern fascinates me. 
What do I mean by the surface? Civilization, any kind of 
control. I just said that I should not personally consider myself a 
novelist of sensibility. I should if I were asked about myself rather call 
myself a novelist of behaviour. 5 
Bowen goes on to relate the story of how, when she was a child, she "got a terrible 
scare from the Halley comet. " She recalls how a young school-friend of hers told her 
Bowen, `Disloyalties', pp. 60-62 (p. 60). 
5 Bowen, `Elizabeth Bowen and Jocelyn Brooke' (1950) [unpublished transcript of a discussion 
recorded 3 October, 1950. Broadcast 15 
December, 1950], HRHRC, p. 12. 
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that this comet was at any moment going to hit the earth, that it was 
whistling towards us and that all the grown-ups knew that the collision 
and the demolition were inevitable. They were keeping it from us, and 
we children had not been told [... ] [This] panic was so intense for me 
that it finally and forever exhausted my fear of impact [... ] [I was] 
immunized. 6 
This incident, Bowen believes, also had the effect of impressing her with "people's 
formidable capacity for silence, for keeping a secret, and not less [with] their power of 
acting up, of behaving as though nothing were the matter. "7 It is this sense of 
performance that most clearly divides Bowen's notion of the social mask from Welty's 
"story of life in a face. " For Welty, the face we present to the world acts as an eloquent 
communicator of some true self. For Bowen this communication is complicated, 
distorted; she is more interested in the ingenious ways people conceal or reveal their 
"stories" than what they actually may or may not be revealing. Despite her claims for 
immunization, Bowen's writing unconsciously repeats the anticipation of an impact, 
carrying at its heart the imminent possibility of threat. "Civilization" and its incumbent 
modes of "behaviour, " the "acting up", the surface-level behaviour, the ways people 
find of living together and surviving each other, become the means for militating 
against impact. "Society" is what people do to protect themselves, a symptom born of 
anxiety. 
However, perhaps because of the sense of a need for self-protection, Bowen is not 
straightforwardly critical of the social mask's veneer. As I will discuss later in the 
chapter, her own conservative views on social relationships demonstrate a respect for 
the formal aspects of relating. Interaction between individuals becomes, after all, "a 
wary business" once the force beneath the surface has been revealed (HP, 95); 
manners, social mores provide a means, however temporary or illusory, of taming the 
lunatic inner giant. In a passage from The Death of the Heart, published in 1938, 
Bowen describes the everyday ways that this threat manifests itself. 
6 Bowen, `Elizabeth Bowen and Jocelyn Brooke', pp. 12-13. 
Bowen, `Elizabeth Bowen and Jocelyn Brooke', p. 13. 
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There are moments when it becomes frightening to realize that you are 
not, in fact, alone in the world [... ] The telephone ringing when you are 
in day-dream becomes a cruel attacking voice. [... ] The happy, passive 
nature, locked up with itself like a mirror in an airy room, reflects what 
goes on but demands not to be approached. A pact with life, a pact of 
immunity, appears to exist - But this pact is not respected for ever -a 
street accident, an overheard quarrel, a certain note in a voice, a face 
coming too close, a tree being blown down, someone's unjust fate - the 
peace tears right across. Life militates against the seclusion we seek. In 
the chaos that suddenly thrusts in, nothing remains unreal, except 
possibly love. Then, love remains only as a widened susceptibility: it is 
felt at the price of feeling all human dangers and pains (DH, 236). 
Love appears as both a cause of and a consolation for the invasion of the self by the 
world and its others. It is a both a vital driving force and a catalyst of collapse in all of 
Bowen's narratives. Love stories become war stories, from which no party emerges 
unscathed, the most dramatic example perhaps being To The North where Emmeline, 
driven mad by her obsessive love for the unfaithful and impossible Markie, kills 
herself and her lover in a deliberately engineered car crash. People in Bowen's worlds 
cannot help but cause harm to one another, act in ways that cannot be predicted. As 
Anna laments in The Death of the Heart "how can one know what people might do? " 
(DH, 422). 8 The invasive intervention of others - whether through the dropping of 
actual or emotional, external or internal bombs - prompts the disappearance of things 
in which one has invested one's certainty, whether that be the intactness of one's house 
or one's psyche. "At the height of being in love" Freud tells us, "the boundary between 
ego and object threatens to melt away. "9 Merleau-Ponty makes a related but different 
move to Freud. Rather than seeing being in love as a psychic state which has 
consequences for our relation to the outside, he sees love, and indeed all emotions, as 
those consequences. "Anger, shame, hate and love are not psychic facts hidden at the 
8 My emphasis. 
9 Freud, `Civilization and its Discontents' (1930), The Future of an Illusion and Other Works, SE XXI 
(1927-1931), trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1995), pp. 57-145 (p. 66). 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Three. 127 
bottom of another's consciousness: they are types of behaviour or styles of conduct 
which are visible from the outside [... ] [E]motion is [... ] a variation in our relations 
with others and the world which is expressed in our bodily attitude. "10 For Bowen as 
for Freud and Merleau-Ponty, the boundaries between private feeling and public 
expression are collapsed. Affect becomes effect, excessive emotion is expressed 
through excessive sensation, the psychic through the physical. 
Like the inhabitants of blitzed London, Bowen's embattled lovers turn to saving 
fictions for the certainties that the real world is unable to offer. And following the 
overflow of the emotional to the phenomenal, these fictions are grounded in the 
material world, based on a displacement of thoughts and feelings into things or actions. 
In the autobiographical Pictures and Conversations, published after Bowen's death at 
her request, Bowen describes her life as "career of withstood emotion. Sensation, I 
have never fought shy of or done anything to restrain" (PC, 9). I would suggest that 
her literary career displays the same traits, registering the "pangs of love [... ] only out 
of the corner of an eye, " only through a vision that is oblique. In this way the subject's 
internal life, that more fragile element, is protected, mediated through a more robust 
physical exteriority. In the same autobiographical piece, Bowen recalls her mother's 
injunctions, that "`You must never tire your brain "'(PC, 11), prompted by the anxiety 
that the young Elizabeth may have inherited the "uncertain mental heredity" that was 
supposedly the cause of her father's mental breakdown (PC, 10). In contrast, Bowen 
recalls, she was allowed to be physically reckless "to an extent at which other mothers 
lifted their eyebrows - falling off horses, flopping about in the sea [... ], plunging 
dementedly round and round till I fell smack down on the roller-skating rink, or death 
diving on the precipitous Folkestone switchback railway" (PC, 12). Bowen's novels 
narrate a similar coincidence of emotional restraint and physical or perceptual 
intensity. People protect themselves from the overwhelming, self-swamping potential 
of emotional attachment with fantasies, fictions, but these are invested in or connected 
to the surface of the material, are operations that occur in the exterior, becoming in a 
sense concretized. It is as if the force of emotion were displaced from the realm of 
human interactions to that of inanimate ones in a way that means even "sense of space 
is emotional" (HP, 311). In a rarely discussed essay on `Why I go to the cinema', 
'o Merleau-Ponty, `The Film and the New Psychology' in SNS, pp. 48-59 (pp. 52-53). 
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Bowen writes: "I go when a day has been such a mess of detail that I am glad to see 
even the most arbitrary, the most preposterous, pattern emerge" (CIN, 205). If 
Bowen's characters might be thought of as, in a sense, trying to ensure that they never 
have to leave the comfort of their cinema-seats, then the material world can be 
imagined as the screen onto which the feature is projected. 
This materiality can be seen in the way Bowen's own approach to narrative often 
seems to enact a kind of spatial composition. Considering her brief early foray into the 
realm of painting, Bowen expresses a sense of this materiality of writing. "It seems to 
me that often when I write I am trying to make words do the work of line and colour. I 
have the painter's sensitivity to light. Much (and perhaps the best) of my writing is 
verbal painting. "11 She carefully crafts almost solid structures with the forms of 
novels; they seem to share the dimensions of the houses about which she writes so 
evocatively. Indeed, the house can be thought of as the model outline for her novels in 
the way that human consciousness was for an earlier generation of novelists. She 
practises a sort of literary architecture, indeed, the author blurb on an early paperback 
edition of The House in Paris notes: "Had she not been a writer, she would have liked 
to be an architect, and will go any distance to see a remarkable or curious building. "12 
Elsewhere, she describe writers as "freelance makers, " claiming "[h]ad I not been a 
writer I should probably have struck out in designing and making belts, jewellery, 
handbags, lampshades or something of that sort" (WHY, 54). However serious she may 
actually have been about this (and she did in fact make her own, reportedly slightly 
odd, clothes), these comments reveal her sense of the importance of the shape and the 
look of things, of thinking about writing not just as the inscribing of a thought, but as 
the moulding of a tangible material. 
This materiality extends beneath the surface of the texts into the narratives themselves: 
if there is one thing you will remember after reading an Elizabeth Bowen novel it is the 
rooms that it inhabits. Within her novelistic houses, Bowen's vision leaves no surface 
untouched, skimming each one like a gloved finger looking for dust. One feels as 
though one has walked around her houses, that one knows them intimately enough to 
11 Bowen cited in Glendinning, p. 41. 
12 Author Blurb, The House in Paris, (London: Penguin, 1946). 
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be able to find one's way through in a blackout. "Am I not manifestly a writer for 
whom places loom large? " Bowen concedes (PC, 34). And elsewhere she confesses to 
Virginia Woolf her sense that "places are so very exciting: the only proper experiences 
one has. I believe I may only write novels for the pleasure of saying where people 
are. 5713 Bowen's descriptions do feel like a pleasurable indulgence, one that she 
sometimes threatens to take too far. This was noted by H. G. Wells who wrote in 
relation to To the North: "Technical note: In your next book, you may have pelmets in 
one room but you must not notice them in more than one room. Pelmet is a rare & 
therefore an arresting word. Q. E. D. "14 As this light-hearted observation suggests, place 
functions for Bowen not simply on the grander scale such as "London" or "Ireland", or 
even one particular house. It is built up through layers and layers of description, which 
puts every object, architectural detail, item of furniture, wallpaper pattern, particular 
nuance of light or shade, in its place, down to the tiniest reflection, the merest draught. 
But Bowen's writing, of course, goes further than a kind of literary interior-design. If 
her novels are like houses, they are most certainly haunted ones. And no object is ever 
simply, decoratively there; it is always deployed in the battle against "nothing and 
nowhere, "15 against dissolution. Bowen's literary scenes have the same communicative 
power as the French films whose sets she praises in her essay on the cinema. In 
contrast to the "unsatirical flatness" of English staging, she suggests, in such films, 
"every vase, tassel and door-handle thickens the atmosphere, makes for verisimilitude, 
and adds more to the story" (CIN, 216). Her own work builds up layers of ghostly 
presence and thickening materiality in an effect that becomes "more real than 
reality. "16 These opposing forces never cease working to undermine notions of solidity 
or certainty. Bowen narrates the meeting point of invisible forces with the visible 
world, that "most difficult point" of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. Through objects, 
landscapes, houses we see the emergence of consciousness, history and ideas. Objects 
lose their status as, to use Merleau-Ponty's phrase "a chunk of absolutely hard 
indivisible being, " becoming instead entangled with the lives that are lived in their 
company, infused with the traits of the human beings who make use of them, in a way 
13 Bowen, letter to Woolf (August 26 1935), in MT, pp. 212-214 (p. 214). 
'-'H. G. Wells, letter to Bowen (5 December 1932) [unpublished], HRHRC. 
15 Ellmann, p. 7. 
16 Rosamund Lehmann, letter to Bowen (20 March 1955) [unpublished], HRHRC. 
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that is physical (VI, 132). Thus, in a letter to Woolf, Bowen writes of the strange 
sensation of having buyers look around her house "It does feel odd [ ... 
J It makes the 
rooms feel unfamiliar afterwards; they begin to look, even, a different shape. " 17 In her 
novel The House in Paris, Bowen describes the impact of Aunt Violet upon the Irish 
house which she has occupied for so many years: "The writing-table overlooking the 
sea, where she rested her elbows among the brass ornaments, her bedroom curtains 
drawn across the daylight must be heavy with her regretful wonder" (HP, 104). This 
sense of an external environment taking on a `heaviness' of feeling characterizes much 
of Bowen's writing. Indeed, it often feels that material things are too heavy, too much 
felt. We are often made to feel like the bemused child, Henrietta, who feels "bumped 
all over the senses" by the eponymous house above. "She felt the house was acting, 
nothing seemed to be real; objects did not wait to be seen but came crowding in on her, 
each with what amounted to its aggressive cry" (HP, 18). Following the pattern of 
conflict that runs through her life and work, Bowen pushes Merleau-Ponty's theory of 
perceptual reversibility to its "aggressive" limits; objects and people not only interact 
with, but assault each other. 
This almost violent pre-eminence of the material leads Maud Elfmann to suggest in her 
recent book on Bowen that the external world in Bowen's novels somehow 
"vampirizes" its human inhabitants: 
the inner world of consciousness is `whitened and gutted' [... ] in order 
to provide the outer world of objects with its frightening vitality [... ] 
[C]onsciousness escapes into the object, leaving human beings as 
vacant as the landscapes that threaten to devour them 18 
She goes on to suggest that "architecture takes the place of psychology: character is 
shaped by rooms and corridors, doors and windows, arches and columns, rather than 
by individual experience. "19 It is true that the external world of objects and architecture 
takes on a sinister sentience in Bowen's writing. Things in her novels haunt, impose, 
17 Bowen, letter to Woolf (31 July 1935), pp. 210-212 (p. 211) 
18 Ellmann, p. 7. 
19 Ellmann, p. 42. 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Three. 131 
loom over their human counterparts. Consciousness appears as structured by the 
contours of its external horizon; characters are inseparable from the crenellations of 
their big houses or the dirty sinks of their squalid London apartments. However, I 
would argue that it is not simply a case of architecture replacing psychology, but of a 
more complex process of interpenetration. Echoing Merleau-Ponty's theory of 
reversibility, the vampirization that takes place is mutual, the process of leakage two- 
way. In a dialectical reversal, human consciousness inflicts its own damage upon the 
material things to which it clings; walls and objects become scarified, infused by 
human Being even as they are magnetized into life by it. 
In his Goodbye to Berlin, Christopher Isherwood evokes such a two-way interaction 
between an inanimate realm and the impositions of human lives. His narrator 
describes his rented room in which the objects are all "unnecessarily solid, abnormally 
heavy and dangerously sharp". He muses: 
What becomes of such things? How could they ever be destroyed? They 
will probably remain intact for thousands of years: people will treasure 
them in museums. Or perhaps they will merely be melted down for 
munitions in a war. Every morning, Frl. Schroeder arranges them very 
carefully in certain unvarying positions: there they stand, like an 
uncompromising statement of her views on Capital and Society, 
Religion and Sex. 20 
The material works here simultaneously as something that is guaranteed survival 
beyond the limits of individual human existence and something that is under threat 
from human carelessness. This latter element reappears when we are told how the 
narrator's landlady, Frl. Schroeder, reads the marks left on the furnishings of the 
apartment by previous tenants. "Yes, Herr Issyvoo, I've got something to remember 
each of them by. .. 
"she declares, before embarking on a relation of the various stories 
attached to each stain. 21 Like her own almost ideological organization of the objects in 
the rented rooms, this staining of surfaces historicizes the otherwise inhuman, the 
20 Christopher Isherwood, Goodbye to Berlin (1939) (London: Vintage, 1998) pp. 10-11. 
21 Isherwood, p. 12. 
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things gaining unasked-for meaning through their contextualization by the humans 
with whom they share space. At the same time, the humans, those past vomiting, 
coffee-spilling, ink-spattering tenants are solidified, given narrative presence through 
the visible traces of their past presences. They somehow hijack an element of the 
things' lastingness. 
In a similar way in Bowen's work, things are cathectically bound to the shapes and 
movements of consciousness. In fact, far from a process of vampirization, Bowen 
frequently expresses the sense that material objects are things to be relied upon. "Their 
imperturbableness, their air that nothing has happened renews our guarantee [... ] they 
remind us how exceedingly seldom the unseemly or unforeseeable rears its head" (DH, 
287). Ellmann is right in a sense: things do appear "frighteningly vital" in Bowen's 
worlds, but this is not because they bleed away a limited reserve of consciousness. 
Rather, they become "riveted" to people "closer than friends or lovers. " The 
movements of consciousness, the permutations of its fantasies are inseparable from the 
material world. Things do not threaten to erase consciousness, but to invade its 
sovereignty. Bowen reconfigures the ways that the physical and the psychical interact 
and in doing so, makes us reconsider precisely what we mean by objects, what we 
mean by character and to what extent the two can be separated at all. 
This intertwining means that the house in Bowen's work works differently to the idea 
of home that we have seen in Welty's. "Home" for Welty derives its power from the 
structure of relations between people; it is value that can be moved from dwelling to 
dwelling, communicating some universal truth throughout its inhabitation of each. 
Welty certainly recognizes the important relation of place and character, between a 
story and its setting. `Every story would be another story and unrecognizable as art if it 
took up its characters and plot and happened somewhere else. , 22 But nevertheless, 
there remains a human element that remains distinct from its material surroundings: 
"place is forever illustrative: it is a picture of what man has done and imagined, it is his 
visible past, result. Human life is fiction's only theme. , 23 This attitude is evident in her 
approach to the question of her regionality as incidental rather than crucial: "I just 
22 Welty, `Place in Fiction', pp. 116-133 (p. 122). 
23 Welty, `Place in Fiction', pp. 116-133 (p. 129). 
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think of myself as writing about human beings and I happen to live in a region, as do 
we all, so I write about what I know. "24 For Bowen, whose identity is riven by the 
liminality of her Anglo-Irishness, watermarked by an image of Bowen's Court, the 
specific and scarring incursions that take place between house and inhabitant override 
the notions of a more general "humanness" or "homeliness. " In an article entitled `The 
Idea of the Home', Bowen expresses concern that the modern ease and frequency of 
house-moving means that 
nothing in the home remains continuous but the idea, on which too 
great stress may therefore come to be laid. The idea may either harden 
into a fixation or degenerate into a fantasy, which as such offers itself to 
exploitation. 
Such a fluidity, such an unfixity as to surroundings may affect 
the relations between persons - husbands and wives, children and 
parents. 25 
It is as though nerves grew through walls, threaded through carpets; reflecting 
Merleau-Ponty's incarnation of Freud's uncanny, Bowen's houses are, in a sense, 
Welty's idea of "home" given flesh. 
The fascination with the surface of civilized life that motivates Bowen's novel-writing 
also emerges in other areas of her work and life. Her correspondence reflects some 
tension between the enjoyment of the enactment of social performance and a 
withdrawal from and nervousness of society. Letters from a huge range of friends and 
acquaintances reveal Bowen as an accomplished socialite and a popular hostess; a 
thank you letter from John Hayward is typical: 
What a perfect hostess you are! I always look forward to a visit to 
Clarence Terrace & afterwards it always seems even more delightful 
than I had thought possible. Always the warm affectionate welcome; 
2-1 Welty, in `The Art of Fiction XLVI1: Eudora Welty', interview with Linda Kuehl, in CON, pp. 82-101 
(p. 87). 
25 Bowen, `The Idea of the Home' (n. d. [1944]) [unpublished], HRHRC, p. 2. 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Three. 134 
the brilliant assembly; the delicious food, and that special atmosphere 
you create so that one feels one is living through one of the happiest & 
most luminous passages in one of your own novels. 26 
At the same time, one gets the sense of a very different side to Bowen. She describes 
herself in one place as being "solitary and farouche. Solitary and farouche people don't 
have relationships: they are quite unrelatable" (WHY, 23). Bowen's regard for Welty 
was at least partly based on the latter's ability to keep herself to herself. She wrote to 
Blanche Knopf, "Eudora Welty is staying at the house - working away on one of her 
great short stories in another room. This is ideal: I'm so fond of her, and her 
preoccupation during the day with her own work gives me a freedom unknown when 
one has an ordinary `social' guest. , 27 Bowen sees her own writing as providing a 
substitute for this failure to relate in real life, and it does indeed seem as if society was 
often directly replaced by work. Throughout the letters from her wide range of 
correspondents there are countless letters written to her which lament her 
disappearance from the London social scene. Bowen would frequently shut herself up 
at Bowen's Court in Ireland, particularly when trying to write a novel. Even when in 
London, she was admonished by her friends for failing to answer her telephone - "But 
why, when I ring up Markham Square does the telephone merely repeat & repeat & 
repeat my demand for Mrs Cameron until the whole house shakes, but no Mrs 
Cameron replies? "28 complained Virginia Woolf - and it seems as if she more 
frequently rejected invitations than accepted them. The gap between the social Bowen 
and the writing Bowen was noted by William Plomer who wrote in a letter concerning 
the publication of The Death of the Heart: "it is wonderful to me that someone who 
has such sociable tastes and habits as you can be as profound and philosophical as 
some old hermit who only leaves his library for his garden and his garden for his 
grave. "29 
26 John Hayward, letter to Bowen (19 May 1939) [unpublished], HRHRC. 
27 Bowen, letter to Blanche Knopf (4 April 1951) [unpublished], Blanche Knopf Collection, Harry 
Ransom Humanities Research Centre, University of Texas at Austin. 
28 Woolf, letter to Bowen (n. d. ), HRHRC. "Mrs. Cameron" is Bowen's married name. 
29 William Plomer, letter to Bowen (6 October 1938) [unpublished], HRHRC. 
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A similar tension is revealed in Bowen's non-fiction writing, often appearing in the 
form of commentary in women's magazines. These articles are overwhelmingly 
concerned with questions of social interaction and in them, beneath the light-hearted 
tone decreed by their context, one can detect a surprising degree of moral wrangling. 
In this writing, Bowen develops an ethics of etiquette that attempts to integrate her 
own twin proclivities for sociability and privacy. The articles build up an imaginary 
instruction manual on the construction and maintenance of the same social mask 
whose deconstruction her novels investigate. 
This proves a continuous preoccupation, one which occurs across Bowen's writing, 
reappearing as late as the 1960s in her responses to that decade's more relaxed 
approach to etiquette. In one such unpublished article, entitled `Was it an Art?, ' Bowen 
sets about warning the current young generation of the dangers involved in their casual 
attitude to love. "They have no idea of the forces within themselves that their sex- 
experimentations could stir up [ ... 
] Heaven help you, you wise ones ! -have you, then, 
no conception what Nature is? A very demon, a tyrant latent within you. "30 This 
"demon" or "tyrant, " like that "something enormous" behind the door, represents some 
illimitable, potentially destructive force. This may well be released in the confusion of 
love's "widened susceptibility" if one does not take care (DH, 170). In opening oneself 
up to love, one runs the risk of opening a Pandora's Box of other, more harmful forces. 
This possibility haunts all of Bowen's writing. We are not allowed to forget that: "To 
release any kind of feeling could be to release it all" (HD, 40). 
In an another article entitled `The Art of Reserve or The Art of Respecting 
Boundaries, ' Bowen addresses the problem of this threat, suggesting that the solution 
might be an emotional reticence. Where this was exemplified in "the tradition of 
manners, a whole flock of social considerations, codes and loyalties interposed 
between lover and lover or friend and friend" of earlier generations, contemporary life 
has lost its sense of propriety. 31 
30 Bowen, `Was it an Art? ' (n. d. [Although the references to free-love and miniskirts suggest this essay 
probably dates from the sixties. ) [Unpaginated manuscript. Unpublished], HRHRC, [p. 3]. 
31 Bowen, `The Art of Reserve or The Art of Respecting Boundaries' ([1952]) [Unpaginated manuscript. 
Published as `The Art of Respecting Boundaries', Vogue 119 (1 April 1952), pp. 116-117. ] HRHRC, [p. 
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In this present-day clouded, uncertain world, the value of people for 
people has gone up [... ] We invest more and more of ourselves, and of 
what we inwardly have, in personal relationships [... ] Yes, people 
matter; perhaps they matter too much - we risk disillusionment, 
tragedy, when we pursue them wrongly. Do we always realize, for 
instance, that relationships most worth having are built up on a basis of 
things unsaid? 32 
This exaltation of being "natural and frank" is described by Bowen in the language of 
violence and conflict; once again, human relationships are indistinguishable from 
warfare. 33 Thus, this prized rejection of the "false reserve"34 of one's grandparents is 
seen not as liberation but "something destructive, " "yet another campaign of ruthless 
intrusion upon the privacies of someone else's life. "35 Motivated by "a vacuous 
curiosity, " people launch "verbal assaults" on one another; "We rush, we storm our 
approaches to other people. "36 
In addition to desanctifying the privacy of others, these clumsy intrusions undermine 
our capability of becoming attached in the longer term. The preservation of an element 
of mystery with regards to our acquaintances is essential to the maintenance of interest; 
"the most interesting people are those about whom we continue to know the least [... ] 
To them, with their shadowy backgrounds and untold secrets, the imagination, 
fascinated, returns. , 37 In order to avoid chasing these fascinating shadows away, 
Bowen argues, the values of art should be applied to social intercourse. 
In handling objects of art, jade, crystal or porcelain, we are careful; we 
have an instinctive feeling for preservation. Ought we to use 
personalities more roughly? Human beings, and the relations between 
32 Bowen, `The Art of Reserve', [p. 1]. 
33 Bowen, `The Art of Reserve', [p. 1]. 
34 Bowen, `The Art of Reserve', [p. 1]. 
35 Bowen, `The Art of Reserve', [p. 2]. 
36 Bowen, `The Art of Reserve', [p. 2]. 
37 Bowen, `The Art of Reserve', [p. 2]. 
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them, are a blend of delicacy and strength: like instruments they reward 
the sensitive touch. Should not art - which means skill and reverence - 
have its place in our immediate dealings with one another? 38 
This injunction encapsulates the uncomfortable dichotomy at the heart of Bowen's 
approach to society. There is no doubt that her concerns spring from a belief in the 
value of human attachments; this cannot simply be dismissed as the protestations of a 
conservative spirit against a modern lapse in social niceties. As Bowen herself insists, 
"There is more than a charm in reticence, there is virtue"; art in this case in not just a 
matter of aesthetics, but a deeply ethical exercise. 39 
However, there is an undeniably disturbing aspect to Bowen's comments; it is one that 
goes beyond the unsurprisingly discordant effect of old-fashioned opinions falling on 
the ears of a more modern sensibility. This discomfort comes from the way in which 
human subjects and the relations between them are so coolly objectified. Personalities 
become things to be "used", "revered", "dealt with". Human beings and human 
relationships take on the qualities of precious stones or pots, of "jade, crystal, 
porcelain", brittle, inanimate substances. The advice that Bowen gives us here does not 
teach us how to love, to engage in living relations with human beings, so much as how 
to transform those beings into manageable objects, safe to be handled. 
If this transformation might prove impossible to effect in literal terms, Bowen 
describes how one might, in a practical way, get close to it. She suggests abandoning 
the direct and penetrating vision for one that is more oblique and distracted. This 
indirectness takes place thorough a reflection off the surface of the outside world that, 
like Perseus' shield, protects the imagination from the petrifying effects that the 
Gorgonic other might have. The commerce between two must be mediated through, 
almost chaperoned by external situations, places, things: "the sweet smelling hour in 
the garden after the rain, the evening by the fire, the sudden talk by the window 
looking out at the snow. " Through these metaphoric interruptions of focus, Bowen 
assures us that "the truth blossoms; the story comes to be told" rather than being 
3ý Bowen, `The Art of Reserve', [p. 3]. 
39 Bowen, `The Art of Reserve', [p. 4]. 
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shattered by a careless heavy hand. 4° What lies at the heart of Bowen's argument here 
is a resolution of the possibility "of knowing another person, the reassurance of 
feeling oneself known" with, as the title pronounces, a respect for boundaries. Here is a 
model of intimacy without invasion, which echoes Merleau-Ponty's description of 
vision, touched on in Chapter One. Between vision and what it sees, he says, there is 
"an intimacy as close as between the sea and the strand. And yet it is not possible that 
we blend into it, nor that it passes into us, for then the vision would vanish at the 
moment of formation, by disappearance of the seer or of the visible" (VI, 130-131). 
Intimacy cannot get too close, cross over the boundary or the sea wall, or it risks 
destroying the terms of its own relation. 
These problems about the question of boundaries in relating bring us back to the 
question of intersubjectivity and empathy that we have seen in both Merleau-Ponty and 
Welty. In Welty's approach to her photographic and fictional subjects, we saw the 
development of an empathetic vision that attempted to collapse the boundaries between 
people, to take on the role of some sort of medium, channelling the individual voices 
of its subjects through a single focussed lens. Welty found a sort of universal human 
"indelibility" in the unique "personal and particular" aspects of the individual. 
Supported by the certainty of this indelible aspect, Welty develops in her writing a way 
of seeing that is inscribed with, that indeed champions the dissolution of boundaries. 
Implanted in the midst of the world that it portrays, caught up in the web of the lives it 
narrates, Welty's vision embraces the intimate interconnections that it describes as 
proof of the possibility of a fully realized empathetic democracy within human 
relations. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty's description of the connections that exist between 
individuals as the site of creative potential; from "the patient and silent labour of 
desire" that magnetizes one person to another, we see the beginnings of "the paradox 
of expression. " For him as for Welty the "personal and particular" manners of "loving 
living and dying" are revelatory of some more fundamental truth than grand political 
narratives. 
However, Merleau-Ponty also recognizes some difficulty or threat that emerges in the 
question of relating; at the same time that human desire can invoke a creative force, it 
ý0 Bowen, `The Art of Reserve', [p. 4]. 
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may also, siren-like, emit a destructively impossible appeal. Where Welty appeals to 
the possibility that we may cohabit each other's lives, walk in one another's shoes, 
Merleau-Ponty's centralizing of the embodied nature of consciousness necessitates a 
recognition of the impossibility of "effectively living" another's experience. In the 
pressurized gap between the desire for and the realization of this coincidence, the 
commerce between individuals as described by Merleau-Ponty takes place in an 
atmosphere unrarified by the universal human spirit imagined by Welty. In `Man and 
Adversity', Merleau-Ponty outlines the difference of the two approaches in a way 
which, I want to suggest, illuminates more generally the difference between Bowen's 
and Welty's approaches to the question of relating. 
When man takes an oath to exist universally, concern for himself and 
concern for others become indistinguishable for him; he is a person 
among persons, and the others are other himselves. But if on the 
contrary he recognizes what is unique in incarnation lived from within, 
the other person necessarily appears to him in the form of torment, 
envy, or at least uneasiness. Cited by his incarnation to appear beneath 
an alien gaze and justify himself before it, yet riveted to his own 
situation by the same incarnation; capable of feeling the lack of and 
need for others but incapable of finding his resting place in others; he is 
enmeshed in the to-and-for of being for self and being for others that 
produces the tragic element of love in Proust's works (MA, 98-99). 
So Merleau-Ponty returns once again to the notion of the blind spot, the experience 
beyond inhabitation. What he identifies in Proust here also emerges in Bowen: trapped 
between these twin poles of being for self and being for others, the socially relating 
subject in her works is in danger of being left with nowhere to go, stuck in an ongoing 
"uncertainty of the `I"". 
This uncertainty was given terrifying actuality for Bowen in the midst of collapsing 
houses in wartime London, as it was revealed that the material things on which people 
rely are all too fragile, prey to the destructive actions of other human beings. In a letter 
to Virginia Woolf, after the bombing of Woolf's flat, Bowen wrote "When your flat 
went did that mean all the things in it too? All my life I have said, `Whatever 
happens 
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there will always be tables and chairs - and what a mistake. 41 In an essay of 1953, 
Bowen reflects on the effect of this shattering of the notion of solidity. 
The salutary view of the exterior, the comfortable sanity of the concrete 
came to be realized only when the approach of the Second World War 
forced one to envisage wholesale destruction. The obliteration of man's 
surroundings, streets and houses, tables and chairs sent up, for him, 
their psychological worth. Up to now, consciousness had been a 
sheltered product: its interest as consciousness diminished now that, at 
any moment, the physical shelter could be gone. 42 
This war, whose physical dangers and realities Bowen experienced first hand, marks 
an end of a certain phase of Bowen's writing. Inscribing its way across the space 
between two World Wars, this early writing is infused with the conflict that surrounds 
it. Bowen approaches the pressure points of human bonding; precisely the "ways of 
loving, living and dying, " which Merleau-Ponty identified as the lynchpins of a 
society's structure (HT, xiv). Throughout this prolific first decade of her career, 
Bowen dissects the pratfalls and pitfalls of human relationships, from minor tragedies 
of misunderstanding to matters of life and death, all of which arise out of relationships 
on the most intimate, domestic scale. In The Hotel (1927), The Last September (1929), 
Friends and Relations (1931), To The North (1932), The House in Paris (1935), The 
Death of the Heart (1938) and numerous short stories we see Bowen not only 
developing her own unique style out of the welter of her influences (most 
recognizably, perhaps, E. M. Forster and Henry James), but also staking out her literary 
territory in the treacherous field of human affections. These inter-war novels and 
stories are full of a series of betrayals and disappointments in matters of the heart and 
the home, something that culminates in The Heat of the Day. Written in response to the 
eruption of real warfare, this novel sees the lover finally unveiled as the literal enemy. 
It is as if a storm was building, a clammy oppressiveness reaching its height with The 
Death of the Heart, finally breaking through the jittery, paranoid sentences of The 
41 Bowen, letter to Woolf (Jan 5 1941), in MT, pp. 216-218 (pp. 216-7), 
`" Bowen, `English Fiction at Mid-Century' (1953) [Unpaginated manuscript. Published in New 
Republic 129 (21 September 1953), 15-16], HRHRC, [p. 2]. 
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Heat of the Day. After this novel, it is as if some of Bowen's previous anxieties have 
been quieted, as if the experience of the Second World War somehow cured her of 
being haunted by conflicts that had gone before; it was, in a way, the impact that she 
had always unconsciously been expecting. The post-war novels will be discussed in a 
subsequent chapter, but for now my concern is with the two named above; The Death 
of the Heart which marks a culmination of a first phase and The Heat of the Day which 
represents a move towards change. 
ýýý 
In `Thoughts for the Times on War and Death', written in 1915, Freud addresses the 
First World War and the ways in which it functions as an imaginative paradigm of the 
collapse of civilized relations. This war is synonymous with a sense of 
"disillusionment, " declares the title of the first chapter; a chapter which echoes aspects 
of Bowen's essay on boundaries. Both, in different ways, describe the danger that lies 
inherent within apparently benign human relationships. Freud describes a pre-war 
Europe seduced by a myth of itself as an international intellectual brotherhood, whose 
most cherished possessions were morality and unity. This myth of a sustained, 
peaceful coexistence was upheld by a process of individual restraint, similar to that 
described by Bowen: "high norms of moral conduct were laid down for the individual, 
to which his manner of life was bound to conform if he desired to take part in a 
civilized community. These ordinances, often too stringent, demanded a great deal of 
him - much self-restraint, much renunciation of instinctual satisfaction. "43 Staking the 
terms of their own existence upon these mechanisms of self-control, the nations of 
Europe were expected to uphold and respect them "and would not think of undertaking 
anything against them which would contradict the basis of [the state's] own 
existence. "44 But when in 1914 "the war in which we had refused to believe broke 
out, " the barbarism that underlay this apparently civilized state broke out too; yet 
another instance of that inchoate force pushing at the door. 
'' Freud, `Thoughts for the times on War and Death', pp. 273-300 (p. 276). 
'4 Freud, `Thoughts for the times on War and Death', pp. 273-300 (p. 276). 
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[This war] tramples in blind fury on all that comes in its way, as though 
there were to be no future and no peace among men after it is over. It 
cuts all the common bonds between the contending peoples, and 
threatens to leave a legacy of embitterment that will make any renewal 
of those bonds impossible for a long time to come. 45 
It is interesting to note that the period of Bowen's life that coincided with this conflict 
- adolescence - is that to which she returns again and again in her fiction; growing up 
in the midst of the Great War, Bowen's generation inherited the legacy of which Freud 
speaks. It is a legacy that emerges in Bowen's attitude to conflict as inevitable, even 
foundational. "I am only not afraid of a conflictless Better World because I am 
absolutely convinced there will never be one [... ] Something always seems to happen, 
something always seems to intervene, something always seems to halt the progress to 
absolute mediocrity" (WHY, 56). 
Given this attitude, it is perhaps not surprising that for Bowen, the war's end came as 
more of a shock than its outbreak. In an unpublished radio dramatization of this 
experience, `A Year I Remember - 1918', Bowen recalls how as a child in 1914, she 
welcomed the start of the war as a relief to the "humdrum days"46 in which she would 
weep out of frustration at the fact that "nothing happened. "47 Her generation, she 
claims, "grew up inside `the War' ; lulled and sheathed by it. Its rules were beautifully 
simple: we had few problems. , 48 This sense of the strange comfort of wartime 
continues as the piece moves on to depict Bowen's time as a volunteer worker at a 
hospital for shell-shocked soldiers in Ireland. Two such workers, "young girls", 
discuss the war's progress. "I can't imagine myself without a war, " muses one, "The 
war's simply come to be part of oneself .. . 
"49 And later another hospital worker, 
Rose, worries about the approaching peace: "I've got to go back home, haven't I? I've 
got to carry on. )750 
as Freud, `Thoughts for the time,, 
46 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 
4' Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 
48 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 
"9 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 
50 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 
on War and Death', pp. 273-300 (p. 279) 
1918', p. 1. 
1918', p. 2. 
1918', p. 4. 
1918', p. 8. 
1918', p. 13. 
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This sense of having to "carry on" through war's absence whilst still literally carrying 
the war inside oneself- "All got guns in our heads" - preoccupies Bowen's narrator. 51 
These internal guns create a never-lost sense of anxiety which contrasts with and is 
even heightened by a reality in which, as in the pre-war years, "nothing happened. " 
Bowen describes this unnerving sense of something missing as she recalls her reaction 
to receiving news of the armistice. 
I remained at the window, searching the empty landscape to see if it 
looked different. I was terrified by the vacuum, the absolute full-stop in 
my thoughts, in my being, in my soul. It seemed to me, suddenly, that I 
had grown up without having the capacity to feel [ ... 
] Peace came as 
such a tremendous shock: it felt like nothing on earth before. It was 
frightening. 52 
The end of the war appears like some kind of awakening, something which ejects 
Bowen from the dream of "the War" and its own internal logic, forcing her back onto 
her own resources. This involves having to confront her thus far undeveloped 
"capacity to feel, "53 though feeling here does not appear as a flood or excess, but as 
absence: " `Grief - why? `Despair? ' -I did not know what that meant. What I felt was 
the sunny empty calm. I felt the absence of all the dead, the young, from this morning I 
was here to enjoy [... ] That missing of unknown people - that was grief. "54 Somehow, 
that "empty landscape" onto which Bowen gazes coincides with the experience of 
emotion; it is a vast uncharted territory, an illimitable chasm. Or rather, perhaps, it is a 
"vacuum": some force, which pulls one irresistibly and dangerously into it. Like the 
giant behind the social mask, like the something that pushes against the door of 
consciousness, this vacuum is a force of the inchoate that threatens to swamp presence, 
erase the edges of the `uncertain `I"'. 
51 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 1918', p. 13. 
52 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 1918', pp. 18-19. 
53 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 1918', p. 18. 
54 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 1918', pp. 18-19. 
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Bowen goes on to describe her generation's attempt to assert their presence in the face 
of this void, to write on the "great new blank white page" set out before them. 55 Onto 
this scene of dreadful absence spills the echo of the clatter of that inner anxious arsenal 
in an attempt to fill it, to avoid the shock of the nothingness that was worse than war. 
"In the future nothing was to surprise us. We of my age grew up with no sense of 
safety. But we tried other things - amazing the experiments we made. , 56 Here two 
young voices explode into the shared recitation of a list of these post-war 
`experiments. ' Executed at an increasingly manic pace, it is a sort of verbal battery, 
making concrete those remembered gunshots: 
Jazz - Votes - Marvellous modem poetry - Love - Sports cars - Planes 
- Jobs - Shows - Rows - Romance - Rinks - Art - Frocks - Stars - 
Dogs - Tunes - Bars - Bands - Plages - Proms - Seeing the world - 
All we mean to say is, you're only young once: you've got to have 
something haven't you? - Got to say something, go to do something, 
got to know something, got to get somewhere. 57 
This attempt to construct some survival strategy in the face of grief is reminiscent of a 
passage at the end of Welty's The Optimist's Daughter, to be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four, in which Laurel McKelva is finally being reconciled with the deaths of 
her family members, including her husband Philip, killed in the Second World War. 
"But the guilt of outliving those you love is justly to be borne, she thought. Outliving 
is something we do to them. The fantasies of dying could be no stranger than the 
fantasies of living. Surviving is perhaps the strangest fantasy of them all" (OD, 162- 
163). 
Bowen's depiction of the desperate search for a tangible `something' (anything) to pit 
against the force of nothing in those empty post-war years expresses precisely the 
construction of this "strangest fantasy. " But antithetical to our usual notions of fantasy, 
the "saving hallucinations" here are earthbound, everyday, banal. Once again, the 
55 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 1918', p. 19. 
56 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 1918', p. 15. 
57 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 1918', pp. 15-16. 
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psychic is transformed into the physical, a threat to intangible consciousness militated 
against by a turn to materiality; the terrifyingly empty scene flooded with desperate 
"somethings. " "The true modernism is not austerity but a garbage-strewn plenitude, " 
suggests Susan Sontag in On Photography, something that is in accord with the vision 
of this "marvellous modem" post-war world. 58 However, Bowen claims, this mass 
creative effort was doomed to failure, collapsing under the pressure of its own 
importance. "If we made a mess of it - as indeed it must seem now that we did - it was 
not because we did not care enough. We cared too much. In our nervousness we left 
behind us nothing but nonsense and gaps and blots. "59 
Merleau-Ponty's description of this inter-war moment bears a striking resemblance to 
Bowen's. Writing, like Bowen, from the perspective beyond the next World War, he 
paints a picture of a Europe paralysed by the gaps created at its centre. 
The truth is that during the period immediately following the War it 
could almost be said that there was no world politics. Forces did not 
confront one another. Many questions had been left open, but just for 
that reason there were `no man's lands, ' neutral zones, provisional or 
transitional regimes (MA, 104). 
What Merleau-Ponty sees as emerging from this state of dormancy is a kind of politics 
as a game of hide and seek. He describes a breakdown in the distinctions between 
peace and war, between friend and enemy that is linked to the relationship, 
characterized by a "fundamental uncertainty, " that nations had adopted towards their 
own founding principles (MA, 105). There developed in these years of transition, 
Merleau-Ponty claims, a certain reticence to act for fear of being caught out in the 
wrong place. Political action becomes in his account less a question of moral agency 
and more a tactical manoeuvre, an attempt to avoid being checkmated: "Governments 
act less to obtain a certain factual result than to put their adversary in a certain moral 
predicament" (MA, 105). Power becomes a matter of effective representation, of 
authorial control. The civilized Europe lamented by Freud has been replaced here by 
58 Susan Sontag, On Photography (London: Penguin, 1977), pp. 68-69. 
'`' Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 1918', p. 19. 
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an almost childlike stubborness to claim final responsibility. "No one wants to reach an 
agreement and no one wants to break off negotiations. So we have actual armistices 
that are observed by everyone for weeks or months on end and that no one wants to 
legalize, as among irritated people who put up with one another but no longer speak" 
(MA, 105). 
This world that seems suspended from meaningful action, lost in appearances, this 
world of nervousness, nonsense, gaps and blots that is clouded by an acute sense of 
failure, is portrayed in The Death of the Heart, published in 1938. Where Merleau- 
Ponty portrays this sense of a stalemated relationality at an international level, Bowen 
dramatizes it through the intricate politics of the middle-class drawing room. Twenty 
years after the armistice, the world of this novel is haunted by the trauma of the war 
and its ending that Bowen has described. Looking back from the perspective of the late 
1960s, the critic John Bayley described the atmosphere of the novel as "the fixed 
upright world of 1937, still bastioned about. , 60 That "still" of 1937 might be 
understood not only in terms of a perpetuity of the state that Bayley describes, but also 
as a noun, as a pause or coda between periods of movement. 61 It is a moment between 
two wars, a moment haunted by its past and poised on the crest of a looming future. 
The atmosphere certainly differs from Bowen's subsequent fiction, written in the 
context of the fractured and dissolving boundaries of the Blitz as described in the 
preface to The Demon Lover. The world of 1937 retains its reserve, is concerned with 
isolating smallnesses; whereas the Blitz engendered a genuine affection towards one's 
neighbours, Bowen claims, in this time before the bombs, "if we `approved' of each 
other it was enough. , 62 
The novel follows the lives of the residents of 2 Windsor Terrace in London. Sixteen 
year old Portia has come to live with her step-brother Thomas and his wife Anna after 
the death of her own mother, Thomas' step-mother, Irene. Portia, we learn, was the 
outcome of an adulterous affair between the old Mr Quayne, Thomas' father, and the 
60 John Bayley, letter to Bowen (n. d. ) [unpublished], HRHRC. 
61 Bennett and Royle refer to a similar double stillness in relation to Bowen's work, indicated in the 
subtitle of their study: "Still Lives". 
62 Bowen, `Britain in Autumn' (n. d. ) [Shortened version published as `London, 1940' in Collected 
Impressions (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950), pp. 217-220], HRHRC, p. 4. 
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much younger Irene, a damp, "bird's-nesty" widow whom he met whilst on business in 
London (DH, 23). On discovering the affair and Irene's pregnancy, Mrs Quayne 
calmly packed off her husband with the instruction that he must marry her, despite his 
own reluctance to do so. Broken and humiliated, Mr Quayne retreated immediately 
with his new bride to the south of France, where Portia was born into a peripatetic life 
in various "back rooms in hotels, or dark flats in villas" around Europe (DH, 27). This 
propensity for shadow and the perpetual evening chill which accompanied it finally got 
the better of Mr Quayne who died, leaving Portia and Irene to continue their nomadic 
lifestyle until Irene's own death, shortly before the novel begins. As well as this 
dubious family history on Thomas' side, we discover that Anna also has skeletons in 
the closet. These take the form of a failed love-affair with a man called Robert Pidgeon 
which immediately preceded her relationship with Thomas, as well as a brief flirtation 
with Eddie, a caddish figure who ends up entangled in a strange and slightly sinister 
relationship with the teenage Portia. As the novel proceeds via a trip to the seaside in 
the central section in which certain truths are revealed to the rapidly maturing Portia, 
the situation gradually unravels through Eddie's rejection of Portia and her subsequent 
attempted flight from the world of Windsor Terrace. As the narrative draws to its 
conclusion, we see that world of order poised on the brink between potential 
restoration and continued disintegration as the Quaynes housekeeper, Matchett, is 
dispatched to fetch Portia home from her rebellion. 
In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty discusses the everyday means by 
which we situate ourselves in the world, the banal reference points of the watch or the 
map. 
But where are these reference events and these landmarks themselves? 
[... ] The question would arise again and indeed would be inexhaustible, 
almost insane, if we wished to situate our levels, measure our standards 
in their turn, if we were to ask: but where is the world itself? And why 
am I myself? How old am I really? Am I really alone to be me? Have I 
not somewhere a double, a twin? These questions, which the sick man 
puts to himself in a moment of respite [... ] expose, at the moment that 
life is threatened, the underlying movement through which we have 
installed ourselves in the world (VI, 104). 
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This turning upside down of knowledge, this momentary revelation of the abyss 
beneath the surface-level constructions is what happens to Portia in the course of The 
Death of the Heart. We do not know if she will go on to interrogate it, to communicate 
with it, to embrace it or, as everyone else in the novel has, cover it over, choose short- 
sightedness, choose to remain "at home" (VI, 104). Crucially though, the novel 
demonstrates precisely how these choices are not entirely Portia's to make, but 
profoundly affected by the influences of her companions. Thrown prematurely into the 
world of adult relationships, Portia may either float or founder. 
This story of one individual fate as examined by Bowen is explored by Merleau-Ponty 
in a more general context: 
Progress is not necessary with a metaphysical necessity; we can only 
say that experience will very likely end up by eliminating false 
solutions and working its way out of impasses. But at what price, by 
how many detours? We cannot even exclude in principle the possibility 
that humanity, like a sentence which does not succeed in drawing to a 
close, will suffer a shipwreck on its way (MA, 108). 
In Bowen's novel we see Portia (who is for us both human and sentence) beset by the 
possibility of such a shipwreck. Through the story of her sentimental education, 
Bowen exposes the manifold obstacles that experience throws up in the path of 
"progress. " Most particularly, she dramatizes the devastating effects that people's 
actions, even at the smallest, most everyday level, can wreak upon others. It is not a 
story of evil intent, but rather of the harm that is caused through inadvertence. Bowen 
reveals the power of carelessness, of accidents, of the mistakes that proceed from the 
uncharted, chaotic nature of our grounding in the world. Cast adrift each character 
reaches for a solid foothold, at every point threatened with half-drowning by the 
thrashing-about of others; there is here "less duplicity than confusion, and less 
wickedness than perplexity" (MA 106). 
The Death of the Heart is populated by characters inhibited precisely by a fear of the 
injury that living in the company of others may inflict; a fear of what is referred to 
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vaguely as "feeling. " Each person is reliant on distracting illusion in the same way as 
that immediate post-war generation described in `A Year I Remember' as seeking 
solace in the distractions of an experimental modernity. These characters are 
`bastioned about' in some way, shut off from their companions. Symbolizing this 
isolation is the internal telephone system at Windsor Terrace, which saves its 
occupants from having to face each other directly. Even visitors know the protocol 
when dealing the Quaynes: "Their privacy was surrounded by an electric fence - 
friends who did not first telephone did not come" (DH, 119). Thomas, whilst repulsed 
by it, recognizes his "state of fortification" (DH, 122); Matchett, the formidable 
housekeeper, quite deliberately "[allows] herself no feeling at all" (DH, 55); Anna has 
made an art out of maintaining a impenetrable social mask: "She could stay so still 
[... ] that to fidget herself was almost an act of passion" (DH, 95). 
In tracing this "edited life", Bowen brings to light the quietly enacted brutalities that 
people inflict upon one another everyday through trying to protect their own positions 
(DH, 237). The smallness and dreadful banality of the lives in the novel clash 
uncomfortably with a sense that we get of the epic; there is a disparity between the size 
of the events viewed from the outside compared with the size of them as felt from 
within. The narrative oscillates within this gap, swinging from the farcical to the tragic. 
One is simultaneously amused by, scornful of the exploits of a group of characters 
whom it is singularly difficult to like, and horrified by the cruelties and sadnesses that 
they all endure. The effect, as May Sarton expressed it in a letter to Bowen, leaves one 
with the sense of something distasteful having occurred: "It did leave me with a feeling 
of distilled horror, like the ash from a fire, a taste I can't get out of my mouth which I 
guess was your intention. , 63 
From its very beginning the novel evokes a sense of some fundamental brokenness. It 
opens in a wintry Regent's Park with the image of ice which "had cracked and was 
now floating in segments" (DH, 9). This is quickly echoed by the positioning of two 
figures leaning on the rail of a footbridge, who at first appear to be lovers but 
"actually, their elbows were some inches apart, " each is sealed up "inside bulwarks of 
fur and cloth" (DH, 9). These tailored fortifications are physical manifestations of the 
63 E. M. Sarton, letter to Bowen (11 December 1938) [unpublished], HRHRC 
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various ways in which each character keeps him or herself wrapped up in a less 
physical way against the prying eyes of the outside world. Like the swans which we 
encounter in the icy park, swimming "in slow indignation, " these people are furiously 
paddling, in one way or another, beneath their immaculate surfaces (DH, 9). 2 Windsor 
Terrace, around which the narrative is magnetized, is not a house for living but for 
performing in: from the outside the houses in the street look "empty, stagy [... j a 
facade with no back" (DH, 60). 
Inside, the house has been styled and polished at the behest of Anna, compensating for 
her failed career in interior design. "In this airy vivacious house, all mirrors and polish, 
there was no place where shadows lodged, no point where feeling could thicken. The 
rooms were set for strangers' intimacy or else for exhausted solitary retreat" (DH, 57). 
The house is, however, still filled with the Quayne family furniture, which has 
ingrained within it the memory of the grimy family history. As Matchett, the 
furniture's keeper and familiar comments: 
Furniture's knowing all right [... ] Oh, furniture like we've got is too 
much for some that would rather not have the past. If I just had to look 
at it and have it looking at me, I'd go jumpy, I daresay. But when it's 
your work it can't do anything to you (DH, 111-112). 
Anna's careful arrangement of the furniture is perhaps an attempt to perform a similar 
talismanic "work" upon it, to gain control over what it might have to say. 
The astute Portia notices that it is not only Anna who performs this kind of focussed 
working upon external things: "Each person at Windsor Terrace lived impaled upon a 
private obsession, however slight" (DH, 237). The natures of these obsessions reveal 
some kind of aspirational identity: what each person wishes to believe about him or 
herself, the way in which he or she wishes to be seen by others. In this wish-fulfilling 
capacity, these activities can be read as a sort of waking, physical dreamwork. 
Characters displace and sublimate themselves into new forms and shapes, more 
acceptable representations. Thus Anna turns to her house, imposing a tyrannous style 
and smoothness in a reflection of the control she wishes she had over her internal life, 
which in reality is wracked by self-doubt. Thomas, having married Anna in the belief 
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that with her he would keep safe "some nerve in his feeling he did not want touched", 
later discovered this was not the case (DH, 53). Terrified more than anything by the 
passion for his wife that he feels stirring within him, he turns to stillness, impassivity, 
the silence of his study. Major Brutt, the unfortunate and lonely friend of Anna's 
former lover chooses Windsor Terrace itself, or rather his own version of it, as his 
target of obsession. "Almost unremitting solitude in his hotel had, since his last visit, 
made 2 Windsor Terrace the clearing-house for his dreams [ ... 
] Today, he came to 
recover that visionary place, round which all the rest of London was a desert" (DH, 
118). 
What all of these displacement activities have in common is an ordering impulse, a 
need to believe in some kind of regulated existence against the force of the unmapped 
illimitable "desert" whose presence they all sense encroaching just beyond their vision. 
These illusions are all willingly entered into; they are recognized, like those wartime 
fictions identified by Bowen, as necessary for survival: "Illusions are art, for the 
feeling person, and it is by art that we live, if we do" (DH, 125). This application of the 
values of art to living recalls Bowen's essay on `The Art of Reserve. ' Here as there, 
the human subject is transformed into a material object. Christopher Bollas describes 
the creative process in the same terms, drawing a distinction between this 
"transubstantiation" and projection. Here we see "the object no longer simply 
expressing self, but re-forming it. "64 It is precisely this reformation that constitutes the 
basis of people's defence strategies in the novel. Anna's relation to Eddie typifies this 
aestheticizing, transformative impulse: 
He lent himself, gladly and quickly, or appeared to lend himself, to 
Anna's illusions about living. He did more: by his poetic appreciation 
he created a small world of art round her. The vanities of which she was 
too conscious, the honesties to which she compelled herself, even the 
secrets she had never told him existed inside a crystal they both looked 
at - not only existed but were beautified (DH, 90). 
`' Bollas, The Mystery of Things (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 173. 
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Despite the efforts to author one's appearance in the world through such controlled 
outlets of consciousness, there is always the danger that it may escape in an 
uncontrolled way. An excited outburst by Portia for example remains "in the room 
somewhere, bobbing up near the ceiling like an escaped balloon" (DH, 63). In the 
same scene, Anna also experiences some kind of psychic incontinence. During an 
uncomfortable conversation in front of her unwitting husband about her past lover, 
Pidgeon, 
Anna had felt [Portia's] dark eyes with a determined innocence steal 
back again and again to her face [... ] Had the agitation she felt 
throughout her body sent out an aura with a quivering edge, Portia's 
eyes might be said to explore this line of quiver, round and along 
Anna's reclining form Anna felt bound up with her fear, with her 
secret, by that enwrapping look of Portia's: she felt mummified (DH, 
66). 
In watching Anna so intently, Portia threatens to read a part of her that Anna is 
determined to censor. The concretization of Anna's agitation and Portia's gaze pits this 
battle for authorial control in the outside world, making it something felt rather than 
just imagined. Once again, we see in Bowen an exaggerated version of Merleau- 
Ponty's perceptual reversibility. Where he described the way in which "my own secret 
thoughts change the aspect of faces and landscapes for me", here Bowen imagines this 
omnipotence of thoughts as characterizing the realm of not only subjectivity but 
intersubjectivity (VI, 35). 65 Taking the ominsicient powers of the narrator and reader 
(an omnisicience, as Nicholas Royle points out, whose uncanniness we are quick to 
ignore), Bowen grants them to characters within the same perceptual plane. 66 The 
possibility arises that others might read one's own "secret thoughts": Portia's balloon 
of excitement hovers over her like a speech bubble; Anna's discomfort is swagged 
about her like a lettered sash. 
65 My emphasis. 
66 Royle, The Uncanny, p. 256. 
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This uncanny extension of the limits of intersubjectivity binds together questions of 
relating and representation. The novel thus self-reflexively turns about the terms of its 
own creation, centralizing the importance of who gets to control what story gets told 
about whom. As Bennett and Royle suggest, the novel in part questions the relation 
between self, others and representation, asking: "what is a person if he or she lives in 
the description of another? "67 Portia sees "dissimulation always on guard" at Windsor 
Terrace: as in a hall of mirrors, there is a ceaseless rebounding of representations until 
any sense of the source of the reflection is lost (DH, 81). The worst that can happen to 
one here, it seems, is that one's cover be blown. Underlying all interactions is an acute 
fear of embarrassment; it is a novel filled with the threat of, as Rose Macaulay 
recognized, "heartless laughing-at". 68 Once again, Bennett and Royle read "the force 
of laughter in Bowen [as] ultimately indissociable from a logic of `death', from a 
dissolution of identity". 69 Certainly, to be laughed at here is to somehow come undone, 
to have one's self-representation taken over by someone else and abused. We see how 
Thomas remembers his father's humiliation, the shame heaped upon him his wife's 
wresting of the control over his own life from his hands, his banishment into exile. 
This shame tinges the atmosphere of Windsor Terrace, making it "queasy and cold" 
(DH, 237). The determination of all not to be the one to repeat this scandalous history 
results in an atmosphere ruled by the law of the survival of the fittest. Attack becomes 
a form of defence; kindness is abandoned in a desperate attempt to look out for 
oneself, to make sure the humiliating, dissimulating gaze ends up resting on somebody 
else. 
This erection of protective boundaries about the limits of subjectivity is precipitated by 
an uncanny recognition of the shakiness of one's hold on oneself, a shakiness that is 
exacerbated by the presence of others. In his evocation of the nature of 
intersubjectivity, Merleau-Ponty takes account of this unsettling element. The 
appearance of a perceiving other represents, on one level, a kind of ontological 
affirmation: "through other eyes we are ourselves fully visible; that lacuna where our 
eyes, our back, he is filled, filled still by the visible, of which we are not the titulars" 
67 Bennett and Royle, p. 65. 
68 Rose Macaulay, letter to Bowen (n. d. [references to DH suggest it may date to 1938]) [unpublished], 
HRHRC. 
69 Bennett and Royle, p. 66. 
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(VI, 143). But this very realization of our visibility to others simultaneously works to 
disrupt subjectivity's sureness; what fills the "lacuna" of selfhood is something other 
than self, something "of which we are not the titulars. " Intersubjectivity initiates us 
into a realization of our generality, divests us of our self-contained identity. "From 
now on it seems impossible to remain in the inner certitude of him who perceives [... ] 
[M] y private world has ceased to be mine only; it is now the instrument which another 
plays, the dimension of a generalized life which is grafted onto my own" (VI, 10-11). 
Once again, Bowen's fiction explores the more sinister possibilities implicit within 
Merleau-Ponty's thought. As we have seen, Welty's model of relating was founded 
upon the notion of a shared human spirit, upon the benign basis of the other's essential 
familiarity to oneself; what we thought was strange is in fact most familiar. Bowen's 
approach to the relation of self to others sees a more chilling recognition in this 
intimacy: that of the self's capacity for harbouring foreignness. For her, what connects 
us, each to each, is not only a universal power of recognition, but also a sort of 
universal estrangement; we are not so much familiar to one another as strangers to 
ourselves. Merleau-Ponty describes the same uncanny realization in his reading of 
Simone de Beauvoir's novel L'invitee. 70 The Bowenesque plot revolves around a love 
triangle, in which a young girl, Xaviere, threatens to disrupt the established 
relationship between Pierre and Franyoise. Like Anna in Bowen's novel, Franyoise 
feels assaulted by the intruding vision of this younger rival. She is made to see herself 
as seen from the outside, made to recognize her foreignness to herself. 
[S]he sees herself from the outside for the first time. And what is she? 
A thirty-year-old woman, a mature woman, to whom many things are 
already irrevocably impossible - who, for example, will never be able 
to dance well. For the first time she has the feeling of being her body, 
when all along she had thought herself a consciousness. 
71 
70 Simone de Beauvoir, L'inv itee (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), published in English as She Came to Stay, 
trans. Yvonne Moyse and Roger Senhouse (London: Secker & Warburg, 1949). 
71 Merleau-Ponty, `Metaphysics and the Novel', pp. 26-40 (p. 33). 
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The intrusion of otherness in the outside world precipitates its intrusion onto the 
private, interior plane. In this case it is Frangoise's body that strikes her as alien, as a 
rogue part of herself that is beyond her control, that refuses to conform to her idea of 
who she is. 
There is a crucial difference between this realization of one's own otherness and the 
sense of the sameness of others that Welty strives to unveil. While the latter illumines 
a world in which we are always in some sense at home, the former confirms the danger 
that an inherently alien world can so easily pose to the intactness of the self. This 
means that, while it is always a possibility, the empathetic moment is forever deferred 
in Bowen's writing; it is, Bowen suggests, as much human nature to resist kindness as 
to offer it; "we are, " as Welty suggests, "the breakers of our own hearts" (OTOP, 7). 
As we have seen in Welty and Merleau-Ponty, Bowen approaches this question of 
empathy through the experience of suffering. "[S]orrow, " pronounces Bowen's 
narrator in The Death of the Heart, "brings one down in the world" (DH, 376). More 
than simply an emotion, it damages one's pride, affects one's ability to deal with the 
world properly. This reduced state attracts "those people who flock to the scene of 
accidents [... ] who are on the spot at once, pressing close with a sort of charnel good 
will. You may first learn you are doomed by seeing those vultures in the sky" (DH, 
377). Suffering is thus transformed into entertainment, one's companions taking on the 
parasitic role we might expect from Bowen. However, Bowen suggests that there may 
in fact be some value in this public hijacking of personal pain. These unwelcome well- 
wishers are, perhaps 
not vultures; they are Elijah's ravens. They bring with them the sense 
that the most individual sorrow has a stupefying universality [ ... 
Accidents become human property: only a muffish dread of living, a 
dread of the universal in our natures, makes us make these claims for 
`the privacy of grief. In naiver, humbler, nobler societies, the sufferer 
becomes public property; the scene of any disaster soon loses its 
isolated flush. The proper comment on grief, the comment that returns it 
to poetry, comes not in the right word, the faultless perceptive silence, 
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but from the chorus of vulgar unsought friends - friends who are 
strangers to the taste and mind (DH, 377). 
Even here though, the public sort of kindness that Bowen describes is only play-acting; 
these people, with their clunky performances filled with "brutalities, [... ] intrusions, 
and ineptitudes" are a breed of professional shoulders to cry on rather than the sites of 
real intimacy (DH, 378). This is the only way that sympathy can be accepted; the really 
"tender touch" is unendurable. The only cure for real feeling, it seems, is for it to be 
channelled through fakery, transmuted once again into an external, superficial 
distraction: "Factitious feeling and true feeling come to about the same thing, when it 
comes to pain" (DH, 378). This model of relating is not an instance of true intimacy, 
but simply another manifestation of manners, of social ritual, albeit one based on the 
rules of a "naiver" society. The tragedy in human nature is perhaps not that kindness is 
not there, but that we don't know how to accept it; our nature, at least "half the 
instinct" will not let us acquiesce to sympathy, will not allow "the spilling over" of 
emotion without a struggle (DH, 377). The other, even in the guise of the benevolent 
friend, is motivated by self-interest and thus remains a threat: "nobody can be kinder 
than the narcissist while you react to life in his own terms; " the question is what may 
happen once you do not (DH, 378). Thus, where Welty wants to "part a curtain" that 
hangs between individuals, we see the characters in The Death of the Heart busy 
mothballing their protective drapes against the possibility of an unravelling infestation 
(OTOP, 8). 
In such an atmosphere of lurking contagion as inhabits The Death of the Heart, the 
trick is to avoid either being noticed or noticing others, to hold oneself so still as to 
practically disappear; to remain precisely, in one sense, undetected behind the dividing 
curtain. This is what Portia's teacher Miss Paullie is training the girls in her care to do, 
preparing them for the respectable lives they will be expected to lead. 
These silent sessions in Miss Paullie's presence were [... ] lessons in the 
deportment of staying still, of feeling yourself watched without turning 
a hair [... ] A little raised in her gothic chair, like a bishop, Miss 
Paullie's own rigid stillness quelled every young body, its nervous 
itches, its cooped-up pleasures in being itself, its awareness of the 
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young body next door. Even Lilian, prone to finger her own plaits or to 
look at the voluptuous white insides of her arms, sat, during those hours 
with Miss Paullie, as though Lilian did not exist (DH, 75-76). 
Portia, however, fails to grasp the rules of this game, either at home or at school. 
Whereas the others share some kind of pact to go along with each other's stories, 
Portia threatens to unravel them In a house that has been carefully arranged so that 
there is "no past", Portia represents an uncanny irruption in the surface of the 
everyday, a figure that brings to light a history her companions would rather was left 
forgotten (DH, 110). 
But it is not only in a symbolic or mimetic sense that Portia acts as some kind of 
enforced reflection. Through the writing of her diary, which has been discovered by 
Anna at the start of the novel, Portia reveals an impertinent and dangerous ability to 
notice things, making seen what would otherwise have remained hidden in this world 
of downcast eyes. She gives specific human shape to the anonymous general visibility 
of the flesh that we saw in Merleau-Ponty, confirming the uncanny, paranoid sensation 
of being watched that infuses the experience of being. Her refusal to take people's 
dissimulations for real, to, as it were, bow down to the naked emperor, ruffles the 
serene surface of life at Windsor Terrace. As Thomas comes to realize, "the fact is that 
nobody can afford to have a girl as thorough as that about" (DH, 432). The diary, with 
its documentation of life at Windsor Terrace, unnerves Anna: "I've seldom been more 
upset" (DH, 10). What is particularly disconcerting is Portia's recording of the banal, 
everyday goings-on in the house. In reply to St Quentin's inquiry as to whether she had 
written about a party, Anna exclaims "No, no: much worse than that. It had simply 
been her and me and Thomas. She must have bolted upstairs and written everything 
down" (DH, 14). Portia has taken Anna's own writing of herself out of her hands, has 
hijacked her self-production: "She was so odd about me, " Anna laments, bemused 
(DH, 14). Portia's threat to other people's personal fictions triggers a paranoid circuit 
of observation of people watching people watching people, like a ring of raised and 
pointed guns. It is Portia, uninitiated into and confused by this "dissimulating" mode 
of living, who is to end up as the inevitable fall guy. 
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The disturbance that Anna feels at the imposition of the diary is echoed by a reaction 
against Portia's untidy bedroom. In relating the story of her finding the diary, Anna 
displays strangely excessive emotion at that mess: "Well, it looked so awful, you see. 
The flap would not shut - papers gushed out all round it and even stuck through the 
hinge. Which made me shake with anger -I really can't tell you why" (DH, 12). The 
reason "why" of course is that the house has become Anna's "private obsession", 
inseparable from her sense of identity. Prior to Portia's arrival, Anna worked to 
prepare her room for her. It was at this time, in quiet communion with the things which 
were to surround her, that Anna has "the closest feeling for Portia she ever had" (DH, 
55). Portia's subsequent neglect of these carefully set surroundings is both a shattering 
of the possibility of this closeness and an overturning of Anna's way of styling the 
world. In creating this mess, Portia has disturbed the surfaces, visible and invisible, of 
Anna's carefully maintained universe. "She is so unnaturally callous about objects" 
Anna storms (DH, 11). It is not so much her treatment of the things in Anna's house in 
itself that is so disturbing, but more what it represents, namely a threat to Anna's 
version of the world, the rules of her fictionalizing. In this way, Portia's messy 
bedroom works in the same way as her unearthed diary to assert a dissident presence in 
the house. What she introduces is a way of seeing anterior to its other inhabitants, a 
way of seeing that is pointed precisely in the direction that they have all silently agreed 
not to look. 
The neatness and controlled nature of life at Windsor Terrace is thrown into sharp 
relief by the second section of the novel, which sees Portia packed off to stay with 
Anna's old governess Mrs Heccomb at the absurdly named "Waikiki", her house on 
the Kentish coast. Here, Portia comes into contact with a brand of living totally alien to 
(but equally as abhorrent as) the hushed solidity and sheen of her London relatives. 
Waikiki is a house of windows, "[c]onstructed largely of glass and blistered white 
paint" (DH, 185) and is built on sand: "a strip of reclaimed beach, just inland from the 
esplanade" (DH, 175). Whereas the Quaynes' lives are characterized by "the shut-in 
room, the turned-in heart" (DH, 81), Portia finds life here at Seale to be, like the 
curtains flying from Waikiki's open windows, "wildly blowing out" (DH, 185). From 
the first moment, Mrs Heccomb "talked so freely to Portia, telling her so much that 
Portia, used to the tactics of Windsor Terrace, wondered whether this were really wise. 
And what would be left to say by the end of the first week? " (DH, 187). This 
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unnerving openness is reflected throughout the house and its inhabitants from the 
unforgiving electric light, to the thin walls that make the building "a sounding box", to 
the large-limbed, bellowing Daphne who "never simply touched objects, she slapped 
down her hand on them; she made up her mouth with the gesture of someone cutting 
their throat" (DH, 191). Portia marvels at this new kind of "spontaneous" and physical 
living in which "eyes constantly bulged and skins changed colour with immediate 
unsubtle impulses" (DH, 237). It is no accident that the section is titled "The Flesh", a 
title that also brings to mind Merleau-Ponty's use of the term as an ontological 
category. Here as there, fleshiness suggests more than a straightforward physicality. 
Through their exaggerated, jarring behaviour, the residents of Waikiki let slip aspects 
of themselves that should, by the rules of Windsor Terrace, remain hidden. They are, 
in a way, living unconsciously; "spontaneously", according to "impulses", breaking 
through the fortresses that Portia has so far observed being erected between emotion 
and expression. If the Londoners are guilty of over-representation to the point of 
trickery, here there is not enough effort at representation in a way that feels obscene. 
This atmosphere prompts Portia to further consideration of those dissimulations of life 
back in London. When Eddie comes to visit her at Seale, even he, usually the 
consummate actor, is exposed by its illuminating powers. On a trip to the cinema, 
Eddie maliciously directs his attentions towards Daphne, without trying to hide his 
behaviour from Portia. As they sit in the dark of the cinema, "eyes fixed on the 
screen", Portia is distracted by something occurring in the shadows. 
She felt some tense extra presence, here in their row of six. Wanting to 
know, she turned to look full at Eddie - who at once countered her look 
with a bold blank smile glittering from the screen. The smile was 
diverted to her from someone else [... ] The jumping light from Dickie's 
lighter showed the canyon below their row of knees. It caught the 
chromium clasp of Daphne's handbag, and Wallace's wrist-watch at the 
end of the row. It rounded the taut blond silk of Daphne's calf and 
glittered on the tinfoil dropped on the floor [... ] Dickie, still with the 
flame jumping, still held the lighter out in a watching pause -a pause 
so marked that Portia, as though Dickie had pushed her head round, 
looked to see where he looked. The light, with malicious accuracy, ran 
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round a rim of cuff, a steel bangle, and made a thumb-nail flash. Not 
deep enough in the cleft between their fauteuils Eddie and Daphne 
were, with emphasis, holding hands. Eddie's fingers kept up a kneading 
movement: her thumb alertly twitched at the joint (DH, 270-271). 
Elfmann reads this scene as a dramatization of the displacements of a desire which 
"ricochets from object to substitutive object. , 72 There is certainly the circulation of 
some force occurring here, but it is as much that of the self-conscious representation of 
desire as of desire in itself. As Eddie looks at the screen, Portia looks at Eddie who is 
both performing at her and being represented to her by Dickie. Through this little mise 
en scene Portia is put doubly in her place. Not only is she faced with Eddie's 
humiliating betrayal, his directing of his desire elsewhere, but she is also left impotent 
in the representation game, reduced to the position of passive viewer. There is a 
paralysis here which goes beyond the substitution of objects to a more incisive, 
personal form of damage, to something that threatens Portia as a subject. 
This paralysing process continues when Portia confronts Eddie about his behaviour 
later, in an empty boarding house -a ghostly version of the London house in a street 
called Winslow Terrace. Eddie vacillates between bravado, blame, remorse, and 
flattery, trying to prevent Portia from pinning him down with accusation. Portia, as 
ever too "thorough" to let people get away with their dissimulating, attempts to hold 
on to reality in the midst of Eddie's chameleon-like defence, to make him be "serious" 
about who he is and how he feels about her. She quotes him back at himself, reminds 
him of his past performances, once again facilitating an unwelcome re-emergence of 
the past; "How you do remember! " quips a cornered Eddie (DH, 277). Realizing that 
he cannot evade Portia's all encompassing gaze and exasperated with what he sees as 
her attempts "to piece me together into something that isn't there", he demolishes the 
foundations of her attempts at interpretation by a desperate appeal to some kind of 
relativism. He criticizes her attempts to pin him down: "How can I keep on feeling 
something I once felt when there are so many things one can feel? People who say they 
always feel as they did simply fake themselves up. I may be a crook but I'm not a 
fake 
- that is an entirely 
different thing" (DH, 277). 
72 Ellmann, p. 134. 
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Eddie may not be a fake, but it would also be difficult to describe him under any terms 
of authenticity. He has pushed the representation game to its limits, made his career 
out of lending himself to other people's fictions, out of being (as he recognizes 
himself) their "monkey" (DH, 97). Initially granted more freedom than most by virtue 
of the fact that his bad behaviour was viewed as charming eccentricity, Eddie is 
quickly drawn into the position of having to perform such eccentricities for his 
wealthier companions in order to retain his lifestyle. 
He became a quite frank arriviste - at the same time, the one thing no 
one, so far, knew about Eddie was quite how he felt about selling 
himself. His apparent rushes of Russian frankness proved, when you 
came to look back at them later, to have been more carefully edited than 
you had known at the time (DH, 85). 
It seems that Eddie is only capable of experiencing himself from the outside. He does 
not inhabit moments from within as such, but immediately begins reproducing them in 
a temporality that, like a photograph, is always already retrospective. It seems that at 
some point he has stopped hiding beneath his dissimulations and has become defined 
by them, forgetting how to live in any other way than outwards, at people in a never- 
ending performance. Eddie has metamorphosed into his "private obsession", his saving 
illusion, working upon, transforming himself as others work upon some external, 
material site, until he is nothing more than an object, a surface both for himself and for 
others. In a reversal of Ellmann's reading of the vampiric qualities of Bowen' s objects, 
here personality becomes the parasite, feeding off the constitutive gazes of others; 
rather than an object extracting consciousness, a subject adopts objecthood in a process 
of deadening petrifaction. 
On the last day of Eddie's stay in Seale, in a pastiche of a lover's outing, he and Portia 
go walking. They end up in a private wood, breaking into rather than being cast out of 
this untouched wilderness. In "the armpit warmth" of this setting, the pair share their 
first kiss, which turns out to be less than passionate (DH, 292). For Portia, reflected 
back at herself by Eddie even at this moment of intimate physical meeting, it feels as 
though she is kissing herself; it "seemed so much her own kiss that she even tasted the 
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salt of her own tears" (DH, 296). Things get worse as Eddie proceeds to repeatedly 
push her away: "for God's sake go away and be quiet" (DH, 296); "Darling, I don't 
want you" (DH, 297); "You must let go of me" (DH, 298). And then, in another 
reversal of mood, perhaps worried by this unprecedented closeness, he exclaims 
"Look, let's see ourselves in the distance, then we shall think, how happy they are! 
We're young; this is spring; this is a wood [... ] No no, you mustn't sigh. Look at us 
sitting under this old oak" (DH, 299-301). This instantaneous transformation of the 
scene as it actually is into the scene as it might be seen, this passage into the outside is 
typical of Eddie. It is something that Anna recognizes about him. "I don't think you 
ever know what is happening: you are too busy wondering what you can make of it" 
(DH, 356-357). Elsewhere, Anna expresses a similar discomfort about Eddie, sensing 
that he is simply a "vacuum" beneath his various fronts (DH, 92). Even Portia, who 
believes she is in love with Eddie, reveals her awareness, albeit as yet unconscious, of 
his fakery. In a half-dreamed fantasy of the two of them together in some distant 
continent, she sees Eddie illuminated by an "unearthly level of light [... ] she saw it 
touch his cheekbones, the tips of his eyelashes, while he turned her way his eyeballs 
blind with gold. She saw his hands hanging down between his knees" (DH, 117). This 
gold-painted, slack-limbed figure is more like a puppet than a living man. 
In a passage from Angela Carter's Nights at the Circus, Buffo the clown contemplates 
his clown identity. He begins by rejoicing in his freedom to represent himself: "We can 
invent our own faces: we make ourselves. " He quickly realizes, however, that this 
performance has become a parasitic kind of prison: "I have become this face which is 
not mine [... ] Take away my make-up and underneath is merely not-Buffo. An 
absence. A vacancy. , 73 Christopher Prendergast describes such a passage from the 
appearance of freedom to the revelation of its emptiness, or pure representational 
"mechanism" as "modernism's nightmare. "74 Eddie is precisely this nightmare come to 
life, a reproduction with no original in a way that echoes Walter Benjamin's famous 
discussion of photography. With the development of this mechanization of art practice, 
"to ask for the `authentic' print makes no sense. , 
75 This dissolution of the notion of 
73 Angela Carter, Nights at the Circus (1984) (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 122. 
74 Christopher Prendergast, `Modernism's Nightmare? Art, Matter, Mechanism', New Left Review 10 
(July/August 2001), 141-156 (p. 148) 
75 Benjamin, `The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', pp. 211-244 (p. 218). 
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authenticity results in a sea change in notions of value. The artwork becomes valued 
not for truly being itself, but for looking like itself; identity is replaced by appearance. 
Benjamin views these developments as a freeing of the art object from "the parasitical 
dependence on ritual. ). )76 Eddie, however, rather than benefiting from any sense of 
emancipated agency through his repeated, self-alienating self- authoring s, is emptied 
out; the mechanism has taken him over rather the other way round. 
However, whilst Eddie's clowning might reveal to us the fictituous nature of his 
freedom, he is wrong in thinking that it is harmless or meaningless. In the scene in the 
wood, Portia is momentarily disturbed by Eddie's painted-on grin: "Don't say we're 
happy with that awful smile, " she chastises. "I never mean how I'm smiling" counters 
Eddie (DH, 301). The thing is, whether Eddie "means" his smile not, he cannot stop it 
from "meaning" as such; this is why it distresses Portia. The workings of 
representation affect the world that and in which they represent, as if belching out 
smoke into the surrounding air. This accountability, this transformative power of 
representation has been revealed to Portia just prior to her confrontation with Eddie. 
Contemplating the disturbing "unlike likeness" of a poorly executed portrait of Anna 
in her bedroom at Waikiki, Portia perceives some intimate connection between this 
shadowy representation and the living Anna. "No drawing from life just fails: it 
establishes something more; it admits the unadmitted [... ] Any face, house, landscape 
seen in a picture, however bad, remains subtly but strongly modified in so-called real 
life - and the worse the picture, the stronger this is" (DH, 287). Eddie's attempted 
composition of a "happy" face to match his script alters not only Portia's view of 
Eddie but of what "happy" or "smiling" might constitute as well. 
77 Thus Portia 
experiences the same consternation as Anna had felt at the younger girl's disruption of 
her conception of Windsor Terrace; the realization of a view that is outside one's own 
dissolves the edges of certainty. 
Once again, the communicative moment described by Merleau-Ponty in which it 
seems "another private world shows through, through the fabric of my own" is 
76 Benjamin, `The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', pp. 211-244 (p. 218). 
" The publication of this novel was to raise such questions of accountability and affect. 
Bowen got into 
trouble, almost being sued for libel, for (mis) representing a friend of hers, Goronwy Rees, in this novel 
in the form of Eddie. 
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imagined by Bowen not as a sharing but as a competition. "[T]his other who invades 
me" poses a threat to my own grasp upon the world and likewise I colonize his 
otherness: "how could I conceive, precisely as his, his colours, his pain, his world, 
except as in accordance with the colours I see, the pains I have had, the world wherein 
I live? " (VI, 11). Through such combative encounters with other accounts of the world, 
such as that with Eddie, Portia's "private world" of innocence, of "heroes" (DH, 310) 
and "absolutes" in which people say what they mean, in which there is a definitive 
"right thing", is gradually worn away (DH, 430). So far, despite her confusion at his 
changeability, Portia has continued to trust Eddie. Indeed, she has a sort of blind faith 
in all her companions with no real sense that there is anything being deliberately 
hidden from her. That is why her diary can have such a disturbingly declamatory tone: 
she believes she knows everything. Her guileless vision is seen as dangerous because 
of its directness; it is also, however, endangered because of its inability to be indirect, 
to take in the greyer areas of shadow. 
In the final section of the novel, "The Devil", St Quentin plays the eponymous role, 
delivering fateful wisdom straight into the innocent's hands. He reveals the fact that 
Anna has been reading her diary, which begins a domino-effect of betrayal. Portia 
realizes that Eddie must have known all along and concludes, with horror, that she 
must have been the subject of the dreaded and undoing "laughing-at. " "The 
conversation had ended in an abyss" (DH, 350), St Quentin admitting that he has 
"started what may make a frightful breach" (DH, 351). Thus Portia feels the alarming 
upsurgence of that chaotic, abyssal absence against which her companions are already 
so busy defending themselves. The secret of these defences, the reason for the 
obsessions and dissimulations she has already noticed, is finally revealed to Portia. 
"What makes you think us wicked is simply our little way of keeping ourselves going. 
We must live, though you may not see the necessity" (DH, 351); "One thing one must 
learn is, how to confront people that at that particular moment one cannot bear to 
meet" (DH, 353); "We've all got to live somewhere, whatever happens. There's 
breakfast, dinner, so on" (DH, 411-412). There have to be some solid things to hold on 
to, some way to orient oneself, even if it is just measuring out one's life in the coffee 
spoon-sized portions of a cheap hotel's mealtimes. The alternative is the "desert", the 
"abyss", the "vacuum", these sites of enveloping absence that each character fears and 
refuses to address. And so each clings to his or her own life-buoy, "strange fantasies" 
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indeed, fantasy turned stale, become the stultifying, numbing power of the banal; what 
Rose Macaulay calls an "insensitive worldly blandness. "78 
As we near the end of Bowen's novel both the carefully constructed world of Windsor 
Terrace and Portia's childish world of "absolutes" seem threatened with collapse. "I 
don't know" (DH, 347), Portia repeats, "I don't know" (DH, 348), and Eddie, after 
being confronted by accusations of betrayal, senses that "the skies had begun to fall - 
like pieces of black plaster they had started, still fairly gently, flaking down on his 
head" (DH, 387). Portia's injured innocence catches everything around it in its death 
throes, threatening a landslide of belief that will reveal a ravaged and chaotic 
landscape. Not only does she threaten to upset the calm at Windsor Terrace and worry 
Eddie with the possibility that his actions may have consequences, but breaking one 
more rule of stylish living, she shatters Major Brutt's illusory world, telling him what 
the people at Windsor Terrace really think of him. "Anna's always laughing at you. 
She says you are quite pathetic [... ] They groan at each other when you have gone 
away. You and I are the same" (DH, 404). 
As the Major departs the scene to call the Quaynes, leaving a prostrate Portia, the 
collapse that she has precipitated coincides with a key moment of insight. 
As he went down flight after flight he saw her face on the pillow, and 
saw in a sleep-bound way how specious wisdom was. One's sentiments 
- call them that - one's fidelities are so instinctive that one hardly 
knows they exist: only when they are betrayed or, worse still, when one 
betrays them does one realize their power. That betrayal is the end of an 
inner life, without which the everyday becomes threatening or 
meaningless. At the back of the spirit a mysterious landscape, whose 
perspective used to be infinite, suddenly perishes: this is like being cut 
off from the country for ever, not even meeting its breath down the city 
street (DH, 417). 
78 Rose Macaulay, letter to Bowen. 
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In this moment the Major sees his steadying fantasies, the banal landmarks that keep 
him from sinking, for what they really are and through this revelation, he loses them 
This recognition of the speciousness of wisdom brings us back to the revelatory nature 
of the moment of threat. As Merleau-Ponty observed, we see exposed "at the moment 
that life is threatened, the underlying movement through which we have installed 
ourselves in the world" (VI, 104). 
In a recorded conversation with Jocelyn Brooke, Bowen discusses the "many legends" 
that The Death of the Heart has gathered about itself: 
I've heard it, for instance, called a tragedy of adolescence. I never 
thought of it that way when I wrote it and I must say I still don't see it 
in that way now [ ... ] The book is really a study, it might be 
presumptuous of me to call it a tragedy of atrophy, not of death so much 
as of a death sleep. And the function of Portia in the story is to be the 
awake one. 79 
The "death sleep" that engulfs the characters in the novel is precisely that banal force 
of self-situating fantasy that I have described, "the movement through which we install 
ourselves in the world. " As Portia makes her final visits, speaking the truth that 
nobody wants to hear, confronted by the chaotic nature of the world without signposts, 
she certainly seems the one waking person in this somnambulitic world. However, as 
the force of her realizations becomes unbearable, she seems to be willing just such a 
sleep upon herself. Throughout the last section, after her eating of St Quentin's 
proffered fruit (it is she who, goaded, asks the fatal question in the end), Portia appears 
to descend into a "dreadful dream" (DH, 350). Later, confronted with the "image of 
cruelty" of her two betrayers together in the same room, she shuts her eyes against 
them, discovering the comfort of "the arms of immunity - the immunity of sleep, of 
anaesthesia, of endless solitude" (DH, 358). This withdrawal from her previous state of 
over-alert consciousness continues - at one stage, she even appears like "a little 
corpse" (DH, 374) - to her final stop at Major Brutt's hotel. As her last hope of 
salvation and escape, the "preposterous happy mirage" of marriage to the Major, is 
79 Bowen, `Elizabeth Bowen and Jocelyn Brooke', p. 7. 
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shattered by its confrontation with the dull reality of the bachelor's life, she ensconces 
herself in his bed, becoming less and less animated (DH, 414). Folding her arms, "she 
locked the eiderdown, her last shelter, to her chest" (DH, 415). In the face of dreadful 
realization Portia reaches for the literal obliteration of the "death sleep" that her 
companion's private obsessions already represent. 
The term "death sleep" recalls Bennett and Royle's notion of catatonia, which they see 
as characteristic of consciousness in Bowen's novels. All of her characters, they 
suggest, suffer from a kind of "stopping of thought, an interior quietness. 3,780 It is not, 
however, simply a question of inertia; there is something more complicated going on. 
This emerges in their elucidation of the term "catalepsy", in which we see emerging 
once again that enigmatic connection between threat and revelation. 
Catalepsy [... ] is a kind of seizure or trance in which consciousness is 
temporarily suspended. But catalepsy also has a technical meaning, in 
stoic philosophy of comprehension or apprehension. This remarkable 
cohabitation of two apparently contradictory or antithetical meanings in 
the word `catalepsy' suggests that the suspension of consciousness 
produces at the same time, a sudden apprehension. "81 
Implicit in the drive to sleep is a recognition of some kind; the various forms of "death 
sleep" in the novel, those myriad "private obsessions" are symptomatic; they hold at 
their centre the nature of their origin, the reason for their existence. As we have seen, 
the ways in which people hypnotize themselves in The Death of the Heart constitute 
not so much a "stopping of thought" as a distraction of it. If these characters achieve 
some kind of "interior quietness", it is not through the cancelling out of the mind's 
anxious motion, but a transmutation of it into the outside. Consciousness is not 
suspended but involved in actively and busily working upon the world, expelling 
its 
excesses in a constant churning out of concretized fantasy. 
ßÖ Bennett and Royle, p. 2. 
81 Bennett and Royle, p. 4. 
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The relation between sleep and symptom is drawn by Merleau-Ponty, who compares 
the sleeper with the hysteric. Suffering a disruption in one arena of intersubjective 
relations, he suggests, the hysterical patient cuts off others through bodily eruptions 
such as aphonia or spasms. "Loss of speech, then, stands for the refusal of co- 
existence, just as, in other subjects, a fit of hysterics is the means of escaping from the 
situation" (POP, 186). The body transforms the anxious reaction of consciousness, the 
fearful idea into a physical thing through a process of symbolization. In this sense, 
both sleep and symptom offer through their bodily aspect an escape from self into the 
anonymity of somatic functioning. The things that have become too hard to deal with, 
"the power of learning, of maturing, of entering into communication with others, have 
become, as it were, arrested in a bodily symptom, existence is tied up and the body has 
become `the place where life hides away"' (POP, 190). 
As we saw in her discussion of sympathy and suffering, Bowen recognizes the 
consolation offered by the performative action, by the stylized movements of ritual: 
"Factitious feeling and true feeling come to about the same thing, when it comes to 
pain" (DH, 378). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty claims, in sleep we see a performance 
transformed into reality; the idea or symbol of sleep gives rise to sleep itself. 
I lie down on my bed, on my left side, with my knees drawn up; I close 
my eyes and breathe slowly, putting my plans out of my mind. But the 
power of my will or consciousness stops there. As the faithful, in the 
Dionysian mysteries, invoke the god by miming scenes from his life, I 
call up the visitation of sleep by imitating the breathing and posture of 
the sleeper. The god is actually there when the faithful can no longer 
distinguish themselves from the part they are playing (POP, 189). 
The achievement of sleep, then, is a successful quieting of one's otherness, an 
accession into the silence of the one. Like the hysterical symptom, it is a refusal of 
coexistence, but not only outside, also inside oneself. This desire for oneness will 
return in Eva Trout, to be discussed in the final chapter. But suffice to say that here, as 
ever in Merleau-Ponty, the coincidence of two antithetical states or terms is only ever 
partial. There always remains that connection with the world at some level which 
keeps the gap open: "the sleeper is never completely isolated within himself, never 
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totally a sleeper, and the patient is never totally cut off from the intersubjective world, 
never totally ill" (POP, 190). However hard one tries to shield oneself from the world, 
one can never totally escape it. 
Thus the characters in Bowen's novel remain afraid, on guard, hostile; thus they 
perpetuate the danger that each poses to the other in their trigger-happy circle of 
defence. Even Eddie, whose disguise almost delivers him from the necessity of being 
human, is prey to the anxiety that he may be caught out, to "the expectation of some 
appalling contretemps which should make him have to decamp from everything 
suddenly" (DH, 389). As the shock waves from Portia's final resistance spread they 
disturb Eddie too, sending "his nerves [to] a pitch of untoward alertness [... ] In the 
state he was in, his enemies seemed to have supernatural powers: they could filter 
through keyholes, stream through hard wood doors" (DH, 387). This paranoia, his own 
fear that he might be sunk, prevents him from extending to Portia the understanding 
she demands. He retains his hostile mask, "his face entirely stiff [... ] without a human 
flicker" and Portia, along with the disturbance that she threatens, is dispatched, left to 
seek solace at the lonely Major's door. This hostility seems to be a harm that is 
destined to go on being done as we come to the close of the novel as the Quaynes 
perform their roles as expected. Refusing to succumb to any feelings of personal guilt 
or responsibility towards the child entrusted to their care, they do what they divine to 
be "the right thing" (DH, 430): they "send" Matchett to "fetch" Portia (DH, 437). Thus 
perpetuating their own installing movement, keeping the "inner life" of Windsor 
Terrace ticking over, these characters avoid impact, evade the awakening that Portia 
has threatened to precipitate 
The "bastioned about" Quaynes are in fact the last such bastion of a social and 
aesthetic intactness; in the war-torn years ahead, Bowen's fictional worlds and their 
inhabitants cannot avoid the encroachment of the outside world. Questions of betrayal, 
disillusionment and threat were to become amplified beyond the novels' pages in the 
years following the publication of The Death of the Heart. With the Second World 
War came the actualization of the conflict that had been playing in Bowen's 
imagination throughout her writing career. Just as Merleau-Ponty describes the self- 
consciousness that emerges only "at the moment life is threatened", so too, as we will 
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see, under the heavy skies of Blitzed London did Bowen's writing take on in various 
ways a newly self-conscious aspect. 
*** 
For Bowen as for Welty, sympathy is an essential component of representational form. 
The false veneer of civilization exposed in The Death of the Heart traps the subject in 
a failure of relatedness. In an essay written in 1950, Bowen muses on a statement made 
by Graham Greene which claims that it is the writer's duty to be disloyal. Bowen 
quotes Greene: "Loyalty confines us to accepted opinions: loyalty forbids us to 
comprehend sympathetically our dissident fellows; but disloyalty encourages us to 
roam experimentally through any human mind; it gives the novel the extra dimension 
of sympathy. "82 It is not an adherence to strong beliefs in general, Bowen points out, 
that Greene is warning against, but specifically the writer's adoption of them; it is the 
writer's duty to remain "susceptible" to the shifting variations of human values. 83 
Without this openness, the writer cannot achieve "the extra dimension of sympathy" 
which is necessary "[i]f the novel is to continue vital". 84 The author must somehow 
suspend her own system of values, entertain the possibility of other, potentially 
"dissident" outlooks in order to play the role of a sort of mouthpiece or medium for the 
"the doublings and twistings of mankind under the grip of circumstance and the 
pressure of life". 85 Bowen admits, however, that this surrender to a kind of ideological 
instability does not come easily: 
for, indeed, the writer has in an even greater degree than his fellow man 
the disposition to be attached - ideas, creeds, persons and ways of 
life 
first magnetize then begin to absorb him. By temperament he has a high 
potential of that extreme of loyalty, fanaticism. To break off any 
adherence involves dismay, pain, loneliness and the sense of loss [... ] 
In turning away from resting places, from lighted doorways, to pursue 
his course into darker country, he carries with him a burden of rejected 
82 Bowen, `Disloyalties', pp. 60-62 (p. 60). 
83 Bowen, `Disloyalties', pp. 60-62 (p. 61). 
84 Bowen, `Disloyalties', pp. 60-62 (p. 60). 
85 Bowen, `Disloyalties', pp. 60-62 (p. 60). 
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alternatives and troubling regrets. Graham Greene is advocating the 
harder road. 86 
With its intertwined explorations of representing and relating, The Death of the Heart 
revealed to us just how hard that road towards the recognition of the other might be. 
But while Bowen is ostensibly describing here the importance of the empathetic 
imagination for the writer, when viewed in the light of her wartime experiences these 
troubled thoughts on disloyalty take on a whole new aspect. 
In the summer of 1940, Bowen wrote to the Ministry of Information to enquire 
whether there was any work she could undertake in Ireland on their behalf. Following 
this, she began making visits to that country, to gather information on the attitudes and 
atmosphere amongst its people. The resultant reports range from accounts of Bowen's 
encounters with Irish political figures to comments about the war and Ireland's 
neutrality overheard on the street. Writing about The Last September, a novel set 
against the backdrop of the Irish Troubles, Bennett and Royle write "The dissolution of 
the boundaries of the self is mapped onto the problematic construction of political 
boundaries in the Ireland of 1920. "87 When it comes to the Ireland of 1940, the same 
rule applies. Her espionage activity must have compounded Bowen's already 
complicated Anglo-Irish identity; as someone who frequently and fervently described 
herself as "an Irishwoman", Bowen cannot, in undertaking her covert activities, have 
failed to feel a pang of the same disloyalty she describes in the piece on Greene. 
There is also, however, a sense in which she herself felt morally betrayed by Ireland's 
neutrality. This tension between the roles of betrayer and betrayed emerges in her 
espionage reports as a simmering frustration. Bowen chides the "childishness and 
obtuseness" of the Irish attitude, despairing that in the light of the "desperate gravity" 
with which the war is viewed in England, such an attitude must appear "as blindness, 
egotism, escapism or sheer funk. "88 However, she also defends Ireland against such 
accusations, coming back once again to the question of being disloyal: 
86 Bowen, `Disloyalties', pp. 60-62 (p. 61). 
87 Bennett and Royle, p. 18. 
88 Bowen, 'Notes on Eire': Espionage Reports to Winston Churchill, 1940-2, ed. Jack Lane and Brendan 
Clifford (Aubane: Aubane Historical Society, 1999), p. 12. 
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I could wish some factions in England showed less anti-Irish feeling. I 
have noticed an inevitable increase in this in England during the last 
year. The charge of `disloyalty' against the Irish has always, given the 
plain facts of history, irritated me. I could wish that the English kept 
history in mind more, that the Irish kept it in mind less. 89 
This final comment reveals some perceived deficiency in the national identities of both 
the English and the Irish. It is a deficiency that centres on the very essence of identity; 
the extent to which one should keep one's self in mind. There is the double danger that 
one may both forget one's identity, or as we have seen with Eddie, lose oneself 
through a migration into excessive self-consciousness. Bowen is also, of course, in this 
time of heightened tension between her homelands, a tension into whose waters she 
chooses to dive, in possession of an embattled identity that has forgotten how to 
simply be present to itself. 
The question of forging an identity between these polarized levels of self-awareness 
animates Bowen's Blitz-set novel, The Heat of the Day. Bowen utilizes the idea of 
espionage, of people both watching and watched, to unravel the notion of identity in a 
time itself presided over, made self-conscious by history. This story moves around 
Stella Rodney, "younger by a year or two than the century", divorced (a move 
"ironically rendered almost at once unnecessary by her husband's death"), mother to a 
young soldier, Roderick and currently, employed "in secret, exacting, not unimportant 
work" connected to the war (HD, 23-24). The narrative moves around Stella's 
involvement with three men: her lover Robert, her son Roderick, and a man called 
Harrison, a mysterious character who comes to Stella claiming to be watching Robert's 
suspect activities. As the story progresses in the bizarre atmosphere of the "garrison" 
society of Blitzed London, the distinctions between watcher and watched dissolve, 
leaving in their wake a thickening atmosphere of paranoia and confusion (HD, 89). 
This confusion at the level of identity is shadowed by a confusion at the level of 
perception. There is an overlapping between "the general rocking of London and one's 
89 Bowen, Notes on Eire, p. 13 
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own mind" (HD, 85); caught in such a moment, people "did not know how much 
might be the time how much themselves" (HD, 91). Things are not merely seen or felt, 
rather perception becomes an invasion of nerves, an entering of bodies. The reciprocal 
movement of perception as we see it described by Merleau-Ponty is coloured here by 
the all-encompassing atmosphere of the war; perception becomes a matter of conflicts 
and incursions, bodies become sites of potential occupation. The material world, which 
has developed such powerful attachments to Bowen's characters before, impinges 
painfully upon heightened senses; nerves are "parched"(HD, 6), "[torn] through" (HD, 
136); simply "[t]o work or to think was to ache" (HD, 86). In another expression of the 
notion that the moment of threat is also a moment of apprehension, in this world of 
imminent material destruction we see magnified "the passionate attachment of men 
and women to every object or image or place or love or fragment of memory with 
which his or her destiny seemed to be identified. " It seems to be the case that 
sometimes the strength of this "passion" for what is so dangerously contingent 
threatens to overwhelm and "[t]he search for indestructible landmarks in a destructible 
world" leads away from the material "down strange paths" (DL, 97). 
In the midst of this intensified perceptual atmosphere, there is a sense in which anxious 
psyches can be seen to recoil from their bodily existence, constructing elaborate 
"worlds-within-worlds of hallucination, " outside the present in which their bodies are 
trapped (DL, 97). If, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, our consciousness and its access to 
the world is defined and limited by the fact of our being body-subjects, then it follows 
that such a retreat into fantasy constitutes a denial of self. We have already seen 
through Bowen's accounts of the Blitz how, at this tumultuous point in history, 
external events threatened to smother individual feeling, to dissolve the boundaries of 
the `uncertain `I"': "Sometimes I hardly knew when I stopped and somebody else 
began" (DL, 95). Throughout The Heat of the Day, we see Bowen invoking precisely 
this sense of a shared identity of the crowd, a sense of belonging to something larger 
than oneself. There is a "war-warmed impulse of people to be a people, " and running 
through London's streets, "the bloodstream of the crowds, the curious animal psychic 
oneness, the human lava flow" (HD, 266). "Disembodied" by the strange, sleepless 
nervousness of the atmosphere, London's residents of 1940's Blitz are transformed 
into a sort of "organic power", "a phantasmagoric streaming", "shoals" (HD, 86). As if 
the possibility of an individual name has been lost, people are identified collectively: 
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"the lookers-on", "the injured and dying", the "homeless", "the dead", "the crowds" 
(HD, 86-87). 
Despite the obvious threat that this atmosphere poses to the integrity of the self, there 
are some senses in which this loss of self provides a source of comfort. In his `Group 
Psychology', Freud suggests the curative potential of group belonging upon the 
neurotic state of mind: "it appears that where a powerful impetus has been given to 
group formation neuroses may diminish and, at all events temporarily, disappear. "90 
Similarly, in the Blitz that Bowen describes, itself a sort of externalized form of 
neurosis, the anxieties attached to daily living are quieted by a surrender to group 
belonging. In a situation where bodies are targets for bombs, the transcendence of 
individual bodily being through a belonging to the new, massive identity of the crowd 
provides a sense of relief. Also, as intimate, one-to-one relationships become 
increasingly strained under the pressure of external events, the power of the crowd to 
melt individuality provides a release from the effort of having to actively engage with 
one's companions; somehow the accession to otherness in one sense staves it off in 
another. 
In her essay on the cinema, written the year before the outbreak of the war, Bowen lists 
just such a sense of pleasurable group belonging among her reasons for going to see 
films: "I go because I like sitting in a packed crowd in the dark, among hundreds 
riveted on the same thing" (CIN, 205). She goes on to describe the pleasure, both 
emotional and bodily, that derives from surrendering to the shared cadences of this 
temporary community. 
[T]he success of a film with its house communicates a tingling physical 
pleasure - joining and heightening one's private exhilaration [... ] 
The happily constituted cinema-goer learns to see and savour a 
positive merit in films that may do nothing to him personally, films 
whose subjects, stars, or settings may be to him, even, antipathetic. To 
reject as any kind of experience a film that is acting powerfully on 
90 Freud, `Group Psychology and the analysis of the Ego' (1921), Beyond the Pleasure Principle and 
Group Psychology, SE XVIII, pp. 65-143 (p. 142). 
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people round seems to me to argue poverty in the nature. What falls 
short as aesthetic experience may do as human experience: the film 
rings no bell in oneself, but one hears a bell ring elsewhere (CIN, 208). 
The pleasure of the cinematic experience is, Bowen suggests, less tied to the quality of 
the film itself than to the opportunity that it provides for a sense of group-belonging. 
At the same time as it achieves this level of passive intersubjective relating, the cinema 
also provides the opportunity to avoid any more active interaction. 
I enjoy, sitting opposite [the film star], the delights of intimacy without 
the onus, high points of possession without the strain. This could be 
called inoperative love. Relationships in real life are made arduous by 
their reciprocities; one can too seldom simply sit back (CIN, 213). 
Once again, this relationship provides the opportunity to escape from oneself: "I not 
only perceive them but I am them [... ] Not only do I enjoy them; I enjoy in them a 
vicarious life" (CIN, 214). There is a breakdown here in the distinction between 
audience and actor, one that echoes the dissolution of the roles of watcher and watched 
in The Heat of the Day. To be an audience member becomes, in a way, the same as 
acting a role; both entail an element of losing oneself, of giving some aspect of oneself 
up; both actor and audience live, to return to The Death of the Heart, a kind of "edited 
life". 
Merleau-Ponty, in a lecture course titled `The Experience of Others', points out the 
distinction between acting and living in precisely these terms. 
The whole difference between life and the theatre lies in the fact that 
one's role in life is subjected to specific relationships with one's past 
and with other people. In this respect, something is measured in the 
audience-actor relationship, whereas in life a certain lack of measuring 
obtains between other people and myself, for we cannot restrict our 
responsibilities as we do in aesthetic activity. We are so intimately 
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engaged with other people that the closer one gets, the less any limit is 
possible. 91 
As we have seen, this sense of illimitability, particularly in the realm of feeling, 
constitutes an ongoing anxiety in Bowen's writing. Anna in The Death of the Heart 
turned precisely to "aesthetic activity" to buffer herself against the world, allowing 
Eddie to create a "beautified" "small world of art round her" (DH, 90). Belonging to an 
audience works in much the same way as the "dis simulations" of Anna, Eddie and the 
other residents of Windsor Terrace to shield a nervous subjectivity. It is, in fact, to be 
shielded twice over, not only through the distancing and limiting effects of an 
aestheticized experience but also through being part of a wider group; the audience 
provides both safety in numbers and safety in numbness. 
The comfort derived from the undemanding, depersonalized model of relating to be 
found in the hypnotic atmosphere of the spectating group is echoed in the first chapter 
of The Heat of the Day. The novel opens upon the scene of Regent's Park on the 
evening of "the first Sunday of September 1942" (HD, 6). As we will gradually 
discover this moment, two years after the "heady autumn of the first London air raids", 
is undisturbed by nightly bombings itself (HD, 85); as a result it appears inert, 
"deadening", dull (HD, 87). Nerves keyed-up by that earlier atmosphere have been left 
with nothing to attach themselves to but "this new insidious echoless propriety of 
ruins", or slogans "desperately reworded to catch the eye, requiring to be pasted more 
strikingly onto hoardings and bases of monuments" (HD, 87-88). In this dreadful pause 
emerges the sense once again of the anticipation of a delayed impact that we saw in 
Bowen's childhood fear of Halley's comet; "Everywhere hung the heaviness of the 
even worse you could not be told and could not desire to hear" (HD, 87). In the midst 
of this "dangerless" yet "malarial" moment (HD, 87), bodies whose senses were 
attuned to the threat of aerial impact are left too much open, like the "[g]reat globular 
roses" in Regent's Park "today at the height of their second blooming" (HD, 15). 
91 Merleau-Ponty, `The Experience of Others' trans. Fred Evans and Hugh J. Silverman, in Keith 
Hoeller (ed. ), Merleau-Ponty and Psychology (Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press International, 
1994), pp. 33-63 (p. 56). 
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As the narrative begins, we see such "woundably thin-skinned" bodies drifting in 
search of some annihilating relief (HD, 9). Somewhere in this park, there is an 
orchestra playing an outdoor concert and the music acts as some mysterious and faintly 
"disturbing" siren, drawing people into the parodistically cinematic gloom of the open- 
air theatre: "this hollow which was the source of the music was found to be also the 
source of dusk" (HD, 5). As the rows of deckchairs fill up, the audience loses its 
uncertainty at entering such an eerie place. Echoing Bowen's living of a vicarious life 
through the performance of the film star before her, the music transports the members 
of this audience away from their physical and emotional situations through a breaking 
down of the distinction between them and it. Like that undemanding, "inoperative 
love" elicited by the film star, the entering of this shared alternative "universe" (HD, 6) 
also suspends its members from the arduousness of "relationships in real life". 
The heroic marches made them lift up their heads; recollections of 
opera moulded their faces into unconscious smiles, and during the 
waltzes women's eyes glittered with delicious tears about nothing. First 
note by note, drop by drop, then steadily, the music entered sense, 
nerves, and fancies that had been parched [... ] 
Pairs of lovers, fatigued by their day alone with each other, were 
glad to enter this element not themselves: when their looks once more 
met it was with refreshed love. Mothers tired by being mothers forgot 
their children as their children forgot them - one held her baby as 
though it had been a doll. Married couples who had sat down in 
apathetic closeness to one another could be seen to draw a little apart, 
each recapturing some virginal inner dream (HD, 6). 
As well as providing the means of escape from taxing elements of self-hood, the 
concert also, like cinema-going, fulfils some need for a sense of more general 
belonging, for a shared "human experience" in the midst of human conflict. "For 
many, chiefly, the concert was the solution of where to be: one felt eased 
by this place 
where something was going on. To be sitting packed among other people was 
better 
than walking about alone. At the last moment, this crowned the day with meaning" 
(HD, 7). 
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However, as one might expect, this atmosphere of integration is not straightforwardly 
positive. Even as Freud acknowledges the potentially curative nature of group- 
belonging, he emphasizes its more sinister aspects. In becoming a member of a group, 
the individual suffers a "reduction; " the "group individual" suffers a "regression of 
mental activity, " a weakening of the instinctual and intellectual controls which 
characterize the civilized state. 92 Similarly, while Bowen depicts a world in which 
surrender to the crowd constitutes a form of psychic protection, her novel also traces 
the difficulties involved in negotiating the transition between one's individual identity 
and one's capacity to belong. As much as it veers towards unconsciousness or 
hypnosis, subjectivity also becomes a self-conscious affair here: "Outwardly, we 
accepted that at this time individual destiny had to count for nothing: inwardly, 
individual destiny became an obsession in every heart" (DL, 97). It is precisely the 
disjunction or gap between these two attitudes - forgetting of self and obsession with 
self - that animates the story at the heart of The Heat of the Day. 
The exploration of self-consciousness extends even to the style and syntax of the text. 
In the discussion with Jocelyn Brooke mentioned above, Bowen defends The Heat of 
the Day against criticisms that it seems disjointed, that the style of prose is "over 
elaborate; " that, in short, it is "written rather too consciously. "93 She explains: 
I think I must say that the apparent disjection between the characters 
and scenes in The Heat of the Day was to a certain extent intended. I 
wanted, I was aiming to give an effect of fortuity, of a smashed up 
pattern with its fragments invecting on one another, drifting and tapping 
rather like that broken ice which I described in the opening passage ten 
years before in The Death of the Heart [... ] I wanted to show people in 
extremity, working on one another's characters and fates all the more 
violently because they worked by chance. I wanted the convulsive 
shaking of a kaleidoscope, a kaleidoscope also in which the inside 
reflector was cracked. 94 
92 Freud, `Group Psychology and the analysis of the Ego', pp. 65-143 (p. 117). 
93 Jocelyn Brooke, `Elizabeth Bowen and Jocelyn Brooke', p. 10. 
94 Bowen, `Elizabeth Bowen and Jocelyn Brooke', p. 11. 
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This broken kaleidoscope is an image whose sense haunts the text at every level. There 
is a feeling of imbalance, of something being out of step, of pieces failing to fit. 
Characters who have one eye "just perceptibly higher than the other" creating "a lag or 
inequality in vision" (HD, 10) or who have a limp, the "trace" of an injury, creating an 
"inequality" in his way of walking (HD, 85). Clocks and watches, periodically "shock- 
stopped" fail to match up, blinds are left at irregular heights: all these things work to 
heighten the mood that the novel's protagonist describes as "mechant, slipshod" (HD, 
20). 
This is a mood that pervades the text; something that meant Bowen was defending her 
novel even before it was published. In a letter to her editor, Daniel George, in response 
to corrections that he had suggested for The Heat of the Day, Bowen makes clear her 
specific intentions regarding the disruptions of style. 
What I am, in the main, sticking to my guns about are various word 
orders which you query. I cannot, myself, bear fanciful arrangements of 
words in sentences. But, in this novel, many sentences in which the 
order is queer are deliberate, because the sentences won't (as I see it) 
carry the exact meaning, or - still more important - make the exact 
psychological impact that I desire in any other way [... ] 
I'd rather keep the jars, 'jingles" and awkwardnesses - e. g. 
"seemed unseemly", "felt to falter". They do to my mind express 
something. In some cases I want the rhythm to jerk or jar - to an extent, 
even, which may displease the reader. 
I hate "poetic" prose; but it seems to me that in passages where 
prose has to do the work of poetry - do more, in fact, than words can 
achieve through reason -a certain poetic licence may be taken with 
prose. It's dangerous, I admit, and should only be done with infinite 
deliberation and at one's own risk. 95 
95 Bowen, letter to Daniel George. 
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Bowen's desire to distance her own deployment of studiedly jarring syntax from empty 
stylistic gestures - `fanciful arrangements", "poetic prose" - echoes at a stylistic level 
the anxiety about self-consciousness that is embedded in the story. Most obviously, of 
course, this anxiety emerges through the various interactions of watcher and watched 
that develop throughout the narrative. As in The Death of the Heart, the observant 
other poses a threat to the self. But here the actual consequences of that threat exceed 
the possibility of social embarrassment; in a world of wartime espionage, watching has 
a concretely sinister purpose. 
In Stella's first appearance in the novel she is confronted by Harrison and his claims 
that Stella's lover Robert Kelway is in fact a spy and a traitor. She is initially 
dismissive of these claims, especially in light of the fact that Harrison hopes to 
convince her to leave Robert for him. 
If this story were for one instant true, if you for one instant were what 
you hint you are, would you tell me, me of all people, knowing I'd go 
with the whole thing straight to Robert? Of course I'll tell him anyhow, 
simply as something comic. What else would you expect? (HD, 34). 
But Stella's riposte is thrown back at her by Harrison. If she does tell Robert what has 
been said, even without believing it, even as something "comic, " she risks 
precipitating a process over which she will have no control. 
I've never yet known a man not change his behaviour once he's known 
he's being watched: it's exactly changes like that that are being watched 
for. He'd be pulled in before anyone could say knife (HD, 35). 
To tell Robert, Harrison suggests, would not only be for Stella to betray her country, 
but also her lover; or, rather, to force him to betray himself. Stella would force open 
the fatal gap between being and acting like an oyster shell, leaving Robert exposed and 
helpless in the palm of his enemies. 
It is not only Robert to whom self-consciousness poses a threat. Indeed, in the opening 
chapter, Harrison himself feels the discomfort of being under scrutiny. 
Sitting in an 
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outdoor theatre in Regent's Park, he sits thinking, "insistently thrusting the fist of his 
right hand against and into the open palm of his left, " preparing himself for his 
subsequent meeting with Stella (HD, 7). His "unconsciousness" is shattered by the 
intrusion of Louie Lewis, a character who will drift in and out of the main story 
throughout the novel. After her unwelcome interruption, Harrison finds himself unable 
to think any further. 
She had made that impossible. Had she not borne in on him, in her 
moron way, the absurdity with which one exposed oneself? She had 
given him, the watcher, the sensation of being watched. New, only he 
knew how new, to emotional thought, he now saw, at this first of his 
lapses, the whole of its danger - it made you act the thinker. He could, 
now, do no better than travesty, repeat in order to judge how much it 
showed, his originally unconscious trick of the hands (HD, 12). 
The slippage from the unconscious act to the self-conscious one, from being to acting, 
is a dangerous one. Just as, in the negotiation between individual destiny as nothing 
and as obsession, one risks losing one's self under the pressure of enforced collective 
experience, here too the self teeters on the verge of giving itself away to a vision that is 
other than its own. The connection between revelation of and loss of oneself brings us 
back to Bowen's concerns about the dangers of over-intimacy; "we risk 
disillusionment, tragedy" when we seek "a total advertisement" of our own or 
another's privacy. Whilst those who exercise reserve retain an air of mystery, fascinate 
our imaginations, "never vanish", those who lay themselves open are left amongst "the 
husks and shells of abandoned friendships. , 96 
However, in The Heat of the Day, we have no sense of how one might go about 
maintaining the kind of reserve that Bowen's essay advocates. As the passage about 
Harrison above indicates, there seems to be no middle ground between 
unconsciousness and keyed-up self-consciousness, both of which constitute some kind 
of loss or exposure. This sense of a polarized subjectivity is captured later in the novel, 
96 Bowen, `The Art of Reserve', [p. 3]. 
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when it is Stella who becomes the watcher's quarry. Returning home one evening after 
a day spent with Robert, she develops a sense that she is being observed. 
That she should seem to perceive a figure posted, waiting, that she 
should instantaneously know herself to be on the return to a watched 
house, could only be another deception of the nerves. She had so 
dissolved herself, during the walk home, into the thousands of beings of 
oppressed people that the idea of the Someone was, at its first flash, no 
more than frightful fulfilment of expectation. Now her approaching 
footsteps were being numbered; no instinctive check or pause in them 
went unmarked. Her part - listening for the listener, watching for the 
watcher - must be the keeping on walking on, as though imperviously 
(HD, 121). 
Stella trips over the gap of being a "Someone", moving from "dissolved" subjectivity 
to a self-conscious performance of it; a "part" to be played "as though" she were other 
than she is. There is here, and in the novel as a whole, no space of subjectivity left to 
occupy. 
This suspended living is presented as characteristic of the time in which the novel is 
set. Identity has been interrupted by history; "Wariness had driven away poetry: from 
hesitating to feel came the moment when you no longer could. Was this war's doing? " 
(HD, 52). Later, in a key passage, Stella reflects that "the fatal connection between the 
past and future" is broken. "It had been Stella, her generation, who had broken the link 
- what else could this be but its broken edges that she felt grating inside her soul? " 
(HD 168). These broken edges recall the image of the convulsed kaleidoscope that 
Bowen used to describe the novel to Jocelyn Brooke; the cracks pervade the text at 
every level. In the same way that presence has been problematized at an ontological 
level, so too has the historical present become a broken set of fragments. 
Repeatedly Bowen emphasizes the sensation of being, at this historically significant 
moment, outside history. Any sense of presence has been devalued by the sensation of 
too-presentness; just as objects force themselves too hard on sensitive nerves, so too 
does the "now" become empty through its severance from any "then. " Stella finds 
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herself living in just such a permanent temporariness in her relationship; "she and 
Robert found themselves conscious of a submerged decision to go on as they were, for 
that `time being' which war had made the very being of time [... ] happy to stay as they 
were, afloat on this tideless, hypnotic, futureless day-to-day" (HD, 95). As well as 
paying no heed to the future the two, fatally as it turns out for Stella, accord with the 
atmosphere of their time and fail to share stories of their pasts. It was a characteristic 
of that life in the moment and for the moment's sake that one knew people well 
without knowing much about them: vacuum as to future was offset by vacuum as to 
past; life-stories were shed as so much superfluous weight" (HD, 90). 
This kind of living "in the moment, " rather than a successful occupation of the present, 
is in fact another means of escaping from it. Stella and Robert's relationship, whose 
pleasures become predictable, defined by "habit", seems not to be an embracing of 
spontaneity but an endless, magical repetition of one moment, like an oft-performed 
scene in a play. Indeed, the way in which this world develops recalls that realm of 
restricted responsibilities and limited experience by which we saw Merleau-Ponty 
describe the theatre: "The whole difference between life and the theatre lies in the fact 
that one's role in life is subjected to specific relationships with one's past and with 
other people. "97 Stella and Robert use their relationship to suspend them from those 
other external relationships; "Outside lies the junk-yard of what does not matter" (HD, 
94). In this way, they create for themselves a "habitat" that is outside the all-pervading 
embrace of the war in the same way we saw those listeners in Regent's Park at the 
beginning of the novel use the concert. 
We see another psychic habitat of this kind as Stella visits Mount Morris, the house in 
Ireland that her son Roderick has recently inherited. The idea of this house, waiting for 
him in a land beyond the reach of the war provides Roderick with the same saving 
escapism that his mother finds in her relationship with Robert and that others find in 
London's shoal-like crowds. Where London presented a feeling of too-presentness, of 
too much now, this place, steeped in history, "seemed to be outside time" (HD, 156). 
The house's rooms demonstrate an "indifference" to the passing of history beyond 
their walls, themselves "arrested" in a sort of fairy-tale "eternal luminousness" (HD, 
97 Merleau-Ponty, `The Experience of Others', pp. 33-63 (p. 56). 
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156). Roy Foster reads Mount Morris as representing "the possibilities of the future, 
and the world that is being fought for. "98 However, to return to Bowen's espionage 
reports, the house seems to justify the admonition "that the English kept history in 
mind more, that the Irish kept history in mind less. "99 The past as it irrupts through this 
house threatens to be a deadly burden. It drags its occupants down into its stagnating 
waters like the boat that has been sunk, at the previous owner Cousin Francis' 
instruction, in the river that runs through the grounds. 
The suggestion of this threat emerges in the sense of ambiguity that Roderick already 
feels at the wording of Cousin Francis' will. The house is bequeathed to Roderick "In 
the hope that he may care in his own way to carry on the old tradition" (HD, 83). 
Roderick puzzles "Did he mean, care in my own way, or, carry on the old tradition in 
my own way? " (HD, 83). On her visit to the house, Stella discovers a collection of 
cards containing instructions for any possible eventuality that might occur in his 
absence, from the correct way to wind clocks to what to do "In case of Parachutists" 
(HD, 157). Added to Roderick's legacy like stage directions scribbled in the margin, 
these prescriptive cards work to make even the future a part of the past, suggesting that 
Cousin Francis cared more for "the old tradition" than any subjective interpretation of 
it. 
When Roderick finally comes to Mount Morris, we will see him discard these 
instructions. However, for Stella, the cards provoke a pang of jealous anxiety: "she 
looked down into the fire, regretting she had not any such clear directions as to her 
own life [ ... 
] Oh to stay here for ever, playing the ghostly part! " By contrast, glancing 
at the things she has brought from London, she is reminded of the impossibility of such 
an escape. "Unwillingly she looked behind her - her gloves, shaped by her hands, her 
bag, containing every damning proof of her identity, were still, always, there" (HD, 
157). To have an identity is, whether one likes it or not, to have an impact, to leave 
one's imprint in the same way that Stella's hands have unconsciously shaped her 
empty gloves. Where the characters in The Death of the Heart were afraid their 
authorial control might be usurped, what is frightening here is precisely the fact that 
ýx Roy Foster, Introduction to The Heat of the Day (London: Vintage, 1998), pp. 1-6 (p. 3). 
99 Bowen, Notes on Eire, p. 13. 
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one must write one's own script. Once again we see the fear of "the blank white page" 
by which Bowen characterized the years after the first world war. In the face of such 
an uncharted territory, "tradition" provides the tempting possibility of a pre-existing 
set of rules. 
This sense of not knowing the right way to act, to simply be, of how to reconcile 
oneself to one's moment runs throughout the anxious escape-acts performed in the 
novel. They are questions that have an ethical dimension, even more so as the novel 
progresses. As Merleau-Ponty points out, in real life "we cannot restrict our 
responsibilities as we do in aesthetic activity. " The accession to the anonymity of the 
crowd, the refusal to act or interact on an individual basis, the retreat from the world 
into fantasy are all strategies that reflect the withdrawal from the world that we saw in 
Merleau-Ponty's description of hysteria. All "a means of escaping from the situation", 
they are also a refusal of responsibility, a refusal of really living (POP, 188). This 
refusal, of course, gains resonance in relation to the question of Ireland's neutrality 
which, as we have seen, Bowen regarded as a failure of moral vision. It is no 
coincidence that it is whilst in Ireland that Stella is confronted by her own ethical 
cowardice, her own failure to assert herself, to accept responsibility. 
She had not yet, in London, made one move towards checking up on 
Harrison. Was he what he had made himself out to be? Was he in a 
position to know what he said he knew, to act as he told her he could? 
She could have come at all three answers: what evasion to tell herself 
she could not! (HD, 164). 
Wandering around Mount Morris' ghostly rooms, Stella discovers a terrifying 
genealogy to her situation. Looking into a darkened mirror, "[s]he became for a 
moment as immortal as a portait. Momentarily she was the lady of the house, with a 
smile moulded against the drapery of darkness. She wore the look of being everything 
she had lost the secret of being" (HD, 166). This judgement, enacted by the mirror's 
ancient eye, jolts Stella. It is precisely this disjunction between seeming and being, she 
realizes, that has driven generations of women in this house "not quite mad" (HD, 
166). Knowing more than they dare reveal, even to themselves, suspecting "what they 
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refused to prove [ ... 
] the enactment of ignorance [became] too much, insupportable 
inside those sheltered heads" (HD, 167). If she were to stay here, Stella senses, she 
would continue this ghostly inheritance which she is already on the verge of enacting. 
Instead, her part is to be "a chapter missing from this book" (HD, 167); it is her 
generation that has severed the link "between the past and future" (HD, 167). 
Shrugging off the mantle of this lineage for herself, she imagines Roderick's future 
wife taking on these rooms. This new wife, "unspent and fearless", unburdened by the 
weight of the generations of dead that Stella feels pressing in on her, will be able to 
enact the necessary betrayal of them (HD, 168). The room that Stella finds so full of 
ghosts, 
for the bride would be a room to be first marvelled at, then changed. 
Required to mean what they had not, old things would be pushed into a 
new position; those which could not comply, which could not be made 
to pick up the theme of the new song, would go (HD, 168). 
Accompanying the danger, seen in Stella's and Robert's parenthetical relationship, that 
ignoring the past will impair one's ability to fully live now, there is also the threat that 
to pay it too much heed will do the same thing. The possibility that the old tradition 
might swamp the assertion of one's "own way" looms up throughout Bowen's 
treatment of the house, which becomes a symbol of what can or should be inherited in 
a larger sense. Responding to Roderick's confusion about the legacy, Stella exclaims: 
One must not be too much influenced by a dead person! After all, one 
can only live how one can; one generally finds there is only one way 
one can live - and that often must mean disappointing the dead. They 
had no idea how it would be for us. If they still had to live, who knows 
that they might not have disappointed themselves? (HD, 84). 
The connection between a troubled identity and history reaches its climax towards the 
end of the novel, in Robert's justification of his espionage. Stella, in a question whose 
utterance Bowen conceals from us, finally confronts Robert about his spying, 
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discovering what she already knows: that it is true. She wants to know: "why are you 
against this country? ". Robert's reply undoes the very terms of Stella's accusation: 
I don't see what you mean - what do you mean? Country? There are no 
more countries left; nothing but names [... ] What is repulsing you is the 
idea of `betrayal' I suppose, isn't it? In you the hangover from the 
word? Don't you understand that all that language is dead currency? 
(HD, 258-259). 
Robert's attitude represents a refusal of the mantle of inheritance, of "hangover"; it is a 
rejection of the responsibilities of living now, a rejection that Stella comes to recognize 
as impossible. It is an attitude that Bowen dispatches along with Robert, who falls to 
his death trying to escape from his watchers. While one cannot define oneself entirely 
through the terms imposed by the past, cannot reserve these terms in aspic, one cannot 
shrug them off entirely. It is this difficult balance that The Heat of the Day plays out. 
The anxieties that it demonstrates about the question of inheritance reflect the ongoing 
struggle that we have seen between being for self and being for others. 
Later, towards the end of the novel and the end of the war, in the aftermath of the affair 
with Robert and Harrison, Stella expresses this difficulty in terms of a difficulty of 
survival; terms that we will see utilized by Welty in my next chapter. In a conversation 
with Harrison, who has returned after years of mysterious absence to find her newly 
settled, Stella explains: 
one goes on hearing what [the dead] said, piecing and repiecing it 
together to try and make out something they had not time to say - 
possibly had not had time to know. Yet most of all there is something 
one has got to forget - that is, if it is to be possible to live. The more 
wars there are, I suppose, the more we shall learn how to be survivors 
(HD, 307). 
For the post-World War Two landscape, in the first words of Bowen's subsequent 
novel, "still pale with the heat of the day before", the question of surviving gains 
urgency (WL, 9). Her anxious anticipation of impact having been fulfilled, the new 
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anxiety is aimed towards that inherited post-war landscape, that "blank white page" 
whose challenge her generation has already failed to meet once. There is potentially 
more danger in peace than in war. Bowen's own fear is expressed through the words of 
the treacherous Robert. 
Freedom. Freedom to be what? - the muddled, mediocre, damned. 
Good enough to die for, freedom, for the good reason that it's the very 
thing which has made it impossible to live, so there's no alternative. 
Look at your free people - mice let loose in the middle of the Sahara. 
It's unsupportable - what is it but a vacuum? (HD, 259). 
It must, Bowen will insist, be anything but. Robert's Fascism is a reaction to the same 
threat of the "vacuum", of mediocrity, of the loss of art that we have seen Bowen 
railing against. Robert provides evidence that a troubled subjectivity suffers a crisis not 
only at an ontological or metaphysical level, but also at an ethical and historical one. 
Frustrated by the ineffectual, emasculated, bland nature of the English middle-class in 
which he has been raised, Robert, like the post-World War One efforts to find 
"something, " "somewhere" that Bowen described in `A Year I Remember', reaches out 
for something he feels is more solid. He, like his grotesque family home, is part of "a 
monstrous hatch-out over southern England of the 1900s" (HD, 248). Describing his 
generation, he laments to Stella, 
Dunkirk was waiting there in us - what a race! A class without a 
middle, a race without a country. Unwhole. Never earthed in - and there 
are thousands of thousands of us, and we're still breeding - breeding 
what? You may ask: I ask. Not only nothing to hold, nothing to touch. 
No source of anything in anything. I could have loved a country, but to 
love you must have (HD, 263-264). 
T. J. Clark notes that "[t]he disenchantment of the world", a disenchantment that 
characterizes modernity, "is horrible, intolerable. Any mass movement or cult figure 
that promises a way out of it will be clung to like grim death. Better even fascism than 
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technocracy. "100 The vacuum that haunts Bowen throughout her career is so terrifying, 
at least in part, because it provides the potential for a process of re-illusioning by the 
more malign forces of history. For her subsequent work, as I will explore in Chapter 
Five, the negotiation of the idea of legacy and of responsibility become increasingly 
integrated with questions of the materiality of form This later writing pitches a battle 
over exactly how and by whom the "great new blank white page" of the present and 
the future will be filled, a battle that entwines ethical with aesthetic concerns. 101 
Challenging the vague nature of Robert's justifications, Stella also reaches for 
something more solid, for the evidence of her own perceptual experience; she knows 
there is such a thing as a country because she has "trodden every inch of a country" 
(HD, 265). As she tries to pin Robert down, he mocks her request for specificity, for 
what he scathingly calls "brass tacks"; "Though, " Stella replies, undaunted, "they are 
always something" (HD, 273). Stella recognizes in Robert's inability to effectively 
formulate his motives the same dangerous "purity of principles", the same failure of 
contingency identified by Merleau-Ponty (HT, xiii). Where Robert fails, The Heat of 
the Day succeeds. Bowen forges her enduring theme of the battle-ground of human 
relations, her recognition that displaced subjects perceive things in displaced ways, 
into a form that is also shaken, "cracked" by the real historical battle-ground from 
which it emerges. In shackling form to history in this way, Bowen has begun the task 
of uncovering a means of representation that is truly contingent, contemporary; a task 
that, as we will see, will dominate her writing in the years to come. 
100 Clark, p. 7. 
101 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 1918', p. 19. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"Making reality real": Eudora Welty's Fiction 
190 
Fiction provides the ideal texture through which the feeling and meaning that 
permeate our own personal, present lives will best show through. 
- Eudora Welty, `Place in Fiction' 
Even with the move from photography to fiction, the visual remains at the centre of 
Welty's work. She attempts to knit out of language the precise fabric of the perceived 
world. This does not manifest itself in objective or naturalistic description but in the 
delicate evocation of a vision that emanates from the heart of the scene it describes. It is a 
vision not of the camera, but of the susceptible body. This gives the writing an 
extraordinary sensual nature, a unique and enveloping atmosphere, and an experience of 
reading that comes vertiginously close to vision. She builds images within her words in a 
way that makes one imagine that the type on the page might quiver and transform into a 
picture of what it describes, like a textual optical illusion. Dabney in Welty's novel Delta 
Wedding, looks out of her window into the night only to find "she could see a single leaf 
on a willow tree as far as the bayou's edge, such clarity there was in everything" (DW, 
101). Like Dabney, Welty's reader looks into the black and white of her words and finds 
piercing images. It is as if Welty takes her early observation that "[t]he human face and 
the human body are eloquent in themselves" (OTOP, 8) and reverses it, making her 
narration bodily, her language as physically striking as gesticulation. 
It isn't only vision that this applies to, but the whole gamut of the senses, evoked in a 
synaesthetic expression. In that same scene from Delta Wedding, Dabney is initially 
woken by "the silver night", as if it had touched her shoulder as she slept rather than 
simply waited outside to be seen. When she does awake, 
she seemed to breathe in a well, drenched with the whiteness of the hour 
that astonished her. It hurt her to lift her hand and touch her forehead, for 
all seemed to be tenderness now, the night like herself, breathless and yet 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Four 191 
serene, unlooked-on. The daring of morning light impending would have to 
strike her when it reached her - not yet. The window invited her to see - 
her window. She got out of bed (her filmy dress like a sleeping moth clung 
to the chair) and the whole leafy structure of the outside seemed agitated 
and rustled, the shadows darted like birds. The gigantic sky radiant as water 
ran over the earth and around it. The old moon in the west and the planets 
of morning streamed their light (DW, 101). 
The whiteness of the moonlit night expands here to affect not only Dabney's vision, but 
her ability to breathe and the surface of her skin. We get the impression that light, both the 
watery radiance of the night-time and the more piercing sunshine of the day have a 
tangibility, a heavy atmospheric quality that both exceeds and is connected to their 
visibility. The same sensation is evoked in this passage from Bowen's The House in Paris: 
Up there in the drawing room, Aunt Violet began playing Schubert: notes 
came stepping lightly on to the moment in which Karen realized she was 
going to die. Phrases of music formed and hung in the garden, where 
violently green young branches flamed in the spring dusk. A hurt earthy 
smell rose from the piteous roots of the daisies and those small wounds in 
the turf that her uncle, not speaking, kept pressing at with his toe. Down 
there below the terrace, the harbour locked in green headlands lay glassy 
under the close sky. No one familiar in Karen's life had died yet: the scene 
round her looked at once momentous and ghostly, as in that light that 
sometimes comes before storms (HP, 98-99). 
I am reminded in both these scenes of Merleau-Ponty's claim that "[s]ynaesthetic 
perception is the rule, and we are unaware of it only because scientific knowledge shifts 
the centre of gravity of experience" (POP, 266). Vision, he tells us, brings us more than 
"only colours or lights [... ] The senses intercommunicate by opening on to the structure of 
the thing. One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass, and when, with a tinkling sound, 
it breaks, this sound is conveyed by the visible glass" (POP, 266-267). 
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In all of these passages, it seems the distinctions between the senses are able to dissolve 
and reform into new combinations. There is a sense of imminence in the two fictional 
scenes - in the form of a breathlessness in Welty and of a momentousness of scene in 
Bowen - as if the surroundings themselves, as well as the senses that perceive them, were 
about to undertake such a reformation. Merleau-Ponty expresses the same sense of an 
imminent perception in a description of the experience of approaching an object that is at 
first indistinct. 
If I walk along a shore towards a ship that has run aground, and the funnel 
or masts merge into the forest bordering on the sand dune, there will be a 
moment when these details suddenly become part of the ship and 
indissolubly fused with it. As I approached, I did not perceive resemblances 
or proximities which finally came together to form a continuous picture of 
the upper part of the ship. I merely felt that the look of the object was on 
the point of altering, that something was imminent in this tension, as a 
storm is imminent in storm clouds. Suddenly the sight before me was recast 
in a manner satisfying to my vague expectation (POP, 20). 
The sense of imminence emerges, it seems in the relation, in the `tension' between the 
actual, material object and the individual subject's perception, between the `sight before 
me' and `my vague expectation'. Similarly, in the Bowen passage, Karen's personal 
thoughts are juxtaposed with the surroundings that are infected by the presence of her 
companions - her aunt's piano playing and her uncle's fidgeting toe. The private and 
public aspects of the description converge towards the end of the passage in that 
`momentous and ghostly' light which is both a part of the external scene and a reflection 
of Karen's realization about her aunt's death. Bowen describes this convergence, which is 
not quite a resolution, in the same terms as Merleau-Ponty, namely the sensation of an 
imminent storm. 
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In Welty's description, Dabney directs her gaze through the opening that is both "the 
window" and "her window", the scene outside both connected to her, "like herself' and 
separated; "She wondered if she would ever know ... the constellations .... " (DW, 101). 
The sense of an imminent meeting between herself and this external world is emphasized 
in her anticipation of her forthcoming wedding. 
Out into [the scene], if she were married, she would walk now - her bare 
foot touch at the night's hour, firmly too, a woman's serious foot. She 
would walk on the clear night - angels though, did that - tread it with love 
not this lonely, never this lonely, for under her foot would offer the roof, 
the chimney, the window of her husband, the solid house (DW, 101). 
Here, the connection becomes more explicitly something that emerges between the scene 
and the body of the observer as Dabney imagines the touch of her foot on the surface of 
what she sees. It also becomes intertwined with Dabney's more prosaic imminent 
transformation into a married woman, her own identity becoming `indissolubly fused' 
with her husband's. This is typical of how Welty moves between perceptual issues and 
psychological and emotional issues. These things, like perception, are forged in the vital 
relationship between an individual person and her world and are just as vulnerable to the 
influence of the body and its physical place. Welty claims: "I like doing things, you know, 
privately. But I like to write with a window that looks out on to the street [... ] I like to be 
a part of my world. " 1 This interaction between the private and the public results in a 
vision that is both inflected with a unique sense of character and responsive to a world we 
are all able to recognize. Welty's sense of a participatory world produces a closeness to 
things a plenitude of sensation and affect, but it also necessarily limits the horizons of that 
vision. Accordingly, as we have already seen in `Where is the Voice Coming From? ', 
Welty narrates the failures as well as the wonders of human vision. 
1 Hermione Lee, `Interview with Eudora Welty', in Writing Lives: Conversations Between Woolen Writers, 
ed. Mary Chamberlain, pp. 249-259 (pp. 258-259). 
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Welty's insistence on being "part of' the world she describes is, as I discussed in an 
earlier chapter, not always extended to the wider world of history. However, it does 
manifest itself in an emphasis on the importance of topology. "Place in fiction, " she writes 
in an essay of that name, "is the named, identified, concrete, exact and exacting, and 
therefore credible, gathering spot of all that has been felt, is about to be experienced, in the 
novel's progress [... ] Every story would be another story, and unrecognizable as art, if it 
took up its characters and happened somewhere else. ,2 As well as being irretrievably tied 
to other people - the revelation of "human relationships" is Welty's "continuing passion" 
- every person is tied into the net of their physical surroundings. `Place' is both the shared 
scene of human interaction and that which colours one's own internal horizons. 
Interestingly, Welty describes her own experience of reading as "a sweet devouring", a 
taking into the body of the text. 3 Her stories are also full of images and metaphors of 
eating; her created worlds both surround and enter her characters. 
Equally though, her characters' inner lives spill out onto the material plane. The 
relationship between observation and imagination is close and ambiguous. There is no 
easy separation between the physical and the psychical in the writing; the stirrings and 
wanderings of consciousness occur within and in tandem with the phenomenal world. 
There is no escaping the world through a retreat to the inner self, rather the dreams and 
imaginings of that self become an integral part of the world. This closeness results in 
confusions, in the impression of a world in which "the dreamed-about [changes] places 
with the dreamer, " in which subject and object collide. 4 For all its physicality, its 
rootedness in the world, Welty's writing also knows how to take flight. Vision in Welty, 
whilst powerful, incisive and often over-assailed, is also frequently unreliable, obfuscated 
and hallucinatory. 
2 Welty, `Place in Fiction', pp. 116-133 (p. 122). 
j `A Sweet Devouring' is the name Welty gives to an article she wrote on the subject of her own childhood 
reading habits. Welty, `A Sweet Devouring' (1957), EYE, pp. 279-285. 
4 Welty, `Moon Lake', The Golden Apples (1949) (London: Bodley Head, 1950) pp. 99-138 (p. 121). 
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The often-disturbing strangeness of Welty's fictional worlds does not match the unified, 
comforting, sometimes saccharine tones of her biographical and critical commentaries. As 
Hermione Lee writes, 
the Eudora aura can cast a slightly misleading light on the work [ ... ] 
And 
for all their passion for `the astonishing world under the sky', there is 
darkness, fear, terror, cruelty, and violence, in Welty's stories. They are not 
benign. Terrible things happen to her characters, often with a cold, brutal, 
accidental carelessness. ' 
Welty's stories are unnerving, worrying, often leaving us with a sense of moral 
uncertainty. The atmosphere is one of threat in which, to use Elizabeth Bowen's phrase, 
"[t]here is actually very little difference as to colour in the moment before the blow and 
the moment before the kiss" (HD, 40). This sense of an uneasy strangeness is echoed in 
Welty's formal experimentations, which have, in the past, aroused disapproving 
responses. In a 1943 review of The Wide Net, for example, Diana Trilling claimed 
"Eudora Welty has developed her technical virtuosity to the point where it outweighs the 
uses to which it is put. "6 In the introduction to the 1978 collection of essays, A Still 
Moment, John F. Desmond identifies this tendency for her work to be accused of a 
"preciosity of style" and suggests that it is precisely the aspects of her work that incite 
such critiques that provide "the reason her work will still be read when the current tides of 
critical and popular taste have turned and turned again. "7 
Eudora Welty is far from being an undiscovered writer. She was awarded nearly every 
literary prize available within the United States, from whence there has emanated a steady 
5 Hermione Lee, `Introduction' to The Collected Stories of Eudora Welty (London: Virago, 1998), pp. ix-xxi 
(p. xix) 
6 Diana Trilling, `Fiction in Review', Review of The Wide Net and Other Stories (1943), in Critical Essays 
on Eudora Welty, ed. W. Craig Turner & Lee Emling Harding (Boston MA: G. K. Hall and Co., 1989), pp. 
39-42 (p. 39). 
John F. Desmond, Introduction to A Still Moment: Essays on the Art of Eudora Welty, ed. Desmond 
(Metuchen, NJ & London: The Scarecrow Press, 1978), pp. vii-viii (p. vii). 
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stream of critical interest. Her writing has been described in terms ranging from American 
Gothic to Southern Romance, to social satire, to modernism. Critics often go to great pains 
to try and fit Welty into some sort of canon. She is frequently compared to her fellow 
Southern writers, particularly Faulkner, as well as to Chekhov and to modernist writers 
such as Woolf and Mansfield. In her influential 1962 study of Welty, Ruth Vande Kieft 
dismisses the notion of a coherent `Southern school' to which Welty belongs. She goes on, 
however, to retain the notion of Welty's writing as falling between the external influence 
of her Southern setting and the modernists' experiments with the internal movements of 
consciousness. The result is that Welty is judged not to succeed fully in either case. Vande 
Kieft identifies "a curious lack of social or political attitude" in relation to Southern 
matters. "[S]he misses, " we are told, "the sweep and drive, the hypnotic power over the 
mind and imagination, of the writer who, like Faulkner or Robert Penn Warren, shows the 
individual in relation to the large social forces which affect and determine his struggle. " 8 
Welty fares no better when put up against modernism. She is portrayed as a minor, 
`almost-modernist', whose writing "shows tendencies in [modernist] directions" whilst 
failing to fully embrace all of its maxims. This definition of Welty's work in terms of a 
negative relationship to larger movements does nothing to illuminate what is unique about 
it and only serves to diminish her particular talent. As Bennett and Royle write of 
Elizabeth Bowen: "if you read [her] as a minor Virginia Woolf, then that is precisely what 
you will find -a minor Virginia Woolf. "9 Eudora Welty may not be undiscovered in the 
usual sense, but she is in one way, I think, exactly that. 
The emphasis on settling Welty into a specific literary context is one reason, I think, that 
the most difficult aspects of her work continue to be under-explored. Another, perhaps 
more significant, reason lies in what Hermione Lee referred to as the `Eudora aura'. Much 
of the scholarship seems to remain in thrall to the idea of Welty as a quintessential 
`Southern lady', something reflected by the small heritage industry, centred on her 
picturesque house and garden, that has sprung up in her hometown of Jackson, 
Mississippi. It is as if her critics (many of whom, interestingly, Welty befriended) don't 
8 Ruth Vande Kieft, Eudora Welty (New York: Twayne, 1962), p. 173. 
9 Bennett and Royle, p. xvi. 
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want to see anything that might be uncomfortable or difficult. Her innovations of style 
have not gone unacknowledged, but they have rarely been discussed in terms of any 
significant underlying philosophy. Welty seems to have outmanoeuvred her critics. She 
was, for example, notoriously protective about her private life and enjoined those close to 
her to follow suit. Ann Waldron describes the impossibility of setting tongues wagging 
when researching her own (unofficial) biography. 10 She does, however, manage to suggest 
that all in Welty's past may not have been as pleasant as she liked to claim. I have, for 
example, already discussed the ambivalence in her attitude towards home, the demands of 
which worked as much as an obstacle to her work as a creative wellspring. 
Welty's selective approach to her past is echoed in what she chooses to emphasize in 
discussions about her writing. Despite her insistence on privacy, Welty was, throughout 
her career, a constant and co-operative interviewee. The material drawn from these 
interviews has done much to shape the way that her work is read. I am not convinced, 
however, that all of her comments can or should be taken at face value. This is not to say 
that Welty's critical commentary should be ignored. Far from it: she was an incisive and 
eloquent critic and makes many useful insights on the processes and aesthetics of writing 
in general, on which I draw in what follows. However, there is sometimes a tendency 
towards an over-simplification of her work, something that we saw in her refusal of the 
role of author in relation to her photographs. Just as she plays down the status of those 
images by calling them "snapshots", she dismisses the seriousness of her writing, pitching 
it as "some little [stories] about rural Mississippi. "" I am aware of not wanting to be 
found guilty of what I have accused others of by forcing Welty's work to fit an image of 
what I want to find there. But nonetheless, it is difficult not to be struck the gap that 
pertains between the `Eudora aura' as propagated by Welty and certain of her critics, and 
what the fiction reveals. 
10 Ann Waldron, Eudora: A Writer's Life (New York & London: Doubleday, 1998). 
11 Charles T. Bunting, ` "The Interior World": An Interview with Eudora Welty' (24 January 1972), in 
Conversations with Eudora Welty, ed. Whitman Prenshaw pp. 43- 69 (p. 57). 
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That revelation is, I want to suggest, the same reconfiguration of the relations between 
embodied consciousness and the world, the same uncanniness of perception that emerges 
in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. The importance of place for Welty is paired with the 
primacy of a perception that sometimes seems to threaten its surroundings. The reassuring 
weight of the material world is combined with the unsettling metaphorical vision through 
which we receive it. These unstable relations strike us as all the more extraordinary 
precisely because they are couched in the context of `little stories about Mississippi'. 
Through a close reading of two texts from different points in Welty's writing life, I intend 
to show in this chapter how her innovations of style run through every layer of her writing, 
the contortions of perception shadowed by an instability of the psychological, an 
uncertainty of identity and relation. Like Merleau-Ponty, Welty connects perceptual 
experience to a more general sense of Being. The freedom of fiction, however, allows 
Welty to push this experience further, testing Merleau-Ponty's philosophical limits, 
allowing the uncanny to remain unchallenged rather than having to qualify it as an 
unwanted effect of an inadequate language. Indeed, Welty uses the ambiguities of words 
to her advantage, allowing her symbolism to proliferate and diversify, letting her language 
"catch a meaning in its own mesh" (VI, 153). Merleau-Ponty may perhaps be a painter 
encumbered by the weight of the words he is forced to work with, but Welty is first and 
foremost a writer, even if she is one in whom the ghost of a photographer still lurks, 
irrepressibly producing pictures. 
ýýý 
The short story collection The Golden Apples was published in 1949, having been written 
in the years following the Second World War. During this period, Welty became more and 
more impatient with the South's (particularly Mississippi's) refusal to change and with its 
continued isolationism. She was eager for the South to overcome this separatism, its self- 
exclusion from the national and international picture, which she saw as connected to the 
need for it to overcome its racism. In this sense, Welty wanted the South to involve itself 
in a double reconciliation, not only forging bonds that would connect to places outside 
itself, but also repairing the damage, closing the gaps at its own heart. Suzanne Marrs 
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recounts Welty's opposition to the various right-wing forces attempting to prolong the 
South's intolerance and introspection. In a letter to the Jackson Clarion-Ledger, "Welty 
denounced the isolationism, anti-Semitism and racism that were [these forces'] staples, 
recognized that the defeat of Nazism had not destroyed the hatreds it represented, and 
called for change. "12 But Welty's criticism of the South and its history is not 
straightforwardly scathing. She writes very much as an insider, who has affection and 
understanding for many of the idiosyncrasies of her environment, recognizing the value of 
small-town life even whilst regretting its restrictions. Whilst Welty was always 
uninterested in accepting the moniker of `regional writer', she accepts the powerful 
influence of her home environment on her work. 
I just think of myself as writing about human beings and I happen to live in 
a region, as do we all, so I write about what I know - it's the same case for 
any writer living anywhere. I also happen to love my particular region. If 
this shows, I don't mind. 13 
Even as she was concerned with the problems in her own Southern backyard, she also 
looked to difficulties elsewhere in the world. She found the reports of the poverty and 
human suffering in post-war Germany extremely distressing and Marrs writes of her 
admission to sending food and clothes to those Germans from whom she received letters 
begging for help. 14 However, even as she did this, she experienced a moral dilemma in 
knowing that those she was helping may have been supporters of the Nazi regime that she 
so abhorred. Just as the boundaries that formed her sense of belonging blurred between her 
home town and the vastness of the world, so too does Welty's sense of morality 
encompass all the shades of grey between right and wrong, understanding that the choice 
between the two is never simple. 
12 Suzanne Marrs, One Writer's Imagination: The Fiction of Eudora Welty (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2002), p. 101. 
13 Kuehl, `The Art of Fiction XLVII: Eudora Welty', pp. 82-101 (p. 96). 
14 Marrs, One Writer's Imagination, p. 103. 
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The Golden Apples reflects this sense of ambivalence in its structure, which is at once that 
of a novel and a collection of stories and creates a delicate balance between multiplicity 
and unity. Welty has said of it, "it excited me, because I discovered only part way through 
that the stories were connected. All this time in the back of my head these connections had 
worked themselves out [... ] [T]his story's people were that story's people at a different 
period in their lives. " 15 Despite the self-contained nature of the stories, there is indeed a 
perceptible progression throughout them all and as one reads the collection together, a 
multi-faceted and cohesive picture starts to emerge. This construction reflects Welty's 
understanding of reality. In an essay on Chekhov, a writer whose work she greatly 
admires, she writes "reality is no single, pure ray, no beacon against the dark. It might be 
thought of as a cluster of lesser lights, visible here on earth like the windows of a village at 
night, close together but not one. "16 The Golden Apples represents the same kind of 
fractured whole, the individual stories functioning like that "cluster of lesser lights" that 
work together in the form of a constellation. 
Within this balanced structure is the question of the relation between inside and outside; 
whilst the stories each work within themselves to produce an intricate and unified vision, 
they also spread beyond that "one" to connect externally. Similarly, even as the stories all 
focus on the intricacies of human relationships within the fictional Southern town of 
Morgana, they are also undertaking an exploration of human relations in a much wider 
sense. As Welty has said, "[fiction] speaks to what is more deeply within, that is, the 
personal, and conveys its meaning that way. And then one hopes that a person made alert 
or aroused to be more sensitive to other human beings would go on to look at things on a 
larger scale by himself. "7 Running through the stories, and reflected in the title of the 
collection, are echoes from W. B. Yeats' poem `The Song of Wandering Aengus'. 18 Filled 
15 Todd Freeman, `An Interview with Eudora Welty', pp. 191-221 (p. 192). 
16 Welty, `Reality in Chekhov's Stories', pp. 61-81 (p. 63). 
17 Devlin and Whitman Prenshaw, `A Conversation with Eudora Welty, Jackson, 1986', 431-454 (p. 453). 
18 W. B. Yeats, `The Song of Wandering Aengus' (1899), in An Anthology of Modern Verse, ed. A. Methuen 
(London: Methuen, 1945), pp. 238-239. 
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with the promise of magical transformations and the expression of the power of human 
relationships, the poem both reflects concerns we have already seen in Welty's work and 
provides an effective shadow-model for the stories contained here. 
`June Recital', one of the longer stories in the collection, recounts the events of a 
summer's day in a deserted house in Morgana through the eyes of Loch, a boy confined to 
his room through illness, and his sister Cassie. The narrative is split into four sections, 
alternately narrated through the two siblings. The two observe the events at the house from 
their position next door and their accounts mix in with, in Loch's case, the hallucinations 
of illness and in Cassie's, the recollections of memory. As they watch, the house is 
occupied by a pair of clandestine lovers who take over one of the upstairs bedrooms as an 
old lady enters below and busies herself with the project of setting fire to the house. 
Through Cassie's narration, we learn the history of the female half of the couple, Virgie 
Rainey, and the old woman, Miss Eckhart, who used to teach piano lessons in the now 
vacant house. Cassie's narration is largely taken up with the recounting of this history 
whilst Loch's provides us with a detailed description of the visible present. Loch's view of 
the house is uninformed by the past, by history. It is immediate and sensual, perceived 
from the surface level and given meaning through a creative imagining rather than through 
reference to the realm of historical fact. Cassie's view of the house is knotted together 
with her experience of it from the past. For her, the immediate perceptions she has of the 
house in the present serve to trigger a journey backwards into memory, which makes up 
the majority of her narration. 
The technique of telling the story through the eyes of two observing subjects introduces 
the relation of inside and outside at a very basic level. Both Loch and Cassie are within the 
story, but without being directly implicated in the action of it. They both begin by 
observing the action from their own house, looking out of their windows into the windows 
of the house next door. In addition, the different interpretations of the same external 
events make the reader question what is occurring outside, in reality and what emanates 
from within the minds of the characters. This confusion is exacerbated by Loch's feverish 
hallucinations, which confuse the seen and the imagined, the waking perception and the 
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dream. Throughout the story the physical and the psychological merge and diverge and it 
becomes confusing as to which is which. This is connected to a more general confusion 
between imagination and reality, brought about by the subjective mode of narration; it is 
hard for us to judge when something is a part of external reality or simply being attributed 
to it by the narrator. The vision to which we are made partisan is a vision that is not 
directed at what it sees in a singular relation. Rather, it occurs, as in Merleau-Ponty's 
notion of reversibility, in a commerce between the characters and their world. It does not 
emanate entirely from the world or entirely from the minds of the characters. The world of 
`June Recital' is both touched and untouched by the consciousnesses through which we 
see it. We know it is touched, because the two accounts differ, they are coloured, tainted 
by the bodies from which they emerge. We also know it is untouched, that it retains its 
"sovereignty" because the two accounts also merge, overlap, have elements in common; 
they are both still describing the same events. Our experience of this phenomenal world of 
the story occurs at the same level of the text as our experience of character, of Loch and 
Cassie who work like the frames around, or filters for, our experience of place and action. 
Loch and Cassie constitute only one layer of Welty's complicated framing devices in the 
story. In fact, the whole of The Golden Apples is made up of overlapping and interlocking 
frames; the character or event that is in the centre or the foreground of the frame of one 
story will be at the edge or background in another. The idea of framing is expanded by 
Welty in `June Recital' through her use of windows. Both Loch and Cassie's windows 
provide the frame through which they view the happenings next door and the windows of 
the vacant house provide snapshot images of the different rooms; the action appears to us 
as a montage of different frames or windows rather than as within one contained building. 
This juxtaposition of various scenes of action means that "[w]hen Loch grew tired of 
watching one animated room he watched the other" (JR, 27). 
Welty relates her use of frame in fiction to the experience of photography she gained 
whilst working for the WPA in the 1930s. "A frame is fundamental to both [fiction and 
photography], " she claims. "Studying drawing and painting made me aware in writing a 
story of framing your vision, as a way towards capturing it" (PHO, xvi). This perceptual 
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awareness of framing is part of a more general centrality of vision within Welty's 
narrative style. She admits, "I have a visual mind. That's the way I see things, so that's the 
way I write. I try to concentrate what I say in stories into visual images - landscapes, 
portraits, seasons, all the aspects plain to the eye. "19 In `June Recital', seeing is intensified 
even further than this "concentration", it is granted extraordinary powers. As Loch 
observes the vacant house, he consistently refers to it as "his". Looking takes on the power 
of ownership: Loch could "in a sweeping glance see it all - as if he possessed it" (JR, 19). 
Looking is also granted powers of transportation, collapsing distance. As Loch looks at the 
house through a telescope, the perceptual gulf between `here' and `there' shrinks, echoing 
his inhabitation of the house in his dreams. 
This shifting sense of space and distance is tied to a treading of the line between reality as 
fixed and fluid that Welty undertakes throughout her writing. Here, the nature of 
Morgana's landscape fluctuates. Sometimes it appears as "still and china-like"(JR, 31); 
Loch sees the lovers "in a clear blue-and-white small world" like the image on the hen- 
pecked china plate in the yard of the vacant house (JR, 21). This version of reality is fixed 
and objective, existing as something separate from the perceiving subject, `out there'. At 
other times, reality seems something much more subjective, emanating from the mind of a 
creatively imagining subject, as with Loch's hallucinations. There also seems to be some 
kind of connection between the imagination of Mr Holifield, who lies sleeping in the 
vacant house throughout the story, and the reality that we see. As he sleeps: 
A framed picture could be seen hanging on the wall, just askew enough so 
that it looked straightened every now and then. Sometimes the glass in the 
picture reflected the light outdoors and the flight of birds between branches 
of trees, and while it reflected, Mr Holifield was having a dream (JR, 19). 
Mr Holifield is never actually seen, only his hat swinging on the bedpost. This metonymic 
presentation of suggests a presence that somehow touches everything: is this almost- 
19 Welty in `An interview with Eudora Welty' (16 October 1965), Comment Magazine, in Conversations 
with Eudora Welty, ed. Whitman Prenshaw, pp. 19-28 (p. 22). 
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visible character the dreamer of all that we see? Is he really there at all or just placed in the 
scene by Loch's own subjective assumptions? Mr Holifield represents a meeting point 
between fact and consciousness and makes the reader question which is which. Echoing 
Merleau-Ponty, Welty's narrative dissolves the distinctions between the subjective and 
objective realms, between seeing and seen. What we see through Welty's narrative is not 
the result of an equation in which the world is added to consciousness but an emergence of 
the two as simultaneous, inseparable. 
In Welty's writing this phenomenological ambiguity impacts and draws upon the 
psychology of her characters. Thus, for example, the juxtaposition of a solid and a mutable 
reality is reflected in a negotiation of beliefs in fate and free will. As the story opens, the 
first thing that Loch describes seeing is his mother's chequered apron, "the whole ironclad 
pattern" (JR, 18) of it. This sense of a fixed pattern underlies the whole story, in which 
even the purchasing of new shoes seems like "something predestined"(JR, 44) and the 
milkman is called `Fate' (JR, 22). Miss Eckhart seems initially to have escaped this 
ironclad fate: when she visits the shoe store, she is the only one to be presented with a 
choice. This freedom is connected to her status as outsider: "Where did Miss Eckhart 
come from, and where in the end did she go? In Morgana most destinies were known to 
everybody and seemed to go without saying" (JR, 58). Miss Eckhart appears, then, to 
belong to the other side of the equation, to the flimsiness within the pattern, the wavering 
at the edges that creates a sense of potential. It is this potential that makes Loch wince at 
"[t]he nearness of missing things and the possibility of preventing them" (JR, 25). But 
Miss Eckhart too becomes prey to the impositions of destiny. Her untraceablity, at first the 
source of her freedom, works against her. Her fate is sealed by the fact of her difference: 
"Missie Spights said that if Miss Eckhart had allowed herself to be called by her first 
name, then she would have been like other ladies. Or if Miss Eckhart had belonged to a 
church that had ever been heard of, and the ladies would have had something to invite her 
to belong to... " (JR, 58). But she remains outside, pushed further and further out until she 
simply goes "down out of sight" (JR, 58). 
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The precarious balance between fate and freedom is also captured in the image of the 
metronome that Miss Eckhart, herself a victim of small-town mentalities, sets going 
during her attempt to burn down the vacant house. It functions to keep time, to stay steady. 
Its constant ticking makes no progress, but rather continues in the same predictable tempo 
into infinity. However, Loch perceives the metronome to be some sort of dynamite that 
will explode, so shattering continuity, so creating a moment of change (JR, 30). For Miss 
Eckhart, the metronome encapsulates her entrapment, for Loch, it represents a counting 
down to a revolutionary blasting open. Its incessant ticking pervades the text like a 
warning, but of what, we are not sure. 
Miss Eckhart is not the only Morgana dweller condemned to isolation. Paradoxically, 
within this community that is on the face of things welded together in an "ironclad 
pattern", everybody is isolated from one another, caught up in themselves just as we saw 
in Bowen's The Death of the Heart. The story is therefore a kind of counter-example to 
the lived, substantial connectedness that Welty expounds in her non-fictional writing, 
narrating the harmful effects of its absence. Welty claims to have named her fictional town 
Morgana after "the conception of Fata Morgana - the illusory shape, the mirage that 
comes over the sea' . 
20 She suggests that the name is appropriate to a set of characters, in 
another echo of Bowen's novel, "living absorbed in illusions". 21 However, where Bowen's 
characters utilized illusion to reassure themselves of their autonomous, unsusceptible 
identities, the greatest illusion for Morgana's residents seems to be that of their belonging. 
While they outwardly express a sense of tight-knit community, the story whispers us an 
alternative message, reminding us of the impossibility of belonging to any kind of 
collectivity without developing a vision that is, not introspective, but directed outwards. 
From the depths of their isolation, all of the characters nonetheless long for intimacy. 
Loch expresses nostalgia for a time when he was close to his sister, a time "different 
altogether from his solitary world now, where he looked out all eyes like Argus, on guard 
everywhere" (JR, 24-25). Cassie continually expresses her distress at her mother's 
distance from her, who always seems to have "slipped away" (JR, 48). Miss Eckhart offers 
20 Kuehl, `The Art of Fiction XLVII: Eudora Welty', pp. 82-101 (p. 88). 
21 Todd Freeman, `An Interview with Eudora Welty', pp. 191-221 (p. 214). 
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love and affection to her most talented pupil, the rebellious Virgie who Loch watches 
entering the house with her lover, but Virgie cannot accept this kindness, instead turning it 
back upon her teacher, grinding her down with it. Virgie's apparent openness seems to be 
pushing out so hard against the internalizing strictures of her society, that it pushes aside 
everything in its path. 
Michael Kreyling reads `June Recital' as a battle between opposite notions, represented 
mainly through the characters of Cassie and Virgie. Cassie, he claims, stands for 
`unpleasure' and for closedness, whilst Virgie is on the side of pleasure and openness. 22 
This reading is, however, simplistic and reductive. Whilst Welty does make use of a 
certain level of symbolism, including that of myth, her characters are never reduced to 
mere ciphers. In this case, both Cassie and Virgie are much more complex characters than 
Kreyling makes out. Cassie indulges in sensual pleasure - such as with the scarf we see 
her dyeing in the course of her reminiscences - and Virgie's apparent expression of 
physical freedom is qualified; Welty suggests that she behaves only "as if she were free" 
(JR, 79). 23 Virgie's acceptance of the external and carnal may have saved her from Miss 
Eckhart's unpleasurable fate, but it has sealed her into her own. Virgie is just as trapped as 
the rest of them. Cassie, whilst she may exercise physical restraint, demonstrates the 
ability for imaginative freedom, especially in terms of her empathetic capabilities. It is 
Cassie who has the power of gentle insight into other characters emotions, Cassie who 
runs barefoot down the street in her petticoats in protection of the ostracized Miss Eckhart 
(JR, 78). But Cassie is also trapped; whilst Virgie models her behaviour in strict defiance 
of the rules of small-town life, Cassie still allows those rules to define her behaviour. Even 
as an excess of feeling makes her chase after her old piano-teacher, she stops herself in 
realization of what she is doing. 
Kreyling's reading of the characters reduces them to "generalities" in precisely the way 
that we saw Welty protesting against in Chapter Two. In `June Recital', Welty dramatizes 
this kind of generalizing approach through the short-sighted inhabitants of Morgana, who 
22 Michael Kreyling, Understanding Eudora Welty (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999) 
23 My emphasis. 
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cannot be moved even by the strangest of things that people may do and whose manner of 
reading events echoes Kreyiing's. 
They only hoped to place them, in their hour or their street or the name of 
their mothers' people. Then Morgana could hold them, and at last they 
were this and they were that. And when ruin was predicted all along, even 
if people had forgotten it was on the way, even if they mightn't have 
missed it if it hadn't appeared, still they were never surprised when it came 
(JR, 79). 
Both perception and people are unruly, refusing to conform to our ideas of what they 
should be. The people of Morgana cannot and will not recognize this, and in a way, this 
protects them, even as it blinds them The price to be paid for the knowledge of the 
possibility of freedom is the simultaneous awareness of the constant threat of a descent 
into chaos. Miss Eckhart, who at first seems to exist outside the boundaries of 
categorization, is caught by the chaos in the end, descending into madness. In this sense, 
freedom is really an illusion, like the "glimmering girl" in the Yeats poem, which has been 
running through Cassie's head all day. 24 As Loch's narrative ends and he drifts into 
dream, even this liberation is qualified. "Even floating, he felt the pressure of his frown 
and heard his growling voice and the gnashing of his teeth. He dreamed close to the 
surface, and his dreams were filled with a colour and a fury that the daytime that summer 
never held" (JR, 84). It is impossible to escape from oneself, the insistent presence of 
one's body maintaining an iron grip on the world even in the midst of fantasy. 
This is what Cassie comes to realize at the end of the story, in a conclusion that is 
anything but comforting. "Both Miss Eckhart and Virgie Rainey were human beings 
terribly at large, roaming on the face of the earth. And there were others of them - human 
beings, roaming, like lost beasts" (JR, 85). At this moment, Cassie's revelation echoes 
Bowen's insight that "each of us keeps, battened down inside himself, a sort of lunatic 
giant", that embedded in our civilized manner of living is some brute force (DH, 434). 
24 Yeats, pp. 238-239 (p. 239). 
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Along with her realization, Cassie remembers that poem she has been struggling to recall. 
"She slept, but sat up in bed once and said aloud, `Because a fire was in my head. ' Then 
she fell back unresisting" (JR, 85). Cassie may have learned something, but that 
knowledge is one that burns. What we end with is the horrible realization that entwined 
with our desire to connect there is an aspect of our being that is, as Bowen says, 
"impossible socially" (DH, 434). The paradox results in an ongoing search for the hope of 
connection that may, Cassie's revelation suggests, never be satisfied; 
Though I am old with wandering 
Through hollow lands and hilly lands, 
I will find out where she has gone, 
And kiss her lips and take her hands. 25 
In a further inflection of Yeats' poem, the notion of `fires in the head' pervades the whole 
story. There is of course the explicit branding of Cassie's consciousness by the poem 
itself, but there is also Loch's burning fever and Miss Eckhart's twin fires: those of her 
madness and its external manifestation which she lights in the living room of the 
abandoned house (JR, 70). These fires, like that of Yeats' Aengus, represent both passion 
and delusion, infections of both the body and the mind but in Welty's story, they also leak 
beyond the limits of the body, setting light to the world outside which takes on the 
character of Yeats' "brightening air. " The perceptual instability of the story is inseparable 
from a psychological and a material instability. The physical and psychical machinations 
of the body disrupt notions of external order. It is as if "the whole of the setting near at 
hand quivers with each footfall down on the asphalt" but whereas Merleau-Ponty ascribes 
this impact to the perceiving subject, Welty allows it to remain more ambiguous (VI, 7). It 
becomes impossible to identify the location of the disruptive force; it is sunk in the midst 
of the text like the metronome whose ticking escapes from its hiding place to invade 
Loch's illness. The edges of the intricately constructed Fata Morgana in which the 
characters are living waver under the pressure of scrutiny, just as the perceptual faith 
25 Yeats, pp. 238-239 (p. 239). 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Four 209 
becomes "a labyrinth of difficulties and contradictions" as Merleau-Ponty tries to describe 
it (VI, 3). Knowledge, revelation becomes not a means of escape from contradiction, but 
an opening up towards a greater, terrifying uncertainty. 
ýýý 
The same ambivalent stance towards knowledge is evident in Welty's novel, The 
Optimist's Daughter, which came twenty years later. The novel was originally written for 
the New Yorker in 1969, before appearing in its current extended novelistic form in 1972. 
It was for this novel that Welty was awarded the Pulitzer Prize and it is widely 
acknowledged as the climax of her literary career and particular vision. The novel follows 
Laurel McKelva who returns to her native Mississippi from her job as a designer in 
Chicago to be with her father, Judge McKelva, who has developed an eyesight problem In 
doing so, Laurel has to contend with her father's new and much younger wife Fay. There 
is clearly tension between the two and our sympathy is extended to Laurel, who manages 
to rise above the grotesque Fay's childishly antagonistic behaviour. Judge McKelva is 
admitted to hospital for an eye operation and during his recovery, which appears to be 
progressing well, he dies suddenly in an ambiguous confrontation with Fay. The two 
women accompany the body back to Mount Salus, the McKelva's hometown, where they 
are swept along by the good intentions of old family friends. The remainder of the novel 
charts the funeral and the following few days in which we see Laurel struggling to come 
to terms not only with her father's death but also those of her mother and her husband, 
both of which occurred some years earlier. The novel reaches its climax on Laurel's final 
night alone in her childhood home. A bird that has become trapped in the house drives her 
to hide in an old sewing room, which is filled with her dead mother's letters and 
belongings. The various things that Laurel discovers trigger a series of Proustian 
reminiscences, building up a pressure which finally releases an outpouring of repressed 
grief at her husband's death. The next morning, Laurel awakes after dreaming of her 
husband and burns all her mother's paraphernalia. After a final confrontation with Fay, in 
which she relinquishes her hold upon the house and everything left in it, Laurel finally 
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leaves Mount Salus, against the backdrop of a group of schoolchildren, "the twinkling of 
their hands, their many small and unknown hands, wishing her goodbye" (OD, 180). 
This parting image is telling; not only is Laurel's married name `Hand', but the bulk of 
bodies in general weighs heavily on the whole text. Their movements are the exaggerated 
ones of mime or some ogreish dance, the stances they adopt like a gestic image. They are 
reminiscent of Cezanne's round-shouldered, stunted-limbed bathers, whose clumsy over- 
physicality stands awkwardly in opposition to the airy luminescence of the sky. In the 
novel also, the grotesqueness of flesh is countered by a sense of weightlessness, of a light- 
handed, floating detachment, that comes from Welty's delicate manipulations of language 
and is encapsulated in the images of birds that run through the text. It is a novel full of 
"people blundering", a word that recurs throughout, appearing first in a description of the 
chaotic Carnival in New Orleans that surrounds the event of Judge McKelva's death. This 
death is itself brought about by a shocking physical contact, perpetrated by Fay: "She laid 
hands on him! [ ... 
] She taken ahold of him. She was abusing him", shrieks the nurse (OD, 
32). The weightiness of bodies is also emphasized at the Judge's funeral. As his too- 
exposed corpse lies at the centre of the scene under the prying eyes of the guests, their 
own physical presence becomes oppressive, as the room becomes filled "with more and 
more speaking, breathing people" (OD, 65). The minister's wife arrives, "[elbowing] her 
way in" (OD, 64) desperate to see the laid-out body. "And here I'd been wanting to see 
who it was I was saving my Virginia ham for" (OD, 64) she exclaims as she gazes at the 
corpse, conjuring up a macabre association between the two kinds of flesh. 
It is the characters who are most associated with a repulsive over-physicality that also 
have no self or social awareness. Fay, with her garish tastes for bright green shoes, tacky 
carnival beads and her fleshy, peach-coloured bedroom serves as a prime example. She 
displays a constant physical inappropriateness, nowhere more so than in her performance 
at the funeral: 
Fay struck out with her hands, hitting at Major Bullock and Mr. Pitts and 
Sis, fighting her mother, too, for a moment. She showed her claws at 
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Laurel, and broke from the preacher's last-minute arms and threw herself 
forward across the coffin onto the pillow, driving her lips without aim 
against the face under hers (OD, 86). 
Later, Laurel comes to recognize that Fay's violent outbursts are indicative of a failure "of 
passion and imagination in herself' which, in turn, prevents her from communicating with 
others. This lack of connection, which could be seen as a simple human critique, in this 
case is also linked with a violent excess of the body. "Other people, " Laurel realizes, 
"inside their lives, might as well be invisible to [Fay]. To find them she could only strike 
out those little fists at random, or spit from her little mouth" (OD, 178). Fay's family, who 
appear at the McKelva house with their over-loud exclamations and unwelcome kisses and 
the family who fill the waiting-room of the hospital with their drunkenness and arguments 
as Laurel waits to hear the news of her father's demise, also blunder their way through the 
text. These two families are recognized by Laurel as part of the same "great, interrelated 
family of those who never know the meaning of what has happened to them" (OD, 84). 
Like the birds who don't recognize their own reflections in the disks of the bird-frightener, 
these people do not know themselves; their lack of physical awareness is a symptom of 
their spiritual blindness (OD, 117). 
The problem of knowledge, most specifically self-knowledge, lies at the centre of the text, 
inherent in the thematic concerns of vision and memory, both of which serve to 
complicate the matter of what can be asserted as truth. The importance of vision is made 
explicit from the opening scene, when Judge McKelva tells Doctor Courtland "it's 
something wrong with my eyes" (OD, 4). John F. Desmond suggests that, "[w]ith vision 
itself as subject, working reflexively as it were, the novel becomes a brilliant kaleidoscope 
of all those major themes that have concerned Welty for almost forty years". 
26 But the 
question of sight is not straightforward. As in `June Recital', there are confusions as to the 
location of vision and the limits of its power. As Judge McKelva is describing his ailment, 
26 Desmond, `Pattern and Vision in The Optimist's Daughter', in A Still Moment: Essays on the Art of 
Eudora Welty, ed. Desmond, pp. 118-138 (p. 118). 
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he attributes the disturbances of his vision to the outside world. The fig tree in his garden, 
he claims, "flashed" at him from the wrong direction: "So I was forced into the conclusion 
that I'd started seeing behind me" (OD, 5). The manner in which the Judge talks about his 
eye problem attributes the disturbances of vision not, in fact, to his eyes but to a change in 
circumstances in the outside world. He does not appear to contest the strange facts that the 
tree flashed from the wrong place or that his vision extends behind him. Indeed, he seems 
reluctant to agree that the problem is with him at all; it is something he has become "ready 
to believe" but not something, we sense, he is convinced of. 
The ambiguity continues through the rest of the consultation, in which the cause of his 
sight problem is uncertain. At first it is suggested that, in a fairy-tale gesture from Welty, 
he scratched his eye on a thorn of the rose bush planted by his first wife, Becky. "Of 
course, " claims Judge McKelva, "my memory had slipped. Becky would say it served me 
right. Before blooming is the wrong time to prune a climber" (OD, 5). Doctor Courtland, 
however, dismisses this diagnosis. "But this eye didn't get a scratch, " he exclaims. "What 
happened didn't happen to the outside of his eye, it happened to the inside. The flashes, 
too. To the part he sees with" (OD, 7). Despite the doctor's explanation with the help of a 
chart of the eye's innards, Fay continues to refer to the problem as a scratch throughout 
the rest of the novel. Our own sense of what has happened to the Judge's eye remains 
muddled. Although the injury occurred to the inside of his eye, "to the part he sees with", 
the Judge's defective vision seems to somehow leak out into the external world, that world 
which everyone else sees. As Laurel looks around the anonymous hospital room and out at 
its bleak view, she contemplates the relation between what she sees and her father's 
ailment. "It seemed to her, " we are told, "that the grayed-down, anonymous room might 
be some reflection itself of Judge McKelva's `disturbance, ' his dislocated vision that had 
brought him here" (OD, 15). 
The eye is not, though, the only faulty instrument through which perception can be 
'dislocated'. Memory, too, plays its part in unseating objective reality. "The book, " writes, 
Marilyn Arnold 
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is about the struggle of a widow in her middle forties to make sense out of 
the past, to understand her mother's and then her father's dying, to 
comprehend why her father took for a second wife a crass, lowbred woman 
younger than his daughter, and to interpret her own brief marriage ended 
suddenly by war and death. 27 
As with Bowen, therefore, perceptual trauma is linked to the effects of war. But the 
emphasis here on understanding, comprehending and interpreting is typical of the many 
readings that see the text as a sort of rite of passage story. These describe how the central 
character, Laurel, faces and rids herself of the demons of her personal history, learning 
valuable life-lessons about the nature of human relationships along the way. The novel 
emerges as a parable of liberation. Not only does Laurel become freed from the weight of 
responsibility she felt towards the past, but she also simultaneously frees that past into 
memory. "The dead, " Arnold deduces, "are not saved by being shut off from the 
vicissitudes of memory; they are saved by being released into memory, freed by it and its 
capacity for pardon. "28 This emancipatory narrative is supported by an interpretation of 
the novel's symbolism that echoes the notion of Laurel's own accumulative journey 
towards understanding. The bird that becomes trapped in the house, only to be released on 
the morning of Laurel's supposed revelation provides the most obvious of these images. It 
is only one of many seized upon in critical readings though, and the handling of the text 
often becomes a process of symbol interpretation, decoding it as if it were a series of 
cryptic clues. 
Welty, however, was frequently critical of this kind of approach to her work. 
Of the questions she's continually being asked, the one that Miss Welty 
says she `really hates' is `did you mean that to be symbolic? ' 
27 Marilyn Arnold, `Images of Memory in Eudora Welty's The Optimist's Daughter, in Critical Essays on 
Eudora Welty, ed. Turner and Harding, pp. 238-248 (p. 238). 
28 Arnold, p. 241. 
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`When symbols occur naturally within the content of a story, that's 
when the author recognizes them; after they spring up. I consider them 
legitimate because they function in the story. The other kind is pretentious 
and just in the way. '29 
It is in reading Welty's symbolism as of this "other kind", I would argue, that many 
readings of her work prove unsatisfactory. We are not meant to approach her symbolism 
as a structured system of signs, "as if', she points out herself, "[she] were really trying to 
write Paradise Lost. " 30 Indeed, she claims, "it is kind of frightening to think that people 
see ponderous allegorical meanings" in her work. Her use of mythology, for example, is 
not meant to send us scurrying to our volume of Greek legends, it is just something that is 
there as a part of her consciousness, to be used "just as I used Mississippi locations and 
names. " 31 Asked about her use of myth in The Golden Apples, Welty replies: 
Well, you know, now I think I'd think twice before I threw around myths 
and everything so freely. I'm glad I did then because I used them as freely 
as I would the salt and pepper. They were part of my life, life poetry, and I 
would take something from Yeats here and something from a myth there. I 
had no system about it. But people write papers on these things and they 
just make things up. 32 
It is true that Welty tends to play down the significance of her own work, her comments 
on writing simplifying what the writing itself allows to remain complex. However, in this 
case, I think that Welty's rejection of "ponderous allegorical meanings" behind her work 
is valid and problematizes a reading of it. In approaching the symbolism of this novel, it 
29 Welty in, `Eudora Welty talks about her new book, Losing Battles' (April 1970), Frank Hams, in, 
Conversations with Eudora Welty, ed. Whitman Prenshaw, pp. 29-32 (p. 31). 
30 Bunting, pp. 43-69 (p. 57). 
31 Welty in Todd Freeman, pp. 191-221 (p. 210). 
32 Welty, in `Eudora Welty' (13 May 1981), interview with John Griffin Jones, in Whitman Prenshaw (ed. ), 
Conversations with Eudora Welty, pp. 353-382 (p. 370). 
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might be wise to follow, once again, Merleau-Ponty's advice on how to read Freud "by 
understanding [the] words [... ] not in their lexical and common meaning, but in the 
meaning they acquire from within the experience which they announce" (PSY, 71). If we 
accept that the images do not work as mere signifiers, pointing to a closed and final 
signified meaning, the symbol patterns begin play with our notions of interpretation. 
Rather than being led to a meaning that is beyond the text, we must look at how the 
images "function in the story" one signifier directing us to the next and that to another and 
so on, building up in layers and depths. This layering of images produces an effect that is 
obscure and dream-like, whilst also retaining a sense of acute focus that becomes 
hallucinatory; the repeated zooming-in on images of hands for example creates a 
distortion of perspective. Just as a word that is looked at for long begins to seem 
nonsensical, the insistent repetition of an image in this way begins to feel uncanny. 
It is only at the end of the novel that we discover the reason for the recurring images, and 
it is less a question of allegorical function than a reflection of a fictional consciousness. 
Desmond claims that "Laurel's interior life is largely kept hidden from us throughout the 
first two-thirds of the novel", something that as we read for the initial time, does indeed 
seem to be true. 33 However, this ignores what we learn in the final section of the novel. It 
is here that we discover that Laurel's "interior life" has in fact been laid out before us all 
along, inherent in the telling of the story from her perspective. In Laurel's dramatic night 
alone in her parent's house, we discover that the recurring images of the novel are linked 
to memories of her husband that she had repressed. Her outpouring of grief, involving a 
strange hallucinatory episode in which the dead Philip appears to her, comes as a surprise 
to the reader, as the facts surrounding her husband's death have barely been mentioned in 
the rest of the text. What is familiar, however, is the imagistic content of Laurel's 
memories, into which the symbolism of the entire novel is condensed. The private life of 
her consciousness has been expressed not as explicit interior monologue nor through 
omniscient pronouncements of the narrator, but as Merleau-Ponty describes the 
unconscious, "in front of us, as articulations of our field, " articulations whose significance 
is only revealed retrospectively (VI, 180). 
33 Desmond, `Pattern and Vision in The Optimist's Daughter', pp. 118-138 (p. 119). 
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The hand images are a prime example of this structure of revelation. At the end of the 
novel, when Laurel's memories of her husband have finally been released, the 
overdetermined significance of hands becomes clear. We have known from the novel's 
first page that Laurel's married name is Hand, and her association of the word with the 
dead Phil connects to and stretches beyond his name. "Philip had large, good hands, " we 
discover, "and extraordinary thumbs - double jointed where they left the palms, nearly at 
right angles; their long, blunt tips curved strongly back. When she watched his right hand 
go about its work, it looked to her like the Hand of his name" (OD, 161). The image is 
also specifically associated with the circumstances of his death as Laurel remembers a 
conversation Phil had with her father on his last leave from the Navy. 
`How close have those kamikaze come to you so far, son? ' the 
Judge wanted to know. 
`About close enough to shake hands with, ' Phil said. 
A month later, they came closer still (OD, 162). 
This attribution of a new significance to the image of hands casts its shadow backwards 
across the text. We remember the frequency with which they occur, often at moments of 
high emotion for Laurel. There are Dr. Courtland's hands, which are described at the start 
of the novel in terms that echo the later description of Phil's, emphasizing both their 
strength and their skill. "Dr. Courtland, the well-known eye specialist, folded his big 
country hands with the fingers that had always looked to Laurel as if their mere touch on 
the crystal of a watch would convey to their skin exactly what time it was" (OD, 4). These 
reliable hands hauntingly return when the doctor breaks the news of the Judge's death 
(itself caused, of course, by Fay's having "laid hands on him"): 'Dr. Courtland stood in 
the doorway, the weight of his watch in his hand [... ] `I couldn't save him. ' He laid a hand 
on the sleeve of each woman, standing between them" (OD, 40). Throughout the scenes 
following this death, we see, through the traumatized vision of Laurel, hands reappearing 
over and over in an obsessive repetition: "Laurel felt the Doctor's hand shift to grip her 
arm" (OD, 41); " [Dr. Courtland] stood there by the car, his hand on the door he had 
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closed [... ] Laurel touched her hand to the window glass. He waved then, and quickly 
turned" (OD, 44). This repetition continues at significant moments throughout the text: 
"Give me those little hands" soothes Major Bullock to Fay after her outburst at the funeral 
(OD, 86); walking towards her father's grave in the cemetery, Laurel "felt her gloved hand 
pressed in that of Miss Tennyson" (OD, 90); as the day of the funeral draws to a close, 
"Miss Adele lifted her empty hands for a moment, and dropped them. Laurel touched her 
own to one of hers and watched her go" (OD, 102). The reader is, of course, aware of this 
repetition in the process of reading, but it is not until the release of Laurel's memories at 
the end of the text that their true meaning is revealed and they form themselves into a 
cohesive pattern. This is true of other images, such as birds or fire for example, the 
patterns formed within each set of images joining with the others in the final scenes. We 
are left with an impression not of a progression from beginning to end, but of a structure 
suspended in mid-air, emergent, its traces woven in and out like a spider's web. 
The events in our lives happen in a sequence in time, but in their 
significance to ourselves they find their own order, a timetable not 
necessarily - perhaps not possibly - chronological. The time as we know it 
subjectively is often the chronology that stories and novels follow: it is the 
continuous thread of revelation (VI, 68-69). 
This sense of the interaction between meaning and chronology is reflected in the 
retrospective structure of the symbol pattern in the novel and also in what Laurel realizes 
about time. Her mother, she claims, had "predicted" Fay in the slow months before her 
death. Her bitter rejection of her previously beloved husband as she sank into the final 
stages of her illness served as a punishment in advance for the betrayal he was later to 
commit. 
Experience did, finally, get set into its right order, which is not always the 
order of other people's time [... ] Past and future might have changed 
places in some convulsion of the mind, but that could do nothing to impugn 
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the truth of the heart. Fay could have walked in early as well as late, she 
could have come at any time at all. She was coming (OD, 174). 
The fact of Fay's coming had always been there, as part of Becky's consciousness, 
colouring what she perceived even before it had happened. In the same way, the traumatic 
memories that we only discover at the end of the novel have been there all the way 
through, shaping the events to which we have borne witness. The fact that one is a 
memory and one a prediction does not seem to matter. They are elements that form part of 
a life that seems organized around a meaning, like a painting, rather than around a 
chronology, like a story. 
In an essay on Cezanne, Merleau-Ponty discusses the relationship between the painter's 
life and his work. The connection is a complicated one, he claims, "beyond causes and 
effects". The structure that Merleau-Ponty attributes to the relationship seems to be 
retrospective in a manner similar to Welty's novel. "If Cezanne's life seems to us to carry 
the seeds of his work within it", he claims, "it is because we get to know his work first and 
see the circumstances of his life through it, charging them with a meaning borrowed from 
that work. " 34 He goes on to explore this retrospective understanding in relation to 
psychoanalysis: 
How can we deny that psychoanalysis has taught us to notice echoes, 
allusions, repetitions from one moment of life to another [... ] [I]n every 
life, one's birth and one's past define categories or basic dimensions which 
do not impose any particular act but which can be found in all [ ... 
] The 
psychoanlayst's hermeneutic musing [... ] is better suited than rigorous 
induction to the circular movement of our lives, where the future rests on 
the past, the past on the future, and where everything rests on everything 
else. Psychoanalysis does not make freedom impossible; it teaches us to 
34 Merleau-Ponty, `Cezanne's Doubt', pp. 9-25 (p. 20). 
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think of this freedom concretely, as a creative repetition of ourselves, 
always, in retrospect, faithful to ourselves. 35 
This approach to the self, I would suggest, imagines it as a sort of self-reflexive creativity 
that is not so much a narrative to which we keep adding, but something less predicated on 
a direct process of cause and effect, something more spatially organized. In this sense, it 
echoes Welty's approach to symbolism less as a referential system and more as a 
compositional pattern. The self emerges not as an unravelling chronology but as a "picture 
emerging beneath [the painter's] hand" or a developing photograph; we have to wait until 
the image has dried before we can see fully what we have there. 36 The mind, Merleau- 
Ponty suggests, should be thought of not as "a multitude of memories, images, 
judgements" files in some order. Rather, we should take a "vertical view"; the mind "is 
one sole movement that one can coin out in judgements, in memories, but that holds them 
in one sole cluster as a spontaneous word contains a whole becoming, as one sole grasp of 
the hand contains a whole chunk of space" (VI, 236). The mind, the self is less a sentence 
or a story than an image, a formed and styled area of space, or region of flesh. 
In `The Ego and the Id', Freud describes such an imagistic mode of understanding. 
Thinking in pictures is [... ] only a very incomplete form of becoming 
conscious. In some way, too, it stands nearer to unconscious processes than 
does thinking in words, and it is unquestionably older than the latter both 
ontogenetically and phylo genetically. 37 
"Thinking in pictures" is associated here with the unconscious and the suggestion is that 
for something to become "fully" conscious, it must be transmuted from this primitive, 
imagistic state into linguistic form. 
"Thinking in pictures", characterized by 
35 Merleau-Ponty, `Cezanne's Doubt', pp. 9-25 (pp. 24-25). 
36 Merleau-Ponty, `Cezanne's Doubt', pp. 9-25 (p. 25). 
37 Freud, `The Ego and the Id', in The Ego and the Id and Other Works, SE XIX (1923-1925), trans. and ed. 
James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1995), pp. 1-66 (p. 21). 
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"incompleteness", recalls the "inchoate" force behind the door (DL, 95), the submerged 
"lunatic giant" that we saw Bowen describe as haunting civilized life (DH, 434). Like 
those forces, this mode of almost unconscious thinking persists somewhere in the murky 
past of a more evolved, more "complete" mode of thinking. What seems to happen in 
Welty's novel is a release of an "older" form of thought across the linguistic surface of the 
text. Through the deployment of a pattern of verbal images, the novel demonstrates the 
persistence of imagistic thinking; even when it seems that the rational, fully conscious 
mind is in control, there is something else less conscious at work, directing ways of 
perceiving, understanding and reading. 
The pre-eminence of this primordial layer emerges in part through a presentation of 
verbalized, narrative communications as somehow inauthentic. The stories that people tell 
in order to make sense of their own situations in the novel aren't to be trusted. At the 
funeral, Laurel is distressed by hearing stories about her father which, she believes, simply 
aren't true. "They're misrepresenting him - falsifying" (OD, 83) she exclaims. There 
seems to be a relation between the prosaic nature of these people's attempts to make sense 
and their blundering bodies, as if the body of language, in their hands, were just as clumsy 
as their own heavy limbs. Their lack of self-knowledge is apparent, despite the constant 
chatter of their voices trying to tell stories about themselves and each other. Laurel herself, 
of course, doesn't participate in this interchange of narratives. The way that she begins to 
understand her past is through a series of oblique images. Just as the novel, as we look 
back on it from the end, seems to hang on a series of symbolic traits strung together like 
beads, so too does Laurel's sense of herself at the end of the novel emerge from a 
confluence of images. 
It is nothing quite so definite as a story that Laurel lays claim to in the end. What she 
discovers, echoing Bowen's expression of the desire for pattern, - "I am glad to see even 
the most arbitrary, the most preposterous, pattern emerge" (CIN, 205) - is shape. Welty 
writes in the conclusion to the story of her own life, One Writer's Beginnings, "I'm 
prepared now to use the wonderful word confluence, which of itself exists as a reality and 
a symbol in one. It is the only kind of symbol that for me as a writer has any weight, 
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testifying to the pattern, one of the chief patterns, of human experience" (OWB, 102). This 
novel certainly explores to an extent, as many critics have suggested, the revelations of 
memory and a journey of self-discovery. However, I would suggest that, ultimately, it is 
not a narrative of escape. Quite the opposite: what emerges at the end of the novel is a 
realization of the fact that there is no escaping from ourselves. There is no real 
emancipation from the "convulsions of the mind", the susceptibilities of perception, from 
memory, prediction or hallucination; from the pattern that constitutes, in Merleau-Ponty's 
phrase, our own "style of being. " 
Even beyond death, the power of "confluence", of a person's intimate connection to others 
and to the world, means that this style goes on being felt. Towards the end of The 
Optimist's Daughter, in a passage that Welty quotes in One Writer's Beginnings, Laurel 
remembers a dream, which had replayed a real journey that she had taken with her dead 
husband. On a train, the couple passes over a bridge above 
the confluence of the waters, the Ohio and the Mississippi. 
They were looking down from a great elevation and all they saw 
was at the point of coming together, the bare trees marching in from the 
horizon, the rivers moving into one, and as he touched her arm she looked 
up with him and saw the long, ragged, pencil-faint line of birds within the 
crystal of the zenith, flying in aV of their own, following the same course 
down. All they could see was sky, water, birds, light and confluence. It was 
the whole morning world. 
And they themselves were part of the confluence. Their own joint 
act of faith had brought them here at the very moment and matched its 
occurrence, and proceeded as it proceeded. Direction itself was made 
beautiful, momentous. They were riding as on with it, right up front. It's 
our turn! She'd thought exultantly. And we're going to live forever. 
Left bodiless and graveless of a death made of water and fire in a 
year long gone, Phil could still tell her of her life. For her life, any life, she 
had to believe, was nothing but the continuity of its love (OD, 159-160). 
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Intertwined with Laurel's life and with the world they had inhabited together, the imprint 
of Phil's style of being goes on informing understanding from beyond the grave. Whilst 
Laurel's youthful belief that they would "live forever" seems cruelly naive in contrast to 
the reality that the subsequent paragraph thrusts at us, there is a consolation in her final 
revelation. Through a connection to others - love, empathy, the interaction of conversation 
- through the power of confluence, there is a kind of survival beyond the mortal limits of 
one's own body. Remembering is most effectively undertaken not through the 
construction of consoling narratives, the attempt to artificially force a life into shapes we 
find more comprehensible, as we saw with the "falsifiers" at Judge McKelva's funeral. 
Rather, it takes place through the continuity of its effects in the outside world, through the 
ways that the perception of the living go on being inflected by those who are now dead. 
This perceptual confluence is perhaps the "human vision" that we saw Welty searching for 
in her photography. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, what makes us uniquely human is that 
"`others, ' [are] not merely [... ] my congeners, as the zoologist says, but the others who 
haunt me and whom I haunt; the `others' along with whom I haunt a single, present, and 
actual Being as no animal ever haunted those beings of his own species, locale, or habitat" 
(EM, 160-161). 
Welty's final novel, then, not only addresses the distortions that memory can reap upon 
the past, but also more generally articulates complex relationships between individual 
consciousnesses and between consciousness and the outside world. It is not only the 
effects of our own subjectivity on the world that we have to contend with, but also that of 
others, which may both help and hinder us. Even as the explorations of memory flutter 
about, even as the connections that we make extend our style of being to realms beyond 
ourselves, we never escape from the thudding here-and-nowness of particular bodies. The 
final image of the hands confirms this. Even as they wave goodbye, they serve as a 
reminder of the grief and guilt she still carries, of the stubborn and paradoxical persistence 
of life in the face of death. "But the guilt of outliving those you love is justly to be borne, 
she thought. Outliving is something we do to them The fantasies of dying could be no 
stranger than the fantasies of living. Surviving is perhaps the strangest fantasy of them all" 
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(OD, 162-163). What Laurel arrives at is not necessarily a truth that will help to 
"understand", "comprehend" or "interpret" but rather an awareness of the futility of those 
activities in the face of that "strangest fantasy of them all". This realization does constitute 
a kind of self-knowledge that goes beyond anybody else in the novel, but it comes with a 
catch. In a double-edged move, she has avoided both the blindness and the optimism of 
her father. ", [W]e are, " as Welty writes elsewhere, "the breakers of our own hearts" 
(OTOP, 7). 
* 
In her essay, `Place in Fiction', Welty reflects on the connected processes of writing and 
reading. 
Making reality real is art's responsibility. It is a practical assignment, then, 
a self-assignment: to achieve, by a cultivated sensitivity for observing life, 
a capacity for receiving its impressions, a lonely, unremitting, unaided, 
unaidable vision, and transferring this vision without distortion to it onto 
the pages of a novel, where, if the reader is so persuaded, it will turn into 
the reader's illusion. 38 
Following the modernist mantra - "before all, to make you see"39 - fiction is, for Welty, a 
matter of vision. But, as always, it is not quite that simple. There is a strange series of 
conversions here, representing a complicated relationship between the notions of illusion 
and reality. Reality becomes real through the intervention of art. The artist's job is to 
translate, undistorted, their vision (which, paradoxically, itself must be cultivated) to the 
reader, at which point, it becomes an illusion. Somewhere along the way reality has got 
lost, or at least altered. It seems to hang in the space between the writer's "lonely vision" 
and the "reader's illusion". Strangely, through these internal exercises of individual 
consciousnesses, we achieve the greatest degree of connection possible. "Vision alone 
38 Welty, `Place in Fiction', pp. 116-133 (p. 128). 
39 Joseph Conrad, `Preface' to The Nigger of the Narcissus (1897) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1929), pp. 
vii-xii (p. X). 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Four 224 
makes us learn that beings that are different, `exterior', foreign to one another, are yet 
absolutely together, are `simultaneity"' (EM, 187). It is through this vision, at once lonely 
and shared, rooted in the world and replete with "the power to imagine, " that human 
relationships emerge (EM, 187). In this sense, Welty's writing articulates the discovery of 
"human vision". But I don't mean to say this in the same syrupy tones as the auratic 
writing I have criticized. Those readings have flattened out the complexity of perceptual 
life; the "human vision" to which I refer is one that is necessarily full of complexity. It is a 
vision for which sacrifices, often painful, sometimes fatal, must be made and a vision, 
once achieved, that illuminates the horrors, the "plight" as well as the beauty, the 
"wonder" of human existence (OTOP, 8). It is not a vision that provides access to a 
fundamental truth, to a logical, expressible narrative. Rather, it opens onto chaos, onto the 
awesome inexpressibility of the image that is nothing other than itself. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
"Have we lost illusion? ": Bowen's Later Fiction 
225 
To be here was, subtly, to feel oneself a survivor from some vanished 
civilization. 
- Elizabeth Bowen, `Beginning of this Day" 
There is an episode in Bowen's memoir, A Time in Rome, which narrates the 
experience of walking around the site of the ancient Forum. She describes entering the 
ruins as being "plunged, keyless, in amongst the prostrate and the inchoate: lumps, 
pitfalls, discontinuous ridges. This might be an abandoned building-site, or outgrown 
giant playroom littered with breakages" (TR, 32). She explains that the "headiness" 
and "lack of method" of the original excavators of the site are to blame for the current 
chaos, which so "exasperates (I learned) modern archaeologists, now at pains putting it 
right" (TR, 32). Whilst recognizing the potential merits of this contemporary diligence 
- "The results are gigantic or pretty, always coherent" - Bowen admits to a frustration 
at the slow and emotionless nature of the activity in comparison to that of a previous, 
reckless generation, "passionate for objects and swayed by drama [... ] More 
sympathetic, I find, that untutored frenzy which sent earth flying and scattered 
fragments of cornice, disjected inscriptions and limbs of statues piecemeal, 
unnumbered from their unnoted beds" (TR, 32). 
Uninspired by the painstaking attempts to reconstruct the site as an authentic replica of 
a time long gone, she is more interested in the effects of the irreverent excavations 
themselves. Rather than wanting to be taught about some carefully reconstructed 
edifice, she is fascinated by the accidents of archaeology, the unintentional traces that 
each group left behind them. 
There is a naivety about the Forum as it now is. It is as though what is 
disinterred took on the character of the greater part of the time of its 
disinterring: the Palatine, later exposed, looks twentieth century, the 
' Fragment of an unpublished story (n. d. [set in post-World War Two London]), HRHRC 
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Forum, Victorian - still like a faint brown photograph in a rectory 
study. 
Suppose the place had been left, undisturbed, for a hundred-and- 
fifty or so years more? Several generations would have been the poorer; 
and so, I think, would these incoherent vestiges themselves 
(TR, 34). 
The disruption of authenticity is seen here not as a travesty or loss, but as something 
that gives value and coherence. More than that, in pointing to what she describes as the 
"naivety" of the intervened-with ruins, she suggests that in being disturbed, 
reconstructed, they have somehow become more authentic. 
In his short story, `The Real Thing', Henry James (whose enormous influence on her 
own work Bowen readily acknowledged) presents to us the figure of an artist with "an 
innate preference for the represented subject over the real one: the defect of the real 
one was so apt to be a lack of representation. I liked things that appeared; then one was 
sure. Whether they were or not was a subordinate and almost always a profitless 
question. ,2 This chapter is about the way that Bowen's later work reveals and 
develops exactly such a "preference for the represented subject over the real one". As 
in the story about the Forum, this involves a consideration of the way that we relate to 
the past. The ruins act as a concretization of the workings of memory, and Bowen's 
later writing, both essays and fiction, circle around the conundrums of remembering, 
which is repeatedly characterized as a highly unreliable activity. "I know that I have in 
my make-up layers of synthetic experience, and that the most powerful of my 
memories are only half true, " she claims. "Reduced to the minimum, to the what did 
happen, my life would be unrecognizable by me. ,3 Like those of the Forum, our own 
foundations come to us already transformed. 
The story about the Forum does, however, reveal something beyond a repudiation of 
the possibilities of mimetic realism and authenticity. There is something at work on an 
Z Henry James, `The Real Thing' (1893), Tales of Henry James, ed. Christof Wegelin (New York and 
London: Norton, 1984), pp. 239-259 (p. 244). 
3 Bowen, `Out of a Book', pp. 48-53 (p. 48). 
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ethical level; these ruins work not just as a metaphor for artistic practice or individual 
remembering, but for the way that we approach our collective history as a basis for the 
construction of our present collective identity. Bowen is searching in this later work 
for new external forms for both the aesthetic and the social. Reading her account of her 
visit to Rome, it is hard not to compare the ancient ruins with those, not dug up, but 
brought down in London just a few years before. Bowen wrote then, in the short story 
`Mysterious Kör', "This war shows we've by no means come to the end. If you can 
blow whole places out of existence, you can blow whole places into it. "4 This sense of 
the imaginary potential of the physical danger of the Blitz is something we have 
already seen in the saving hallucinations in Bowen's description of wartime London. 
"The search for indestructible landmarks in a destructible world led down many 
strange paths. The attachment to these when they had been found produced small 
worlds-within-worlds of hallucination" (DL, 97). 
However, just as Bowen rejects the passionless pedantry of the modern generation of 
archaeologists in favour of those who came earlier and were unconcerned with leaving 
their own trace, she expresses concerns about the general state of the post-Blitz world. 
Looking back, from the point of this war's end, at the armistice of 1918, she draws the 
two moments together through the use of similar language. In an essay of 1948, Bowen 
describes the current social climate as a "white, too quiet morning. " 5 In a radio play, 
broadcast a year later, she writes of 1918: "Where I was, it was a silent morning [... ] 
The sun was dazzling, pale [ ... 
] I was terrified by the vacuum. ,6 The shock of the 
falling bombs, rather than shaking society up, releasing its creative potential, seems to 
have stunned it into a dull conformity; along with the physical ruins left by two world 
wars, it seems that there has also been some deterioration of the architecture of life. 
She expresses a growing frustration towards the increasing blandness of this post-war 
world and its "mechanical uniformity. "7 It seems that life that is not under threat is 
actually more threatening: "We may think we dread mass extinction; what we dread 
more is vacuum. "8 The lack of "catastrophe" or "emergency stimulus", the "increasing 
4Bowen, `Mysterious Kör', The Demon Lover and Other Stories, pp. 173-189 (p. 176). 
Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', [p. 2]. 
6 Bowen, `A Year I Remember: 1918', p. 17. 
7 Bowen, `Subject and the Time', p. 4. 
8 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', p. 2. 
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smoothness" of life appears, to Bowen, to be leading towards some kind of atrophy: 
"Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness... what were desiderata become perils. "9 Where 
Freud saw the brutal landscape of war as the site of "disillusionment", Bowen sees the 
outbreak of peace as precipitating a process of de-aestheticization. 10 Contemporary life 
seems, to Bowen, to have sacrificed its "sensibilities" for the sake of a mundane 
functionality. Do we not owe it to those sensibilities, she asks, to "live more 
rewardingly, more stylishly, more fully? Agreed. But then, if so, how? Why not? What 
is holding us up? How, again, is not only pleasure but sense of worth [to] attend our 
conduct of a day? Have we mislaid some formula, or, have we lost illusion? "" 
We have already seen Bowen's sense of the human need for pattern, for solid 
grounding. "For a main trait of human nature is its amorphousness, the amorphousness 
of the drifting and flopping jellyfish in a cloudy tide, [... ] There results an obsessive 
wish to acquire outline, to be unmistakably demarcated, to take shape. Shape - shape 
is the desideratum" (PC, 58-59). But this need is not merely a private one. She writes 
elsewhere, "couldn't it be that the wish, the demand for shape is more than individual, 
that it's a mass thing? Or rather, the mass's wish or demand not to have to go on being 
a mass merely? The difference between a mass and a society is, I suppose, shape" 
(WHY, 25). Like the felled stones of the Forum, the ruins of a post-war civilization 
must be worked upon to make them coherent; it is not enough to simply be, they must 
be represented. "Social intercourse does need staging, however modestly: it is the 
aesthetic that is the charm, the discipline that is (for us) the repose. Once, the futilities 
of Society were the target - now we must think again. The Englishman in his dinner 
jacket in the jungle - was he so ridiculous, after all? 1-)12 As we have already seen in an 
earlier chapter, this formalized approach to human interaction is always on the verge of 
an uncomfortable objectification or dehumanizination. In fact, Bowen's reactionary 
stance threatens at moments to align her with Robert Kelway, whose transformation 
into Nazi sympathiser in The Heat of the Day is presented as a response to precisely 
the lack of social aesthetics that Bowen laments. However, I want to suggest, Bowen's 
turn to the stylization of etiquette here is motivated not by a wish to turn away from 
9 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', p. 2. 
10 Freud, `Thoughts for the Times on War and Death' (1915), pp. 273-300 (p. 275). 
11 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', [p. 3]. 
12 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', [p. 8]. 
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the society around her, as we saw in Robert's rejection of his country, but by the desire 
to reconnect with it in a more meaningful way. Similarly, Kristeva suggests that for 
Merleau-Ponty, "the aesthetic experience is preserved and understood as a space for 
authentic subjectivity. It establishes and communicates the subject's implication `in the 
roots of Being' through perception and in an erotic intimacy with other people. " 13 
As we saw in The Heat of the Day, the crowd or "mass", for Bowen, dissolves 
individual subjectivity and with it the chance for "real life relations. " The distancing, 
differentiating effects of manners, of social performance, Bowen believes, provide the 
opportunity for these relations to take place. Differing from the "dissimulation" we 
saw in The Death of the Heart, which attempted to elide self and role, this "staging" of 
"social intercourse" is not a confidence trick or a disguise; it gives form to an 
expression of self rather than trying to smother it. Bowen saw the shape-shifting 
accession to the organic crowd during the war's anxious years as a refusal of such 
definite forms, of real identities; as a refusal to live in the present. Post-war society, 
free from immediate threat, seems to have sunk into a similar passive disengagement. 
In 1953 Bowen writes, "we seem to be cut off from some great part of our power to be. 
Somehow, somewhere we have lost freshness; a sort of eager immediacy is gone from 
our reactions, from our response. Today, the sensation of living now, eludes us. "14 
Bowen's later work is, to a large extent, concerned with this question of "living now". 
In one essay, she directly links this question to the need to find a new contemporary 
artistic form. "In so far as today is without precedent, it has always demanded to be 
expressed in a manner, through a medium or by a means for which no aesthetic 
precedent can be found. "15 This aesthetic innovation requires a liberation from the 
values attached to the art of the past and the notion of the "timeless" that is applied to 
it. 
We salute the `timeless' because it seems to exclude our own nagging, 
modern disorder - our frustrated, our haunted, taunted uneasiness with 
13 Kri s teva, pp. 274-6. 
'a Bowen, `Subject and the Time', p. 1. 
15 Bowen, `Subject and the Time', p. 2. 
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regard to what is our own time. But, for that very reason, the art of the 
past has a lacking element - an element only to be supplied, at whatever 
cost in harshness or inconvenience, by art which is contemporary with 
us. 16 
The yawning abyss that Bowen found in the outer world is always and directly linked 
with a sense of loss or absence in the world of creativity. The empty "white" morning 
of the post-war moment is accompanied by a description of her profession as "writers 
who can no longer write, we falter every day at the sight of the blank white page. " 17 
Whilst this "blank white page" is presented as one waiting to be written upon, it 
nevertheless calls up a very visual image. Indeed, the imagery of needing to break up 
empty space or smoothness with the introduction of shape or outline, and the 
invocation of a white expanse untouched by colour, are painterly. Elsewhere, Bowen 
refers to the future as "a picture sketched, but still to be coloured in. "18There is a sense 
of a need to introduce depth or perspective onto an otherwise flat, homogenous 
surface. Just as James's artist expresses a preference for the represented over the real, 
and just as Bowen is more interested in the creative rather than the revelatory side of 
archaeology, so too it seems does she feel the need for a drawing over the blank of 
what is. It is as if the world cannot be understood unless it is shaped by representation, 
made articulate: "To regain realization, we need expression. " 19 
Echoing James's artist, Bowen seems, at root, to find the reality of post-war culture 
defective in its "lack of representation"; beyond the purely material devastation 
wreaked on lives and landscapes by the war, both society and art are threatened by 
some sort of formlessness. But this formlessness is not to be understood in terms of the 
kind of fragmentation seen in that passionate work upon the ruins; rather, it stands in 
direct contrast to it. Formlessness here does not so much denote chaos or damage as 
absence; a refusal of intervention or engagement; the wearing of white gloves to 
handle the object of the past for fear of leaving one's own fingerprints upon its surface. 
16 Bowen, `Subject and the Time, ' p. 2. 
17 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', [p. 2]. 
18 Bowen `The Cult of Nostalgia' (1951) [transcript of radio broadcast, 4 August 1951. A version later 
published in Listener XLVI (9 August 1951), 225-226], HRI-IRC, p. 6. 
19 Bowen, `Subject and the Time', p. 2. 
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Bowen's language of boundaries and rules, etiquette and art must be understood as 
coextensive with the language of emotion seen in the "untutored frenzy" which 
fragmented the relics of the Forum. There is a sometimes confusing tension here 
between an idea of formal control and heady "lack of method": "On the one hand, a 
greater romantic irregularity, more carelessness; on the other, a greater impersonality - 
are these impossible to combine? The more formal facade, the more gothic interior? "20 
The tension between conscious, rationalized and irrational, involuntary action that lies 
at the heart of the new form that Bowen is striving towards stands in direct opposition 
to the Sartrean notion of agency. Where Sartre claims that the human subject is defined 
by the ability to make choices - "man is condemned to be free"21 - Bowen develops a 
sense of subjectivity predicated on chance. In her notes for a reading of The Little 
Girls, cited by Ellmann, Bowen writes: "This is a story about identity. It is about the 
involuntary element in behaviour: `Chance, not choice. '22" This sentiment appears 
within the novel itself, as Clare contemplates Dinah in the aftermath of her breakdown. 
"We were entrusted to one another, in the days which mattered, Clare thought. 
Entrusted to one another by chance, not choice. Chance, and its agents time and place. 
Chance is better than choice; it is more lordly. In its carelessness it is more lordly" 
(LG, 276). The notions of the involuntary or unconscious element in behaviour, in 
history, in creation are entwined with issues of materiality, of representation. "The 
apparent choices of art are nothing but addictions, predispositions [... ] The aesthetic is 
nothing but a return to images that will allow nothing to take their place; the aesthetic 
is nothing but an attempt to disguise and glorify the enforced return. "23 
"The enforced return" here is the nostalgic impulse writ large, working both in terms 
of a longing for a temporal return, a failure to "live now" and conceptually, as the 
desire to rediscover some imagined pure object, some "real thing" behind the mediated 
experience of the thing. As the repeated negatives in Bowen's description suggest, "the 
enforced return" is also, on one level, a desire for annihilation, the death-drive: "the 
20 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', [p. 7]. 
21Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism (1946), trans. Philip Mairet (London: Macmillan, 
1984), p. 34. 
22 Cited in Eilmann, p. 194. 
23 Bowen, `Out of a Book', pp. 48-53 (p. 53). 
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instinct to return to the inanimate state. , 24 The aesthetic, then, is nothing but nostalgia; 
the aesthetic is nothing but an attempt to disguise and glorify the desire for death. 
Pitched against this, it is not surprising that Bowen struggles with her search for a 
contemporary form, one that can express the essence of "living now. " Throughout 
Bowen's work, echoing Welty's balancing of fate and freedom, we have seen a similar 
tension between the pessimism of tragic knowledge and the optimism of creative 
potential. It leads her, for example, to be both impressed and appalled by "people's 
formidable capacity for silence, for keeping a secret, and not less [with] their power of 
acting up, of behaving as though nothing were the matter. , 25 And as we saw in The 
Death of the Heart and The Heat of the Day, the desire to seal oneself away in "death- 
sleep" is achieved through the creation of intricate fantasies. In her final works, we see 
this tension emerge through the charged relationship between the aesthetic and the 
nostalgic impulses. 
The final two novels, The Little Girls (1964) and Eva Trout (1969) demonstrate a 
move towards a new, much more self-conscious style; each can be seen in a different 
way as pushing towards that notion of a contemporary form. A large part of this seems 
to be related to Bowen's increasingly fraught relationship with language in its prosaic 
form. Far from the emotional, expressive weight of her sentences in her earlier novels, 
we see here an emptying out of language, a loss of faith in its efficacy. The children in 
The Little Girls speculate that the people of the future "may have no language" (LG, 
134), and Eva Trout fatally adopts a son who can neither speak nor hear. These last 
two novels are filled with the most banal verbal exchanges, a clutter that comes to rival 
Bowen's ever-proliferating fictional furniture. Words in the employ of the characters 
in these novels reflect the dull, mechanized landscape of their time; morphemes are 
selected and arranged with the same steady-handed banality as the modem architects at 
the Forum who produce coherence without any real meaning. 
If she fills her characters' mouths with meaningless chatter, Bowen's deployment of 
words outside this discourse is crystallized into cryptic brevity. John Bayley wrote to 
24 Freud, `Beyond the Pleasure Principle' (1920), in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology 
and Other Works, SEXVIII (1920-1922), pp. 1-64 (p. 38). 
25 Bowen, 'Elizabeth Bowen and Jocelyn Brooke', p. 13. 
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her on reading Eva Trout: "How much you can do with style now is almost 
uncanny. "26 In the final essay in the 1961 collection Afterthought, Bowen emphasizes 
the author's task as conscious crafter, and that knowing what to omit is an important 
part of that craft. The author learns "that what may be most eloquent, sometimes, is the 
excluded word - or phrase, or paragraph, or it may be chapter. He learns that 
elimination may serve expression. He comes to see how far the unstated builds up the 
content. , 27 More and more so in these last works, it is what is not or cannot be said that 
exudes hypnotic power. Where this invisible energy was once channelled through the 
inanimate inhabitants of Bowen's narrative in a kind of magnetization of the material, 
it now appears in the spaces between things. Reading feels like decoding, a search for 
the right system, for the syntactical connections that will usher in sense. As we saw in 
Welty's The Optimist's Daughter, this decoding process is more pictorial, spatial than 
narratological; it is once again a question of shape. In Bowen's last novel we see its 
heroine, Eva, remembering in a way not modelled on narrative but on "pattern-arriving 
at", a grouping together of fragmented pictorial elements in sets of "predominant 
colour, " that "like a kindergarten game [... ], made sense in a way" (ET, 52). Orbiting 
around the twin poles of "disjection" and "concatenation", this novel, along with its 
heroine, questions the ways we make and communicate sense, exploring what can and 
cannot be coaxed into representation. 
I want to suggest that these questions of representation, of the interactions between the 
visible and the invisible, can be understood through Bowen's interest in painting. 
Eilmann and Bennett and Royle use the notion of painting to discuss what they see as 
Bowen's tendency towards stillness. "It is possible, " muses Eilmann, "that Bowen was 
drawn to painting in her early youth because of the petrifaction it inflicts on life. "28 In 
subtitling their work on Bowen Still Lives, Bennett and Royle also play on the 
connection between painting and immobility. For both of these studies, the stillness of 
painting is associated with death, a desire for, literally, "stilling life. "29 However, I 
want to suggest another way of reading the trope of painting that runs through 
26 Bayley, letter to Bowen. 
27 Bowen, `Exclusion', Afterthought: Pieces about Writing (London: Longmans, 1962), pp. 216-220 (p. 
216). 
28 Eilmann, p. 79. 
29 Eilmann, p. 79. 
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Bowen's writing. The medium of painting does not, for her, signify a diminishment of 
life. Rather, it is mobilized by her in the investigation of precisely how the realms of 
the real and the represented become intertwined. The painting is not conceived simply 
as some Platonic copy of a copy, but as an active and interactive space. It is not a 
question of reducing life, consciousness, to the dimensions of the canvas, to the play of 
lines and figures, but of what these material elements can convey to us of the 
relationship between the visible and the invisible; the way that, as surface, they 
manifest the pressure of something underneath. 
The limits and possibilities of painterly representation became a key issue for art 
theory in the 1960s. In opposition to Clement Greenberg's seminal formulation of 
visual modernism in `Modernist Painting', certain minimalist artists, such as Donald 
Judd and Frank Stella, suggested that painting had become an exhausted art form. 30 
Michael Fried's 1967 essay `Art and Objecthood', written from a Greenbergian 
perspective, is a key text in this debate about representation. The minimalist, or what 
Fried terms "literalist case against painting rests mainly on two counts: the relational 
character of almost all painting and the ubiquitousness, indeed the inescapability, of 
pictorial illusion. "31 In place of painting, what is proposed by literalism are "specific 
objects, " "unitary-type forms" which avoid any referential movement, internally or 
externally, which are "absolutely plain. "32 Such pieces Greenberg disparagingly 
describes as "non-art. " 
In his essay, Fried identifies the literalist project not as "an isolated episode but the 
expression of a general and pervasive condition. "33 I want to suggest that the 
minimalist drive towards this kind of objecthood constitutes the same refusal of 
representation that Bowen identifies as plaguing post-war society. The desire for the 
"one thing, " for "real relations in real space" echoes the nostalgic impulse for the "real 
thing" that we have already seen. In trying to silence the referential chatter of the 
30 Clement Greenberg, `Modernist Painting' (1961), in Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of 
Changing Ideas, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 754-760. 
31 Michael Fried, `Art and Objecthood' (1967), Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 148-172 (p. 149). 
32 Fried, pp. 148- 172 (p. 150). 
" Fried, pp. 148- 172 (p. 149). 
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artwork, to make it "absolutely plain", this kind of minimalism, one might argue, 
reveals its own death drive; "Without their indistinctness, " Bowen claims, "things do 
not exist" (HP, 153). Like nostalgia, however, what minimalism reaches for is 
ultimately unobtainable. Greenberg suggests that "no matter how simple the objects 
may be, there remain the relations and interrelations of surface, contour and spatial 
interval. -, 34 As well as these relations within itself, one cannot suspend the object from 
its position in the world; the object is never "a chunk of absolutely hard, indivisible 
being" (VI, 132). The way in which objects are given to us through perception, which 
is for Merleau-Ponty always partial, always ambiguous, makes the notion of the 
"specific object" dissolve. There is no such thing as an "absolutely plain" 
representation because there is always something that remains invisible, obscured by 
the fact of my being a subject who is in the world. Merleau-Ponty writes: "There is a 
sort of madness in vision such that with it I go unto the world itself, and yet at the 
same time the parts of that world evidently do not coexist without me (the table in 
itself has nothing to do with the bed a yard away)" (VI, 75). It is as though whenever 
one turns one's back, the objects start being themselves, start behaving "for real"; as if 
I could catch them at it if I turned round quickly enough or positioned myself in front 
of a mirror. 
Bowen's later work is concerned precisely with the temptation and the insanity of this 
task. It is a coming to terns with impossibility of making the invisible fully visible, 
with the points at which representation falters. Eva Trout in particular is a novel 
fascinated by the idea and possibilities of two-dimensional representation, using 
questions of depth and flatness to explore vision, language, consciousness and form. 
There is a blurring of the line between canvas and consciousness, a questioning 
whether people really are anything more than pictures, portraits. In the course of this 
chapter I will be considering Bowen's implicit and explicit use of painting as a literary 
motif in her fiction and also in her non-fictional writing about painting, specifically 
two previously undiscussed pieces on the Irish painters, Norah McGuinness and 
Mamie Jellett. I will also be considering to what extent this late work is a 
reassessment, even an indictment, of what she as a writer has been trying to do. 
Eilmann suggests that Bowen's writing reveals "a sense of guilt about the act of 
3' Clement Greenberg, cited in Fried, pp. 148-172 (p. 152). 
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writing as a violation of the inarticulate. "35 In a way, it is also increasingly an effort to 
find a way of writing that might minimize the violation. Whilst recognizing that the 
aesthetic effort will always be plagued by the lures of the nostalgic impulse in all its 
forms, Bowen continues to search for new means of expression. In the face of the 
threat of a loss of art, "there is much to be argued for dressing up. "36 
ýýý 
In a radio broadcast of July 1951, Bowen discusses what she calls "The Cult of 
Nostalgia" in contemporary culture. This "perpetual dwelling on the past" plays a large 
role in that failure to "live now" described above. 37 It is an impulse reflected in and 
encouraged by literature, which Bowen sees as shying away from the unfamiliar. "The 
unfamiliar - really, it may be argued, these days we are having enough of that ! [... 1 To 
live at all, to conduct oneself through a day, week, year is a matter of shocks, 
incredulities, then, adjustments. , 38 The natural reaction to this unfamiliar world is, 
Bowen claims, a reaching for stability; for those fantasies of solidity that appeared in 
Bowen's earlier work. The current trend is to find those solidities in the past, which 
"now, seems to be the repository of all treasures. "39 
The most powerful element of this supportive past is the scenes and landscapes of 
one's own childhood. The return to childhood scenes, either in fact or in imagination, 
Bowen suggest, is about more than an egotistical search; it is rather, she suggests, 
about precisely attempting to escape oneself, to rediscover a more objective solid 
ground. 
Is it one's nascent self, one's in-the-bud identity, that one looks for? Or, 
better, is one, really, in search of the thing-in-its-self - of that 
independent clearness with which the flint wall, the flight of uphill 
35 Ellmann, p. 12. 
36 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', [p. 8]. 
37 Bowen, `The Cult of Nostalgia', p. 1. 
38 Bowen, `The Cult of Nostalgia', p. 2. 
39 Bowen, `The Cult of Nostalgia', p. 2. 
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steps, the reflected arch of the bridge, used to stand out - stand out not 
blurred, as yet, by many, or perhaps any, associations? 4o 
Nostalgia is, then, an impulse towards that notion of the unearthed "real thing" 
discussed above. Like the archaeologists at the Forum, it represents a wish to unearth a 
perfectly preserved object. But while Bowen admits the virtue in desiring this 
unclouded, childlike perspective, she stresses that it is only ever a return that can be 
imagined. When it comes to the landscapes of one's past, 
Change [... ] wreaks a personal injury -a tearing out of pages from 
one's own story: so much so that, knowing how wide and drastic the 
scope of change is, we may not dare to risk a real-life return, but prefer 
to dwell, brood on those scenes in memory - which is more insidious, 
more in-growing, but more safe. 41 
While the nostalgic impulse might appear to be about rediscovering some authenticity 
then, it is in fact directed towards a fiction. What was is always mediated through the 
requirements and influences of what now is; it can never simply be a thing of the past. 
In Bowen's Court, Bowen describes an alternative way of understanding our relation to 
the past that takes account of the questions of this mediation and of the involuntary 
aspect of understanding. In creating this family history, she claims, rather than 
succumbing to the nostalgic impulse for total return, "I accepted the ignorance, set up 
by time and death, that separated my ancestor's conscious lives from mine" (BC, 451). 
What there is in the place of this conscious understanding of the past is something 
more involuntary; it is unsurprising, perhaps, that Bowen frequently cites Proust in 
relation to the workings of memory. Her family's relation to history has been "an 
unconscious one", and her own relation to the past generations is likewise 
unconscious. 
40 Bowen, `The Cult of Nostalgia', p. 3. 
41 Bowen, `The Cult of Nostalgia, ' p. 3. 
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I was not conscious of the lives of the dead [at Bowen's Court]. It may 
be that, like so many writers, I have not much imagination to spare. But 
the unconsciousness - the unknowingness, the passivity - in which so 
much of those finished lives had passed did somehow reach and enter 
my own. What runs on most through a family living in one place is a 
continuous, semi-physical dream Above this dream-level successive 
lives show their tips, their little conscious formations of will and 
thought. With the end of each generation, the lives that submerged here 
were absorbed again. With each death, the air of the place had 
thickened: it had been added to. The dead do not need to visit Bowen's 
Court rooms - as I said, we had no ghosts in that house - because they 
already permeated them. Their extinct senses were present in lights and 
forms (BC, 451). 
The past is perpetuated by an almost telepathic communication of unconsciousnesses. 
But remembrance is also explicitly connected to physical perception: the house's past 
is felt through a "semi-physical dream, " seen in "lights and forms. " Even in being thus 
perceived, though, this history retains its unconscious quality, being more a matter of 
"intuitions" than reasonings or conscious analyses. This relation between 
remembering, unconsciousness and perception is echoed in Bowen's understanding of 
individual memory. She describes the perpetuation of one's childhood within one's 
adult self. "Happily, the Eden of childhood], like a natal climate, can be 
unconsciously remembered, and the magic stored up in those years goes on secreting 
under today's chosen sensations and calculated thoughts. -42 Here, the process of 
unconscious remembering is given a somatic quality, memory involuntarily 
"secreting" itself as if from its own special gland and emerging in "sensations", 
"thoughts" that may appear to be "chosen", "calculated. " This configuration of the 
unconscious as an aspect of the material, visible world echoes what we have seen in 
Merleau-Ponty's declaration that "perception is unconsciousness" (VI, 189). 
42 Bowen, `Out of a Book', pp. 48-53 (p. 49). 
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In a working note to The Invisible and the Invisible, referred to in an earlier chapter, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that the "existentials" - our outward gestures, creations, being 
- contain 
the sedimented meaning of all our voluntary and involuntary 
experiences. This unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of 
ourselves, behind the back of our `consciousness, ' but in front of us, as 
articulations in our field. It is `unconscious' by the fact that it is not an 
object, but it is that through which objects are possible, it is the 
constellation wherein our future is read" (VI, 180). 
The unconscious is understood as some material accretion, as "sedimentation, " as 
something given within perception. But, while it is imagined in material terms, the 
unconscious is, importantly, not object-like. Rather, it acts as the context in which 
objects appear, the ground that supports them; it is, to use Bowen's term, the 
"thickened air" through which we see. In another note, Merleau-Ponty uses the 
relationship between object and ground to describe that between perception and 
forgetting. 
[U]nderstand perception as differentiation, forgetting as 
undifferentiation. The fact that one no longer sees the memory = not a 
destruction of a psychic material which would be the sensible, but its 
disarticulation which makes there be no longer a separation [ecart], a 
relief. This is the night of forgetting. Understand that the `to be 
conscious' = to have a figure on a ground, and that it disappears by 
disarticulation (VI, 197). 
The difference between conscious and unconscious, then, lies not in a distance 
between different regions or realms, but in the manipulation of "psychic material", in 
whether it is articulated or disarticulated. The manipulation of the material is thus not 
corruption of an authenticity that we might otherwise reach unmediated. Rather, this 
`authenticity, ' the past event, `inner being' is only accessible through the manipulation: 
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"there is no vision without the screen" (VI, 150). This, of course, brings us back to 
James' artist: "I liked things that appeared; then one was sure. " 
This notion of a pre-existent, manipulable material is, again, echoed in Merleau- 
Ponty's discussion of painting. The line in modern painting is reimagined beyond its 
"prosaic conception [... ] as a positive attribute and a property of the object in itself' 
(EM, 182) and is instead understood as "the restriction, segregation, or modulation of a 
pre-given spatiality" (EM, 184). The line works on this space in the same way that 
becoming conscious works on the "psychic material; " the two are both a kind of 
"articulation". The drawing of a line can, then, perhaps be imagined as making the 
space conscious: " `to be conscious' = to have a figure on a ground. " As well as 
bringing the blank space to expression, however, the line also introduces the 
appearance of depth, which is both the context and the result of the line. Merleau- 
Ponty insists that we should understand depth as more than a dimension, "at least in 
the ordinary sense of a certain relationship according to which we make 
measurements". It is rather, a "global `locality"' from which the ordinarily conceived 
dimensions are abstracted, "a voluminosity we express in a word when we say that a 
thing is there" (EM, 180). In this sense, depth works in a similar way to the 
unconscious, which Merleau-Ponty characterizes as a context for presence. The 
articulation thus makes us conscious of the present/absence of the unconscious; it both 
articulates it and allows it to remain enigmatic. We cannot trace the depth of a 
painting, point out its position or contours as we can with the line, nevertheless, it is 
there. The depth is like the invisible of the visible, the ideas of the flesh that Merleau- 
Ponty has described as being "behind the sounds or between them,, behind the lights or 
between them" (VI, 151). 
As we have seen, this undoing of the crude positivism of a certain notion of objecthood 
is inherent to Merleau-Ponty's particular characterization of vision. The dissolution of 
vision is magnified by the concretization that painting undertakes. 
The painter's world is a visible world, nothing but visible: a world 
almost demented, because it is complete when it is yet only partial. 
Painting awakens and carries to its highest pitch a delirium which is 
vision itself, for to see is to have at a distance; painting spreads this 
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strange possession to all aspects of Being, which must in some fashion 
become visible in order to enter into the work of art [... ] It gives visible 
existence to what profane vision believed to be invisible; thanks to it we 
do not need a "muscular sense" in order to possess the voluminosity of 
the world (EM, 166). 
Even as the painting makes visible "what profane vision believed to be invisible, " it 
remains "partial. " The world appears as "voluminosity, " as depth, as visibility 
plumped out by the force of the invisible. The partialness of the painting is not a 
failure, "a paralyzed or miscarried utterance" but a reflection of the nature of our being 
(EM, 189). 
What, says the understanding [... ] is it only that? 
Is this the highest point of reason, to realize that the soil beneath 
our feet is shifting, to pompously name "interrogation" what is only a 
persistent state of stupor, to call "research" or "quest" what is only 
trudging in a circle, to call "Being" that which never fully is? 
But this disappointment issues from that spurious fantasy which 
claims for itself a positivity capable of making up for its own 
emptiness. It is the regret of not being everything, and a rather 
groundless regret at that" (EM 190). 
This "emptiness" recalls that terrifying "vacuum" by which Bowen characterized the 
artless post-war landscape. This "spurious fantasy, " which rejects obliqueness, 
indirectness, invisibility, is another manifestation of the nostalgic impulse, that desire 
for total possession which wages war on representation. 
ýýý 
The Little Girls, published in 1964, is a novel that explores the disappointments that 
stem from the nostalgic impulse, an impulse understood precisely as a refusal of 
representation. It recounts the story of three friends, Dinah, Clare and Sheila, otherwise 
known as Dicey, Mumbo and Sheikie. The first section of this tripartite novel sees 
Dinah manufacturing a reunion between the three, motivated by the desire to return to 
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their old school and dig up a coffer filled with secret objects that they buried as 
children. The story then flicks back to the past, the three friends' childhood, and 
recounts the story of the burial. In the final section, we see the adult women return and 
excavate the coffer, only to find it empty. Dinah is particularly shaken by the discovery 
and eventually suffers a breakdown. 
As this brief description suggests, the novel is explicitly (often clumsily) concerned 
with questions of remembering. In particular, through Dinah's ordeal, it explores the 
risks of failing to "live now. " Dinah is clearly in denial about the passing of time. She 
and Frank, her neighbour and companion, are described as "a pair of ageless 
delinquents" despite the fact that they are in or nearing their sixties. "Nobody of their 
ages, it might be said, had any business to look as these two still did" (LG, 7). This 
sense of temporal suspension is evident at the very opening of the novel, where we see 
Dinah preparing a museum full of donated objects that are intended to preserve 
people's individual characters into "the far future, " to "leave posterity some clues. " 
The drive to leave something for posterity is the twin impulse of the nostalgia that 
Bowen identified as rife in contemporary culture. Indeed, Dinah's project here is soon 
revealed not only as directed towards the future, but haunted by the past. When Mrs 
Coral, a neighbour, asks regarding the cave "who's going to seal it up? ", Dinah is 
stunned with the reminiscence of an earlier identical utterance from, we later discover, 
her burying of the coffer as a child. As the phrase is repeated, it becomes clear that 
Dinah's actions are also "only a repetition. " The past irrupts into the present in a sort 
of momentary enactment of nostalgia, whose literal `homesickness' emerges as an 
`unhomeliness' or uncanny as it is brought into consciousness. Dinah describes this 
uncanny moment as 
the most extraordinary sensation ![... ] Because, to remember something 
all in a flash, so completely that it's not `then' but `now', surely is a 
sensation, isn't it? I do know it's far, far more than a mere memory! 
One's right back into it again, right in the middle. It's happening round 
one. Not only that, but it's never not been happening (LG, 19). 
As we have seen in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenologizing of Freudian latency, 
uncanniness is transformed here into a sensation of the body, externalized into 
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something "happening round one. " The passage also contains echoes, once again, of 
Proustian involuntary memory which, as Kristeva writes, "envelops a present sensation 
[... ] in the boiling lava of memories and desires of years past. "43 
In a letter to Bowen, John Bayley comments on the way that Bowen manages to give 
form to the latent presence of what is past within the present. Her novels, he claims, 
reveal "the nature of time: I mean the fact that we all live our whole lives all the time, 
as regards our own consciousness, past, present, future. 744 He compares Bowen's 
novels to the idea in Philip Larkin's `Reference Back. ' 
Truly, though our element is time, 
We are not suited to the long perspectives 
Open at each instant of our lives. 
They link us to our losses: worse, 
They show us what we have as it once was, 
Blindingly undiminished, just as though 
By acting differently we could have kept it so. 45 
Dinah's belief in digging up the coffer is precisely that the past is not lost, but 
preserved there, "blindingly undiminished. " When the contents are found to be 
missing, it is proof-positive of the time that has elapsed, of the changes that have 
occurred, of the years that have interposed themselves between her and her childhood. 
As Bowen warned in her piece on nostalgia, the intrusion of change into the landscape 
of one's remembered childhood can have a devastating effect, and hence Dinah is 
precipitated into collapse. 
Eilmann reads this novel as being about "the psychic consequences of `incubing, ' as 
opposed to burying the dead: a process that results in an inability to come to terms with 
loss. Incubed, the lost object proceeds to incubate, hatching nightmares to oppress the 
43 Kristeva, p. 172. 
" Bayley, letter to Bowen. 
45 Philip Larkin, `Reference Back' (1955), in Collected Poems, ed. Anthony Thwaite (London: The 
Marvell Press and Faber and Faber, 1988), p. 106. Cited in Bayley, letter to Bowen. 
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living. "46 Likewise, Bennett and Royle note "Dinah has unknowingly built her life on 
the possibility of an ultimate return - in posterity - to the past or an ultimate return of 
the past [ ... 
], and this discovery of a void in the past results, eventually, in her 
collapse. "47 However, in addition to these readings of the novel as a serious critique of 
nostalgia, another, just as common response has been confusion or even rejection. 
Hermione Lee felt that it was "presented without depth or resonance", that it felt 
"dubious and disconcerting" with "a provisional, indeterminate air. "48 While Bennett 
and Royle directly suggest that the terms of Lee's critique are exactly the elements of 
reading and writing that the novel sets out to challenge, there are many others who 
sympathize with her difficulty. In the introduction to his recent study of Bowen, Neil 
Corcoran confesses to finding The Little Girls "a deeply flawed book, in which the 
restless flurry of plotting, both busy and banal, seems almost helplessly out of key with 
the haunting desolation of its theme; and I therefore find myself with nothing of 
interest to say about it. "49 Interestingly, Corcoran's comments here echo those of Frank 
Stella's on the early reception of minimalist art. Despite its physically massive 
presence, he suggests that critics find it "hard to talk about - there's `not enough there' 
to talk about. That seems to be the thing that bothers them most. 750 In her introduction 
to the recent Vintage edition of the novel, Penelope Lively, whilst generally expressing 
enthusiasm for the novel, nevertheless notes a similar disjunction. Following her 
account of the novel she remarks: "All this makes The Little Girls sound a sombre 
book. Far from it. In many ways this is Elizabeth Bowen's most high-spirited novel. "5' 
Actually, I am not at all sure that "high-spirited" is right. In fact, there is something 
chillingly lifeless about the novel, something too strained, forced about its relentless 
humour. As Corcoran and Lively suggest, there is a sense of impropriety, of some 
malapropos assembly; where The Death of the Heart saw the intimacy of the domestic 
sphere taking on the proportions of tragedy, here emotions are shrunk to the size of a 
bawdy image on a seaside postcard. 
46 Eilmann, p. 177. 
47 Bennett and Royle, p. 125. 
48 Hermione Lee, Elizabeth Bowen: An Estimation (revised edition) (London: Vintage, 1999), p. 196. 
a9 Neil Corcoran, Elizabeth Bowen: The Enforced Return (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 7-8. 
50 Frank Stella cited in James Meyer, Minimalism: Art and Polemics in the Sixties (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 81. 
51 Penelope Lively, Introduction to The Little Girls (London: Vintage 1999), pp. 1-5 (p. 4). 
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In `The Cult of Nostalgia', Bowen claims: 
245 
One of the dangerous powers of the writer is that he feeds, or plays up 
to, fantasies he knows to exist. He knows of their existence for the good 
reason that they are probably active in himself [ ... ] 
It's true, of course, 
that creation - in the literary sense - is, must be, to a great extent 
evocation - the calling up of images, feelings, trains of thought which 
are recognizable, being common to all men. Accepted human 
experience is not only the writer-artist's subject: it gives him his terms 
of reference, and - up to a point - provides - even dictates - his 
vocabulary. 52 
The temptation to pander to the nostalgic impulse for the familiar is something directly 
addressed in The Little Girls. In the last section of the novel, after having found the 
empty coffer, Dinah speaks with disdain of what she calls the "tremendous market for 
prefabricated feelings" (LG, 193). People seem to thrive on being "distraught", on "a 
tremendous to-do" in their emotional lives whilst in fact, she claims, "So much is so 
simple. " She continues: "so many of these fanciful ways people have of keeping 
themselves going, at such endless expense of time and money, seem not only 
unnecessary but dated. Isn't that so? " Clare objects that this is something that cannot 
simply be pointed out to people. "I'll speak as a shopkeeper. Bad for business. You'd 
put more than half the world out of business, including novelists" (LG, 194). 
Bowen's attempts to avoid the pitfalls of this "emotion racket" leave the novel at odds 
with itself. On the one hand, it is a satiric critique of the dangers of nostalgia and on 
the other it is battling against those dangers itself. It returns to various aspects of 
Bowen's own past: to the literal landscape of her youth at a school on the South coast; 
to her familiar fictional landscape of adolescence, of which the title The Little Girls is 
almost a parody; and, in its central section, to a world before the First World War, the 
world of Bowen's own childhood. It is as though Bowen is setting herself a stylistic 
test: trying to approach the material of nostalgia through a non-nostalgic idiom, 
52 Bowen, `The Cult of Nostalgia', pp. 1-2. 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Five 246 
interrogating the very possibility of a representation that is free from nostalgia. In 
attempting to perform this escape trick, to outmanoeuvre the prefabricated feeling that 
is the novelist's stock in trade, Bowen threatens to erase feeling altogether. There is a 
strange detachment of action and affect in the exactly the way that Corcoran suggests, 
the distinct feeling that something is missing. 
Discussing her writing process in a radio interview of 1950 Bowen claims: 
I revise like one prunes - snipping away dead wood [... ] What I mean 
by `dead wood' is anything too cerebral, too confused - anything which 
fails to convey sensation. I make particular war on analysis. My first 
draughts are always over-analytical. My ideal is, to replace analysis by 
a pure image - as in poetry. 
53 
It is tempting to suggest that Bowen's "pruning" of The Little Girls has gone too far. 
Lee notes, disparagingly, that "Bowen has decided, now, to give up the controlled, 
elaborate commentary and the sharp, inward presentation of character of her earlier 
novels. , 54 What we have in the place of this inward presentation is a proliferation of 
the surface; more than any other, this novel is suffocated by the weight of things. 
While Eilmann notes the way in which "lists of objects take the place of arpeggios of 
emotion, " she also sees the "very flatness" that Bowen achieves in the novel as 
evocative of "the immensity of the unsayable. Bowen [... ] cannot rid her characters of 
depth. "55 Whilst the recognition of this latent "immensity" may rely to a large extent 
on a reader familiar with Bowen's more successful work, it is true that the novel does 
not simply fail. It is, crucially, consciously feeling out new modes of representing. 
As other critics have pointed out, this is a transitional novel, and one that is uncertain 
about its identity, manifesting throughout its painful awareness of its own difficulties. 
We are repeatedly confronted with inadequate or failed communications: a badly 
recited poem, an unknown language, lost and misdirected letters, the cracked lettering 
53 `How I Write: a discussion between Elizabeth Bowen and Glyn Jones' (1950) [ Unpaginated 
transcript of a radio broadcast of May 10,1950. Unpublished], I-IRHRC, [p. 2]. 
54 Lee, p. 196. 
ss Ellmann, p. 197. 
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on the iced surface of a birthday cake. The text also challenges itself more explicitly, 
posing questions in parentheses which seem to come direct from the author. These 
questions interrupt in ways that undermine the plausibility of the novel's events: 
"(Why in there, why at this hour? )" (LG, 103); "(mother of pearl: how come by? )" 
(LG, 117); "(out of habit? )" (LG, 48). It is as if Bowen were dismantling her own 
writing, shaking our belief in the coherence of her story. 
This cracking of certainty, the interrogation of the efficacy of representation that 
occurs at a stylistic level, successfully or otherwise, continues through the narrative of 
The Little Girls. Whilst Bowen is attempting to reorient her approach to character, the 
characters themselves are engaged in a questioning of identity. The novel's opening 
sees Dinah setting up her museum of "expressive objects", a project that comes close 
to being a parody of Bowen's own preoccupation with things. These objects have been 
donated by Dinah's acquaintances in response to her anxiety about being forgotten by 
the 'far future", being remembered as nothing more than "a race [... ] one lump. I do 
think we deserve to be thought of as personalities. " She explains: "What really 
expresses people? The things, I'm sure, that they have obsessions about: keep on 
wearing or using, or fuss when they lose, or can't go to sleep without. You know, a 
person's only a person when they have some really raging peculiarity" (LG, 10). This 
recalls those self-protective "private obsessions" that we saw in Death of the Heart. 
Dinah's resistance to the idea of belonging to one mass or lump also echoes Bowen's 
description of her experience of the Blitz, where the individualizing impulse is again 
described as an "obsession. " "Outwardly, we accepted that at this time individual 
destiny had to count for nothing: inwardly, individual destiny became an obsession in 
every heart" (DL, 97). Like the resistance fantasies engendered by this obsession, 
Dinah's cave project is a double-pronged attack against annihilation: that threatened by 
the imposition of group identity and that imposed by bodily death, one's physical 
absence from the "far future" to which these objects are to be bequeathed. It is also an 
instance of her attempts at self authoring, reflected in her changing of her name from 
Diana to Dinah. 
In her discussion of the novel, Ellmann reminds us of Bowen's own contempt for what 
she calls "Personal Life'", something that emerges in Dinah's realization that the 
collection that she has amassed of other people's things appears less revelatory than 
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first imagined. 56 Despite her declaration about people's "raging peculiarity, " her belief 
in the idea that "all are completely different, " the donations to her museum are 
disappointingly uniform. "It is extraordinary, really, isn't it, Frank? " exclaims Dinah to 
her companion, "I suppose the fact is, people are the same, if one goes down deep. All 
the variety seems to be on the surface" (LG, 4). Dinah not only confuses question of 
surface and depth here (the objects are both the surface "peculiarities" of people's lives 
and what is "down deep") but she also mistakes the things for the people, as if they 
were directly transferable, as if the objects in themselves say all there needs to be said. 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that perception, in particular that of other people, is a more 
complicated matter. 
In fact, the perception of other people does not involve only the activity 
of external stimuli; it also depends heavily upon our pre-established 
relations with others prior to this particular perception. It has roots in 
our whole psychological past. Each perception of another person is 
never simply a momentary event. Such a perception is not therefore a 
pure reception of a certain content which is given as such. 57 
The shedding of this "pre-established relation", of a "psychological past" that Dinah's 
objects enact recalls Bowen's evocation of the Blitz, where "life-stories were shed as 
so much superfluous weight" (HD, 90). Like this refusal of individual identity, Dinah's 
method of trying to represent people is a de-humanized one, aimed precisely at "the 
pure reception of a certain content", at the notion of one `real thing'. Indeed, as this 
suggests, abstracted from their functional and relational context, placed in random 
groupings, the objects of Dinah's failed collection are like a minimalist exhibition, 
some of the first of which were in fact taking place in 1964, the same year that The 
Little Girls was published. One strand of minimalist discourse holds that the art object 
should be nothing other than itself, non-referential, non-conceptual: "the spectator is 
56 Ellmann, p. 192. 
57 Merleau-Ponty, `The Experience of Others', pp. 33-63 (p. 40). 
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not given symbols, but facts. "58 In compliance with this credo, the objects in Dinah's 
cave remain defiantly mute in the face of her wish that they be "expressive. " Pointing 
out one of the numerous pairs of nail scissors, she exclaims hopefully: " `Look, this 
pair has its tip broken: that means something ... ' Exhausted, Dinah's voice ran down 
to a pause" (LG, 11). The objects, far from being "expressive, " push Dinah herself 
towards silence. 
Like the archaeologists at the Roman Forum, Dinah fetishizes authenticity: she wants 
to unearth the past unscathed, she wants to leave "the real her" to posterity. Dinah's 
nostalgia reveals a belief that identity is a whole constructed from constituent parts; if 
we could once see what is hidden inside it, the past of our present, the unconscious of 
our consciousness, we would understand it. As if by piecing together the fragments of 
the ruined Forum, we could bring ancient Rome to life before our eyes, as if by 
assembling a disparate group of objects, we could capture the essence of character. For 
Merleau-Ponty, as we have seen, there are some things that cannot be made visible, 
physical. There is an invisibility that is "not only hidden like a physical reality which 
we have not been able to discover, invisible in fact but which we will one day be able 
to see facing us" but that is irretrievably hidden from us, only accessible through that 
which hides it. (VI, 150) In believing this invisible element to be quantifiable, capable 
of being objectified, Dinah is inadvertently grounding her identity on mine shafts. The 
things that she thinks constitute her turn out to be fakes, empty coffers. Through 
Dinah, Bowen enacts the revelation that the war had brought for her: "All my life I 
have said, `Whatever happens there will always be tables and chairs - and what a 
mistake. "59 
Attached in her mind to a time before either World War and to the childhood that 
accompanies it, Dinah has thus far avoided the revelatory shocks of both bombing and 
adolescence. Indeed, despite the disparity in their ages, Dinah's collapse when 
realization does come in the course of the novel echoes Portia's at the end of The 
Death of the Heart. Both naively believe in a world that is quantifiable, in a world of 
5' Eugene Goossen, cited in Anna C. Chave, `Minimalism and the Rhetoric of Power', in Art in Modern 
Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts, ed. Francis Frascina and Jonathan Hams (London: Phaidon, 
1992) pp. 264-281 (p. 266). 
59 Bowen, letter to Woolf (January 5 1941), pp. 216-218 (pp. 216-7). 
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"absolutes" (DH, 310) and "heroes" (DH 430), and both suffer a sense of betrayal 
when they are disillusioned. Portia suffers because she is "the awake one" in a world 
of sleepers, because her lambent youth unveils the mask of that sleep for what it is. 
The tragedy of the novel is one of "atrophy", the fact that as the novel ends, we see 
Portia compelled into the death-sleep of her companions . 
60 So much for the "bastioned 
about" world of 1937.61 By 1964, things have changed. "Once the futilities of Society 
were the target - now we must think again. " 62 Dinah is also a character plagued by a 
sort of sleep, a refusal to wake up from the dream of her childhood; a refusal, in fact, to 
enter that "Society" that was once the target. Where once Portia's adolescent 
innocence seemed preferable to the treacherous adult world, the treachery now is in 
refusing to enter that world; it constitutes a betrayal of the present, a failure to "live 
now. " Thus Dinah, like the novel must, "at whatever cost in harshness or 
inconvenience, " become truly contemporary. 63 In both cases, this involves a 
renunciation of both artlessness and nostalgia. In the final scene of The Little Girls, 
this metaphorical awakening is dramatized. Clare, creeping into the recovering Dinah's 
room bids the sleeping patient goodbye and in doing so, wakes her. When Dinah asks 
"Who's there?, " her friend replies "Mumbo. " In a creakily symbolic gesture, Dinah 
responds "Not Mumbo. Clare. " (LG, 277). This final recantation of the childhood 
nickname that Dinah has thus far stubbornly refused to drop signals her letting go of 
the past, her accession to the present. 
ýýý 
Eva Trout, Bowen's final novel published in 1969, presents us with another belatedly 
adolescent woman. Eva, a product of her broken memories had, we are told, "been left 
unfinished" and as such, despite her being past the natural age of adolescence, she 
joins the ranks of Bowen's numerous teenage heroines (ET, 58). The novel, once 
again, traces a sort of passage from innocence. It follows Eva's development, through 
a series of bizarre escapades, from a blundering, chaotic giantess - the embodiment in 
fact of that lurking "lunatic giant" inside us all that we saw in The Death of the Heart - 
to a being capable of thought, speech and love. We follow this transition through its 
60 Bowen, Transcript of a recorded discussion between Elizabeth Bowen and Jocelyn Brooke, p. 7. 
61 Bayley, letter to Bowen. 
62 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', [p. 8]. 
63 Bowen, `Subject and the Time', p. 2. 
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various stages, which involve Eva's gradual progression through various kinds of 
attachment towards romantic love. An orphan, Eva was sent to live with her old 
teacher, Iseult Arble and her husband, Eric. Financially crippled after the failure of 
their romanticized attempt at running a fruit farm, the couple is forced to persevere 
with their guardianship, despite the evident strain it has effected on their marriage. 
Driven out, she claims, by some unspecified aspect of this awkward tri-partite 
relationship, Eva runs away, acquiring a ramshackle house in Broadstairs. But when 
her problems show no sign of abating (it seems that, having visited her new home, 
Iseult's husband Eric might be about to make a move on her), Eva jets off to America 
to illicitly buy herself a baby son. With this son, she forms a symbiotic relationship; 
the two are "near as twins in a womb" (ET, 221). This connection is compounded by 
the fact that the child, Jeremy, is both deaf and dumb. During their isolated and 
"inaudible years" together (ET, 221), they exist "within a story to which they imparted 
the only sense, " communicating in a way that is almost telepathic (ET, 221-222). 
Eight years on, Eva returns to England with Jeremy. She at first sees no reason to 
attempt to usher her son out of his silent world, convinced he would prefer "to stay 
happy the way he is"(ET, 181). Others react to this decision with bemusement: "who 
would not wish to speak? "(ET, 181) "I have never wished to, " Eva replies, defiant, 
"What is the object? What is the good? " (ET, 181) This resistance is, however, 
gradually worn down. "The fact was, since the return to England her mistrust of or 
objection to verbal intercourse - which she had understood to be fundamental - began 
to be undermined. She was ready to talk" (ET, 221). This readiness is accompanied by 
a distancing from Jeremy; entering the linguistic realm, Eva feels as though she has 
abandoned him. This sense of distancing is compounded by a strange incident in which 
Jeremy mysteriously disappears for an afternoon with a strange woman who, we can 
guess but are never told for sure, is in fact Iseult. Frightened by this episode, Eva runs 
away once again, this time to France. Once there, she is talked into having her son 
cured of his aphasia by the Bonnards, a husband-and-wife team of doctors whose 
treatment regime appears to be vaguely psychoanalytic; "a method they had 
themselves evolved - its success depended on certain factors, in the main psychic" 
(ET, 253). While Jeremy is off being treated, Eva finds herself cured of her previous 
inability to love, with the realization of her growing affection for Henry Dancey, a 
friend of long standing. Eva returns to England and tries to convince Henry to marry 
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her. She fails, but does, however, manage to get him to agree to take part in a farcical 
charade, in which the two will pretend to be departing by train on a wedding journey. 
The plan is for Eva to make an unchallenged escape and for Henry to sneak off the 
train once their gathered well-wishers have departed. As the novel twists and contorts 
towards its conclusion, Henry confesses his love to Eva, agreeing to marry her for real. 
But just as things seem placed for a happy, if bizarre, ending, Jeremy appears, wielding 
a gun, and shoots Eva dead. 
Ellmann reads Bowen's killing off of Eva as the writer "murdering her own august 
naivety; the infantile core of her own writing; the pictorial imagination before it has 
been taught to speak. "64 It is true that Eva Trout is a novel about the trouble with 
articulation, but as much as an exploration of the non-verbal imagination, Eva 
represents a site of struggle between the forces of articulacy and inarticulacy, or to use 
Merleau-Ponty's term, "disarticulation" (VI, 197). It seems to be a struggle that is 
destined to wreak havoc on the notion of form. As is always the case with eponymous 
heroes, `Eva Trout' is an uncannily double term: both a person and a text. Thus, as the 
lethal shot rings out, the body that drops at our feet is not only that of the imaginary 
giantess, but the frame that holds her, the novel itself. Eva Trout represents Bowen's 
most challenging attempt to answer the call for a contemporary form This is 
recognized by Bennett and Royle, and Elfmann. The latter suggests that in an atomic 
age, "an age in which the world can be destroyed by accident [... ] the novel can no 
longer rely on plot and character, for both imply a logic of cause-and-effect in which 
events proceed according to intelligible laws to a predictable conclusion". 65 
Throughout the novel, the categories of representation and reality are muddled. These 
jugglings begin from the very start, when we are introduced to Eva having taken her 
friends the Danceys on what appears to be a tedious mystery car journey that has at 
this moment seen them arrive at a castle. "This is where we were to have spent the 
honeymoon, " Eva announces to her "dumbfounded" passengers. Contrasting with all 
the implied solidity of the idea of a castle, this one appears decidedly flimsy. 
64 Ellmann, p. 224. 
65 Ellmann, p. 212. 
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The castle, mirrored into the sheet of artificial water did not look 
ancient. Nor did it look indigenous: though its setting was English, the 
pile resembled some Bavarian fantasy. Light-coloured, standing straight 
up out of the lake (there was no terrace) the facade showed with 
photographic distinctness in the now fading January afternoon. Its 
windows, many of which were balconied, one and all were made 
sightless by white shutters. Above the turreted roofline rose steep 
woods, sepia with winter: no smoke from any contorted chimney 
blurred the transparency of the trees. The only movement was in the 
foreground, where swans rippled the image cast on the water by 
zizagging absently to and fro (ET, 11). 
The castle is at once presented to us as a thing and as a representation. It is a reflection, 
a fantasy, an image, photographic, almost a negative, filled as the passage is with 
Bowen's typical nos and nots. The description of the scene is altogether more like a 
description of a painting than a place, the notion of it having a foreground somehow 
framing it, flattening out its depth to the dimensions of a canvas. But if it is a painting, 
it is one in which something strange is happening to form. Whilst we are told that the 
castle appeared to have a photographic distinctness, there is also a sense of the of 
undoing of literalness towards the end of the passage, in which the chimneys are 
revealed as contorted, and the mirror image of the castle is carelessly distorted. Later, 
Iseult, the retired teacher and failed novelist, visits "the Dickens room in Bleak House, 
Broadstairs" (ET, 128). In the room, is a chair and table, apparently those used by 
Dickens as he wrote. A painting hangs on the wall, depicting an identical table and 
chair, which "gave authenticity [... ] apparently? " to the relics (ET, 129). To add to our 
sense of uncertainty in the face of this merely "apparent" authenticity, the painting is 
itself "a reproduction. " By the end of this descriptive passage, any hope we may have 
had of holding onto what the real thing actually is has been completely confounded, a 
sensation that characterizes the novel as a whole. 
It is not only the authenticity of things that is questioned. People also fail to make 
sense as people, fail to be believable; not only (and perhaps not mostly) to the reader 
who stands outside the novel, but to each other, within the world of the text, according 
to its own rules. "Nothing [... ] makes sense, " muses Eric Arble to his wife Iseult, "I 
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don't; you don't. You and I don't, too much, Izzy? " (ET, 27). Iseult is herself variously 
described as a "marionette" (ET, 25), "a carcase", having a voice that sounds 
"recorded" (ET, 25). Constantine, Eva's sinister guardian, "did not seem possible - did 
not seem likely, even. Nothing authenticated him as a `living' being. A figure cut from 
some picture but now pasted on a blank screen" (ET, 51). Eva's schoolmate Elsinore is 
not only named in a bizarre fictional echo of the castle in which their school is situated, 
but is also described as "fairylike" (ET, 60) and spends a length of time in an almost 
mythic sleep. 
The eponymous heroine, we are told early on, comes from a family with "a genius for 
unreality" (ET, 50). Indeed, it does seem that Eva lives in a bubble, oblivious to the 
world around her: "She walked through everything, straight ahead, as a ghost is said to 
walk through walls" (ET, 57-58). However, this disconnection from reality comes 
combined with a strange literalness. There is, of course, Eva's own physical bulk; 
described as "the giantess", she blunders through the text, her physical gestures larger 
than life (ET, 13). As we saw in The Optimist's Daughter, this physical blundering is 
twinned with some social or communicative indelicacy. In addition to her physical 
weightiness, Eva approaches language with in a heavy-handed manner. She seems 
unable to understand things in anything but the plainest of terms, baffled by metaphor 
or allusion. Asked whether her estate agent Mr Denge is "the big noise" around the 
area, Eva replies straight-facedly "He was noisy, but he's quite small though" (ET, 98). 
Such playings with the literal and the literary manage here to enact a more successful 
version of the self-conscious questioning that we saw in The Little Girls. 
The later novel's heroine also provides a more complex echo of the literalism glimpsed 
in The Little Girls' Dinah. As well as apparently only understanding the most direct 
speech, Eva is, it seems, incapable of understanding anything that she cannot see, 
cannot visualize, cannot touch. We are told of how, as a young girl in her uncle's 
experimental school that was based in the castle, Eva would wake from strange dreams 
to be comforted by the dawn's light making things visible again. "Seeing is believing: 
again, after the night of loss and estrangement, after the malicious lying of her 
misleading dreams in which she was no one, nowhere, she knew herself to be here" 
(ET, 60). Eva's sense of self-consciousness is predicated on the visibility of her 
surroundings. Yet while at moments this veers towards Dinah's crude literality, it is 
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more precisely based on Eva's ability to grasp things as a representation; it is not 
through the window, but through its reflection in a looking-glass that Eva experiences 
the dawn. Similarly, there are other, non-material notions that Eva makes 
comprehensible through a sort of concretization. Iseult Arble, Eva's teacher and 
guardian tries but fails to lead her pupil towards the processes of rational thinking: "try 
joining things together, " she coaxes, "this, then that, then the other. That's thinking; at 
least, that's beginning to think" (ET, 71-72). Eva's answer to this challenge is to 
extensively re-wire the house, Cathay, she buys upon her flight to Broadstairs. Filling 
it with the newest electronic equipment, she attempts to form around her, through the 
"miles of flex" and myriad artificial methods of communication, the connections she 
fails to form for herself (ET, 138). She has got herself a computer, she tells Iseult, 
because "It thinks [... ] That is what you used to tell me to do" (ET, 138). 
Eva's only way of making sense is to objectify, to transform things into palpable 
objects. Indeed, the very notion of objecthood is called into question by the novel's 
circumlocutions. We circle around things being things and things which, in Michael 
Fried's phrase, somehow "suspend [their] own objecthood", things which function as 
representations66: the difference between "a bleak house" and Bleak House, (131) 
between Eva Trout and Eva Trout. Eva herself, of course, is incapable of perceiving 
the gap, eliding things and representations, approaching words like solid, unambiguous 
building blocks. Merleau-Ponty suggests that "we all secretly venerate the ideal of a 
language which in the last analysis would deliver us from language by delivering us to 
the things" (PW, 4). Elfmann identifies just such a secret desire made manifest through 
Eva and also through Dinah in The Little Girls. She suggests that both displace words 
with things, both "testing the hypothesis, proposed in Swift's famous satire of the 
academicians of Lagado, that words should be replaced by the objects that they 
name. "67 Crucially for this chapter, this literal mode of understanding emerges in the 
way that the two characters approach paintings. 
In The Little Girls, this takes place in relation to paintings of the Old High Street in 
Southstone, the town where the children went to school. Such paintings appear in both 
66 Fried, pp. 148-172 (p. 161). 
67 Ellmann, p. 205. 
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the past and present sections of the novel. We discover that in the past, the girls liked 
to look in the window of a shop selling pictures of the very street in which it was 
situated: "it guaranteed a sensation like no other - that of looking at pictures of where 
one was" (LG, 110). This "sensation like no other" echoes Dinah's "extraordinary 
sensation" at the beginning of the novel, experienced at the point of collision between 
two separate moments of history. Sensation arises here, also, out of a collision; here it 
is between the real and the represented scene. "[O]utside the picture, there the Old 
High Street actually was. You could verify simply by turning round: there, it indeed 
remained -a magnified picture" (LG, 111). The street itself is both outside the picture 
and a magnified picture itself. The sense of confusion is added to by the various 
reflections of the street outside the window in the glass of the picture frames. The 
result is that the real scene and the represented scene interfere with one another. The 
reflection of the real street impinges on a clear view of the pictures, the pictures 
intrude upon the viewer's sense of the scene, rendering it uncanny: turning from the 
window to the familiar street, "one saw it for the first time" every time (LG, 111). 
Once again, this uncanniness is an operation occurring in the outside, through a 
collision of two phenomenal appearances of the same thing in one place. 
The same scene, like so many aspects of this historical section, resurfaces in the final 
section of the novel, after the now grown-up women have unearthed the empty coffer. 
Sheila, in whose house the three have gathered, has a painting of the Old High Street 
hanging on her living room wall. The hostess explains that the painting is now "of 
historical interest", as the real Old High Street has been modernized beyond 
recognition (LG, 187). Dinah, in a state of nervous excitement following the 
devastating discovery of the empty coffer, exclaims "So this will be the Old High 
Street for evermore - this lie! " (LG, 192). Whilst agreeing that the picture is "correct in 
every detail", Dinah still maintains that there is something untruthful about it. "It's just 
that something has given the man the slip, so in place of what's given him the slip he's 
put something else in" (LG, 192). Sheila objects that as far as she can see, it is a 
picture "and I should have thought that was the idea? Pictures are what people go for - 
who wants a street? Streets are six a penny" (LG, 192) Dinah's objection does indeed 
seem to be that the picture fails to be the street. She moves towards such a recognition 
herself once she has calmed slightly, and is about to leave. "I owe an apology to this 
picture. It is not such a lie, really, as lies go. I was too ready to think it must be a lie 
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because of its even attempting to be a picture. And also because it's here when the 
street is not - when the street is gone, you tell me? It might be better to have no 
pictures of places which are gone. Let them go completely" (LG, 195). The picture, for 
Dinah, embodies that painful "personal injury" that Bowen has described as the result 
of the collision between memory and reality. Not only does it expose the ravages of 
time upon the street as it is present, but in failing to adhere to Dinah's own nostalgic 
fantasy of the street, it enacts a more personal betrayal. 
Eva, as one might expect, makes a similar mistaken move in her consideration of 
pictures. In a typical collision of the philosophical and the farcical, Eva, troubled 
suddenly by the question "what is a person? ", takes herself off to the National Portrait 
Gallery in the hope that "by examining many" persons, she may find the answer (ET, 
227). After walking around the different historically themed galleries, finishing with 
the Victorians, Eva remains unsatisfied. 
But, upstairs or down, they were all `pictures'. Images. `Nothing but a 
pack of cards'? - not quite, but nearly enough that to defeat Eva. She 
could no more - she retraced her way to the foyer and sat down on an 
unfriendly bench. No, no getting through to them. They were on show 
only. Lordily suffering themselves to be portrayed, they'd presented a 
cool core of resistance even to the most penetrating artist. The most 
martial extroverts, even, nursed their mysteries. Each was his own 
affair, and he let you know it. Nothing was to be learned from them (if 
you expected learning that nothing was to be learned). In so far as they 
had an effect on the would-be student, it was a malign one: every soul 
Eva knew became no longer anything but a Portrait. There was no `real 
life' ; no life was more real than this. This she had long suspected. She 
now was certain (ET, 229-230). 
Going to the gallery to find the essence of personhood, Eva is disappointed to discover 
answers riddled with gaps. She sees the persistence of that "cool core of resistance" as 
a failure; because the portraits cannot show her this unconscious aspect, Eva, who only 
believes in what can be made visible, concludes that it does not exist. She encounters 
precisely the "disappointment" in the face of these pictures that Merleau-Ponty has 
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ascribed to the positivist spectator. This is also the disappointment of the modem 
archaeologists in the face of the muddled ruins of the Forum Merleau-Ponty, echoing 
Bowen's use of this image, has written of the philosopher who fails to completely 
"inhabit" the world, "in the visible there is never anything but ruins of the spirit, the 
world will always resemble the Forum" (VI, 180). 
The question of the accessibility of those invisible "mysteries" of identity emerges 
elsewhere in the novel in a way that is, once again, linked to painting: through the 
psychoanalysts whom Eva engages to treat Jeremy's muteness. Their name, 
"Bonnard", in another self-consciously parodic twist, recalls that of the painter Pierre 
Bonnard. Working from the 1890s to the 1940s, he was influenced by, among others, 
Gaugin, Denis and Matisse and his work displays elements of Symbolism, Fauvism 
and, particularly later on, what Robert Hughes calls "a refined and intensified form of 
Impressionism". 68 It is these later paintings and the tensions which they elicit that bear 
comparison with Bowen. These works emphasize surface, vision, light, air, even as 
they undo those things. Their style magnifies the elements of vision like a close-up of a 
pixelated image, demanding that we see the particles that constitute it in a way that 
means their cohesion is simultaneously unsettled. What at first appears chancy, 
melting, contingent in the image is also deeply contrived, structured, sometimes almost 
scientific in its formalization. T. J. Clark identifies the Impressionist and Post- 
Impressionist work of Bonnard and his contemporaries as the site of an anxiety about 
the relation "between schema and sensibility, or reason and contingency, or signs with 
and without the stuff of nature. " This is an anxiety that he describes as "modernism's 
deepest unease". 69 This unease reflects precisely that uncomfortable tension that I 
have identified in Bowen's work between formal control and involuntary frenzy: "On 
the one hand, a greater romantic irregularity, more carelessness; on the other, a greater 
impersonality - are these impossible to combine? "70 
Describing Bonnard's painting style, Hughes writes: 
68 Robert Hughes, The Shock of the New: Art and the Century of Change (London: Thames & Hudson, 
1991), p. 141. 
69 Clark, pp. 93-4. 
70 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', [p. 7]. 
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Bonnard constantly surprised the familiar things in his field of view, 
cropping them in odd ways, taking them from unexpected angles, and 
vapourizing them in sudden effulgences of rose, madder, lilac, chrome, 
yellow, viridian, and bright, sun-dappled green. The brushwork is loose, 
knitted and impressionistic, so that the substance of these paintings 
seems half-formed and ready to vanish back into the light of which it is 
made. 71 
Bowen's textual paintwork in her descriptions of the Doctor Bonnards' Parisian 
environment directly echoes the terms of this description. 
At this hour, [Paris] exhausted the resource of Technicolor, and 
exceeded them. Creamy buildings transmuted to honey yellow as the 
sun came languidly down the sky, dazzling half the city out of 
existence. Viridian shadow clothed such trees as were not in the sun's 
path. Rainbows of traffic frayed into splintering whirlpools. Flowers 
spumy like sherbets though more brilliantly chemical in colour 
effervesced from their artificial settings (ET, 240). 
The doctors themselves live in a fairy-tale, wisteria-covered house somewhere near 
Fontainebleu, which is reached by walking through a forest. `Everywhere indoors was 
drowned in the green of trees disseminated into a glossy gloom sometimes further 
varnished by sunshine; underfoot polish became bottomless pools" (ET, 255). On 
Eva's last night in Paris before returning to London, she walks with the male Dr 
Bonnard in the park surrounding his house. "All was sensuously dissolving, yet was as 
gentle as a sigh, breathless - day, a dying yellow suffusion, was at its last" (ET, 264). 
All of these descriptions are made up of light and colour, with no sense of solidity, 
very much like a Bonnard painting. 
The atmosphere of dissolution of Bonnard's paintings, the "looseness" of the 
brushwork, is combined with an organized surface pattern. Like other artists of his 
time, Bonnard subscribed to the idea that "painting should be mainly decorative. " 
1 Hughes, p. 143. 
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Maurice Denis exhorted: "Remember that a painting - before being a battle horse, a 
nude, or some anecdote or other - is essentially a flat surface covered in colours 
arranged in a certain order. "72 But, as T. J. Clark suggests, this concern with decoration, 
formal style, ornamentation simultaneously expresses something more oblique: the 
concern for the material surface of the painting, for the visible elements, is also a 
concern for what is being signified, for the invisible. Clark suggests Bonnard "[makes] 
of the decorative - meaning the flimsy, the gaudy, the repetitive, the cheaply consoling 
- something uniquely passionate and regretful. "73 Undermining the literalist approach 
that Fried saw in minimalism and that Bowen describes through Dinah and Eva, there 
is in these paintings the surface and then something else that takes one by surprise. 
This `something' emerges explicitly in Bonnard's `The Breakfast Room' [Fig. 15]. 
This painting could almost be a commissioned illustration of the view from the Dr 
Bonnards' window. `The Breakfast Room' gives visual form to Bowen's description of 
the realm of the fictional house in a forest, with its "white doves and weathered 
jalousies" (ET, 253). Outside these painted windows, we can glimpse the same "twin 
flights, widening apart like reversed antlers, of the exterior staircase" that Eva and 
Jeremy traverse (ET, 255). At first, one sees a bright scene of bourgeois domesticity, 
an image that is decorative, pretty, in a certain way nostalgic. But then one notices the 
cut-off figure cowering on the left. This revelation is shocking and it transforms the 
way one sees the picture. The eye moves from the well-lit order of the table to the dark 
tangle of trees outside. It scans the edges of the painting, trying to look beyond them, 
to check for further bogeymen. The unfinished features of this figure draw attention to 
the patchiness of focus and texture in the whole painting: to the sharp contrast between 
the orange jug and the teapot beside it; between the insistent outlines of the trees 
branches and its smudgy leaves; between the photographic sharpness of the left side of 
the doorway's centre panel and the shadowy dissolution of its right. Through these 
inconsistencies, the painting throbs, or tilts. It seems on the verge of falling apart, or on 
the brink of forming, capturing that sense of imminence we have seen in Bowen, 
Welty and Merleau-Ponty's visual descriptions. Despite its explicit subject matter and 
72 Maurice Denis, cited in Clark, p. 129. 
73 Clark, p. 131. 
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Fig. 15 Pierre Bonnard, `The Breakfast Room', c. 1930-31 
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its insistence on the materiality of its paint, this painting is anything but still life, 
nature morte. 
Hughes describes Bonnard as a "voyeur" who gives us the sense that he catches his 
objects by surprise, granting us access to his covert surveillance of his wife, who was 
his constant model. More than this though, Bonnard's paintings, with their sense of 
living presence, make the viewer feel watched. The figure in `The Breakfast Room' 
sees us before we see it; we are put in the position of Stella in The Heat of the Day, 
caught unawares by a watcher in the shadows as she returns home. I am both spying on 
another, as Hughes suggests, and spied on myself by a gaze which always precedes 
me. These paintings, through their incongruous elements, through their evocation of a 
sense of being stared at, concretize the uncanny force of the other. Not all Bonnard's 
paintings have such an explicit watcher, but there is always a similar sense of being at 
some perceptual disadvantage. The pictures are prematurely cropped, giving the 
impression of something lurking just out of sight and, as we saw in `The Breakfast 
Room', the inconsistency of focus creates the impression that we are being enjoined 
not to look at certain things. There is also often an uncomfortable disjunction between 
the prettiness of the palette, the buoyant energy of the brushwork and what is being 
depicted. In `Nude with Red Slippers' [Fig. 16], for example, the blood-coloured 
shoes, playfully poised as if dancing, seem a ghoulish, almost brutal counterpoint to 
the woman who is apparently doubled over in pain. It is as if Bonnard's paintings hide 
behind their decorativeness, letting a more sinister element slip out here and there like 
feet protruding from behind a curtain. As we have seen repeatedly in Bowen's writing, 
Bonnard's paintings combine a self-consciousness of style, a highlighting of the 
mechanism of their representation, and an unconscious element, that force behind the 
door, making the surface of the painting shudder. 
Bowen's Doctor Bonnards are also associated with an unsettling of selfhood through 
the introduction of outside view, eroding Eva's "monolithic" grasp on things, 
conspiring in a dissolution of the symbiotic relationship that Eva and Jeremy have 
heretofore shared. The erosion of this mute oneness, which echoes the non-referential 
unity of the minimalist "specific object, " began just before the pair's flight to Paris, 
prompted by Eva's growing realization of her love for Henry Dancey and by Iseult's 
covert meeting with Jeremy. Through these contacts with the outside world, built upon 
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Fig. 16 Bonnard, `Nude with Red Slippers', c. 1932 
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by the Bonnards' treatment, both Eva and Jeremy experience "expanding desires" 
which drains the magnetic energy from their relationship with one another (ET, 264). 
Rather than their previous telepathy, Eva now "had to touch him" to get his attention, 
and Jeremy begins to "formulate, or attempt to formulate, [ ... ] words" (ET, 254). Eva 
realizes: "his and her universe was over. It had not been shattered; simply, it had 
ended" (ET, 255). The Bonnards, it seems, have undone the threads of some 
unconscious net, ushered Eva and Jeremy into the differentiated world of conscious 
communication, the arduous reciprocity of "relationships in real life" (CIN, 213). In so 
doing, they have enacted some irreparable destruction, one akin to that experienced by 
all of Bowen's heroines, from Portia to Stella to Dinah. Rather than just being one, 
sealed off from the world, "bastioned about", Eva and Jeremy must now relate as self 
and other. One must pay heed to the way that others see one, Dr Bonnard tells Eva, 
"[b]ecause one is so much made by it. Whether one resists it or not, it has so much 
power" (ET, 263). 
In the final scene before Eva's departure in which the doctor offers this advice, his 
tone of profundity is twinned with farcically symbolic touches. Throughout the novel, 
as we have also seen in Bonnard's paintings, in addition to the growing realization of 
the problematic perceiving other, there is also an uncanny disjunction between the 
mode of presentation and what is presented. The preoccupation with the notion of 
conflict that we saw in an earlier chapter manifests itself here at a formal level. In that 
scene with Eva, Doctor Bonnard interrupts the enlightening conversation to exclaim on 
the beauty of the scene: "Look at the chateau! [ ... 
] I was born here, everything should 
be familiar; yet I have never seen what we are looking at exactly as it is in this 
moment, in this light! " (ET, 263) At the end of the scene, the psychoanalyst, the 
mapper of the unlit regions of the mind, walks home through a shadowy forest, "this 
track being so known to him that he could walk quickly through the gathering dark" 
(ET, 265). As we have seen in Welty's use of symbolism, this writing both tempts and 
rejects "ponderous allegorical" interpretations. " It is as though Bowen is defying her 
reader to read into these details, to analyse her text in the same way that Doctor 
Bonnard analyses Jeremy and Eva. It is as if, in fact, her text were racing its reader to a 
74 Todd Freemen, `An Interview with Eudora Welty', pp. 191-221 (p. 210). 
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reading of itself; as if, in a bizarre extension of Merleau-Ponty's theory of reversibility, 
it were trying to read its reader. 
We are left feeling like Eva before the pictures in the Portrait Gallery, unable to 
penetrate the resistant core of meaning, left questioning the very possibility of that 
meaning. Where in Bowen's earlier novels, we saw characters building up a protective 
layer of "dis simulations" about themselves, here it is the novel itself that deflects in 
this way. Ellmann makes a similar observation, noting the patterns of circulation that 
run through the narrative in various plays on the word "fish" (the most obvious, of 
course, being Eva Trout herself), and in the periodic appearances of the revolver that is 
later to kill Eva, which gets passed between characters. These patterns, Ellmann 
suggests, resist rationalized readings; the uncanny force of linguistic repetition and the 
clumsy "melodramatic contrivance" of the revolver's fatalistic path empty out meaning 
and stifle our attempts at interpretation. "In this context, Eva's ignorance of 
`concatenation" may be wiser than the reader's urge to join things up. "75 Indeed, 
"concatentation" is associated with deadly consequences: "what is `concatenation'? " 
Eva asks at the moment before her untimely death precludes the possibility of there 
ever being an answer (ET, 317). 
"The reader's urge to join things up" suffers the disappointments of positivism 
described by Merleau-Ponty and the exasperation felt by the Bowen's modern 
archaeologists at the Forum These thwarted efforts around the boundary line of idea 
and expression are also akin to the frustrations of the writer or artist. Eva and Dinah, 
two of Bowen's least articulate characters, are faced with the task of negotiating 
between the realms of articulation and disarticulation; they are acting out the anxieties 
of the writer. Jeremy is, in a way, a concretization of Eva's approach to this problem; a 
more complex version of those computers and radio equipment that she set up earlier 
in the novel. Bowen described her writing as playing a similar role, objectifying her 
attempt to function socially. "My writing, I am prepared to think, may be a substitute 
for something I have been born without -a so-called normal relation to society. 
My 
books are my relation to society" (CIN, 23). In this sense, Jeremy works as Eva's 
's Elfmann, p. 220. 
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artwork, the thing that she must drag with her out of muteness into expression, the 
means by which she can rehabilitate herself into the world. 
But as well as being the sign of her achievement or failure to "live now", to function 
socially, Jeremy is also the sign of her removal from life: of her death. The motives, if 
there are any, behind Jeremy's shooting of Eva remain, as with much else in the novel, 
ambiguous. It does, however, seem to be a consequence of precisely that bringing to 
expression. We have seen Jeremy's imminent articulacy developing through his 
treatment by the Bonnards, and in the moment before Eva's death she achieves an 
expression of her own. Having never in her life done so, Eva is suddenly prompted to 
cry by the effect of Henry's admission of his love for her. 
Something took place: a bewildering, brilliant, blurring filling up, 
swimming and brimming over; then, not a torrent from the eyes but one, 
two, three, four tears, each hesitating, surprised to be where it was, then 
wandering down. The speediest splashed on to the diamond brooch. 
`Look what is happening to me! ' exulted Eva (ET, 315-316). 
Elfmann suggests: "Corny though they are, Eva's tears elicit real emotion in the 
reader. "76 We see in these stylized, diamond-like tears a collision of form and feeling, 
an uncanny making visible of what has heretofore remained hidden. In contrast to her 
previous attempts at expression, these tears are not a materialized replacement for 
something that is missing, but an emergence of the invisible through the visible. This is 
the difference between trying to reach the real thing unmediated, and accepting that 
"there is no vision without the screen" (VI, 150). It is also the difference between 
mocking up a complete Forum to cohere to one's idea of what it should be and seeing 
the disjected ruins of the Forum as already more expressive in themselves. As Bowen 
walks through those ruins, she claims there is "a wordless echo of what the guide tells: 
the Forum voices itself to me in the afternoon [... ] There is eloquence in this extended 
dazzle of unearthed stone" (TR, 35). Eva's tears, I want to suggest now, represent how 
Bowen's ideas on stylistic formality reverse a particular way of thinking about the 
representation of emotion, of the human, of eloquence. 
76 Ellmann, p. 222. 
Katy Menczer. From Flesh to Fiction. Chapter Five 267 
In The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty suggests a manner of reading that pays heed 
to the same "wordless echo" of language that Bowen describes. 
Just as our body guides us among things only on the condition that we 
stop analyzing it in order to use it, so literary language can say new 
things only with the condition that we make common cause with it, that 
we stop examining its origins in order to follow where it is going, that 
we allow the words and means of expression in a book to be enveloped 
in that haze of signification that they derive from their particular 
arrangement, and finally, that we let the whole work veer toward a 
second-order tacit value where it almost rejoins the mute radiance of 
painting. 
No less than with painting, the essential meaning of the work of 
art is perceptible at first only as a coherent deformation imposed on the 
visible. It can never be otherwise. (PW, 90-91) 
This sense of a "coherent deformation" perfectly describes what Bowen is trying to do 
in her later writing. In apparently going farthest from the thing itself through the most 
stylized, the most "deformed" mode of representation, this writing strives towards the 
most effective form of expression. 
This emerges in Bowen's discussion of the painters Norah McGuinness and Mainie 
Jellett. Irish painters, born two years either side of Bowen, McGuinness and Jellett, 
both studied in the 1920s in the Paris studio of the cubist painter, Andre Lhote. Of the 
two, Jellett embraced cubism much more eagerly, working with the Cubist theorist 
Albert Gleizes in an attempt to develop an increasingly abstract form of Cubism. The 
formal severity of this style led to her paintings being denounced as "freak pictures", 
"artistic malaria" when they were exhibited in Dublin in 1923.77 In subsequent years, 
Jellett's style became less rule-bound, combining a geometrical approach with more 
77 Bruce Arnold, `Mainie Jellett and the Modern Movement in Irish Art', in Mainie Jellett 1897-1944, 
catalogue of an exhibition at the Irish Museum of Modem Art, Dublin, 7 December 1991-22 March 
1992 (Dublin: Irish Museum of Modem Art, 1992), pp. 15-23 (p. 19). 
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organic shapes and recognizable figures and her late style of the 1940s returns to the 
landscape of Western Ireland. `Achill Horses' [Fig. 17] ("whose growth", Bowen 
wrote, "I have seen in her studio, from sketch to sketch"78) comes from this later 
period. The precision of the circular shapes reflects Jellet's earlier passion for the rules 
of a more geometrical method, but the figure of the rearing horse remains almost 
naturalistic in its representation before being repeated through increasingly stylized 
versions of itself. 
McGuinness was not so enamoured with such extreme forms of abstraction. She did, 
however, cite Braque as the painter she most admired, and her own work, though 
remaining essentially representational, demonstrates the flattened perspectives of 
Cubism. Her later work, focussing largely on Irish landscapes, becomes increasingly 
stylized, constructed through a focus on pattern. These paintings have the quality of 
being at once abstract and representational, pieced together from distinct blocks of 
colour. They form both a pattern and a recognizable image in a way that straddles the 
turning point of Denis' statement "that a painting - before being a battle horse, a nude, 
or some anecdote or other - is essentially a flat surface covered in colours arranged in 
a certain order. , 79 `Shells and Stones' [Fig. 18] is typical of this combination. The 
image is dominated by the s-shaped curve across its width, an organic shape that 
reappears in many of McGuinness' paintings. The pattern is made up of repeated 
circles of paint, apparently hastily applied but, echoing Bonnard's combination of 
chanciness and structure, holding together by a unified sense of rhythm In `The Black 
Gate' [Fig 19], the fields which supposedly stretch away from us into the distance 
appear like fields viewed from above, plotted out in adjacent squares. The gate itself 
bends away from us in a way that almost parodies the notion of perspective. The 
painting's highly stylized elements are counterbalanced by the familiar s-curve of the 
mountains in the background and the apparent spontaneity of the brushstrokes that 
make up the grasses on either side of the gate. 
78 Bowen, `Mainie Jellett', in A Tribute to Evie Hone and Mainie Jellett, ed. Stella Frost (Dublin: 
Browne and Nolan, 1957), pp. 5-9 (p. 9). 
79 Maurice Denis, cited Clark, p. 129. 
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Fig. 17 Mainie Jellett, `Achill Horses', 1939 
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Fig. 18 Norah McGuinness, `Shells and Stones', (n. d. ) [exhibited 1968] 
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Fig. 19 McGuinness, `Black Gate', (n. d. ) 
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In an introduction to a McGuinness exhibition catalogue from 1957, Bowen brings 
together notions of form and of feeling to describe her own response to the paintings. 
The work is "both more concrete and more visionary"; "there is lyricism, deepened by 
something harsher"; "a brilliant elation, not purely nervous" is combined with "a 
tingling note struck from objects"80; "the expansive existence of space, air, light" is 
entwined with "the forcefulness of contracted pattern, derelict buildings, knotted 
expired energy. , 81 Bypassing a certain nostalgic idea of Ireland, the "formula", the 
"myth", the "convention" through which it is usually represented, "[i]t is as though her 
way of seeing had pierced through to the bone structure of her country: in themselves 
her Irish subjects are bare and factual, myth-defying. "82 McGuinness reveals, Bowen 
claims, "the architecture instinct in livingness. "ß3 By this, Bowen seems to mean not 
only natural forms - "the sheaf of wheat [... ] the veining of a leap' but also the 
artificial - "an angular fall of drapery. , 
84 
The same year that Bowen wrote the McGuinness preface, she also wrote a piece in 
tribute to Jellett, whom she had known as a child and who had died in 1944. The 
tribute is largely a personal one, but Bowen does discuss Jellett's work and the 
resistance with which it was initially met in Dublin. 
A mystique without the familiar softness, expressing itself in the ice of 
abstract terms, and the apparent subjugation of the soul to the intellect, 
took some accepting. A whole force of opinion clings strongly to the 
idea (or superstition) of art's spontaneity, and believes that in theory 
and discipline, past an accepted point, the artist can do himself nothing 
but injury. Such opinion she was very slowly and very quietly to 
confound. [... ] It became apparent that her spirit had only gained in 
fullness through its recognition of the intellect. Her poetic spontaneity, 
80 Bowen, Preface to Norah McGuinness, catalogue of an exhibition held at The Leicester Galleries, 
London, November 1957, pp. 2-4 (p. 3). 
81 Bowen, Preface to Norah McGuinness, pp. 2-4 (p. 4). 
82 Bowen, Preface to Norah McGuinness, pp. 2-4 (p. 3). 
83 Bowen, Preface to Norah McGuinness, pp. 2-4 (pp. 3-4). 
84 Bowen, Preface to Norah McGuinness, pp. 2-4 (p. 4). 
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her human apprehension of life round her, had been strong enough to 
"take" the cold discipline. 85 
Intellect, clarity, "the ice of abstract terms": these bring us back to Clark's "fantasy of 
cold artifice. " Here, though, Bowen does not see them "shuttling" away from soul, 
mystique, spontaneity, "immediacy"; conscious form is not a limitation of unconscious 
livingness, but the means of its expression. 
Bowen's response, which is not at all an obvious one, to these highly formalized 
representations as an expression rather than a diminishment of "livingness" is, I think, 
telling. It goes some way to explaining why Eva's emotional epiphany, when it comes, 
occurs through the carefully-drawn four diamond tears rather than through the lavish 
sentences of Bowen's earlier omniscient narrators. In Eva's controlled, beautified 
tears, we see a momentary embodiment of Bowen's call for "[o]n the one hand, a 
greater romantic irregularity, more carelessness; on the other, a greater impersonality 
[... ] The more formal facade, the more gothic interior. , 86 
In an unpublished essay entitled `The Poetic Element in Fiction' Bowen argues for a 
new approach to novel writing that moves away from realist documentation towards 
something more "poetic. "87 The novel is prone to being overcome by the weightiness 
of description, of plotting, by the formal necessities of verisimilitude. The short story, 
which has "the advantage, and one might say again, the virtue of being non- 
explanatory", provides a potential model for success-88 "The novelist can no longer 
rely on the full picture, the crowded canvas and the circumstantial account. "89 Bowen 
seems to call for a stripping away, not only of the clutter of the realist novel's 
predilection for objects, but also of language; as we have seen, she believed that prose 
writing must aim for "pure image - as in poetry. "90 This formal purification must be 
combined with the novel's unique ability to convey the complexities of human 
85 Bowen, `Mainie Jellett', pp. 5-9 (p. 9). 
86 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', [p. 7]. 
87 Bowen, `The Poetic Element in Fiction' (n. d. [1950]) [unpublished], HRHRC. 
88 Bowen, `The Poetic Element in Fiction', p. 7. 
89 Bowen, `The Poetic Element in Fiction', p. 9. 
90 Bowen, `How I Write', [p. 2]. 
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relations, its concern with "an unnumbered cast of persons, placed in a pattern relating 
to one another and acting upon one another. "91 What is needed is a meeting of prose's 
materiality with poetry's access to the "irrational and unregimentable elements in 
mankind and humanity which no hard set form of the classical, of the disciplined story 
can hope to contain. "92 Bowen foresees a yielding of the "frontier line between prose 
with its precision, and poetry with its infusion of what cannot be precise. " "Prose" here 
seems to stand for a kind of literalism, for language in its most functional form that, as 
Ellmann suggests in her evocation of Swift, brings us the weight of objects, of things 
themselves. "Poetry" represents almost a withdrawal from language, an imagistic 
mode of understanding, artfulness, the power of representing. But if through some 
formal purity, poetry provides access to a realm of lasting truths, then prose, the novel, 
is the insistent hand of history on its shoulder, the reminder of human contingency. 
If Eva's tears represent some kind of intertwining of the aesthetic and the human, this 
moment of realization yet again coincides with a moment of destruction: Eva is killed 
by Jeremy, the embodiment of her expressive effort. In this act, we see the resurfacing 
of the conflict that is at the heart of Bowen's ideas about writing. To write is always in 
some sense to be disloyal, to violate, to break some conspiratorial silence. As Eva 
Trout ends with the colossal, mute bulk of Eva's body, rushed upon by her murderous, 
surviving heir, Bowen offers up the image of the silence she has always been 
betraying. Stella, in The Heat of the Day, observed of the double-bind of inheritance: 
"there is only one way one can live - and that often must mean disappointing the 
dead" (HD, 84). Both Jeremy and Eva Trout betray, in one sense, their dead creators 
through their own survival; they are the continuing expression of lives reduced to 
silence. But it is a vital betrayal, in that it is the refusal of the nostalgic impulse, which 
must be overcome in the effort to live now, to be truly contemporary. Merleau-Ponty 
writes: 
If we dream of fording again the natural world or time through 
coincidence, of being identical to the O-point which we see yonder, or 
to the pure memory which from the depths of ourselves governs our 
91 Bowen, The Poetic Element in Fiction', pp. 11-12 
92 Bowen, `The Poetic Element in Fiction', p. 4 
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acts of recall, then language is a power for error [ ... ] One has to 
believe, then, that language is not simply the contrary of the truth, of 
coincidence, that there is or could be a language of coincidence, a 
manner of making the things themselves speak (VI, 125). 
Looking to the model of painting as a site of this oblique form of expressiveness, 
Bowen's final work forges towards a writing that is not the contrary of the "irrational 
and unregimentable elements in mankind and humanity", of what remains defiantly 
silent, but a writing that is fused with it. 
We, today, query whether actual writing can any longer carry the full 
charge: we have the art, the policy of exclusion. In their aim for size, 
our novels are partly silence: we seek what tells. By our own means, we 
seek to keep for the novel the veracity, the authority of the work of 
X 93 
Bowen writes elsewhere that the task of the novelist is "[t]he non-poetic statement of a 
poetic truth. Have not all poetic truths already been stated? The essence of poetic truth 
is that no statement of it can be final. , 94 Through Bowen's works, through the 
uncanny, disloyal outliving of her undertaken by her own writing, the fmality of her 
own statement goes on being deferred. "But the guilt of outliving those you love is 
justly to be borne, " Welty has told us. "Outliving is something we do to them. The 
fantasies of dying could be no stranger than the fantasies of living. Surviving is 
perhaps the strangest fantasy of them all" (OD, 162-163). 
93 Bowen, `Exclusion', pp. 216-220 (p. 220). 
94 Bowen, `Notes on writing a novel' (1945), MT, pp. 35-48 (p. 36). 
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CONCLUSION 
What's unfinished haunts one. 
-Elizabeth Bowen, The Heat of the Day 
Our world, as Malebranche said, is an `unfinished task' 
-Maurice Merleau-Ponty, `A Prospectus of His Work' 
[I]t was tantalizing never to be exposed long enough to hear the end. 
-Eudora Welty, One Writer's Beginnings 
276 
The unfinished in various forms, as Bowen suggests above, "haunts" the writing of all 
three writers in this study. We have seen it in Merleau-Ponty's characterisation of a 
presence ever-deferred, in his evocation of a fleshly "style of being"(VI, 139), replete 
with "fissures and lacunae" (PRO, 6). It emerges in Welty's vision of a reality that "is 
no single, pure ray", that "is transient, ephemeral, contradictory, even on the point of 
vanishing before our eyes. "1 And in Bowen's "something enormous and inchoate" 
pushing against the door, which is later embodied in her final heroine, "Eva, who had 
been left unfinished", the force of the unfinished emerges explicitly as something 
connected to issues of creativity and representation (ET, 58). Common to these three 
writers is a sense of a presence that is haunted by absence, a materiality that is haunted 
by consciousness, a being that is undone from its own insides. The inchoate sits at the 
heart of these texts, both hiding behind and emerging through their perceivable, 
comprehensible surfaces. It is the invisible of the visible, it is the power of the unsaid, 
it is the ghost of one's childhood self uncannily living on into the present; it is, in 
short, the "something strange" that I identified in my introduction. This unfinishedness 
gains rather than diminishes from the simultaneous fixity of experience; the perceptual 
faith, resounding like a clarion cry for a positivist metaphysics of presence, in fact 
undermines certainty. "We see the things themselves, the world is what we see" but it 
is also true that we never totally grasp the things and that the world retains realms that 
will never be made visible to us (VI, 3). 
' Welty, `Reality in Chekhov's Stories', pp. 61-81 (p. 63). 
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All three of these writers are, in one way or another, trying to write the force of the 
invisible depth of perceptual experience; to transmute into form the formless, powerful 
pull that binds us to one another and to the world. "The words follow the contours of 
some continuous relationship between what can be told and what cannot be told, to be 
in the silence of reading the lightest of the hammers that tap their way along this side 
of chaos. "2 Whether this unrelatable chaos emerges as a dreadful or a wondrous thing, 
its irruption onto the plane of expression is never less than strange; in being brought 
into flesh, it strikes that particular nerve we call uncanny. The uncanny is in one sense 
characterised precisely by these feelings of dissolution, confusion, and loss; by the 
force of the inchoateness that this writing circles around. But equally, the uncanny is 
only uncanny because something has survived, is surviving. "The more wars there are, 
I suppose, the more we shall learn how to be survivors, " ponders Bowen's heroine in 
The Heat of the Day (HD, 307). All three writers were exposed to violent conflict at 
varying levels from the personal to the global, each had to face the question of what 
shape survival might take at a practical level. The idea of the unfinished is therefore 
also something that is historically grounded. In Bowen's evocation of a blank, deserted 
post-war landscape, for example, we see the legacy of what has been left unfinished 
emerging as a threat. All three of these writers are faced with the question of how to 
fulfil the role of survivors, both of a history riddled with imminent mortal danger and 
also of a cultural movement to which they all came late. 
That movement is one that is frequently charged with a failure to engage with its own 
historical moment, removed from the world of human dramas. But the intimate 
connection of embodied consciousness to the material world that Merleau-Ponty, 
Bowen and Welty employ imposes upon subjectivity the weighted role of historical 
agency. "Because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning, and we cannot 
do or say anything without its acquiring a name in history" (POP, xxii). Bowen and 
Welty's writing investigates this engagement with history at the smallest levels of that 
"doing or saying anything", exploring the ways people have of living together, a 
business that is itself balanced between loving and surviving. There is a sense that 
although one's individual experience is unavoidably affected by the wider world 
in 
2 Welty, `Words into Fiction' (1965), in EYE, pp. 134-145 (p. 143) 
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which it takes place, it is nonetheless to be protected from the depersonalizing 
colonization of general or collective identities. Both novelists narrate various 
withdrawals from the social realm, demonstrating a shared reverence for privacy. 
Welty defends the "personal and particular" against the encroachment of public 
political discourses, of the State and its generalizing narratives. Bowen outlines the 
limits that need to be respected within individual relationships, and highlights the 
dangers of an unthinking accession to the dissolving tendencies of the crowd. 
Both Welty and Bowen are deeply concerned for the historical and political world 
around them, but both shy away from a direct involvement, choosing instead to 
approach the political through the personal, through an examination of what Merleau- 
Ponty calls "ways of loving, living and dying" (HT, xiv). The domestic sphere is 
imagined as the site on which the battle against the ever-present spectre of Fascism 
must be played out. In The Heat of the Day the necessity of this battle is made explicit. 
Robert's betrayal of his country in favour of a lazy kind of Fascism is presented as a 
reaction to precisely that domestic sphere, born out of a frustration with the cold, bland 
mediocrity of the British middle-classes. This is the real, historical consequence of the 
vacuum whose spectre haunts Bowen's work; the inchoate may provide creative 
potential, but there is as much chance that it will go to the bad as to the good. As 
Merleau-Ponty points out: "We cannot even exclude in principle the possibility that 
humanity, like a sentence which does not succeed in drawing to a close, will suffer a 
shipwreck on its way" (MA, 108). 
The question of surviving also takes on a significance beyond the historical; it is not 
only a question of having escaped history's violent permutations with one's life, but 
also ontological and aesthetic, embedded within the heart of experience and 
expression. Conscious, rational, civilized being emerges from, is plumped out by a 
brute being, a pre-cognitive, primordial layer. We see this in Merleau-Ponty's "silence 
of primary consciousness", in Welty's turn to myth and fairytale forms and symbols, 
and in Bowen's awareness of society's latent "lunatic giant", "of the primeval impulses 
battering at the bastions of modernity". 3 The writer or artist is also always haunted by 
the unfinished business of their formative years; "the aesthetic is nothing but a return 
3 Ellmann, p. 5 
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to images that will allow nothing to take their place" 4; "the writer cannot help the 
material of his fiction. That is, he cannot help where and when he happened to be 
born' 
.5 Crucially though, this persistence of origins, the power of the enforced return 
does not preclude or paralyse creativity; rather, the aesthetic or imaginative effort 
provides a means by which to creatively transmute this nostalgic impulse. This is why 
Bowen's wartime stories "act as releases"; they channel the "something enormous and 
inchoate", that level of the primordial, unconscious experience and give it form (DL, 
196). 
The writer's task is also the task of the phenomenologist, charged with making sense 
of an experience already given to us in perception, in a way that is both interpretive 
and creative. This duality becomes clear if we recognise the uncanny element of 
survival, of an unfinished task. On the one hand, in surviving finality, unity, is 
constantly deferred; the end of the story is never reached. But on the other, it also 
counters the immanent, chancy, unstable connotations of the inchoate. Survival 
suggests some original, authentic event; it provides the idea of a beginning (albeit an 
ultimately unreachable one) at the same time that it denies the satisfaction of an 
ending. To be a survivor, to write as a survivor, is to be faced with the task of both 
remembering the world that was and making the world anew. The tension between 
these two tasks is the ambiguity at the heart of the legacy in Bowen's The Heat of the 
Day: "In the hope that he may care in his own way to carry on the old tradition" (HD, 
83). 
In this legacy we see, resolved into some sort of coexistence, the tension that I 
identified in my introduction between things seen and solipsistic consciousness. The 
world is given to us, but we also take hold of it, we both perceive it and represent it to 
ourselves, the interpretative act of disclosure is also a creative act of expression; the 
one is inherent in the other. As Welty puts it in another context: "a society that no 
longer writes novels is not very likely to read any novels at all. ,6 This also brings us 
back to discussions of modernism and postmodernism, touched on in my introduction, 
4 Bowen, `Out of a Book', pp. 48-53 (p. 53). 
5 Welty, `Words into Fiction', pp. 134-145 (p. 141). 
6 Welty, `Words into Fiction', pp. 134-145 (p. 134). 
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as differentiated along the lines of the epistemological and the ontological, between 
reading the world and writing the world. Structured by a relation of reversibility, we 
have seen how the writing of Merleau-Ponty, Welty and Bowen moves beyond this 
distinction, finding meaning, art, expression at the points where thinking and being, 
ideas and things meet. "It is the things themselves, from the depth of their silence, that 
[philosophy] wishes to bring to expression, " writes Merleau-Ponty (VI, 4). But this 
expression is more than a transcript of an impassive observation. `Expression is like a 
step taken in the fog - no one can say where, if anywhere it will lead' 7; the "leap in the 
dark is exactly what writers write fiction for in order to try" .g 
Even as it brings us back 
to the things themselves, the world we think we know, expression demands that we let 
go of our hold on it, step into shadow; confront the vacuum of "the blank white page. " 
9 
Merleau-Ponty recognizes this approach to creativity, as something both grounded and 
open-ended, in the hermeneutic structure of psychoanalysis. "Psychoanalysis does not 
make freedom impossible; it teaches us to think of this freedom concretely, as a 
creative repetition of ourselves, always, in retrospect, faithful to ourselves [... ] We 
never get away from our lives. "10 This faithfulness to oneself, this never getting away 
from oneself, is one's "style of being", a style that inflects everything, from one's 
treatment of others, to one's politics to the art that one creates. It is what connects the 
shapes made at the level of the ways people love each other, at the level of the ways 
people see objects and make objects. In The Optimist's Daughter, Welty presented us 
with a world styled through the lens of one particular life. It is only in retrospect that 
we see that styling for what it is, that we recognize the faithfulness of its focus to the 
memories, the experiences, the perspective of one person. 
But style must also be understood beyond the level of the individual; indeed, through it 
the poles of individuality and generality are broken down. "For fiction, ideally, is 
highly personal but objective. It is something which only you can write but which is 
not, necessarily, about you. Style, I think, is whatever it is in the prose which has 
'' Merleau-Ponty, Preface to SNS, pp. 3-5 (p. 3). 
8 Welty, `Words into Fiction', pp. 134-145 (p. 134). 
9 Bowen, `Lost Art of Living', [p. 2]. 
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constantly pressed to give the writing its objectivity. "11 Style, or to give it another 
name, the flesh is "midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea", 
between being and Being, existence and thought (VI, 139). It is what connects us to 
others, what makes my vision compatible with and expressible to others; "the `private 
worlds' communicate, [... ] each of them is given to its incumbent as a variant of one 
common world" (VI, 11). In Bowen's writing, we saw this communicative power of 
the flesh extend beyond the realms of linguistic or gestural expression and take on a 
telepathic, haunting quality: "extinct senses were present in lights and forms" (BC, 
451). 
Style is never just about aesthetic issues, but an expression of how we engage with the 
world, how we meet with others, how we leave our imprint upon history. "Having 
looked back at them steadily" Bowen writes of her ancestors, "I begin to notice, if I 
cannot define, the pattern they unconsciously went to make. And I can see that pattern 
has its relation to the outside more definite pattern of history" (BC, 452). This intimate 
connection between historical being and form brings us back to the intimate 
connection between consciousness and painting. Returning again and again to the 
notion of shape, both in being and creating, these writers think through ontological 
questions within a poetics of vision, a pictorial paradigm. To be conscious is to 
articulate space, "to have a figure on a ground" (VI, 197). Consciousness is a searching 
for pattern; "For a main trait of human nature is its amorphousness [... ] There results 
an obsessive wish to acquire outline, to be unmistakably demarcated, to take shape. 
Shape - shape is the desideratum" (PC, 58-59). It is, however, ultimately through 
prose, versed in the techniques and preoccupations of a more imagistic medium, that 
this work obtains towards this shape. "It seems to me that often when I write I am 
trying to make words do the work of line and colour [... ] Much (and perhaps the best) 
of my writing is verbal painting. "12 Words must undertake the articulation, the 
manipulation of experience that returns to us the shape emergent within it; "To regain 
realization, we need expression. "13 
10 Merleau-Ponty, `Cezanne's Doubt', pp. 9-25 (p. 25). 
i' Welty, 'Words into Fiction', pp. 134-145 (p. 142). 
12 Bowen, cited in Glendinning, p. 41. 
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But as we have seen, again and again, the moment of realization is always in some way 
the moment of destruction; we see exposed "at the moment that life is threatened, the 
underlying movement through which we have installed ourselves in the world" (VI, 
104). Expression is precisely this paradoxical movement between attainment and loss; 
it is the movement of reaching towards the blind-spot at the heart of experience. 
What is hazardous in literary communication, or ambiguous and 
irreducible to a single theme in all the great works of an, is not a 
provisional weakness of literature which we could hope to overcome. It 
is the price we must pay to have a conquering language which, instead 
of limiting itself to pronouncing what we already know, introduces us to 
new experiences and to perspectives that can never be ours, so that in 
the end language destroys our prejudices [... ] Just as our body guides us 
among things only on the condition that we stop analyzing it in order to 
use it, so literary language can say new things only with the condition 
that we make common cause with it, that we stop examining its origins 
in order to follow where it is going" (PW, 90). 
At the moment that one confronts the "blank white page", at the extended height of 
expression's "leap in the dark", presence emerges; within expression, we succeed in 
"living now". 14 The present is knitted out of a creative reinvention of what has been; 
the means to create anew is already given, in the same way that the potential for new 
perceptions is guaranteed by the same body that brought us the old ones. The writer 
looks both back and forward; to truly "live now" is to engage with the power of the 
unfinished, to allow both the memory of what is past and the potential of what may 
come to haunt one. 
"What's unfinished haunts one" (HD, 310); "Our world, as Malebranche said, is an 
'unfinished task"' (PRO, 6); "it was tantalizing never to be exposed long enough to 
hear the end" (OWB, 14). What is unfinished is the occupation of now, an occupation 
that takes place through a continuous creative expression. This expression is the means 
13Bowen, `Subject and the Time', p. 2. 
14 Bowen, `Subject and the Time', p. 1. 
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by which we install ourselves in the world, float ourselves between the chaos of 
disarticulated unconsciousness and the self-conscious "purity of principles". It is how 
we manage to reconcile our idea of ourselves as a private individual and a historical 
agent, how we both take control of telling our own story and succumb to the dangers 
of releasing that story to the world. 
There can be speech (and in the end personality) only for an "I" which 
contains the germ of a depersonalization. Speaking and listening not 
only presupposes thought but - even more essential, for it is practically 
the foundation of thought - the capacity to allow oneself to be pulled 
down and rebuilt again by the other person before one, by others who 
may come along, and in principle by anyone (PW, 19-20). 
A perpetual movement between being "pulled down and rebuilt again", between the 
inchoate and the formed, between the personal and the depersonalized, expression is 
the unfinished movement of creation. Through various means, from a philosophy of 
flesh to fiction, Merleau-Ponty, Welty and Bowen undertake an expression of the 
ongoing emergence of the world, of living, of history, intertwining forms of being with 
forms of showing. Through their work, we glimpse the "strangest fantasy" that is 
survival. "If creations are not permanent acquisitions, it is not just that, like all things, 
they pass away: it is also that they have almost their entire lives before them" (EM 
149). 
*** 
Considering her own relation to literary history, Bowen claims: 
I've never belonged to any group. I was thinking about the great elder 
group, to me, the people in Bloomsbury. I think they were not wielding 
particular power, but they were creating influence. I wouldn't say my 
generation were so much of a group and, so far as we worked our way 
along, that Graham Greene, or Evelyn Waugh or Henry Green or 
Rosamund Lehmann have a certain prestige and influence; but I 
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wouldn't say that the establishment consisted of the novelists who were 
at work so much as the critics and the circle which they create. " 
Welty also resisted the attempts, touched on in Chapter Four, to place her work in a 
critically designated context. Questioned about her relation to Southern tradition, in 
particular to other Southern women writers such as Carson McCullers and Flannery 
O'Connor, Welty responds: "It intimidates me so, that anyone wants me to speak for a 
culture. I'll leave that to those other girls, and they can't speak now [... ] I don't know 
why we are combined, except that we are all females and come from south of the 
Mason-Dixon Line. "16 Similarly, she comments: "Of course, in Mississippi they 
always say, `What about you and Faulkner? ' It was just a coincidence that we lived 
there. I am happy I came from the same place, but I can't see any other connection. " 17 
Whilst they distance themselves from any particular contemporary group as writers, 
both Welty and Bowen place themselves firmly at the heart of a literary community as 
readers. They were both avid readers of their literary peers, sharing a love for Henry 
Green, Virginia Woolf, Katherine Mansfield, V. S. Pritchett, as well of course for one 
another's work. Again and again, however, Welty and Bowen express their intimate 
connection to writers of an earlier generation, a group to which they are belated 
members. Charles Dickens, Gustave Flaubert, Sheridan Le Fanu, Rider Haggard, 
Henry James, Marcel Proust, E. M. Forster, Jane Austen, Anton Chekhov, Ivan 
Turgenev, are some key figures which both writers, to varying degrees, cite repeatedly 
as major influences. Of these, Proust and James have featured most explicitly in the 
present work, surfacing as ghostly echoes in all of the writing studied. However, it has 
not been my project here to focus directly on the impact of this literary heritage on the 
work of either writer. There is certainly the potential to begin such an intertextual 
is Bowen, `Frankly Speaking: Interview with Elizabeth Bowen by John Bowen, William Craig, W. N. 
Ewer' (1959) [transcript of an audio recording. Broadcast 16 March 1960. Unpublished], HRHRC, [p. 
51. 
16 Welty, in `Eudora Welty', an Interview with Charles Ruas (1980), in More Conversations with 
Eudora Welty ed. Peggy Whitman Prenshaw (Jackson MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1996), pp. 
58-68 (pp. 60-61). 
17 Welty, `Eudora Welty', an Interview with Charles Ruas, pp. 58-68 (p. 60). 
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conversation on a wider scale than I have chosen; something that would provide much 
material for future study. 
With regard to my own interests, though, I understand the litany of famous writers to 
whom both women express such an ardent attachment less as a direct or conscious 
source of influence, but as a certain atmosphere, a certain climate of thought or 
imagination. As well as the writers that she admires, Welty stresses the importance of 
an oral tradition of myths, folk stories and the conversations of the adults going on 
around her as a child. Bowen and Welty also share a sense of the importance of a 
sensual education, the physical experiences of childhood, the attachment to places and 
to people. Like this sensual "natal climate", the writers who influence Bowen and 
Welty are like the imprint of a well-known landscape on the contours of one's 
perception. 18 Or, perhaps, it is as though these literary giants took on the role of their 
fairytale counterparts, their works forming an environment as inseparable from the 
motions of creative thought as are the patterns of childhood fairy tales. Both writers 
admit that whilst influence, the effects of reading are what drive the urge to write in the 
beginning, a development of authorial maturity coincides with a moving beyond these 
early influences. The writer, Bowen suggests, at first undergoes some kind of 
"apprenticeship" in the shadow of their literary heroes. 
Throughout his oscillations from style to style, his experiments in 
manner after manner, the writer is making his own growth. At the same 
time, he will have absorbed something; and he will continue to owe 
something to his place as a link in art's continuity. As he reaches 
maturity, and himself tends to become an influence, he in his turn will 
be transmitting something - there is an honourable, nay, necessary 
artistic heredity. As to literary influence, we may leave it that only 
uncertain talent stifles during this phase: the stamp of 
inherent 
originality is that sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, 
it must 
emerge. 19 
18 Bowen, `Out of a Book', pp. 48-53 (p. 49). 
19 Bowen, `Sources of Influence', Afterthought, pp. 205-209 (p. 207). 
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The writer "himself tends to become an influence", or as Merleau-Ponty has it: "the 
writer is himself a new kind of idiom, constructing itself, inventing ways of 
expression, and diversifying itself according to its own meaning" (PRO, 9). The writer 
may grow out of the soil of her influences, but it is her task to transform them into 
something completely new. 
However, as the sense of "an honourable [... ] artistic heredity", of being "a link in 
art's continuity" suggests, even whilst the author must forge an original path she must 
remain aware of her historical and cultural context. However "solitary and farouche" 
Bowen may actually have been, however isolated in the depths of Mississippi Welty 
have found herself, both forged strong ties to their contemporary culture (WHY, 23). 
As we have seen throughout the present study, this culture is one in transition, both in 
terms of history and artistic practice. Coming at a moment when both history and an 
earlier, more cohesive modernist avant-garde were unravelling, these writers inherit an 
uncertain legacy, one that we saw echoed in The Heat of the Day: "In the hope that he 
may care in his own way to carry on the old tradition" (HD, 83). Indeed, what 
produces some of the most extraordinary effects in Bowen and Welty's writing is this 
carrying on of an old tradition, one that both precedes and encompasses modernism's 
breakages, in the face of a culture that is rattling into post-war modernity, "the 
`modernity' which modernism prophesied", at breakneck speed. 20 Particularly in 
Bowen, whose status as one of the most skilled literary stylists of her century is rapidly 
growing, we see the stuccoed patterns of an older idiom contorted and stretched to 
accommodate the demands of a much less ordered contemporary life. As Hermione 
Lee suggests, "[w]hat's most extraordinary (and often very disconcerting) about her 
work is that she applies supremely stylish and crafty fictional methods to a treatment 
of chaotic, unmanageable, even incommunicable experience". 
21 
The present to which the writers in my study respond is one that, for the most part, 
lacks an earlier fervour for movements and manifestos. Looking back, its emergence is 
perhaps best described less as a transition than as a dissolution. In the midst of a 
collapse of one kind of certainty, all three write with a phenomenological impulse, 
20 Clark, p. 2. 
Z1 Lee, p. 3. 
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dissecting worlds they know. As Said wrote of Merleau-Ponty, through this work "one 
is readmitted from distraction to one's own experience". 22 I would suggest that Bowen 
and Welty's turn to the authors with whom they had developed a lifelong intimacy as 
readers is another manifestation of this phenomenological impulse. Acutely aware of 
the persistence of origins, their examinations of the present moment also look to the 
footprints that the present has left on its way here. They recognize the value of 
retrospection to any attempt to "live now". 23 As with Merleau-Ponty, the manner in 
which the familiar world is revealed is a creative one; retrospection is not the same as 
nostalgia. In their fiction, Bowen and Welty undertake the work of the poet who 
"melts ordinary language", and for whom "the disorder is always another order. It is a 
new system of equivalences which demands this upheaval and not just any one, and it 
is in the name of a truer relation among things that their ordinary ties are broken" (PW, 
63-4). 
In placing these three writers together, making them a genealogy of their own, I have 
tried to go some way towards doing what Merleau-Ponty describes. Here, through "this 
upheaval", in the web of interrelations between Bowen, Welty and Merleau-Ponty, 
there is "a new system of equivalences. " Through the uncovering of these points of 
contact, through exploring the ways that these writers echo one another's strangeness, I 
have discovered new ways of reading them. I have also opened up new possibilities for 
future discussions of all three, new contexts from which those discussions can draw 
and to which these writers can add. Following their example, I want to finish with the 
idea of this "unfinished task"; something that I hope may outlive the limits of my own 
ending. 
22 Said, pp. 1-14 (pp. 5-6). 
23 Bowen, The Cult of Nostalgia', p. 1. 
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